Presentation on theme: "An Introduction to Safety Management System (SMS)"— Presentation transcript:
1An Introduction to Safety Management System (SMS) Safety PolicySafety Risk ManagementSafety AssuranceSafety Promotion
2Outline Fundamentals of Safety Safety Management System Concept of SafetyEvolution of Safe ThinkingAccident CausationOrganizational AccidentPeople, Context & Safety – SHELErrors & ViolationsOrganizational CultureSafety InvestigationFundamentals of SafetySafety Management SystemComponents of SMSLegislationSummary
3Outline Fundamentals of Safety Safety Management System Components of SMSLegislationSummarySafety StereotypeManagement DilemmaNeed for Safety ManagementStrategies for Safety ManagementImperative of ChangeBuilding Blocks – SMSResponsibilities of Managing Safety
4Outline Fundamentals of Safety Safety Management System Components of SMSLegislationSummarySafety PolicySafety Risk ManagementSafety PromotionSafety Assurance
5The Concept of SafetyZero accidents or serious incidents — a view widely held by the travelling public;Freedom from hazards, i.e. those factors which cause or are likely to cause harm;Attitudes of employees of aviation organizations towards unsafe acts and conditions;Error avoidance; andRegulatory compliance.
6What is Safety?The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.
7Evolution of Safety Thinking Traditional Approach:Focus on outcomes (causes)Unsafe acts by operational personnelAssign blame/punish for failure to “perform safety”Address identified safety concern exclusivelyIdentifies:WHAT? WHO? WHEN?But not always disclose:WHY? HOW?
8Evolution of Safety Thinking TECHNICAL FACTORSTODAYHUMAN FACTORSORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS1950s1970s1990s2000
21Errors vs. Violations General types of violations: Situational violations occur due to the particular factors that exist at the time, such as time pressure or high workload.Routine violations are violations which have become “the normal way of doing business” within a workgroup.Organization-induced violations, which can be viewed as an extension of routine violations. The full potential of the safety message that violations can convey can be understood only when considered against the demands imposed by the organization regarding the delivery of the services for which the organization was created.
22Understanding Violations Errors vs. ViolationsRegulationsAccidentTechnologyHighIncidentSystem’s production objectivesTrainingViolation SpaceExceptional violation SpaceRISKSafety SpaceLowMinimumSYSTEM OUTPUTMaximumUnderstanding Violations
24Organizational Culture Organizational literature proposes three characterizations of organizations, depending on how they respond to information on hazards and safety information management: a) pathological — hide the information; b) bureaucratic — restrain the information; and c) generative — value the information.
25Organizational Culture National culture differentiates the national characteristics and value systems of particular nations.Professional culture differentiates the characteristics and value systems of particular professional groupsOrganizational culture differentiates the characteristics and value systems of particular organizations
27Effective Safety Reporting Effective safety reporting builds upon certain basic attributes, such as: a) Senior management places strong emphasis on hazard identification as part of the strategy for the management of safety; b) Senior management and operational personnel hold a realistic view of the hazards faced by the organization’s service delivery activities; c) Senior management defines the operational requirements needed to support active hazard reporting, ensures that key safety data are properly registered, demonstrates a receptive attitude to the reporting of hazards by operational personnel and implements measures to address the consequences of hazards;
28Effective Safety Reporting d) Senior management ensures that key safety data are properly safeguarded and promotes a system of checks and); e) Personnel are formally trained to recognize and report hazards and understand the incidence and consequences of hazards in the activities supporting delivery of services; and f) There is a low incidence of hazardous behaviour, and a safety ethic which discourages such behaviour.
29Effective Safety Reporting – 5 basic traits InformationPeople are knowledgeable about the human, technical and organizational factors that determine the safety of the system as a wholeFlexibilityPeople can adapt reporting when facing unusual circumstances, shifting from the established mode to a direct mode thus allowing information to quickly reach the appropriate decision-making levelWillingnessPeople are willing to report their errors and experiencesEffective safety ReportingLearningPeople have the competence to draw conclusions from safety information systems and the will to implement major reformsAccountabilityPeople are encouraged (and rewarded) for providing essential safety-related information. However, there is a clear line that differentiates between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour
30Safety Investigation to put losses behind; to reassert trust and faith in the system;to resume normal activities; andto fulfil political purposes.
31Safety InvestigationSafety investigation for improved system reliability:to learn about system vulnerability;to develop strategies for change; andto prioritize investment of safety resources.
32Outline Fundamentals of Safety Safety Management System Components of SMSLegislationSummarySafety StereotypeManagement DilemmaNeed for Safety ManagementStrategies for Safety ManagementImperative of ChangeBuilding Blocks – SMSResponsibilities of Managing Safety
33Safety Stereotype The safety stereotype: safety first vs. safety is an organizational processSafety is not first priority in aviationsafety is just organizational process.
34Management DilemmaDilemma of 2 P’s:ProductionProtection
38Need for Safety Management Major air disaster are rareIncidents occur more frequentlyIgnoring the major could lead to an increase number of more serious accidentsMinor-major accident
39Need for Safety Management Minor-major accidentEconomics of SafetyAccidents cost moneyInsurance can help but not allThere are many uninsured costLost of confidence of the travelling public
40Need for Safety Management Minor-major accidentEconomics of SafetyPublics perceived safety while travelingPrerequisite for a sustainable aviation business
41Strategies for Safety Management Baseline performanceSystem DesignTrainingTechnologyRegulationsOperational deploymentOperational performanceSource: Scott A. SnookThe practical drift
42Strategies for Safety Management ReactiveProactivePredictive
43Strategies for Safety Management Reactive methodThe reactive method responds to events that have already happened, such as incidents and accidentsProactive methodThe proactive method looks actively for the identification of safety risks through the analysis of the organization’s activitiesPredictive methodThe predictive method captures system performance as it happens in real-time normal operations to identify potential future problems
44Strategies for Safety Management Safety management levelsHighMiddleLowHazardsPredictiveProactiveReactiveReactiveFDADirect observation systemsASRSurvey AuditsASRMORAccident and incident reportsHighly efficientVery efficientEfficientInsufficientDesirable management levelsHighStrategies – Levels of intervention and tools
45Imperative of Change The management of change Aircraft and Equipment are changing overtimeHazards that are by product of changeChange can introduce new hazardFormal Process for the Management of changeCritically of system and activitiesStability of systems and operational environmentPast performance
46Imperative of ChangeThe traditional safety paradigm relied on the accident/serious incident investigation process as its main safety intervention and method, and it was built upon three basic assumptions: a) The aviation system performs most of the time as per design specifications (i.e. baseline performance); b) Regulatory compliance guarantees system baseline performance and therefore ensures safety (compliance-based); and c) Because regulatory compliance guarantees system baseline performance, minor, largely inconsequential deviations during routine operations (i.e. processes) do not matter, only major deviations leading to bad consequences (i.e. outcomes) matter (outcome oriented).
47Imperative of ChangeIt is based on the notion of managing safety through process control, beyond the investigation of occurrences, and it builds upon three basic assumptions also: a) The aviation system does not perform most of the time as per design specifications (i.e. operational performance leads to the practical drift); b) Rather than relying on regulatory compliance exclusively, real- time performance of the system is constantly monitored (performance-based); and c) Minor, inconsequential deviations during routine operations are constantly tracked and analysed (process oriented).
488 Building Blocks - SMSSenior Management’s commitment to the management of safetyEffective safety reportingContinuous monitoringInvestigation of safety occurrencesSharing safety lessons learned and best practicesIntegration of safety training for operational personnelEffective implementation of standard operating procedures (SOP’s)Continuous improvement of the overall level of safety
494 Responsibilities of Managing Safety The responsibilities for managing safety can be grouped into four generic and basic areas, as follows:Definition of policies and procedures regarding safety. Policies and procedures are organizational mandates reflecting how senior management wants operations to be conducted.Allocation of resources for safety management activities. Managing safety requires resources. The allocation of resources is a managerial function.Adoption of best industry practices. The tradition of aviation regarding safety excellence has led to the continuous development of robust safety practices. Aviation has, in addition, a tradition regarding exchange of safety information through both institutional and informal channels.
504 Responsibilities of Managing Safety d) Incorporation of regulations governing civil aviation safety. There will always be a need for a regulatory framework as the bedrock for safety management endeavours. In fact, sensible safety management can develop only from sensible regulations.
51SummaryIn summary, safety management: a) includes the entire operation; b) focuses on processes, making a clear differentiation between processes and outcomes; c) is data-driven; d) involves constant monitoring; e) is strictly documented; f) aims at gradual improvement as opposed to dramatic change; and g) is based on strategic planning as opposed to piecemeal initiatives.