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Protecting People and Things Different But the Same DYCOR USA Special Applications Division.

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Presentation on theme: "Protecting People and Things Different But the Same DYCOR USA Special Applications Division."— Presentation transcript:

1 Protecting People and Things Different But the Same DYCOR USA Special Applications Division

2 Background We cannot protect everything, all the time, against every threat We cannot protect everything, all the time, against every threat Our ability to protect is a function of time, place, determination, design, and circumstances Our ability to protect is a function of time, place, determination, design, and circumstances Protective strategies cannot be static, they must evolve as the threat evolves Protective strategies cannot be static, they must evolve as the threat evolves Our ability to protect is diminished by a “rule based” mentality Our ability to protect is diminished by a “rule based” mentality

3 Primary Threats Intentional acts Intentional acts Terrorists / Insiders / Criminals Terrorists / Insiders / Criminals Methods of attack Methods of attack Explosives / Contamination Explosives / Contamination

4 Targets Government buildings Government buildings Commercial buildings Commercial buildings Infrastructure facilities Infrastructure facilities Transportation hubs Transportation hubs Public venues Public venues

5 Facility Dynamics Changes in population and concentration over a given period of time Changes in population and concentration over a given period of time Generally predictable Generally predictable Can be studied and analyzed Can be studied and analyzed Exploitable for attack Exploitable for attack Commuter operations Commuter operations Workplace arrival and departure Workplace arrival and departure Gathering places Gathering places Security queuing areas Security queuing areas

6 Facility Population Dynamics

7 Explosive Threats VERY SMALL SMALL MEDIUM LARGE VERY LARGE EXTRA LARGE ,000 5,000 40,000 LETTER PIPE BOMB HIDDEN BRIEFCASE PIPE BOMB BOX HAVERSACK HIDDEN LARGE BOX CAR PICKUP VAN EXPLOSIVE SIZE CAR VAN PICKUP VAN TRUCK LARGE TRUCK SEMI TRUCK LBS TNT OPM/SANG (5)) METHOD OF IMPLACEMENT WORLD TRADE CENTER OK CITY (168) KHOBAR TOWERS (19) BEIRUT (241) TYPICAL LETTER BOMBS PIPE BOMBS PAN AM 103 (274) ATLANTA (1)

8 Personal Injury From Blast > 80% of injuries from a blast are caused by impact from objects, especially flying glass

9 PRESSURE 800 psi. YIELD (  TNT Equiv.)20,000 lb.YIELD (  TNT Equiv.)4000 lb. STANDOFF 80 feetSTANDOFF 15 feet PRESSURE 9600 psi. Standoff vs. Effect 19 dead 168 dead

10 Blast Analysis – Personnel Range to Effects

11 Blast Analysis – Personnel Protective Standoff

12 Blast Analysis – Structural Response Structural response can be modeled and estimated for a specific explosive threat

13 Protective Strategies - Blast Standoff – standoff – standoff !! Standoff – standoff – standoff !! Distance = protection from a blast event Distance = protection from a blast event Restrict vehicle traffic around the facility Restrict vehicle traffic around the facility Re-route deliveries, inspect vehicles Re-route deliveries, inspect vehicles Enforce restriction with barriers and landscaping Enforce restriction with barriers and landscaping

14 Protective Strategies - Blast Establish sacrificial space in the facility Establish sacrificial space in the facility Move critical operations away from the most accessible and vulnerable areas Move critical operations away from the most accessible and vulnerable areas Threat Before After Mission Support Public access Mission Critical Utilities

15 Protective Strategies - Blast Identify structural elements that could be exploited in an attack Identify structural elements that could be exploited in an attack

16 Protective Strategies - Blast Observe personnel flow and concentration Observe personnel flow and concentration Building design and facility functions channel traffic Building design and facility functions channel traffic Open facility earlier, use more entrances if possible Open facility earlier, use more entrances if possible Stagger employee work hours Stagger employee work hours Minimize exposure time in non-secure areas Minimize exposure time in non-secure areas Anticipate crowds – assign sufficient security resources to minimize processing delays Anticipate crowds – assign sufficient security resources to minimize processing delays Improve structural and physical security in areas where people congregate Improve structural and physical security in areas where people congregate Install fragment retention film or blast curtains to reduce glass injuries Install fragment retention film or blast curtains to reduce glass injuries Consider use of visual obscuration (reflective film on windows) Consider use of visual obscuration (reflective film on windows) Splinter protection barriers Splinter protection barriers

17 Contamination Threats Chemical Chemical Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) Lethal agents (Sarin) Lethal agents (Sarin) Biological (Anthrax) Biological (Anthrax) Radiological (Radium) Radiological (Radium) Delivery methods Delivery methods Aerial dispersal (aerosol cloud) Aerial dispersal (aerosol cloud) Contact (mail, package) Contact (mail, package) Manually placed Manually placed By-product of explosion By-product of explosion

18 Damages - Contamination Effects on personnel Effects on personnel Depends on agent and amount of exposure Depends on agent and amount of exposure Physical effects show in seconds to days Physical effects show in seconds to days Death Death Protracted illness Protracted illness Unable to return to work Unable to return to work Effects on facilities Effects on facilities Widespread contamination possible Widespread contamination possible Lengthy decontamination process Lengthy decontamination process Loss of use / service Loss of use / service Financial disaster (Est. $42 M USD – Hart Bldg.) Financial disaster (Est. $42 M USD – Hart Bldg.)

19 Contamination Analysis – Material Transport Computer models Computer models Exterior environment Exterior environment HPAC (Hazard Prediction & Assessment Capability) HPAC (Hazard Prediction & Assessment Capability) Can run with predicted or actual weather information Can run with predicted or actual weather information Interior environment Interior environment Limited availability Limited availability Labor intensive Labor intensive Material specific Material specific Composition Composition Amount Amount Persistence Persistence

20 Vulnerabilities - Contamination Location Location Proximity or downwind to hazardous production or storage sites and transportation routes Proximity or downwind to hazardous production or storage sites and transportation routes Air handling Air handling Fresh air intakes located near ground level Fresh air intakes located near ground level Limited filtration capabilities (large particulates) Limited filtration capabilities (large particulates) Multiple air handling systems without central control Multiple air handling systems without central control Limited or no hazard sensing capability Limited or no hazard sensing capability Package and mail handling Package and mail handling Direct deliveries to lobby and other public access areas Direct deliveries to lobby and other public access areas Poor inspection and isolation protocols Poor inspection and isolation protocols No inspection of personal items No inspection of personal items Limited situational awareness (warning & procedures) Limited situational awareness (warning & procedures)

21 Protective Strategies - Contamination Know your neighborhood Know your neighborhood Check with government & commercial sources Check with government & commercial sources Fire Department Fire Department Emergency planning & permitting agencies Emergency planning & permitting agencies Railroad and trucking companies Railroad and trucking companies Research material hazard data Research material hazard data Understand general properties Understand general properties Protective methods Protective methods Decontamination issues Decontamination issues

22 Protective Strategies - Contamination Facility improvements Facility improvements Identify location of fresh air intakes Identify location of fresh air intakes Relocate intakes to top of building if possible Relocate intakes to top of building if possible Understand capabilities of air filter units Understand capabilities of air filter units Consider adding additional filtration stages Consider adding additional filtration stages Install master shut-off for all air handling systems Install master shut-off for all air handling systems Isolate/dedicate air handling unit for mail room Isolate/dedicate air handling unit for mail room Determine hazard sensing capability Determine hazard sensing capability Install additional sensing Install additional sensing

23 Protective Strategies - Contamination Procedural improvements Procedural improvements Employ a trans-shipment facility, isolate the mail/package receiving area within the facility Employ a trans-shipment facility, isolate the mail/package receiving area within the facility Establish comprehensive inspection protocols Establish comprehensive inspection protocols Obtain equipment to contain suspicious articles Obtain equipment to contain suspicious articles Obtain materials for immediate decontamination Obtain materials for immediate decontamination Spot inspection of employee personal items Spot inspection of employee personal items 100% inspection of visitor personal items 100% inspection of visitor personal items

24 Protective Strategies - Contamination Crisis operations planning Crisis operations planning Connect to local emergency notification networks Connect to local emergency notification networks Reverse “911” Reverse “911” Establish internal emergency notification procedures Establish internal emergency notification procedures Incorporate contamination events into crisis response planning Incorporate contamination events into crisis response planning Determine capabilities to provide “shelter in place” protection Determine capabilities to provide “shelter in place” protection Consider “urge to flee” response Consider “urge to flee” response Assign assets to secure the facility until cleared to leave Assign assets to secure the facility until cleared to leave

25 Summary The addition of people to any facility complicates the protection process The addition of people to any facility complicates the protection process Effective protection planning depends on an understanding of the environment, facility functions, and population dynamics Effective protection planning depends on an understanding of the environment, facility functions, and population dynamics Reorganization of building space and functions can offer substantial protective benefits Reorganization of building space and functions can offer substantial protective benefits Procedural and facility improvements can greatly enhance personnel security and safety Procedural and facility improvements can greatly enhance personnel security and safety

26 Contact Data Dycor USA, Inc. Corporate Headquarters 401-A Cooley Mill Road Havre de Grace, MD Phone: Fax:


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