1. PHYSICAL SECURITY (NSTISSI 4011)BY
Josef Onuoha
CS 996

2. Outline Goals of Physical Security Perimeter and Building protection
Access Controls
Distributed Processing
Stand-alone Systems and Peripherals
Environment and Life Safety Controls
Tamper Resistance

3. Goals of Physical Security
Prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents
Safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft
Safeguard personnel

4. Perimeter Protection Standoff distance Exclusive Standoff Zone
The maintained distance between where a vehicle bomb is allowed and the target
Exclusive Standoff Zone
Vehicles are not allowed within perimeter unless they have been searched and cleared
Nonexclusive Standoff Zone
Established when a facility or location permits a mixture of trucks and cars.
Includes inner and outer perimeters

5. Perimeter Protection

6. Perimeter Protection Speed Control
Controls the speed of vehicles used for bombs

7. Perimeter Protection
Vehicle barriers

8. Perimeter Protection
Perimeters should also protect against Standoff weapons such as riffles, shot guns, pistols
Primary defense is to obstruct Line Of Sight (LOS) from vantage point outside the site
Use a Predetonation Screen

9. Perimeter Protection

10. Perimeter Protection Surveillance
aggressors remain outside of controlled areas and try to gather information from within those areas
Designers must eliminate or control vantage points from which aggressors can surveil or eavesdrop on assets or operations.
Trees, bushes, fences, other buildings etc

11. Perimeter Protection

12. Perimeter Protection Lighting Staffing
Discourage or deter attempts at entry by intruders.
Prevent glare that may temporarily blind the guards.
Different types
Continuous, standby, movable
Different applications
Entrances, Parking areas, Critical areas
Staffing
Security Guards
Patrols
Dogs

13. Building Protection
A Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) is an accredited area, room, group of rooms, buildings, or installation where Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) may be stored, used, discussed, and/or processed
We now focus on construction requirements of a SCIF

14. Building Protection
Vault Specifications

15. Building Protection Vault Specification (cont)
minimum compressive strength of 3000 psi after 28 days of aging for class A
5/8-inch diameter steel rein- forcing bars laid 6 inches on centers
In seismic areas, 6-inch or thicker RC will be used.

16. Building Protection Walls Floors
The walls will be of either reinforced concrete in excess of four inches thick or solid masonry (stone or brick) in excess of eight inches thick
Floors
The floor and ceiling selected for a Secure Area will be at least a four inch thickness of concrete

17. Building Protection Entrances Windows
A Secure Area will be equipped with a GSA Class 6 vault door
Windows
It is preferable that Secure Area be windowless . Accessible windows, where required, will be secured with bars, installed as specified in the requirements

18. Building Protection Barred Window Specifications for SCIF
Type of Installation
Type A: Requires a steel frame with steel bars welded on it to be bolted to the inside of the facility window frame
Type B: Requires imbedding the ends of steel bars in the masonry window frame of the facility
Type C: Requires a grillwork of steel bars to be imbedded in the masonry walls immediately adjacent to the facility window frame

19. Building Protection Sound Attenuation for SCIF
The SCIF walls, windows, floor and ceiling, including all openings, should provide sufficient sound attenuation to preclude inadvertent disclosure of conversation
Must meet the following SCT:
Executive Suite       45+
Briefing Rooms
Auditoriums

20. Building Protection Telephone Security for SCIF
Telephone cables and wires which penetrate a facility's perimeter will enter the facility through one opening and be placed under control at the interior face of the perimeter
The number of telephone instruments servicing a SCIF will be limited to those operationally necessary

21. Interior Intrusion Detection Systems
Structural vibration sensors
Detects energy due to hammering, drilling, etc
Point sensors
Detects close proximity to an object.
Passive ultrasonic sensors
detect acoustical energy
Volumetric Motion sensors
Detects intruder motion within the interior of a protected volume

22. Exterior Intrusion Detection Systems
Fence sensors
Detects penetration generated by mechanical vibrations and stresses in fence fabric and posts
LOS sensors
generate a beam of energy and detect changes in the received energy that an intruder causes by penetrating the beam.

23. Alarms
Requirements
perimeter doors will be equipped with high security balanced magnetic door switches.
Vault doors will be equipped with heat detectors and balanced magnetic switches.
The interior spaces not continually occupied by authorized personnel will be protected by motion detection alarms.
vents and ducts over six inches will be alarmed.
Windows less than 18 feet from ground level will be alarmed

24. Alarms Types Motion alarm detectors Door Switches
Overt body motion walking through the protected areas at the rate of one step per second for four seconds, in areas protected by ultrasonic, microwave, and other motion detection devices
Door Switches
Actual opening of doors (or windows or other openings using door switches) which are protected by balanced magnetic door switches.

25. Alarms Types (cont) Capacitance Alarms Tamper Switches
Attempts to push hands, arm, or legs through the protected area (air ducts or vents); to touch an item being protected (door, window, wall, etc.); or to move protected objects (security containers).
Tamper Switches
Removal of the covers for sensors, alarm control units, day/night switches, and end of the line supervision control units should cause an alarm regardless of the status of the overall system

26. Physical Access Control
Designate restricted area: Facilitates enforcement

27. Physical Access Control
Locks
Preset Locks and Keys
Typical door looks
Programmable Locks
Mechanical (Cipher Locks)
Electronic (Keypad Systems): Digital Keyboard
Number of Combinations
Number of Digits in Code
Frequency of Code Change

28. Physical Access Control
Cards
Photo-ID cards
Wireless Proximity readers
Magnetic Strip cards
Smart Cards
Often Require Use of PIN Number with Card
Readers: Card Insertion, Card Swipe & Proximity

29. Physical Access Control
DOD Smart Cards (Common Access Cards)

30. Physical Access Control
Biometric Devices
Fingerprint/Thumbprint Scan
Retina Scan
Hand Geometry
Facial Recognition
Voice Verification
Problems
Cost
Speed
Accuracy

31. Physical Access Control
Typical verification times for entry-control devices

32. Physical Access Control
Visitor identification and control
Visitors, Cleaning teams, Civilians in work areas after normal work hours, Government contractors
Personnel
Position Sensitivity Designation
Management Review of Access Lists
Background Screening/Re-Screening
Termination/Transfer Controls
Disgruntled Employees

33. Physical Access Control
Movement Control
Escorts
Two-person rule

34. Distributed Computing
Threats
To Confidentiality
Sharing Computers
Sharing Diskettes
To Availability
User Errors
To Data Integrity
Malicious Code
Version Control

35. Physical security of Distributed Computing
Office Area Controls
Entry Controls
Office Lay-Out
Property controls
Electronic Media Controls
Clean-Desk Policy
Space protection devices
Heat/Humidity considerations

36. Stand-alone Systems and Peripherals
PC Physical Control
Cable locks
Vinyl-covered steel cable anchoring the PC or peripheral to desk
Port controls
Devices that secure data ports (such as USB ports) and prevent their use

37. Stand-alone Systems and Peripherals
PC Physical Control (cont)
Switch Controls
A cover for the on/off switch, which prevents a user from switching off the file server’s power
Peripheral switch controls
Lockable switches that prevent a keyboard from being used
Electronic Security Boards
Boards inserted into an expansion slot in the PC and force a user to enter a password when the unit is booted

38. Environment and Life safety Controls
Environment considerations to physical security include the following
Electric Power
RFI, EMI
Implement TEMPEST
Humidity
Humidity of < 40% increases static elec. Damage potential
Emergency power off controls
Voltage monitoring/recording
Surge protection

39. Environment and Life safety Controls
Electric Power (cont)
Backup power
Backup feeders, UPS
Emergency power generators

40. Environment and Life safety Controls
Temperature
Temperatures When Damage Occurs
Paper Products: 350o
Computer Equipment: 175o
Disks: 150o
Magnetic Media: 100o
Fire detection
Heat-sensing
Flame-actuated
Smoke-actuated
Automatic dial-up fire alarm

41. Environment and Life safety Controls
Fire Extinguishing Systems
Wet pipe
Dry pipe
Deluge
Suppression mediums
Halon
Excellent for vaults, equipment cabinets, etc
Carbon IV Oxide
Great for unattended facilities. Potentially dangerous

42. Information System Centers
Site selection
Low visibility
Low natural disaster threat
Easy access to external services such as police, fire, hospitals, etc

43. Information System Centers
Infrastructure
Servers, switches, routers, should be placed in looked racks and looked rooms
Wiring and cables should be routed through walls, floors, etc to avoid tampering
Uninterrupted power supply should exist for computing facility

44. Tamper Resistance
A device is said to be tamper-resistant if it is difficult to modify or subvert, even for an assailant who has physical access to the system.
Specialized materials used to make tampering difficult
One-way screws, epoxy encapsulation, trox
Closely tied to tamper detection and response

45. Tamper Detection
The ability of a device to sense that it is under physical attack and includes
Switches to detect opening of device covers
Sensors to detect changes in light or pressure within the device
Barrier to detect drilling or penetration of physical boundary
Paint

46. Tamper Response
Tamper Response is the counter measure taken upon the detection of tampering
Ex.: Erase memory, shutdown/disable device, enable logging
This is especially very important in the case of cryptographic keys stolen or lost
Computational errors introduced into a smart card can deduce the values of cryptographic keys hidden in the smart card
layers of a chip can be uncovered by etching, discerning chip behavior by advanced infrared probing, and reverse-engineering chip logic

47. OPSEC
Operations security (OPSEC) is an analytic process used to deny an adversary information - generally unclassified
Trains people on the handling of information
We can apply OPSEC in our daily lives
“What could an adversary glean from the knowledge of this activity?”

48. Resources
Physical Security Requirements For NSA/CSS Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
FM Physical Security, Department of the Army
AR Appendix H Classified document and Material Storage
Smart Card/Common Access Card Program