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Game Protection and Internal Theft

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1 Game Protection and Internal Theft
Slots Game Protection and Internal Theft


3 Slots Protection In today’s world, we have to deal with both the oldest and newest of cheating techniques. In the first part of this presentation, we will deal with old methods, still in operation, for cheating coin-operated gaming devices (slots).

4 Slots Protection We will then phase in, through other, more modern methods of cheating, and end up with Internal Theft in Slots. Be aware that all of these methods, together, demonstrate one thing:

5 Slots Protection No matter what technology is developed, there will always be someone who will try, and probably succeed, in figuring out a way to get around it

6 Slugs

7 Slugs Slugs are poor-quality approximations, cast in lead or other base metal, of a slot-machine token. They will be accepted generally into old or poorly maintained machines. Occasionally the slugger will force a coin acceptor, effectively breaking it, so that it will accept a slug or different denomination coin or token.

8 Slugs Tells: Playing out of Pockets
Coin in from one pocket or bucket and winnings out into another pocket or bucket Rubber-necking Separation of tokens from payouts Coins frequently fall through to tray Catching coins as they fall into the tray Distinctive sound

9 Slugs

10 Slugs

11 Slugs Preventive/Detection Procedures:
Consistent surveillance of slot areas Notification of suspicious players to Surveillance by Slots personnel Hard Count notifies of slugs found in drop Slot floor and techs notify of slugs in machines Fix the coin acceptors

12 Slugs Detection Techniques:
Surveillance coverage & foot patrols by slots and security Look for rubber-necks Establish dedicated coverage of areas being hit Review slots area tapes for suspects

13 Counterfeit Tokens

14 Counterfeit Tokens Tells: Maximum coin in , then cash out credits
Minimal play On-and-off play JDLR Rubber-necking Brings tokens into the casino: plays from pockets or bag, frequently cashes out, never buys tokens Frequent cash-out, but still has tokens to play

15 Counterfeit Tokens Preventive/Detection Procedures
Dedicated coverage of high-action slots Monitor high action players, fills and jackpots Check by tech and hard count of the machines and drop Tighten up or repair the coin acceptors

16 Counterfeit Tokens Detection Techniques
Routinely check high action players Monitor unknown high action players Determine a reason for hopper fills Check in drop buckets of high-action machines

17 Shaved Tokens In coin-operated slot machines, there is a device which counts the coins as they run through the payout chute by counting the number of times a beam of light is interrupted by the passing coins. Shaved tokens do not interrupt this beam on certain types of slot machines. The coins or tokens are reduced in diameter by as little as 3% or as much as 10%

18 Shaved Tokens Coin Chute Light Emitter Light Receiver Standard Token

19 Shaved Tokens Tells: Rubber-necking Sorting coin from payout
Frequent cash-out of tokens, retaining one part of sort Coins frequently fall through to tray Blockers/Distracters Coin out doesn’t match win meter Frequent cash-out of credits Shaved tokens found in drop during weigh/wrap Suspects will catch tokens as they are paid out of machine Brings tokens to the casino but does not buy them

20 Shaved Tokens

21 Shaved Tokens

22 Shaved Tokens Preventive/Detection Procedures:
Hard Count and/or Slots must report unusual sized tokens/coins and/or different denominations found in hopper or drop Slot Dept. must report hopper fills on any machine left unattended Slot Dept. must report any machine filled 3 times within a 24 hour period Tighten up or repair the coin acceptors

23 Shaved Tokens Detection Techniques Observe rubber-neckers
Determine reason for unusual amount of fills Investigate reports of unusual sized coins and/or different denomination coins or tokens Check players who frequently cash-out coin or credits Check payout meter to reel symbols for correct pays

24 Counterfeit Cash

25 Counterfeit Cash No matter what changes the Treasury Department makes in our bills, the counterfeiter is only one very short step behind, especially with today’s computer technology. It is unfortunately very common for people to feed counterfeit bills through dirty or poorly maintained or adjusted bill validators.

26 Counterfeit Cash Tells:
Frequent input of cash, frequent cash-out of credits Minimal and/or no play Player or associate continuously at cage or booth cashing out Unknown player (does not use player card) Will return several times to a machine that accepts counterfeit money

27 Counterfeit Cash Tells: Rubber-necking
Bills will be rejected often, suspect will try same bill repeatedly Counterfeit & good money will be kept separate, bills into validator from one location and bills from cash-out to another. Moves from machine to machine until one is found that will accept the money

28 Preventive Procedures:
Counterfeit Cash Preventive Procedures: Investigate reports of counterfeit bills found by soft count Contact Validator Unit manufacturer for repair/tuning of units Preventive maintenance/cleaning of bill validators

29 Detection Techniques:
Counterfeit Cash Detection Techniques: Review existing recordings to provide a description of suspects Dedicate coverage to machines where bills were found

30 Payout Scams There are a number of other scams that focus on the payout mechanisms of slot machines.

31 Payout Scams Tells: Coin payout meter does not match coin paid out.
Payout does not match symbols on reel Player reaches up into payout chute to place/retrieve device Hoppers found empty or near empty without players present Rubber-necking

32 Optic Devices Coin-operated slot machines have in the payout chute, an optic coin counter, that works by counting the number of times a coin interrupts a beam of light. Devices have been designed that “fool” this counting device by shining a strong light into the receiver.

33 Optic Devices Coin Chute Optic Device Light Receiver Light Emitter
Shaved Token

34 Optic Devices Optic devices (known as Mini-Lights) must be tailored exactly to a particular type of machine: it is shaped exactly to be inserted through the payout chute or other opening.

35 Optic Devices

36 Optic Devices

37 Optic Devices Tells: Hand in unusual position in the payout tray
Flexing fingers on the hand in the payout tray Credit meter does not match number of coins paid Pauses in payout meter while coins still falling Hopper empties without matching coin-out reader Too many fills Rubber-necking Two people working, one runs credit meter up and the other cashes out while the first one blocks Machine requires fill but no player present

38 Optic Devices

39 Optic Devices

40 Optic Devices

41 Optic devices Prevention/Detection procedures
Visible foot patrols in coin machine areas Check coin-out meter against SDS system Consistent Surveillance patrols Check out unknown players (no player card) Check people frequently cashing out coin, unusual amounts of win Check out rubber-neckers Coverage of any coin machines with payout inconsistent with number of fills

42 Shims and Other Manipulators
Other devices have been designed over the years to fool or otherwise manipulate the coin-out chute, by holding it open.

43 Shims and Other Manipulators

44 Shims and Other Manipulators
Kickstand Device

45 Shims and Other Manipulators
Variations of the kickstand

46 Shims and Other Manipulators

47 Shims and Other Manipulators
Tells: Hand in payout tray in unusual position Hand will be flexing during payout Pauses in credit meter while coins are falling Too many fills on one machine or bank of identical machines Fill required on machine with no player present Coin out does not match meter

48 Shims and Other Manipulators
Prevention/Detection procedures Visible foot patrols in coin machine areas Check coin-out meter against SDS system Consistent Surveillance patrols of coin machine areas Check out unknown players (no player card) Check people frequently cashing out coin, unusual amounts of win Check out rubber-neckers Coverage of any coin machines with payout inconsistent with number of fills

49 Stuffing Coin Chutes This is definitely low-tech cheating.
By stuffing a piece of paper, tape or a magnet into the end of the coin-out chute, one can cause the last few coins of a payout to stop in the chute. Later, the cheater comes back and removes the blockage, and a few coins will fall out into his hand.

50 Stuffing Coin Chutes Tells: Rubber-necking Payouts with no play
Legitimate guests complain at change booth of short payout Hand in chute inserting the blockage Hand in chute retrieving coin with no play

51 Stuffing Coin Chutes Tells: Bits of paper or tape in payout tray
Apparent random wandering through slots areas, no play but sits at several machines and puts hands into payout area Coins falling into tray with no credit-paid registering

52 Stuffing Coin Chutes

53 Stuffing Coin Chutes Preventive Procedures:
Slot employees should check for blockages upon receiving reports of partial or short pays Slot employees should report individuals acting suspiciously to Surveillance

54 Stuffing Coin Chutes Detection techniques
Surveillance patrols of Slots areas Teamwork between Slots floor and Surveillance ID suspicious individuals

55 Stuffing Coin Chutes Detection Techniques
Check out machines where guests complain of short payouts Monitor Slot areas for subjects casing or loitering about Report to Security any subjects observed attempting to reach into coin chutes

56 Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Tells: Rubber-necking Places hand at payout chute to disguise amount of or manipulate payout Payout does not respond to symbols on machine Wins consistently and cashes out frequently Disproportionate number of jackpots Machine loses money consistently

57 Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Tells: Display shows unusual activity, such as jumping rapidly between Help and other displays Abnormal amount of hopper fills Same individuals consistently play and win Expert input of coins or use of play/credit buttons Machine constantly being played by suspicious individuals

58 Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout

59 Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Preventive Procedures: Slots must report machines that are consistent losers Slots must report machines with 3 hopper fills in 24 hour period Investigate machines with same player returning and winning Investigate machines at which unusual activity occurs

60 Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout
Detection Techniques: Investigate machines that are consistent losers or abnormal amount of fills Monitor rubber-neckers and unusual play Check players who display expert playing techniques Investigate players who have unusual items by machine

61 Coin-In Scams Just like the optic and other devices used to fool the payout section of the machine, other devices have been designed to fool the coin acceptors. Clicker Stringing Breaking acceptor

62 Coin-In Scams Tells: Hands at coin slot in unusual position, or unusual motions Rubber-necking Coin-in/out meter does not match with inventory Blockers

63 Coin-In Scams

64 Coin-In Scams

65 Coin-In Scams

66 Coin-In Scams

67 Coin-In Scams Clicker

68 Coin-In Scams A “Stringer” operates much the same way: a piece of monofilament fishing line (or braided line called Spiderwire) is glued to a coin, which is put into the coin acceptor and pulled out multiple times, causing the acceptor to count many coins.

69 Coin-In Scams Another way of fooling the coin acceptor is sometimes done for slugs or coins or tokens of different denomination. By slamming a token into the acceptor, it can sometimes be damaged in such a way that it will accept almost any coin. Another way of fooling it has been to use a drink straw to slide a coin through the acceptor.

70 Coin-In Scams Fast-feeder:
The final method we will speak about is not considered cheating in many jurisdictions. The perpetrator takes advantage of a poorly adjusted or dirty coin acceptor, or one of low quality. By feeding coins through very rapidly, the acceptor can be fooled into counting more than are fed.

71 Coin-In Scams Fast-feeder Tells:
Arranging coins or tokens in hand to fall rapidly through the acceptor Little or no play, immediate cash-out Returns again to the same machine Often will feed the coins back through and cash out again Rubber-necking

72 Coin-In Scams

73 Coin-In Scams

74 Counterfeit Tickets Tickets (TITO vouchers) can be counterfeited and cashed in at change booths and the cage. To a criminal, they are as good as cash, provided he can turn them in.

75 Counterfeit Tickets In order for this scam to work, the cage or change-booth cashier must be very lax in his or her procedures. The scammer will scout to find a place and a person who does not first verify every ticket through the computer system.

76 Counterfeit Tickets The next step is to acquire a valid ticket, which is scanned into a computer. The computer file is duplicated and parts of it are changed, including the value and other information. Several tickets are printed.

77 Counterfeit Tickets The scammer then goes to the casino during a busy period, gets several valid vouchers, and hands them all to a cashier at once, usually when several people are waiting in line. He already knows this cashier will not scan the tickets prior to cashing. He gets his money and leaves the casino immediately, as it will be only moments before the cashier discovers the scam.

78 Counterfeit Tickets This scam requires only two things to operate:
First and most important, a lazy or careless cashier A computer, scanner, and printer for creating the tickets (all available on the open market) A third item that helps the scammer is to be able to steal valid blank vouchers on which to print the tickets

79 Counterfeit Tickets Tells:
Individual feeding money into a slot machine and cashing without play, possibly on several machines Same individual cashing several tickets at once at cage or change booth Suspect will be in a hurry, and may scout the area for security or suits prior to cashing Cashier is not scanning each ticket prior to paying out

80 Counterfeit Tickets Preventive Procedures:
Require that all TITO vouchers be scanned and checked in the computer prior to cashing. Drill this into your cashiers Suspicious persons: Both Surveillance and Slots floor personnel watch for people feeding machines and cashing without play Safeguard supplies of blank TITO vouchers from theft

81 Counterfeit Tickets Detection Techniques:
Review cage/booth tapes for ID of suspect when counterfeit tickets are found Suspect multiple ticket transactions when cashier has history of skipping the scan.

82 Manual Vouchers This is a false-claim scam.
When ticket printers fail, a manually printed or hand-written TITO voucher can be generated in many systems

83 Manual Vouchers These manual vouchers can be scammed, by getting the manual voucher made and then cashing both the originally printed voucher and the manually generated duplicate. This scam also requires a gullible cashier or two, and a carelessly checked TITO printer

84 Manual Vouchers Tells: Player claims no ticket was generated
Machine shows a ticket was printed, but no evidence of printer failure

85 Manual Vouchers Preventive Procedures:
For all manually generated tickets, whether printed or handwritten, get the player’s name Require that for handwritten tickets, both a tech and a slots manager sign for it For machine generated duplicates, the same signatures should be required Require that the manual ticket be scanned and checked in the computer like any other for cashing out Require that the original ticket printed (or not) is cancelled in the system prior to issuing a manual ticket For sizable amounts, require Surveillance coverage review before generating a ticket.

86 Manual Vouchers This scan also be an internal scam, whereby a floorperson, supervisor or tech generates a manual ticket and hands off to another person to cash. Prevention: require notification to Surveillance on generation AND cashing out of manually generated payout vouchers.

87 Counterfeit currency on ticket paper
Recently there has been a scam where a person printed cash facsimiles on TITO paper How this worked is not fully understood, but probably required a poorly maintained validator to accomplish.

88 Counterfeit currency on TITO paper
The tells and prevention/detection would be the same as for any other counterfeit

89 Modern Cash-in Scams Several more scams have been designed to work on the cash-in function on slots.

90 Zip Strips Scams have been designed to allow “players” to feed currency into a bill acceptor, then pull the bill out of the machine and retain the credits These are called Zip Strips, and there are several variations

91 Zip Strips

92 Zip Strips

93 Zip Strips

94 Zip Strips

95 Zip Strips

96 Zip Strips Tells: Unusual activity at bill validator Blockers
Count on currency in the can does not match machine records Minimum or no play Once this scam is successful, the scammers will return to the same area and machines, as not all BV acceptors will work for this

97 Zip Strips Preventive Procedures
Surveillance and floor people alert for unusual activity with bill validators When cash counts come up short against machine records, review available surveillance coverage for unusual activity and suspect IDs. Slots execs should contact the manufacturers and get the BV acceptors repaired, updated or replaced

98 Radio Device This is a false-claim scam
There are some bill acceptors which can be jammed by a relatively powerful radio transmitter, causing a time-out. the person watches until a player puts a bill in the machine, then waits for the player to leave. He then times out the validator with a hand-held radio, and makes a claim that his bill ($20, $100, whatever) was eaten by the machine. The can is checked and his claim is validated.

99 Radio Device Tells: Time-out on bill validator
Unusual activity near the validator prior to the time-out Possible blockers Individual moving in on a machine right after a player leaves.

100 Radio Device Preventive Procedures
Check machine records on any claims that acceptors ate the money. Review machine records for the last five bills, and see what play was done and whether play or cash-out occurred after the last bill Machine records should show that a bill was accepted for the last one, and no play afterward, if the claim is valid

101 Radio Device Detection: Investigate unusual people watchers
Review available surveillance coverage if machine records are questionable Tell the claimer as a routine matter that Surveillance is reviewing their coverage of the area Be aware of people carrying radios

102 Credit Meter Devices Devices exist which are claimed to be able to run up, very fast, the numbers on some kinds of credit meters The scam is obvious: put a little money in, run up the meter and cash out

103 Credit Meter Blaster

104 Credit Meter Blaster Ad for this device on the internet:
GAMBLING MACHINE JACKPOTTER & CREDIT SIGNALER MICRO EDITION This device used to manipulate all kinds of gambling machines including video slots, video poker, video blackjack, fruit, electromechanical slot machines, etc. Tested on different machines with positive results including: credits added, larger payouts, and the outright emptying of entire machine contents. This concealable device can be placed in an ordinary handbag, camera case, pocket, etc... So small, it will fit in a pack of cigarettes, including the battery, and still have room for several cigarettes!!! Powered by a standard 9 volt battery.

105 Credit Meter Devices

106 Key Fob Device: This completely remote-controlled device affects the coin mechanism and hopper payout counters on modern post-1996 machines. It will increase credits as well as increase payouts making it so you can literally EMPTY a machine in as little as 15 minutes of play. The device emits a variable, invisible signal from the key-chain transmitter all done remotely without contact to the target machine. In fact, it affects ONLY the machine you are playing, as the signal is directional. The signal is completely undetectable by current security measures. The unit is powered by a mini 12 volt battery commonly available at most retail, electronics, and convenience stores.

107 Credit meter device Tells
Little or no play, large cash out with no jackpots showing on Slots computer system Unusual activity near the slot machine face Coin out does not match play records Possible blockers

108 Credit Meter Device Preventive Procedures:
Consistent video, security and slots foot patrols of slots areas Investigate remotely anyone who appears to cash out too often and too much for short play Communication from Slots floor to Surveillance: TEAMWORK

109 High-Tech Scam Injecting Chips with false information Tells:
New/unknown player Blockers/Distractors blocking camera angles Substantial jackpot over $30,000 -usually a progressive Must open machine

110 Injecting Chips with False Information
Preventive Procedures: Dedicated coverage of large-jackpot machines and progressive banks Hold large jackpot payouts until Surveillance reviews tape completely Tell the winner that Surveillance is reviewing the coverage.

111 Injecting Chips with False Information
Detection Techniques: Review recordings of the area thoroughly, including at least half an hour prior to the win.

112 Distract & Grab Wherever there is money, there are people trying to steal it. Distract and Grab scams include: Bucket theft Purse (and other belongings) theft Cashing and stealing the credits on a machine Major theft from casino patrons

113 Distract & Grab Theft from your patrons makes the casino a victim: Each time one of your players gets ripped off, you lose future customers.

114 Distract & Grab Tells: Lone individuals moving around casino floor, not playing, and checking out the players Small groups entering together, then splitting up and re-forming as a group. Individuals walking about with coins in hand, looking at players JDLR

115 Distract & Grab Tells: Sloppy appearance Don’t fit customer profile
Watching players, not looking at machines Avoiding security and other employees Approach slot players and engage in conversation or toss coins on the floor JDLR

116 Distract & Grab

117 Distract & Grab

118 Distract & Grab

119 Distract & Grabs Preventive Procedures:
Report suspicious non-playing people to security for approach and ID Escort out or 86 subjects who roam or loiter about the slot areas Train Slots employees to approach and greet subjects and /or report to Surveillance All thefts from persons should be reported to surveillance for tape review and possible ID of suspects

120 Distract & Grabs Detection Techniques:
Patrol Slots and other areas for subjects casing or loitering Review tapes of all thefts to identify subjects for future response

121 Employee Impersonators
Tells: Dressed as or similar to casino employees Roaming Slot areas without playing Approaches players, obtains cash, coin, tokens or tickets and then exits property

122 Employee Impersonators
Preventive Procedures: Train Slot employees to approach and greet subjects and /or report to Surveillance Review tapes of reported thefts for suspects 86 subjects whenever possible

123 Employee Impersonators
Detection Techniques: Patrol Slots areas for subjects casing or loitering Monitor subjects who are dressed similar to Slot employees Review recordings of reported incidents to identify suspects for future response

124 “Professional” Players
Also known as “slots advantage players” Frequenting banks with “predictable” jackpots, progressives This is not an illegal activity Their only disadvantage occurs when they discourage other guests from playing the machines

125 “Professional” Players
Techniques: Occupy a whole bank of machines when they think the jackpot is likely to hit Discourage non-team members from play Operate from a common bankroll, split winnings Use of “cash-back” comps whenever possible Often several players using the same player club account to build comp points

126 “Professional” Players
Tells: All machines of type in constant play Players are adept at putting coins or bills into acceptor, using credit buttons, playing machine Players appear to be locals and are familiar with the casino environment, policies & procedures

127 “Professional” Players
Preventive procedures: Signage preventing team play Remove machines if not profitable 86 individuals who bully or otherwise discourage other guests from play

128 “Professional” Players
Detection Techniques: Investigate why specific types of machines are attracting professional players Monitor players to determine methods of play Obtain Slot statistics to determine machine profitability

129 Direct Theft Often the most obvious method of theft is neglected: breaking into the machine to steal the money Vulnerable areas: Coin operated slots: drop area, hoppers Bill validators Booths and slots banks

130 Direct Theft: Machines
Tells: Often two or more people, a lookout and the person who breaks in Machine candle lit Person seated but not playing the machine Avoiding attention of security and Slots floor personnel Can be off-duty or ex-employees who did not turn in keys

131 Direct Theft: Machines
Tells: Illegal drop door or illegal machine entry signal Drop Door Open signal at unusual time of day without prior notification from Slot Department Suspicious Individuals loitering in drop areas Unsecured and/or broken drop door or lock Drop crew leaves behind drop bucket or validator can

132 Direct Theft: Machines
Preventive Procedures: Utilize recessed drop locks Maintain drop security Slots must report any broken drop door, suspicious circumstances or individuals Slots must strictly monitor Slot Data System (SDS) for drop alarms

133 Direct Theft: Machines
Preventive Procedures: Missing keys must be reported Slots personnel maintain alertness and reports suspicious individuals to Surveillance Surveillance maintains SDS monitor and investigates illegal machine openings For this to work, ALL slots personnel must ALWAYS use machine entry cards

134 Direct Theft: Machines
Detection Techniques: Monitor Slot Data System (SDS) and investigate drop door or illegal entry alarms Enforce required drop security procedures Monitor drop for suspicious circumstances or individuals Ensure drop buckets and validator cans are picked up and doors are secured

135 Direct Theft: Machines

136 Direct Theft: Machines

137 Direct Theft: Booths There is also the even more direct method of stealing from complacent or distracted change persons in the booth.

138 Direct Theft: Booths

139 Direct Theft: Booths And then, there is always armed robbery.

140 Direct Theft: Booths

141 Direct Theft: Booths

142 Direct Theft: Booths Tells: Distracted cashier
Individual avoids area when security is near Hands inside the booth area Frantic activity in the booth

143 Direct Theft: Booths Preventive Procedures: Visible Security presence
Cameras visible and in position to ID anyone at the window Alertness of booth personnel Wide counters and other barriers to keep money out of reach from outside

144 Quick Change Artists Tells:
Attempts to confuse cashier with more than one transaction at a time Sleight of hand move, changing one bill for another Or leaves booth window and returns Claims to have been given lower denomination than received

145 Con Artist

146 Quick Change Artists Preventive Procedures:
Cashiers perform and complete one transaction at a time Alert Supervisor Immediately for count down of bank prior to giving subject any money Tell the person claiming that Surveillance is reviewing the video of the transaction

147 Quick Change Artists Detection Techniques:
Review videotape of all reported short change incidents to identify suspect Release photos of subject to Security and Slots Managers and cashiers ID suspects who don’t want to wait for a Surveillance review

148 INTERNAL THEFT Slots Department

149 Internal Theft With the newer, high-tech safeguards, it nearly requires the collusion and conspiracy of an inside person, an employee of the casino, in order to successfully perpetrate a scam.

150 Internal Theft In most cultures in the world today, it requires an extreme amount of stress, or a completely unethical person, to perpetrate fraud or theft upon the employer—the person upon whom one’s living depends.

151 Internal Theft Now let’s look at a few of the ways that internal theft can be, and has been, accomplished in casinos.

152 False Jackpots By creating and paying a jackpot that does not in fact exist, the Slots employee hopes to “lose” the money and paper trail amongst legitimate payoffs.

153 False Jackpots Tells: Required number of personnel not present at jackpot Jackpot not located at machine listed on Slot system and/or paperwork Signatures of verifying personnel not legible or identifiable Jackpot form not signed at location of jackpot

154 False Jackpots Preventive Procedures:
Strictly enforce slot jackpot procedures Surveillance should be notified of large jackpots for verification

155 False Jackpots Detection Techniques:
Audit jackpot procedures routinely and consistently Watch for slot employees with expensive habits (gambling, etc.) or living outside their means

156 False Hopper Fills Filling out the paperwork for a fill, and then diverting either the bag of coin or other cash to cover it. This is relatively easy for a slots floorperson or a supervisor. In the past, a supervisor inserted the paperwork for a fill amongst jackpot slips for a booth attendant, and was issued the cash for a fill as if it were a jackpot.

157 False Hopper Fills Tells:
Required number of personnel not present at fill Fill not located at machine listed on Slot Data System (SDS) and/or paperwork Signatures of verifying personnel not legible or identifiable Fill slip not signed at location of fill Coin for fill not placed directly into hopper Fill bag opened prior to arrival at machine

158 False Hopper Fills Preventive Procedures:
Strictly enforce Slots Fill Procedure Surveillance should be notified of fills for high denomination machines for verification Surveillance should be notified of any machines with three fills in 24 hour period

159 False Hopper Fills Detection Techniques:
Audit fill procedures routinely and consistently

160 Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Tells: Unauthorized counting of bank Counting and manipulating funds in bank Rolls or racks of coins or tokens short, cashier often handling rolls Racks of high-denomination tokens short, sometimes pushed to back of bank Removing coins from coin bag Bags not weighed when sent Complaints by customers

161 Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Tells Coin cans missing roll, placed behind other cans Straps of currency short, positioned in back of drawer Out-going cashier enters amount of funds counted by in-coming cashier Hands to body without clearing Closed hand after entry into drawer Money set aside in drawer separate from other funds Markers (coins, clips, etc.) set aside after some transactions Covering money with paperwork or otherwise concealing it

162 Cashier/Changeperson Theft

163 Cashier/Changeperson Theft

164 Cashier/Changeperson Theft

165 Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Preventive Procedures: Strictly prohibit unauthorized count of bank Verify and rotate stored cash and coin routinely Weigh all coin bags, investigate shortages In-coming cashier must both count funds and enter figures on check-out sheet

166 Cashier/Changeperson Theft
Detection Techniques: Monitor cashiers and changepersons frequently Audit shift-change counts, plus one hour prior to change Monitor employees who are observed or reported to display any of the Tells Investigate shortages and overages Audit change booths frequently

167 Shorting Players In order to remove funds from an imprest bank without detection, the cashier or changeperson must create an overage. This is done by short-changing players or by short-changing fill and jackpot monies going out of the bank.

168 Shorting Players Tells:
Cashier or Changeperson does not empty all the coins/tokens from bucket Cashier or Changeperson does not run all the coin through coin counter, sets aside some in tray Short rolls or racks Unauthorized countdown of bank Hands to body without clearing

169 Shorting Players Tells: Complaints by customers
Handling racks of tokens, “recounting” “Helping” the players to rack tokens Not turning the change bucket over Hands in the jet-sort machine Change machine read-out turned away from window Not counting the money clearly for the players

170 Shorting Players Tells: Funds or “counters” set aside in drawer
TITO tickets set aside from multiple cash-outs Cashier occasionally does not follow TITO cashing procedures, especially on multiple-ticket cash-outs Use of a calculator rather than slot computer and scanner Multiple counts prior to end of shift Discarded or concealed paperwork

171 Shorting Players Preventive Procedures:
Complaints from guests must be reported to Surveillance Prohibit unauthorized counting of bank Require cashier or changeperson to always turn coin bucket upside down to show empty Install mirror over coin tray to show all coin is run through Occasional random mid-shift counts by managers Ruthless enforcement of TITO procedures Require money to be counted in the window under the camera as it is sent to the players

172 Shorting Players Detection Techniques:
Monitor cashiers and change personnel frequently Investigate personnel observed or reported to display tells Investigate shortage complaints from customers Frequently audit last hour of shift Audit procedures during shift

173 Machine Theft Tells: Floorperson or technician entering machine for no apparent reason or without player present Hands to body without clearing after entering machine Does not sign entry card and/or use system card Hands in hopper for no apparent reason Passes coin to player

174 Machine Theft

175 Machine Theft

176 Machine Theft Preventive Procedures:
Slots Floor and Tech personnel must clear hands after entering machine and prior to touching body Enforce use of system entry cards and machine entry cards

177 Machine Theft Detection Techniques:
Monitor Floor and technical employees on a routine basis Always observe floor and technical employees when entering machines alone Routinely observe floor and techs when entering machines

178 Machine Theft Detection Techniques:
Investigate illegal machine entries Investigate entry into machines with no players present Observe conduct around well-known players

179 Internal Theft General Prevention
As with all other parts of the casino and hotel operation, prevention of internal theft starts with hiring: is the person honest? Background checks of new hires Credit history Arrest history Drug and/or gambling problems Excessive monetary outflow/debt Bankruptcies Work history: why is he looking for a job?

180 Internal Theft General Prevention
The second most important part of internal theft prevention is to HAVE preventive procedures in place, beginning with the internal controls required by state and/or local and federal law. Procedures BEGIN with the internal controls.

181 Internal Theft General Prevention
Next is always training of personnel Without training in the particular policies and procedures of the department, the person cannot be expected to follow them. Part of the training in procedures is to instruct staff on the reasons for each procedure, and to show them that following procedures protects them from accusations or investigations of theft.

182 Internal Theft General Prevention
Enforcement of procedures by reporting violations and requiring managers to retrain and follow progressive disciplinary procedures as needed on staff. Investigation of all shortages over a set amount, and investigation of staff who repeatedly violate procedures.



185 Pickpocket

186 Distract & Grab






192 That concludes the Slot presentation
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