Presentation on theme: "Game Protection and Internal Theft"— Presentation transcript:
1Game Protection and Internal Theft SlotsGame Protection and Internal Theft
2SLOT CHEATS WOULD TURN A MACHINE ON IT’S SIDE IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH IT!
3Slots ProtectionIn today’s world, we have to deal with both the oldest and newest of cheating techniques.In the first part of this presentation, we will deal with old methods, still in operation, for cheating coin-operated gaming devices (slots).
4Slots ProtectionWe will then phase in, through other, more modern methods of cheating, and end up with Internal Theft in Slots.Be aware that all of these methods, together, demonstrate one thing:
5Slots ProtectionNo matter what technology is developed, there will always be someone who will try, and probably succeed, in figuring outa way to get around it
7SlugsSlugs are poor-quality approximations, cast in lead or other base metal, of a slot-machine token.They will be accepted generally into old or poorly maintained machines.Occasionally the slugger will force a coin acceptor, effectively breaking it, so that it will accept a slug or different denomination coin or token.
8Slugs Tells: Playing out of Pockets Coin in from one pocket or bucket and winnings out into another pocket or bucketRubber-neckingSeparation of tokens from payoutsCoins frequently fall through to trayCatching coins as they fall into the trayDistinctive sound
11Slugs Preventive/Detection Procedures: Consistent surveillance of slot areasNotification of suspicious players to Surveillance by Slots personnelHard Count notifies of slugs found in dropSlot floor and techs notify of slugs in machinesFix the coin acceptors
12Slugs Detection Techniques: Surveillance coverage & foot patrols by slots and securityLook for rubber-necksEstablish dedicated coverage of areas being hitReview slots area tapes for suspects
14Counterfeit Tokens Tells: Maximum coin in , then cash out credits Minimal playOn-and-off playJDLRRubber-neckingBrings tokens into the casino: plays from pockets or bag, frequently cashes out, never buys tokensFrequent cash-out, but still has tokens to play
15Counterfeit Tokens Preventive/Detection Procedures Dedicated coverage of high-action slotsMonitor high action players, fills and jackpotsCheck by tech and hard count of the machines and dropTighten up or repair the coin acceptors
16Counterfeit Tokens Detection Techniques Routinely check high action playersMonitor unknown high action playersDetermine a reason for hopper fillsCheck in drop buckets of high-action machines
17Shaved TokensIn coin-operated slot machines, there is a device which counts the coins as they run through the payout chute by counting the number of times a beam of light is interrupted by the passing coins.Shaved tokens do not interrupt this beam on certain types of slot machines.The coins or tokens are reduced in diameter by as little as 3% or as much as 10%
18Shaved Tokens Coin Chute Light Emitter Light Receiver Standard Token
19Shaved Tokens Tells: Rubber-necking Sorting coin from payout Frequent cash-out of tokens, retaining one part of sortCoins frequently fall through to trayBlockers/DistractersCoin out doesn’t match win meterFrequent cash-out of creditsShaved tokens found in drop during weigh/wrapSuspects will catch tokens as they are paid out of machineBrings tokens to the casino but does not buy them
22Shaved Tokens Preventive/Detection Procedures: Hard Count and/or Slots must report unusual sized tokens/coins and/or different denominations found in hopper or dropSlot Dept. must report hopper fills on any machine left unattendedSlot Dept. must report any machine filled 3 times within a 24 hour periodTighten up or repair the coin acceptors
23Shaved Tokens Detection Techniques Observe rubber-neckers Determine reason for unusual amount of fillsInvestigate reports of unusual sized coins and/or different denomination coins or tokensCheck players who frequently cash-out coin or creditsCheck payout meter to reel symbols for correct pays
25Counterfeit CashNo matter what changes the Treasury Department makes in our bills, the counterfeiter is only one very short step behind, especially with today’s computer technology.It is unfortunately very common for people to feed counterfeit bills through dirty or poorly maintained or adjusted bill validators.
26Counterfeit Cash Tells: Frequent input of cash, frequent cash-out of creditsMinimal and/or no playPlayer or associate continuously at cage or booth cashing outUnknown player (does not use player card)Will return several times to a machine that accepts counterfeit money
27Counterfeit Cash Tells: Rubber-necking Bills will be rejected often, suspect will try same bill repeatedlyCounterfeit & good money will be kept separate, bills into validator from one location and bills from cash-out to another.Moves from machine to machine until one is found that will accept the money
28Preventive Procedures: Counterfeit CashPreventive Procedures:Investigate reports of counterfeit bills found by soft countContact Validator Unit manufacturer for repair/tuning of unitsPreventive maintenance/cleaning of bill validators
29Detection Techniques: Counterfeit CashDetection Techniques:Review existing recordings to provide a description of suspectsDedicate coverage to machines where bills were found
30Payout ScamsThere are a number of other scams that focus on the payout mechanisms of slot machines.
31Payout Scams Tells: Coin payout meter does not match coin paid out. Payout does not match symbols on reelPlayer reaches up into payout chute to place/retrieve deviceHoppers found empty or near empty without players presentRubber-necking
32Optic DevicesCoin-operated slot machines have in the payout chute, an optic coin counter, that works by counting the number of times a coin interrupts a beam of light.Devices have been designed that “fool” this counting device by shining a strong light into the receiver.
37Optic Devices Tells: Hand in unusual position in the payout tray Flexing fingers on the hand in the payout trayCredit meter does not match number of coins paidPauses in payout meter while coins still fallingHopper empties without matching coin-out readerToo many fillsRubber-neckingTwo people working, one runs credit meter up and the other cashes out while the first one blocksMachine requires fill but no player present
41Optic devices Prevention/Detection procedures Visible foot patrols in coin machine areasCheck coin-out meter against SDS systemConsistent Surveillance patrolsCheck out unknown players (no player card)Check people frequently cashing out coin, unusual amounts of winCheck out rubber-neckersCoverage of any coin machines with payout inconsistent with number of fills
42Shims and Other Manipulators Other devices have been designed over the years to fool or otherwise manipulate the coin-out chute, by holding it open.
47Shims and Other Manipulators Tells:Hand in payout tray in unusual positionHand will be flexing during payoutPauses in credit meter while coins are fallingToo many fills on one machine or bank of identical machinesFill required on machine with no player presentCoin out does not match meter
48Shims and Other Manipulators Prevention/Detection proceduresVisible foot patrols in coin machine areasCheck coin-out meter against SDS systemConsistent Surveillance patrols of coin machine areasCheck out unknown players (no player card)Check people frequently cashing out coin, unusual amounts of winCheck out rubber-neckersCoverage of any coin machines with payout inconsistent with number of fills
49Stuffing Coin Chutes This is definitely low-tech cheating. By stuffing a piece of paper, tape or a magnet into the end of the coin-out chute, one can cause the last few coins of a payout to stop in the chute.Later, the cheater comes back and removes the blockage, and a few coins will fall out into his hand.
50Stuffing Coin Chutes Tells: Rubber-necking Payouts with no play Legitimate guests complain at change booth of short payoutHand in chute inserting the blockageHand in chute retrieving coin with no play
51Stuffing Coin Chutes Tells: Bits of paper or tape in payout tray Apparent random wandering through slots areas, no play but sits at several machines and puts hands into payout areaCoins falling into tray with no credit-paid registering
53Stuffing Coin Chutes Preventive Procedures: Slot employees should check for blockages upon receiving reports of partial or short paysSlot employees should report individuals acting suspiciously to Surveillance
54Stuffing Coin Chutes Detection techniques Surveillance patrols of Slots areasTeamwork between Slots floor and SurveillanceID suspicious individuals
55Stuffing Coin Chutes Detection Techniques Check out machines where guests complain of short payoutsMonitor Slot areas for subjects casing or loitering aboutReport to Security any subjects observed attempting to reach into coin chutes
56Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout Tells:Rubber-neckingPlaces hand at payout chute to disguise amount of or manipulate payoutPayout does not respond to symbols on machineWins consistently and cashes out frequentlyDisproportionate number of jackpotsMachine loses money consistently
57Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout Tells:Display shows unusual activity, such as jumping rapidly between Help and other displaysAbnormal amount of hopper fillsSame individuals consistently play and winExpert input of coins or use of play/credit buttonsMachine constantly being played by suspicious individuals
59Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout Preventive Procedures:Slots must report machines that are consistent losersSlots must report machines with 3 hopper fills in 24 hour periodInvestigate machines with same player returning and winningInvestigate machines at which unusual activity occurs
60Manipulation of Play Buttons to Alter Payout Detection Techniques:Investigate machines that are consistent losers or abnormal amount of fillsMonitor rubber-neckers and unusual playCheck players who display expert playing techniquesInvestigate players who have unusual items by machine
61Coin-In ScamsJust like the optic and other devices used to fool the payout section of the machine, other devices have been designed to fool the coin acceptors.ClickerStringingBreaking acceptor
62Coin-In ScamsTells:Hands at coin slot in unusual position, or unusual motionsRubber-neckingCoin-in/out meter does not match with inventoryBlockers
68Coin-In ScamsA “Stringer” operates much the same way: a piece of monofilament fishing line (or braided line called Spiderwire) is glued to a coin, which is put into the coin acceptor and pulled out multiple times, causing the acceptor to count many coins.
69Coin-In ScamsAnother way of fooling the coin acceptor is sometimes done for slugs or coins or tokens of different denomination.By slamming a token into the acceptor, it can sometimes be damaged in such a way that it will accept almost any coin.Another way of fooling it has been to use a drink straw to slide a coin through the acceptor.
70Coin-In Scams Fast-feeder: The final method we will speak about is not considered cheating in many jurisdictions.The perpetrator takes advantage of a poorly adjusted or dirty coin acceptor, or one of low quality.By feeding coins through very rapidly, the acceptor can be fooled into counting more than are fed.
71Coin-In Scams Fast-feeder Tells: Arranging coins or tokens in hand to fall rapidly through the acceptorLittle or no play, immediate cash-outReturns again to the same machineOften will feed the coins back through and cash out againRubber-necking
74Counterfeit TicketsTickets (TITO vouchers) can be counterfeited and cashed in at change booths and the cage.To a criminal, they are as good as cash, provided he can turn them in.
75Counterfeit TicketsIn order for this scam to work, the cage or change-booth cashier must be very lax in his or her procedures.The scammer will scout to find a place and a person who does not first verify every ticket through the computer system.
76Counterfeit TicketsThe next step is to acquire a valid ticket, which is scanned into a computer.The computer file is duplicated and parts of it are changed, including the value and other information.Several tickets are printed.
77Counterfeit TicketsThe scammer then goes to the casino during a busy period, gets several valid vouchers, and hands them all to a cashier at once, usually when several people are waiting in line.He already knows this cashier will not scan the tickets prior to cashing. He gets his money and leaves the casino immediately, as it will be only moments before the cashier discovers the scam.
78Counterfeit Tickets This scam requires only two things to operate: First and most important, a lazy or careless cashierA computer, scanner, and printer for creating the tickets (all available on the open market)A third item that helps the scammer is to be able to steal valid blank vouchers on which to print the tickets
79Counterfeit Tickets Tells: Individual feeding money into a slot machine and cashing without play, possibly on several machinesSame individual cashing several tickets at once at cage or change boothSuspect will be in a hurry, and may scout the area for security or suits prior to cashingCashier is not scanning each ticket prior to paying out
80Counterfeit Tickets Preventive Procedures: Require that all TITO vouchers be scanned and checked in the computer prior to cashing. Drill this into your cashiersSuspicious persons: Both Surveillance and Slots floor personnel watch for people feeding machines and cashing without playSafeguard supplies of blank TITO vouchers from theft
81Counterfeit Tickets Detection Techniques: Review cage/booth tapes for ID of suspect when counterfeit tickets are foundSuspect multiple ticket transactions when cashier has history of skipping the scan.
82Manual Vouchers This is a false-claim scam. When ticket printers fail, a manually printed or hand-written TITO voucher can be generated in many systems
83Manual VouchersThese manual vouchers can be scammed, by getting the manual voucher made and then cashing both the originally printed voucher and the manually generated duplicate.This scam also requires a gullible cashier or two, and a carelessly checked TITO printer
84Manual Vouchers Tells: Player claims no ticket was generated Machine shows a ticket was printed, but no evidence of printer failure
85Manual Vouchers Preventive Procedures: For all manually generated tickets, whether printed or handwritten, get the player’s nameRequire that for handwritten tickets, both a tech and a slots manager sign for itFor machine generated duplicates, the same signatures should be requiredRequire that the manual ticket be scanned and checked in the computer like any other for cashing outRequire that the original ticket printed (or not) is cancelled in the system prior to issuing a manual ticketFor sizable amounts, require Surveillance coverage review before generating a ticket.
86Manual VouchersThis scan also be an internal scam, whereby a floorperson, supervisor or tech generates a manual ticket and hands off to another person to cash.Prevention: require notification to Surveillance on generation AND cashing out of manually generated payout vouchers.
87Counterfeit currency on ticket paper Recently there has been a scam where a person printed cash facsimiles on TITO paperHow this worked is not fully understood, but probably required a poorly maintained validator to accomplish.
88Counterfeit currency on TITO paper The tells and prevention/detection would be the same as for any other counterfeit
89Modern Cash-in ScamsSeveral more scams have been designed to work on the cash-in function on slots.
90Zip StripsScams have been designed to allow “players” to feed currency into a bill acceptor, then pull the bill out of the machine and retain the creditsThese are called Zip Strips, and there are several variations
96Zip Strips Tells: Unusual activity at bill validator Blockers Count on currency in the can does not match machine recordsMinimum or no playOnce this scam is successful, the scammers will return to the same area and machines, as not all BV acceptors will work for this
97Zip Strips Preventive Procedures Surveillance and floor people alert for unusual activity with bill validatorsWhen cash counts come up short against machine records, review available surveillance coverage for unusual activity and suspect IDs.Slots execs should contact the manufacturers and get the BV acceptors repaired, updated or replaced
98Radio Device This is a false-claim scam There are some bill acceptors which can be jammed by a relatively powerful radio transmitter, causing a time-out.the person watches until a player puts a bill in the machine, then waits for the player to leave.He then times out the validator with a hand-held radio, and makes a claim that his bill ($20, $100, whatever) was eaten by the machine. The can is checked and his claim is validated.
99Radio Device Tells: Time-out on bill validator Unusual activity near the validator prior to the time-outPossible blockersIndividual moving in on a machine right after a player leaves.
100Radio Device Preventive Procedures Check machine records on any claims that acceptors ate the money.Review machine records for the last five bills, and see what play was done and whether play or cash-out occurred after the last billMachine records should show that a bill was accepted for the last one, and no play afterward, if the claim is valid
101Radio Device Detection: Investigate unusual people watchers Review available surveillance coverage if machine records are questionableTell the claimer as a routine matter that Surveillance is reviewing their coverage of the areaBe aware of people carrying radios
102Credit Meter DevicesDevices exist which are claimed to be able to run up, very fast, the numbers on some kinds of credit metersThe scam is obvious: put a little money in, run up the meter and cash out
104Credit Meter Blaster Ad for this device on the internet: GAMBLING MACHINE JACKPOTTER & CREDIT SIGNALER MICRO EDITION This device used to manipulate all kinds of gambling machines including video slots, video poker, video blackjack, fruit, electromechanical slot machines, etc. Tested on different machines with positive results including: credits added, larger payouts, and the outright emptying of entire machine contents. This concealable device can be placed in an ordinary handbag, camera case, pocket, etc... So small, it will fit in a pack of cigarettes, including the battery, and still have room for several cigarettes!!! Powered by a standard 9 volt battery.
106Key Fob Device:This completely remote-controlled device affects the coin mechanism and hopper payout counters on modern post-1996 machines. It will increase credits as well as increase payouts making it so you can literally EMPTY a machine in as little as 15 minutes of play. The device emits a variable, invisible signal from the key-chain transmitter all done remotely without contact to the target machine. In fact, it affects ONLY the machine you are playing, as the signal is directional. The signal is completely undetectable by current security measures. The unit is powered by a mini 12 volt battery commonly available at most retail, electronics, and convenience stores.
107Credit meter device Tells Little or no play, large cash out with no jackpots showing on Slots computer systemUnusual activity near the slot machine faceCoin out does not match play recordsPossible blockers
108Credit Meter Device Preventive Procedures: Consistent video, security and slots foot patrols of slots areasInvestigate remotely anyone who appears to cash out too often and too much for short playCommunication from Slots floor to Surveillance: TEAMWORK
109High-Tech Scam Injecting Chips with false information Tells: New/unknown playerBlockers/Distractors blocking camera anglesSubstantial jackpot over $30,000 -usually a progressiveMust open machine
110Injecting Chips with False Information Preventive Procedures:Dedicated coverage of large-jackpot machines and progressive banksHold large jackpot payouts until Surveillance reviews tape completelyTell the winner that Surveillance is reviewing the coverage.
111Injecting Chips with False Information Detection Techniques:Review recordings of the area thoroughly, including at least half an hour prior to the win.
112Distract & GrabWherever there is money, there are people trying to steal it. Distract and Grab scams include:Bucket theftPurse (and other belongings) theftCashing and stealing the credits on a machineMajor theft from casino patrons
113Distract & GrabTheft from your patrons makes the casino a victim: Each time one of your players gets ripped off, you lose future customers.
114Distract & GrabTells:Lone individuals moving around casino floor, not playing, and checking out the playersSmall groups entering together, then splitting up and re-forming as a group.Individuals walking about with coins in hand, looking at playersJDLR
115Distract & Grab Tells: Sloppy appearance Don’t fit customer profile Watching players, not looking at machinesAvoiding security and other employeesApproach slot players and engage in conversation or toss coins on the floorJDLR
119Distract & Grabs Preventive Procedures: Report suspicious non-playing people to security for approach and IDEscort out or 86 subjects who roam or loiter about the slot areasTrain Slots employees to approach and greet subjects and /or report to SurveillanceAll thefts from persons should be reported to surveillance for tape review and possible ID of suspects
120Distract & Grabs Detection Techniques: Patrol Slots and other areas for subjects casing or loiteringReview tapes of all thefts to identify subjects for future response
121Employee Impersonators Tells:Dressed as or similar to casino employeesRoaming Slot areas without playingApproaches players, obtains cash, coin, tokens or tickets and then exits property
122Employee Impersonators Preventive Procedures:Train Slot employees to approach and greet subjects and /or report to SurveillanceReview tapes of reported thefts for suspects86 subjects whenever possible
123Employee Impersonators Detection Techniques:Patrol Slots areas for subjects casing or loiteringMonitor subjects who are dressed similar to Slot employeesReview recordings of reported incidents to identify suspects for future response
124“Professional” Players Also known as “slots advantage players”Frequenting banks with “predictable” jackpots, progressivesThis is not an illegal activityTheir only disadvantage occurs when they discourage other guests from playing the machines
125“Professional” Players Techniques:Occupy a whole bank of machines when they think the jackpot is likely to hitDiscourage non-team members from playOperate from a common bankroll, split winningsUse of “cash-back” comps whenever possibleOften several players using the same player club account to build comp points
126“Professional” Players Tells:All machines of type in constant playPlayers are adept at putting coins or bills into acceptor, using credit buttons, playing machinePlayers appear to be locals and are familiar with the casino environment, policies & procedures
127“Professional” Players Preventive procedures:Signage preventing team playRemove machines if not profitable86 individuals who bully or otherwise discourage other guests from play
128“Professional” Players Detection Techniques:Investigate why specific types of machines are attracting professional playersMonitor players to determine methods of playObtain Slot statistics to determine machine profitability
129Direct TheftOften the most obvious method of theft is neglected: breaking into the machine to steal the moneyVulnerable areas:Coin operated slots: drop area, hoppersBill validatorsBooths and slots banks
130Direct Theft: Machines Tells:Often two or more people, a lookout and the person who breaks inMachine candle litPerson seated but not playing the machineAvoiding attention of security and Slots floor personnelCan be off-duty or ex-employees who did not turn in keys
131Direct Theft: Machines Tells:Illegal drop door or illegal machine entry signalDrop Door Open signal at unusual time of day without prior notification from Slot DepartmentSuspicious Individuals loitering in drop areasUnsecured and/or broken drop door or lockDrop crew leaves behind drop bucket or validator can
132Direct Theft: Machines Preventive Procedures:Utilize recessed drop locksMaintain drop securitySlots must report any broken drop door, suspicious circumstances or individualsSlots must strictly monitor Slot Data System (SDS) for drop alarms
133Direct Theft: Machines Preventive Procedures:Missing keys must be reportedSlots personnel maintain alertness and reports suspicious individuals to SurveillanceSurveillance maintains SDS monitor and investigates illegal machine openingsFor this to work, ALL slots personnel must ALWAYS use machine entry cards
134Direct Theft: Machines Detection Techniques:Monitor Slot Data System (SDS) and investigate drop door or illegal entry alarmsEnforce required drop security proceduresMonitor drop for suspicious circumstances or individualsEnsure drop buckets and validator cans are picked up and doors are secured
142Direct Theft: Booths Tells: Distracted cashier Individual avoids area when security is nearHands inside the booth areaFrantic activity in the booth
143Direct Theft: Booths Preventive Procedures: Visible Security presence Cameras visible and in position to ID anyone at the windowAlertness of booth personnelWide counters and other barriers to keep money out of reach from outside
144Quick Change Artists Tells: Attempts to confuse cashier with more than one transaction at a timeSleight of hand move, changing one bill for anotherOr leaves booth window and returnsClaims to have been given lower denomination than received
146Quick Change Artists Preventive Procedures: Cashiers perform and complete one transaction at a timeAlert Supervisor Immediately for count down of bank prior to giving subject any moneyTell the person claiming that Surveillance is reviewing the video of the transaction
147Quick Change Artists Detection Techniques: Review videotape of all reported short change incidents to identify suspectRelease photos of subject to Security and Slots Managers and cashiersID suspects who don’t want to wait for a Surveillance review
149Internal TheftWith the newer, high-tech safeguards, it nearly requires the collusion and conspiracy of an inside person, an employee of the casino, in order to successfully perpetrate a scam.
150Internal TheftIn most cultures in the world today, it requires an extreme amount of stress, or a completely unethical person, to perpetrate fraud or theft upon the employer—the person upon whom one’s living depends.
151Internal TheftNow let’s look at a few of the ways that internal theft can be, and has been, accomplished in casinos.
152False JackpotsBy creating and paying a jackpot that does not in fact exist, the Slots employee hopes to “lose” the money and paper trail amongst legitimate payoffs.
153False JackpotsTells:Required number of personnel not present at jackpotJackpot not located at machine listed on Slot system and/or paperworkSignatures of verifying personnel not legible or identifiableJackpot form not signed at location of jackpot
154False Jackpots Preventive Procedures: Strictly enforce slot jackpot proceduresSurveillance should be notified of large jackpots for verification
155False Jackpots Detection Techniques: Audit jackpot procedures routinely and consistentlyWatch for slot employees with expensive habits (gambling, etc.) or living outside their means
156False Hopper FillsFilling out the paperwork for a fill, and then diverting either the bag of coin or other cash to cover it.This is relatively easy for a slots floorperson or a supervisor.In the past, a supervisor inserted the paperwork for a fill amongst jackpot slips for a booth attendant, and was issued the cash for a fill as if it were a jackpot.
157False Hopper Fills Tells: Required number of personnel not present at fillFill not located at machine listed on Slot Data System (SDS) and/or paperworkSignatures of verifying personnel not legible or identifiableFill slip not signed at location of fillCoin for fill not placed directly into hopperFill bag opened prior to arrival at machine
158False Hopper Fills Preventive Procedures: Strictly enforce Slots Fill ProcedureSurveillance should be notified of fills for high denomination machines for verificationSurveillance should be notified of any machines with three fills in 24 hour period
159False Hopper Fills Detection Techniques: Audit fill procedures routinely and consistently
160Cashier/Changeperson Theft Tells:Unauthorized counting of bankCounting and manipulating funds in bankRolls or racks of coins or tokens short, cashier often handling rollsRacks of high-denomination tokens short, sometimes pushed to back of bankRemoving coins from coin bagBags not weighed when sentComplaints by customers
161Cashier/Changeperson Theft TellsCoin cans missing roll, placed behind other cansStraps of currency short, positioned in back of drawerOut-going cashier enters amount of funds counted by in-coming cashierHands to body without clearingClosed hand after entry into drawerMoney set aside in drawer separate from other fundsMarkers (coins, clips, etc.) set aside after some transactionsCovering money with paperwork or otherwise concealing it
165Cashier/Changeperson Theft Preventive Procedures:Strictly prohibit unauthorized count of bankVerify and rotate stored cash and coin routinelyWeigh all coin bags, investigate shortagesIn-coming cashier must both count funds and enter figures on check-out sheet
166Cashier/Changeperson Theft Detection Techniques:Monitor cashiers and changepersons frequentlyAudit shift-change counts, plus one hour prior to changeMonitor employees who are observed or reported to display any of the TellsInvestigate shortages and overagesAudit change booths frequently
167Shorting PlayersIn order to remove funds from an imprest bank without detection, the cashier or changeperson must create an overage.This is done by short-changing players or by short-changing fill and jackpot monies going out of the bank.
168Shorting Players Tells: Cashier or Changeperson does not empty all the coins/tokens from bucketCashier or Changeperson does not run all the coin through coin counter, sets aside some in trayShort rolls or racksUnauthorized countdown of bankHands to body without clearing
169Shorting Players Tells: Complaints by customers Handling racks of tokens, “recounting”“Helping” the players to rack tokensNot turning the change bucket overHands in the jet-sort machineChange machine read-out turned away from windowNot counting the money clearly for the players
170Shorting Players Tells: Funds or “counters” set aside in drawer TITO tickets set aside from multiple cash-outsCashier occasionally does not follow TITO cashing procedures, especially on multiple-ticket cash-outsUse of a calculator rather than slot computer and scannerMultiple counts prior to end of shiftDiscarded or concealed paperwork
171Shorting Players Preventive Procedures: Complaints from guests must be reported to SurveillanceProhibit unauthorized counting of bankRequire cashier or changeperson to always turn coin bucket upside down to show emptyInstall mirror over coin tray to show all coin is run throughOccasional random mid-shift counts by managersRuthless enforcement of TITO proceduresRequire money to be counted in the window under the camera as it is sent to the players
172Shorting Players Detection Techniques: Monitor cashiers and change personnel frequentlyInvestigate personnel observed or reported to display tellsInvestigate shortage complaints from customersFrequently audit last hour of shiftAudit procedures during shift
173Machine TheftTells:Floorperson or technician entering machine for no apparent reason or without player presentHands to body without clearing after entering machineDoes not sign entry card and/or use system cardHands in hopper for no apparent reasonPasses coin to player
176Machine Theft Preventive Procedures: Slots Floor and Tech personnel must clear hands after entering machine and prior to touching bodyEnforce use of system entry cards and machine entry cards
177Machine Theft Detection Techniques: Monitor Floor and technical employees on a routine basisAlways observe floor and technical employees when entering machines aloneRoutinely observe floor and techs when entering machines
178Machine Theft Detection Techniques: Investigate illegal machine entriesInvestigate entry into machines with no players presentObserve conduct around well-known players
179Internal Theft General Prevention As with all other parts of the casino and hotel operation, prevention of internal theft starts with hiring: is the person honest?Background checks of new hiresCredit historyArrest historyDrug and/or gambling problemsExcessive monetary outflow/debtBankruptciesWork history: why is he looking for a job?
180Internal Theft General Prevention The second most important part of internal theft prevention is to HAVE preventive procedures in place, beginning with the internal controls required by state and/or local and federal law.Procedures BEGIN with the internal controls.
181Internal Theft General Prevention Next is always training of personnelWithout training in the particular policies and procedures of the department, the person cannot be expected to follow them.Part of the training in procedures is to instruct staff on the reasons for each procedure, and to show them that following procedures protects them from accusations or investigations of theft.
182Internal Theft General Prevention Enforcement of procedures by reporting violations and requiring managers to retrain and follow progressive disciplinary procedures as needed on staff.Investigation of all shortages over a set amount, and investigation of staff who repeatedly violate procedures.