2. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 1 Borda, Condorcet, and Approval Section 1.3 Stick animation

3. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 2 The animation hints at another voting method. How does it work with this preference schedule? (Hint: C wins with 24 points) 632Pts ABC3 CCD2 BDA1 DAB0

4. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 3 Borda Count Algorithm Each is assigned a. Calculate the total for each candidate Most wins Method 4 Count Borda

5. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 4 Borda (3 – 2 – 1 – 0) - Who Wins? 1. A 2. B 3. C 4. D 4221Pts ABCC3 BCDD2 CDBA1 DAAB0

6. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 5 Same Election (6 – 5 – 1 – 0) - Who Wins? (Assign candidates to groups) 4221Pts ABCC6 BCDD5 CDBA1 DAAB0

7. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 6 Same Election (20 – 5 – 2 – 1) - Who Wins? ( Answers on clicks) 4221Pts ABCC20 BCDD5 CDBA2 DAAB1 A 8022 86 2 C 81020 78 40 D 445 23 1020401 65 4 B

8. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 7 Borda Count - Advantages 1.All P L co 2.Increases V T 3.Fewer P A

9. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 8 Who has a legitimate complaint with the outcome of this election? 1. K 2. C 3. L 4. D 522Pts ABC3 BCD2 CDB1 DAA0

10. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 9 Borda Count - Disadvantages Rigging elections 1.May not 2.Different

11. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 10 Who wins using Borda? 1. A 2. B 3. C 4. D 20191510Pts ABCD3 DDBC2 CCDB1 BAAA0

12. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 11 P.S. - Recall a big theme of this chapter Plurality = Runoff = Hare = Now Borda = 20191510 ABCD DDBC CCDB BAAA We saw the preference schedule on the last slide in Section 1.2. Winners were

13. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 12 Borda Count Heisman winner in football, Academy Awards Not used in public elections Roman Senate - 105 A.D

14. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 13 Another method due to a French nobleman Animation

15. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 14 The Hillary, Barack, John, and Joe animation hints at another new voting method. Explain how it works with this preference schedule. (Hint: C wins) 987 ABC CCA BAB

16. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 15 Condorcet - Who wins? 1. A 2. B 3. C 4. D 9872 ABCD CCAC DDDA BABB

17. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 16 There are 3 candidates A, B, C in an election. Suppose A defeats B and B defeats C. Then 1.A defeats C 2.A may defeat C 3.A can’t defeat C

18. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 17 Condorcet Algorithm Form of candidates Determine the of each pairing The candidate who defeats is the Condorcet winner Method 5 Condorcet

19. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 18 Condorcet - Advantage 1.No

20. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 19 Condorcet - Disadvantages 1.A 2.B 3.C 4.Other 469 ACB BAC CBA 1.May not 2.Fairly comp

21. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 20 Suppose that A beats B, C beats B, and A loses to C. Who could be the Condorcet winner? 1.A 2.C 3.Can’t tell 4.No one

22. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 21 If candidate A has a majority of the votes A will always win using the Condorcet method 1. True 2. False 3. Can’t tell

23. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 22 Last (and most contemporary ) voting method Smurf Animation

24. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 23 The Smurf animation hints at a final voting method. Explain how it works

25. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 24 Approval Algorithm Method 6 Each voter votes. The candidate with wins Brams, Weber

26. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 25 Who wins using Approval voting? Assume voters approve of the candidates in RED type 1.A 2.B 3.C 4.D 9872 ABCD CADB DADC BCBA

27. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 26 Who wins using Approval voting? Assume voters approves of the candidates in RED type 1.A 2.B 3.C 4.D 6871 DBCD C DBC ACD A BAAB

28. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 27 If candidate A has a majority of the votes A will always win using the Approval method 1. True 2. False 3. Can’t tell

29. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 28 “Vote Splitting” 1992 (Democrats Benefit) George Bush Republican Bill Clinton Democrat H. Ross Perot Independent 2000 (Republicans Benefit) George W. Bush Republican Al Gore Democrat Ralph Nader Independent

30. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 29 Approval - Advantages Avoids vote splitting Feasible

31. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 30 Reduce negative campaigning Increases voter turnout

32. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 31 Approval - Disadvantage

33. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 32 Dis - Approval Voting

34. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 33 Presidential Elections – Approval method to reduce a field of 15 to 2. Then plurality. 13th c. by the Venetians to elect magistrates

35. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 34 End of 1.3

36. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 35 A B C D 3 2 1 03 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 Voters Candidates Points ABCD Point totals 2763 B C D A D B A C D A B C Points

37. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 36 True Story Female colleague of mine started working for a Hartford insurance company in 1972 First job was to determine a formula for best salesperson based on points for Most Sales, Most New Customers, Least complaints,… Winner was a woman (for first time) Colleague was ordered to revise point counts so that a man would win

38. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 37 Monsieur Borda Jean-Charles Borda (1733-1799) French mathematician, scientist, expert in military weaponry Played a role in the American War of Independence

39. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 38 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat (Marquis de) Condorcet (1743-94) French mathematician and political leader Passionate in his hatred of injustice and took part in the French Revolution Close friend of Thomas Jefferson

40. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 39 Dr. Steven J. Brams NYU Dr. Robert J. Weber Northwestern University

41. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 40 The Winner

42. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 41 The Winner

43. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 42 0 0 0 0 ‘08 Smurf Election 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 3 4 Smurffet Wins

44. 1.3 Borda, Condorcet, Approval 43 Meta - Material