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Reflections on 50 years in R&D

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1 Reflections on 50 years in R&D
Professor Phil Ruffles March 8th 2011 I have spent my whole career in R&D including over 40 years with Rolls-Royce During this time I was faced with many challenges and will talk about some of these today. I will draw out some important lessons from this experience

2 RB211 and Trent Family Variants -9 Engines sold and on Order
RB ,Trent sold,2600 on order Aircraft RB211-L1011,B747,B757, B 767 Tu 204 Trent - A 330 A340 A350 A 380 B777 B787 71 Trent Operators Revenue 40bn to date,35bn New engines on order. Aftermarket is additional Through most of my career I was involved with the RB211 and Trent programmes. The early days were very difficult and led the Company into Receivership in 1971 when the programme was almost cancelled. However the engine has now been under continual development of over 40 years and is the engine of choice by many of the worlds airlines.

3 The Launch – 29 March 1968 The launch of the RB211 was both a great challenge and a great achievement. Sir Denning Pearson (Chairman) and Sir David Huddie (Managing Director) were its champions.. They knew the stakes were high as the alternative was to sink into oblivion. They both resigned just prior the Company going into receivership and received much criticism However events have proved that they were right in their judgement to proceed although Sir David said in later life. We simply took on more than we could cope with.

4 RB211 Advantages of three shafts
Picture and Chart which summarises the benefits of 3 shaft engines The engine had three shafts which gave it a significant advantage over its competitors. This benefit has become more pronounced in recent years with the Trent family which have a higher by-pass ratio and overall pressure ratio.

5 RB211-06 Designed for market leadership through technology
33,260 lb thrust in 1966 -06 was unable to meet increasing demand for thrust during aircraft development Subsequently redesigned for 40,600lb from April to October in 1968 to become -22C Uprated to 42,000lb (-22B) to compensate for weight growth Notable advances were the Hyfil fan, composites replacing metal in the IP compressor static members and the overall increase in temperatures and pressures.

6 RB211-Scale of advance Performance advance Thrust +95% Cruise sfc -21%
Noise -19PNdB Turbine entry temp. +150ºC Pressure ratio 17 > 25 Airflow x 3.7 RB (1972) Conway RCo43 (1965) 45in. dia. Weight 8861lb Weight 4855lb 85.5in. dia. It is difficult for people today to comprehend the size of the task that was undertaken. The engine was twice the diameter and thrust of the Conway but was 5ins shorter in length. It had a bypass ratio of 5 and turbine entry temperature some 150C higher. The final weight (bare engine) was double that of the Conway but the original weight was 6900lb and sfc was 21% less. The Conway and Spey pretty well represented our best technology and so we had to develop new technology on the programme. In order to meet the weight and performance targets many technology advances had been included including extensive use of composites, an annular combustor and highly loaded compressor stages. Little of this technology had been adequately validated. The risks in the shafting system were understood but I don’t think we expected as much trouble for the intershaft bearing as actually occurred.

7 RB The Hyfil fan The Hyfil fan offered a 300 lb weight and two per cent fuel consumption benefit High risk of Hyfil was recognised so a Titanium alloy alternative was designed in parallel as early as 1969 Hyfil blades were experiencing integrity problems replacement with Titanium blades allowed continued testing The Hyfil blade was replaced by the Titanium blade in Spring 1970 All of the other composites at the front of the engine also had to be removed thereby increasing the engine weight.

8 RB211-The review of early milestones
Mid 1967 Mar 1968 Aug 1968 Jan 1970 Mar 1970 Nov 1970 Feb 1972 Apr 1972 Feb 1973 RB detailed design commenced at 33260lbs thrust RB order received at 40600lbs thrust First run of -06 engine First run of -22 engine First flight of RB211 in VC10 First flight of L1011 Type approval obtained for 42000lbs at ISA+3, 40600lbs at ISA+15 L1011 obtains type approval – airline service starts Type approval obtained for lbf at ISA+15 (-22B) 34 development engines were built, compared with today’s usual six or seven 36 flight engines were sent to Lockheed, compared with today’s usual seven or eight The programme was a fast programme when compared with both previous and subsequent programmes. It depended on their being no major setbacks. The first RB started design in mid 1967 and the engine ran at the end of August 1968 following a week of abortive attempts to start it due to failure of the Lucas fuel system. We adapted a Conway system which was used for many months before the Lucas system was ready. The first RB ran in Jan 1970.First flight in the VC10 occurred in March 1970,fitted with a Titanium fan blade, using the third -22 engine after a very short flight clearance test on the second. The first flight on the L1011 was in Nov 1970,10 months after the first run. The Company went into receivership on Feb 4th 1971. Certification was achieved in April 1972, 27months after first run and Entry into Service was in the same month. This was four and a half months after the planned date. By today's standards this was a fast program, even more so because of the enormous technical problems that had to be overcome in such a short period of time.

9 RB211-06 Realising 40,000lb thrust
RB211-06, Engine 5 – Test Report (Jan 1969): Seizure of LP spool during initial attempts to start engine Strip revealed distorted blades, severe foul with seal segments Turbine module from Engine 3 fitted to resume testing After 19hrs 40mins, several Hyfil fan blades were found damaged Hyfil assembly removed and Titanium assembly fitted to resume testing Surge at 36,000 lbf after 21hrs 34mins (day temperature: -7°C) Engine rejected from test due to seized HP spool Strip examination revealed HP turbine blade foul with seal segments Thermal deterioration of the flame tube had also occurred Best performance to date! RB211-06, Engine 7 (March 1969): Engine achieved 40,000lbf but surged and seized on run-down due to HP turbine blade failure The first -06 engine run was deficient in both performance and durability. The engine suffered HP NGV bulging after a run to about 20,000lb thrust and a turbine temperature of 1400K. Performance was awful and numerous problems were identified on strip. Progress over the next few weeks was slow and our customers were getting anxious. In November 1968, it was declared that we had to realise 40,000lb thrust by end March 1969 in order to demonstrate confidence in the engine. This was no mean feat. Engine 5 was built to a better standard and ran during a very cold spell in January, good for producing thrust. After some initial problems we got underway with the performance curve. All was looking good at 36,000lb but on accelerated to 40,000lb thrust, the engine surged and sized on shutdown, an HP turbine blade had failed, a fairly regular occurrence at that time. The next attempt was made on Engine 7 in March but the day temperature was higher and the engine performance was worse than Engine 5.We were therefore in for a hot run and knew the hardware would not last for long, perhaps only a few seconds. When the day temperature was at its lowest (7C) at 5.00am in the morning, we performed a performance check at 25,000lb, then accelerated slowly to 40,000lb thrust and remained on condition just long enough to get an ADR scan. The engine surged as the throttle was pulled back and then caught fire!! We had met the goal and pronounced to the world that 40,000lb thrust had been achieved. We said it performed as predicted!

10 RB211-06 Realising 40,000lb thrust
‘The Evidence’ !

11 RB211 Early development problems
Fan blade integrity Poor performance of compressors and turbines Combustion chamber and NGV cooling, cracking and collapse HP turbine blade cooling/fatigue (IPNGV excitation) Deletion of composites and strengthening of engine structure IP NGV performance Operability Temperature traverse Engine overweight LP blade profile changes We had an enormous number of problems to address. All the composite materials were taken out of the engine and after this the engine was re-designed many times equating in effort to about ten complete redesigns. We had nine different standards up to initial production followed by the conversion to the -22B standard after 12 months service operation. Performance was a major problem because it was so poor, required a lot of effort and prevented us running the engine at the right conditions to test it mechanically. Also the unreliability of the engine, even at moderate powers, made it difficult to run for sufficient time to expose new problems. Progress was therefore very slow throughout 1969 and 1970.The life of the hot section was awful and the HP turbine blade suffered a variety of mechanical and thermal failures throughout the program. At one stage we were failing turbine blades after only a few minutes running.

12 Rolls-Royce Receivership-February 4th 1971
Engine 10011, fitted with a package of performance modifications, returned best performance to date on evening of Feb 3rd 1971 The SFC shortfall was approx 8% with thrust close to 40,000lb This demonstrated the engine’s potential and had a major bearing on the events that followed The receiver allocated 12 development engines compared with the previous 18 - this required a clear focus on priorities Contract with Lockheed was re-negotiated with technical spec eased HP turbine blade was fixed, turbine sealing improved and further performance improvements made 14 months after bankruptcy the engine entered service at 40,600lbs, 41/2 months late, derated and overweight! 12 months later thrust was fully recovered and SFC target met. Feb 4th 1971 is a day that everyone in RR at the time will remember. The previous evening we performance test on Engine This engine was fitted with improvements to the IP compressor, increased capacity IP and LP turbines, and an improved turbine flow path. The engine returned the best performance to date. The sfc was about 8% above specification at sea level (51/2 % at cruise) and thrust capability was close to 40,000lb.Whilst the result did not save us from receivership, the engines potential had been demonstrated and this had a major bearing on the events that followed. . The focus of attention then moved to reliability and certification, but performance still needed to be better. The receiver had allocated 12 development engines compared with the 18 in the program at that time. Our work was prioritised more carefully. This was the best thing he did as we had more time to concentrate on the technical issues The contract was re-negotiated with Lockheed and the technical specification was eased, notably with respect to thrust at EIS, weight and starting. The HP turbine blade vibration problem was fixed by increasing the gap between the HP blade and IP NGV and an interlock was fitted to the shroud. Our first type test was passed at very much derated conditions in the third quarter of 1971. Three different standards of flight engine were delivered to Lockheed during 1971 (24 engines), all of which had to be cleared in about 12 months. The engine entered service with Eastern Airlines at the original thrust of lb, four and one half months late and somewhat overweight. Twelve months later the thrust was recovered, and the fuel consumption was achieved.

13 RB211 Early service problems
HP turbine life (800 hours initially) Fan disc LP location bearing Accessory reliability HP compressor stators HP compressor surge Combustion liner life (800 hours initially) Rate per 1,000 hours 1973 1974 Fan disc Surge/ compressor damage Other reasons Turbine blade/combustion liner deterioration -22 total engine-caused removals ’72 6900hours of bench running has bee accumulated at EIS but only a small amount of this was on the correct standard of engine or at high conditions. Cyclic endurance was minimal as all the effort had gone into getting through the type test which we achieved only two weeks before certification and EIS. Reliability was far worse than we feared. In the early days the IFSD rate rose to about 0.6 per 1000 hours and removal rate averaged 1.2 per 1000 hours. The intershaft bearing was the main cause of IFSDs but not the only one by any means. The Combustion liner and HP turbine blade had a life of about 800hours initially and remained at about 3000hours until we fitted the cast blade in 1980. Over Christmas 1972 we had the first fan disc failure to be followed by the second a few days later. The operation was kept going by inspecting discs every 50 cycles and fitting new discs every 400 cycles until they were replaced bydiscs with 6/4 Titanium material. New discs were available in about 6 months and fitted across the fleet in about a year. We discovered that the cyclic life of certain types of Titanium was sensitive to time on load, making our lifing methodology invalid. Our quick response to this problem earned us respect for our customers. The -22B engine in 1973 was introduced in It had revised HP compressor aerodynamics to improve performance. The engine had a nasty habit of surging on take-off at rotation, particularly on the first start of the day. It was even worse when the No2 engine swallowed snow from the top of the fuselage and on one occasion all three engines surged. Eastern Airlines alone suffered no fewer than 170 events before the problem was fixed. There were a number of contributory factors , but he primary one was the poor thermal response of the compressor casing (too fast) combined with a tendency to go off centre which deteriorated surge margin at twice the normal rate.. A warm up procedures was used to alleviate the problem before it was fixed by redesigning the compressor casing s. Many other problems that had to be addressed over the next 10 years before the engine achieved a respectable standard of reliability. Most notable amongst these was the HP turbine blade which I will address in a minute.

14 RB211-524 and RB211-535 Thrust – lb x 1000 -524G/H (pkg 3) -524G/HT
Boeing 767 Boeing 747 Lockheed L-1011 Tupolev Tu 204 Boeing 757 70 -524G/H (pkg 3) -524G/HT 60 -524D4 -524C -524B -524D4-B 50 -524B4-B Improved -22B -535E4 -535F5 40 -22B In 1970,it was realised that a further development of the engine was necessary in order to keep the Tristar competitive and to seek applications on the B747 and DC10. Detailed design started on the -524 in 1972 and the first run occurred in October It achieved its design thrust on the second day of testing and performance was close to specification. A more ambitious target of 50,000lb was therefore set. The engine entered service in 1977 on a heavier version of the L1101with Saudi Arabian Airlines and subsequently on the B747 with British Airways. The L1011 fitted with the had a reduced the fuel burn of 7% and increased range of 66%. I was Chief Engineer on the RB D4 having previously been Chief engineer on the RB211-22B This engine was rated at 53,000lb thrust with a 4.5% improvement in sfc relative to the RB B. It was ordered by Qantas against a very tough delivery schedule .The development programme was disrupted by a prolonged strike. The first run was in June 1980 and delivered four fully certified engines were delivered to Boeing March It went on to take an equal share of the market with GE and P&W, thereby establishing our position on the B747 The RB was launched in 1977 to provide for the B757, the first time that RR had been the first engine supplier on a new Boeing Aircraft Boeing were naturally concerned that we had over stretched ourselves with the RB B4, RB D4 and RB C developments running concurrently. They monitored and audited us very regularly .As a result we improved our program management enormously. The RB was further developed to become the RB G/H for the Boeing B747 and B767 programmes Thus with the RB and RB we had improved the customer base and market share which formed a platform on which to launch the Trent engine. -535C

15 RB211-22B/-524/-535 and Trent HP turbine blades
1979 RB211-22B/535C Multi-pass cast DS blade HP feed Extensive film cooling 1660K 1983 RB E4 Second generation multi-pass cast DS blade 1680K RB211-22B Extruded blades LP feed, cut back trailing edge Suction and trailing edge cooling HP feed to leading edge Interlock 1545K -1550K 1995 Trent 800 Multi-pass Single crystal Root damper HPNGV shaping Parallel shroud 40 NGVs 1840K RB Strategy 2C-2.5C Modified interlock Multi-pass Single crystal 36 NGVs 1730K-1751K 1977 RB Equiaxed HP feed racetrack NGVs 1660K The HP turbine blade is arguably the most important component in the gas turbine as it determines the maximum temperature that the engine can operate at.Advances are made by a combination of better materials and better cooling technology. Rolls-Royce was the first to exploit air cooling in turbine blades with the Conway but they failed to advance the technology and in particular to change from Wrought N108 to a cast material. We therefore had little choice but to try to improve the extruded blade .We raised the life of the extruded blade from 800 hours to about 3000hours. When the -524 was launched, the turbine disc was redesigned to provide high pressure air to the blade and a cast material was used. The cooling configuration was similar to the -22B but the HP feed allowed it to be film cooled much more effectively. It worked quite well but the disc cyclic life was poor. A high temperature demonstrator unit was launched in the early 1970’s and by 1977 we had developed new cast blade using Directionally solidified material with HP feed. It was a designed and validated very thoroughly through carefully planned testing aimed at ensuring that the design intent had been fully achieved. The design and development approach adopted on this program marked a change in the way we tackled engineering problem. The old make it and break it approach was abandoned. The bade has been further developed on the RB E4,the RB G/H and subsequently the Trent The failure to develop the appropriate technology during the 1960's and early 1970's proved to be a very expensive and painful experience and one which all engineers should take to heart. Gas turbine engines are technology intense and can rapidly become uncompetitive without continuous investment.

16 Rolls-Royce Changing pace of technology 1980-1990
RB V2500 RB G/H Technology introduction Emergence use of modelling/analysis tools, e.g. TACITUS Early use of CFD, FEA etc – development of turbine key systems Widespread us of key systems across all components IT power and capability During the 1980's technology was changing at an enormous pace, particularly the capability of computing systems. Our first design system, TACITUS was developed in the late 1970s and this led the way to defining a set of Key Systems in the mid 1980s with both Derby and Bristol contributing to a common approach. Up until this time they had gone there separate ways. 80’s 90’s

17 Rolls-Royce Modelling Capability 1980 to 1986
Impractical or impossible Transient dynamic response 10 Improving Method Quality 9 Whole engine modelling (FE) 8 Rotor blade vibration analysis Analysis time 7 6 Disc temperature prediction Time to influence design 5 4 Disc LCF lifing Benefit from vector processor 3 Analysis of 14 aerofoils at six operating points (Inc OGV in 3D) 2 V2500 Plan B In 1986 I gave a presentation to the Board to seek approval for further investment in computing at a time when we were in some difficulty with the V2500 engine. This chart was used to show that if we could analyse designs more quickly we had a better chance of getting them right before hardware was released to manufacture. The board gave approval for our first foray into the use of a vector processor. Since then our computing capability has grown enormously and there is virtually nothing that need go unanalysed prior to manufacture today. 1 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Date (year)

18 Rolls-Royce Computer Simulation
Computer Simulation has changed the way Engineering is carried out 1960’s 1st Computers used 1970’s 1st Turbine design system(1976) 1980’s Mechanical Analysis concurrent with design. 1990’s Faster, greater complexity, more iterations Digital Pre-assembly(Trent 800) 2000’s Simulation validation via test then used for subsequent certification 2010 Whole engine modelling & Fan Blade-Off simulation

19 RB211-535, V2500, RB211-524 improvement programmes
Attempts at performance improvement programmes through technology introduction provided mixed successes due to technology management and process difficulties 1991 was a bad year. We had already experienced major difficulties in developing the compressor for the V2500 engine in 1986 and in 1991 we failed to deliver major improvements to the RB and RB Engines. These failures had cost the Company a lot of money at the time we had just embarked on Developing the Trent engine. Confidence in Engineering throughout the Company was rock bottom I had just been appointed Director of Engineering of the Aerospace group and so it was my job to sort out the reasons. The engineers would argue that they lacked the technology when things went wrong, but this argument did not stand up to analysis as our technology was now quite good we having invested significantly during the 1980s. More often than not the failures were due to poor planning and resourcing, lack of attention to detail or poor communications between projects and the functional departments. The Trent 600 for the MD11was underway (fortunately it got cancelled), the Trent 700 was launched and the Trent 800 was in prelim design. It was essential that we succeeded on these programs otherwise we would face 1971 all over again. Clearly something had to change. After considerable debate amongst the engineering seniors we launched Project Derwent as the new stage gate New Product Introduction Process and associated changes.

20 Derwent – The new product introduction process
Stage 1 Preliminary Concept Definition Audit gates Stage 1 Exit review Stage 2 Full Concept Definition Stage 2 Exit review Stage 3 Product Realisation Critical design review Design verification review Production readiness review Stage 4 Production Production process check Stage 5 Service Support I chose to call the initiative Project Derwent because we needed to replicate in a modern environment those things that made the Derwent V engine such a success. These were teamwork across functional boundaries, use of proven technology and the application of a set of common processes, but now we could use IT to cope with the extra complexity and ensure that all engineers operated from a common data base. In-service review Stage 6 Disposal

21 Integrated team and product structure
IPT structure Product & Functional structure Chief Engineer Whole System (Product) Etc Chief Design Engineer Chief Devt. Engineer Sub-system Sub-system Team leader of Sub-system Team leader of Sub-system Component Component The organisation structure was aligned to the product breakdown structure. Engine systems were at one level and the gas turbine sub systems and components at another. All groups were responsible for the activity from 'Cradle to Grave‘. No longer could design pass the problem over the wall. The new functional groups were responsible for developing the capability and the project groups were responsible for executing the projects. Some people in the project were permanent members whilst others were seconded. Some specialist tasks were performed by the functional groups. The changes were opposed by some and others wanted to delay the changes until after the Trent program. I realised we had to make the changes and pushed ahead in two Phases, the first in late 1991 and the second in mid A new building was erected to house the Project teams called Trent Hall but it has since been named the Lombard Building after one of the Company’s famous engineers. An independent Technical Audit team was created headed by a very senior and well respected engineer who gave me tremendous support Better performance was evident within12 months. The Trent 700 was certified on time.. The Trent 800, was certified three months ahead of schedule at 90,000lb thrust cf 84,000lb planned. The new company structure for manufacturing followed in 1998 enabling the engineering and manufacturing teams to come together in a single unit. Team leader of Component Team leader of Component Team leader of Component Team leader of Component Component Component

22 Rolls-Royce Capability Acquisition
Requirements: Airframers Operators New Product Planning Full Concept Definition Product Realisation Service Support Production Disposal Solutions Facilities People/skills Supply Chain Infrastructure R&T Strategy Planning New Capability Realisation Technology Validation Generic Project specific Research and Technology Programme Strategic Research Applied Research It was necessary to give greater focus to the companies Corporate Strategy and anticipated future product needs. This chart shows how the development of technology feeds into the design process at the different stages of development, supported by a global Research and Technology programme. The Research and Technology programme provides the vital link between the global academic network, technology validation and new product development. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY CENTRES Global Academic Network

23 Rolls-Royce Technology Acquisition
Prior to mid 1970’s technology acquisition was determined by functions, largely with a research focus High Temperature Demonstrator Unit 1st run in 1972 Structured Advanced engineering programmes launched in 1976 including Demonstrator engines University Technology Centres launched in 1990 Technology Strategy linked to Corporate and Product strategy from 1995 onwards Technology programmes key to success of Trent Engine family and growth of Company in other sectors

24 Research and technology management
Increasing cost/Reducing uncertainty/Reducing time to market Maturity Levels 3D Compressor Blading High Temp. Demo. Unit Fuel Cells Strategic research Applied research Validation Wide Chord Fan MMC Blisk Technology Categories The Technology programs were managed on a company wide basis and covered a range of technologies at different stages of maturity. Rigorous assessments were carried out to check for competitiveness and benefit in relationship to risk and cost. In this way a focused program is maintained. Titanium Disc Fuel Cells Base Key Pacing Emerging Relative to competition: Lead/Neutral/Lag

25 The Trent Family 2060 engines delivered 2600 orders backlog
EIS 2011 EIS 1996 EIS 2007 EIS 2013 Trent XWB 84,000lb Trent 800 95,000lb Trent 1000 74,000lb Trent 900 80,000lb 110 Fan diameter 2060 engines delivered 2600 orders backlog (December 2009) 97.5 EIS 1995 EIS 2002 Trent 700 72,000lb Trent 500 56,000lb It is through the approach outlined above and the dedication of a very large number of very capable engineers that we have been able to develop the Trent family of engines based around the three-shaft architecture of the RB211. Ironically we were able to retrofit the Trent 800 HP system to the -524 to give the -524G/HT which fulfilled the requirement that package 3 should have satisfied. Each variant of the Trent, including the Trent 900 has incorporated new technology made available by the technology programs that have run in parallel with and ahead of the next engine launch. 86.5 RB G/H-T 60,000lb

26 Trent 1000 – High technology at low risk
Soluble core manufacturing of HPT blade Active anti icing Advanced LPT design IP power off-take Optimized lightweight fan system More electric Accessories and Engine Health Monitoring

27 Developing our Engineering Talent
Directors Chief Engineers Fellows Technical Managers Associate Fellows Recruits Some External Losses Movement out of Engineering Specialists Recruits Project Managers Technical Leadership Project Leadership Graduate Level Recruits & Apprentices

28 Product Development –Keys to Success
Competitive Product Concepts Technology acquired ahead of product development Stage Gate Product introduction process Formal gate reviews Risk assessment and management Integrated Product Teams Robust product requirements Work package management Clearly defined deliverables The best digital tools inc verification Well trained and motivated people

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