1. Safeguarding Animal Health National Institute for Animal Agriculture April 1, 2014 Beth Lautner, DVM, MS Associate Deputy Administrator, Science, Technology and Analysis Services Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture Veterinary Services Foot-and-Mouth Disease Strategies

2. Safeguarding Animal Health Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus Biology Picornavirus family, Apthovirus genus 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 Multiple topotypes (substrains tied to geographical region) within each serotype

3. Safeguarding Animal Health Presumptive FMD Prevalence

4. Safeguarding Animal Health 4 FMD Serotype Distribution

5. Recommendations from WRLFMD strains to be included in FMDV antigen bank HIGH PRIORITY O Manisa O PanAsia-2 O BFS or Campos A24 Cruzeiro Asia 1 Shamir A Iran-05 (or A TUR 06) A22 Iraq SAT 2 Saudi Arabia (or equivalent i.e. SAT 2 Eritrea) MEDIUM PRIORITY A Eritrea SAT 2 Zimbabwe SAT 1 South Africa A Malaysia 97 (or Thai equivalent such as A/NPT/TAI/86) A Argentina 2001 O Taiwan 97 (pig-adapted strain or Philippine equivalent) LOW PRIORITY A Iran ’96 A Iran ’99 A Iran 87 or A Saudi Arabia 23/86 (or equivalent) A15 Bangkok related strain A87 Argentina related strain C Noville SAT 2 Kenya SAT 1 Kenya SAT 3 Zimbabwe

6. Safeguarding Animal Health 6 T YPES OF FMD O UTBREAKS

7. Safeguarding Animal Health APHIS FMD Response Goals 7 The goals of an FMD response are to: (1) detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate FMD using strategies that stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non- infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.

9. FMD Response Strategies 9 FMD response strategies—strategies are not mutually exclusive:  Stamping-out  Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill  Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter  Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live  Combination of options  Vaccination to live without stamping-out

10. Safeguarding Animal Health Challenges to Stamping-Out Only Strategies Huge herds, highly concentrated Mobility of animals/products

11. Safeguarding Animal Health Depopulation & Disposal Challenges Captive bolting Labor intensive Slow Gunshot Accessible Expensive Safety issues Rendering Preferred Capacity issues Logistics issues Unlined Burial Polluting Long-term environmental impact

12. Safeguarding Animal Health Develop a Balanced Response Strategy

13. Safeguarding Animal Health Continuity of Business Planning Secure Milk Supply: for milk and milk movement in an FMD outbreak, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement. Secure Pork Supply: for swine and pork products, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement.

14. Safeguarding Animal Health FMD Response CapabilitiesNAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

15. Safeguarding Animal Health National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)

16. Safeguarding Animal Health Current Deployable Capabilities 24 Hour Push Packs of PPE and decon supplies PPE individual kits Antiviral medications Vaccine Poultry depopulation foaming units, CO2 carts Mobile refrigeration/ vaccine storage & transport systems Animal handling equipment Response support services

17. 17 Iowa Outbreak: One Infected County WhereBovineSwineSheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)14,93366,5153,893404 Buffer Zone (blue)143,8661,860,96820,1072,525 Total158,7991,927,48324,0002,929 Total livestock affected: 2,110,282 Data: NASS, 2007

18. 18 Iowa Outbreak: Three Infected Counties WhereBovineSwineSheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)63,548240,4848,0671,025 Buffer Zone (blue)463,6373,534,16432,8446,245 Total 527,1853,774,64840,9117,270 Total livestock affected: 4,342,744 Data: NASS, 2007

19. 19 Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 WhereBovineSwineSheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)181,1061,567,56018,6903,108 Buffer Zone (blue)1,927,95511,423,618133,97923,723 Total 2,109,06112,991,178152,66926,831 Total livestock affected: 15,252,908

20. 20 Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties and Vaccination Zone Data: NASS, 2007 WhereBovineSwineSheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)181,1061,567,56018,6903,108 Buffer Zone (blue)1,927,95511,423,618133,97923,723 Vaccination Zone (yellow) 1,873,2836,225,637101,50119,698 Total 3,982,34419,216,815254,17043,799 Total livestock affected: 23,453,329

21. 21 California Outbreak: One Infected County WhereBovineSheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)1,071,95671,2101,159 Buffer Zone (blue)1,141,028181,8182,362 Total2,212,984253,0283,521 Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 2,466,012 Data: NASS, 2007 Complete county-level swine data for California is not available.

22. 22 California Outbreak: Five Infected Counties WhereBovineSheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink) 3,029,931183,3215,675 Buffer Zone (blue)1,188,938236,5687,061 Total4,218,869420,38912,736 Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 4,639,258 Data: NASS, 2007 Complete county-level swine data for California is not available.

23. 23 Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Approximately Three Infected Counties WhereBovineSwine*Sheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)900,6541,336,8811,236564 Buffer Zone (blue)3,494,67286518,8164,091 Total4,395,3261,337,74620,0524,655 Total livestock affected: 5,753,124 Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated.

24. 24 Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Six Infected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. WhereBovineSwine*Sheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)1,516,2591,337,1574,5691,633 Buffer Zone (blue)7,549,474146,61539,78312,268 Total9,065,7331,483,77244,35213,901 Total livestock affected: 10,593,857

25. 25 Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Twelve Infected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. WhereBovineSwine*Sheep/GoatsOperations Infected Zone (pink)2,180,2361,476,78314,8733,120 Buffer Zone (blue)12,713,4221,322,64297,64831,298 Total14,893,6582,799,425112,52134,418 Total livestock affected: 17,805,604

26. Safeguarding Animal Health The Complexities of FMD Vaccine Planning 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 Multiple topotypes within each serotype Topotypes within serotype ± cross-reactive Most vaccine inactivated (killed) Molecular vaccines in development (Genvec) Two categories: Emergency Vaccine - ≥ 6 PD 50 Commercial Vaccine - ≥ 3 PD 50 Emergency vaccine stored as concentrate Commercial vaccine stored as finished product Difficult to anticipate what to bank Novel vaccine technology needed

27. Mission Statement The NAFMDVB fosters the preparedness for responding to an FMD outbreak in North America, maintaining expertise in FMD vaccines, vaccine deployment, vaccination and other FMD control measures. The NAFMDVB maintains the repository of vaccine antigen concentrates (VAC) for the production of emergency FMD vaccines.

28. Background Established: In 1982 from a Memorandum of Understanding between United States, Canada, and Mexico to ensure the availability and readiness of vaccines when needed, to control an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in North America. Based on emergency vaccinate to kill strategy Annual contributions from Canada, Mexico and the United States proportional to the susceptible animal population of each country.

29. Two Governing Bodies  The Commission: Chief Veterinary Officer from each country  The Technical Committee (TC):  Comprised of one technical and one regulatory representative from each country.  The TC advises the Commission on matters of a scientific and technical nature.  The TC works in coordination with the Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG) to advise the Commission on policy and implementation of the NAFMDVB program by each member country.  The EMWG is a subcommittee of the North American Animal Health committee (NAAHC) charged with coordinating, harmonizing, and expediting animal health emergency management in North America.

30. NAFMDVB Location  USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.  Under stringent safety and security controls 24/7.

31. Facilities  Laboratory facility for antigen, sera and master seed testing.  Storage facility  Liquid nitrogen freezers for antigens and antigen samples  Refrigerators for pilot vaccines  Access to animal rooms with capacity to house 17 bovines of 400 pounds.

32. USDA-APHIS-VS/NAFMDVB/ US COMMODITY GROUP DELEGATION VISIT LPA 20/02/2014 WELCOME / BIENVENUE / BIENVENIDOS

33. Safeguarding Animal Health

34. Questions?