Presentation on theme: "THE EFFECT OF DEBT CONTRACTING ON VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTING METHOD CHANGES Presented By: Ira geraldina Intan Oviantari Nova Novita."— Presentation transcript:
THE EFFECT OF DEBT CONTRACTING ON VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTING METHOD CHANGES Presented By: Ira geraldina Intan Oviantari Nova Novita
Outline Introduction Research Questions Hypothesis Development Methodology Results Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions
INTRODUCTION Debt contracts that make covenant thresholds a function of financial ratios give borrowers an incentive to change accounting methods to avoid costly covenant violations (WZ, 1986) The evidence on whether accounting choices are motivated by debt covenant concerns is inconclusive (Fields et al., 2001)
Notes to Previous Researches It does not use the details of firms actual debt contracts assumes that contract calculations are based on current accounting methods It focuses exclusively on debt covenants, ignores other accounting-based features of debt contracts, such as performance pricing It focused on borrowers who were either close to violating or had already violated covenants
Beatty & Weber Research Examine accounting methods changes on income increasing choices for firms that allows to do so by debt contract Examine the effect of accounting based performance pricing as incentive to increasing income by changing accounting methods Examine all accounting changing motivations
Specifics Research Questions Does allowing accounting changes to affect debt contract calculations influence accounting choice? Do the expected costs of covenant violations influence accounting choice? Does performance pricing influence accounting choice? Do dividend restrictions influence accounting choice?
H2 Borrowers whose bank debt contracts allow voluntary accounting changes to affect contract calculation will be less likely to make income increasing (rather than income-decreasing) accounting method changes when they expect lower technical default cost
Hypothesis Development (Q3) Asquith et al (2002) Interest rate charged on loan in the average increase in interest rates charged when the borrowers performance one performance pricing level is 15 basis points Beatty et al (2002) A contract with performance pricing has a covenant based on the performance pricing ration Performance pricing provide an additional incentive for borrowers to make income increasing accounting method changes
H3 Borrowers with debt contracts allowing voluntary accounting method changes to affect contract calculations will be more likely to make income increasing (rather than income decreasing) accounting changes if their contracts include accounting based performance pricing in addition to traditional covenants
Hypothesis Development (Q4) Healy & Palepu (1990) Borrowers incentive to make an income increasing accounting change may be lower for covenants affected by dividend payments Sweeney (1994) Covenants affected by dividend payments are more likely than other covenants to be binding, give a greater incentive to make an income increasing accounting chan
H4 The likelihood that borrowers with debt contracts allowing voluntary accounting method changes to affect contract calculations make income increasing (rather than income decreasing) accounting method change will depend on whether their debt contracts contain accounting based dividend restrictions
Sample To Identify firms that change accounting method, We search all annual 10-K or quarterly 10-Q reports available on Lexis/Nexis from 1995-2000 for exhibit 18 disclosures. Then read each exhibit 18 report to determine whether the firm made a material accounting change. Table 1 describe the results of this sample selection process.
We argue that our inferences are unlikely to be an artifact or sample selection bias for two reasons. First, we examine the types of accounting changes made by the firms we exclude. And the effects of these changes on net income, to ensure that our data requirements are not systematically related to our dependent variable. We conclude that our data requirements did not results in an endogenous sample bias. Second, we compare other characteristics or our sample firms and the exclude firms to ensure that our data these two groups of firm are not systematically different on other dimensions. We confirmed that these characteristics did not differ between the sample and exclude borrowers after partitioning on the accounting changes effect on net income.
Table 6 Model 1 Test H1 and H2 has explanatory power of 24,3% Model 2 Test H3 and H4 has explanatory power of 27,8%
Support H1 (Table 6 Model 1) Indicates; borrower more likely to make changes that increase income when the changes affect debt contract calculation Acc_Change: Significant and positive coefficient Borrowers are 39% (1.57x0.25) more likely to make income increasing accounting changes when their debt contracts allow the accounting changes to affect contract calculation Amemiya (1981,1488): prob X 0.25
Support H2 (Table 6 Model 1) One_Lender: Significant negatif Technical default cost are lower = less likely to make income increasing acc changes
Support H3 (Table 6 Model 2) 59% (2.34x0.25) borrower more likely to make income increasing when the changes not only affect their covenant, but also affect their interest rates through performance pricing provision PP: significant and positive
Support H4 (Table 6 Model 2) Div_Res: Significant positive 46% (1.84x0.25) borrowers are more likely to make income increasing acc method changes when the changes affect their dividend restriction
Table 6 Model 2 PP&Div_Res significant and positive: indicates that borrowers with both performance pricing and dividend restriction are 50% (2.02x0.25) The insignificant coefficient on NoPPorDiv_Res indicates that we find no evidence that borrowers without performance pricing or dividend restriction were more likely to report income increasing acc method changes.
Management Compensation Incentive Management compensation incentives influence the choice between income increasing and income decreasing acc method changes. When managers receive accounting-based performance bonuses (COMP) they are more likely to make income icreasing changes. Consistent with a big bathstory, borrowers with new CEOs who report large losses before the effect s of the accounting method changes (LGLOSS_ CEO) are more likely to report income decreasing accountingchanges. _
Noncontracting Motives Noncontracting motives to manage earnings affect borrowers decisions to make income increasing vs income decreasing acc method changes. Borrowers with share listed on a major exchange expecting to report a small loss prior to the acc method change (SMLOSS) are more likely to report an income increasing changes, while those not listed on a major exchange are more likely to report an income decreasing change (SMLOSS_NL) This is consistent with Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) conclusion that exchange –listed firms are more likely to manage earnings to beat earnings benchmark than are firms that are not listed on a major exchange.
External Parties External parties affect accounting choices Borrowers with NOL carryforwards who make accounting changes affecting taxes are more likely to amke income-increasing accounting changes than borrowers without such carryforwards.
Sensitivity Analysis (Table 7) Signed Magnitude of Income Effect Debt Contracting Variable
Signed Magnitude of Income Effect (Table 7) The result are largely consistent with those from logistic analysis (table 6 ). Support H1: borrowers make accounting changes that have more positive effects on income when the acc changes affect their debt contract calculation. Support H2: borrowers make acc changes that have a less positive effect on income when the acc changes affect their debt contract calculation,but the costs of covenant violation are lower because all of their bank debt contracts are with a single lender. Support H3 and H4: borrowers whose bank debt has performance pricing and dividend restrictions make acc changes that have a more positive effect on income and, in fact, these appear to be the most significant debt contracting factors explaining the magnitude of the income effect. The result on control variable largely conform to the result from previous analyses. The performance based-executive bonus compensation variable (COMP) is insignificant in rank regressions.
The Sensitivity of Rank Regression (Table 7) Re-estimate the regression result without ranking the data. After winsorizing the dependent variable for three outliers that fall more than 5 standard deviation from the mean Obtain result similar to those in table 7 First specification Obtain similar result when re-estimate the rank regression using the unscaled income effect of the accounting method changes as dependent variable. Second specification
Debt Contracting Variable (PUB_COV) equal to 1 for firm with covenants on non bank debt (another debt contracting variable) Coefficient (PUB_COV) is insignificant See Smith and Warner, 1979 (PUB_COV X (1-ACC_COV) equal to 1 if the borrower has public debt and accounting changes do not affect bank-debt calculation (PUB_COV X (1-ACC_COV) is insignificant indicating that covenant on public debt do not appear to affect whether borrower accounting changes are income increasing vs income decreasing regardless of whether borrowers acc changes affect bank debt calculations.
Debt Contracting Variable One_Lender See El-Gazaar and Pastena, 1991 The number of covenants is not significant in this model Indicate either that the initial covenant tighness is not an important of the subsequent acc choice decision, or that the number of covenants is not a good proxy for covenant tighness
Fact (1) Many recent debt contract do not allow borrowers to use voluntary accounting method changes to affect contract calculation (2) Debt contracts often include performance pricing features as well as debt covenants (3) Debt contracting decisions may affect accounting choices of borrowerswho are not approaching covenant violations
Conclusions When debt contracts allow these changes to affect contract calculation. Income Increasing When the borrower expect cost of technical violation to be lower because all of the borrowers bank debt is from a single lender. The increase of income increasing lower Executive compensation incentives, incentives to meet earning benchmark, and incentives to reduces taxes. These results, which hold even after controlling other motives
Conclusions Borrrower that voluntary change their acc methods Income increasing if their debt contracts include acc-based- performance pricing or dividend restriction Incentives to lower interest rate through performance pricing or to retain dividend payment influence borrower acc choices Addresing Fields et al.(2001) fundamental question of whether, under what circumtances, and how accounting chice matters
Data Limitations Do not include borrower that do not file their bank debt contracts with SEC To mitigate this concern, provide evidence that these borrowers made voluntary acc changes 1 Cannot directly test whether an accounting changes 2