Presentation on theme: "The Effect of Debt Contracting on Voluntary Accounting Method Changes"— Presentation transcript:
1The Effect of Debt Contracting on Voluntary Accounting Method Changes Presented By:Ira geraldinaIntan OviantariNova Novita
2Outline Introduction Research Questions Hypothesis Development MethodologyResultsSensitivity AnalysisConclusions
3INTRODUCTIONDebt contracts that make covenant thresholds a function of financial ratios give borrowers an incentive to change accounting methods to avoid costly covenant violations(WZ, 1986)The evidence on whether accounting choices are motivated by debt covenant concerns is inconclusive(Fields et al., 2001)
4Notes to Previous Researches It does not use the details of firms’ actual debt contracts assumes that contract calculations are based on current accounting methodsIt focuses exclusively on debt covenants, ignores other accounting-based features of debt contracts, such as performance pricingIt focused on borrowers who were either close to violating or had already violated covenants
5Beatty & Weber Research Examine accounting methods changes on income increasing choices for firms that allows to do so by debt contractExamine the effect of accounting based performance pricing as incentive to increasing income by changing accounting methodsExamine all accounting changing motivations
6Primary Research Question Firm’s bank contractsAccounting ChoicesIncome increasing or decreasing
7Specifics Research Questions Does allowing accounting changes to affect debt contract calculations influence accounting choice?Do the expected costs of covenant violations influence accounting choice?Does performance pricing influence accounting choice?Do dividend restrictions influence accounting choice?
8Hypothesis Development (Q1) Healy & Palepu (1990)Change accounting methods to increase dividend covenant restrictions limitsSweeny (1994)Change accounting methods to avoid violating financial covenant designed to monitor borrowers’ performanceMohrman (1996); Beatty et al (2002)Debt contract calculations are often based on the accounting rules
9H1Borrowers who change accounting methods will be more likely to make income-increasing (rather than income-decreasing) accounting method changes when such changes affect covenant calculations
10Hypothesis Development (Q2) WZ, 1986Costly covenant violations give borrowers an incentives to make income increasing accounting methods changes to create slack in covenantsBenish & Press (1993)Covenant violations cost the borrowers an average 80 basis point increase in the interest rate the lender charges on loan after renegotiationHealy & Palepu (1990)Firms preferred to cut the dividends they pay rather than violate the dividend restricting covenant
11H2Borrowers whose bank debt contracts allow voluntary accounting changes to affect contract calculation will be less likely to make income increasing (rather than income-decreasing) accounting method changes when they expect lower technical default cost
12Hypothesis Development (Q3) Asquith et al (2002)Interest rate charged on loan in the average increase in interest rates charged when the borrowers ‘ performance one performance pricing level is 15 basis pointsBeatty et al (2002)A contract with performance pricing has a covenant based on the performance pricing rationPerformance pricing provide an additional incentive for borrowers to make income increasing accounting method changes
13H3Borrowers with debt contracts allowing voluntary accounting method changes to affect contract calculations will be more likely to make income increasing (rather than income decreasing) accounting changes if their contracts include accounting based performance pricing in addition to traditional covenants
14Hypothesis Development (Q4) Healy & Palepu (1990)Borrowers incentive to make an income increasing accounting change may be lower for covenants affected by dividend paymentsSweeney (1994)Covenants affected by dividend payments are more likely than other covenants to be binding, give a greater incentive to make an income increasing accounting chan
15H4The likelihood that borrowers with debt contracts allowing voluntary accounting method changes to affect contract calculations make income increasing (rather than income decreasing) accounting method change will depend on whether their debt contracts contain accounting based dividend restrictions
18SampleTo Identify firms that change accounting method, We search all annual 10-K or quarterly 10-Q reports available on Lexis/Nexis from for exhibit 18 disclosures.Then read each exhibit 18 report to determine whether the firm made a material accounting change.Table 1 describe the results of this sample selection process.
20We argue that our inferences are unlikely to be an artifact or sample selection bias for two reasons.First, we examine the types of accounting changes made by the firms we exclude. And the effects of these changes on net income, to ensure that our data requirements are not systematically related to our dependent variable. We conclude that our data requirements did not results in an endogenous sample bias.Second, we compare other characteristics or our sample firms and the exclude firms to ensure that our data these two groups of firm are not systematically different on other dimensions. We confirmed that these characteristics did not differ between the sample and exclude borrowers after partitioning on the accounting changes’ effect on net income.
28Table 6 Model 1 Test H1 and H2 has explanatory power of 24,3% Model 2
29Support H1 (Table 6 Model 1) Acc_Change:Significant and positive coefficientIndicates; borrower more likely to make changes that increase income when the changes affect debt contract calculationAmemiya (1981,1488):∆ prob X 0.25Borrowers are 39% (1.57x0.25) more likely to make income increasing accounting changes when their debt contracts allow the accounting changes to affect contract calculation
30Support H2 (Table 6 Model 1) One_Lender:Significant negatifTechnical default cost are lower = less likely to make income increasing acc changes
31Support H3 (Table 6 Model 2) PP: significant and positive59% (2.34x0.25) borrower more likely to make income increasing when the changes not only affect their covenant, but also affect their interest rates through performance pricing provision
32Support H4 (Table 6 Model 2) Div_Res:Significant positive46% (1.84x0.25) borrowers are more likely to make income increasing acc method changes when the changes affect their dividend restriction
33Table 6 Model 2PP&Div_Res significant and positive: indicates that borrowers with both performance pricing and dividend restriction are 50% (2.02x0.25)The insignificant coefficient on NoPPorDiv_Res indicates that we find no evidence that borrowers without performance pricing or dividend restriction were more likely to report income increasing acc method changes.
34Management Compensation Incentive Management compensation incentives influence the choice between income increasing and income decreasing acc method changes.When managers receive accounting-based performance bonuses (COMP) they are more likely to make income icreasing changes.Consistent with a “big bath”story, borrowers with new CEOs who report large losses before the effect s of the accounting method changes (LGLOSS_∆CEO) are more likely to report income decreasing accountingchanges._
35Noncontracting Motives Noncontracting motives to manage earnings affect borrowers’ decisions to make income increasing vs income decreasing acc method changes.Borrowers with share listed on a major exchange expecting to report a small loss prior to the acc method change (SMLOSS) are more likely to report an income increasing changes, while those not listed on a major exchange are more likely to report an income decreasing change (SMLOSS_NL)This is consistent with Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) conclusion that exchange –listed firms are more likely to manage earnings to beat earnings benchmark than are firms that are not listed on a major exchange.
36External Parties External parties affect accounting choices Borrowers with NOL carryforwards who make accounting changes affecting taxes are more likely to amke income-increasing accounting changes than borrowers without such carryforwards.
37Sensitivity Analysis (Table 7) Signed Magnitude of Income EffectDebt Contracting Variable
38Signed Magnitude of Income Effect (Table 7) The result are largely consistent with those from logistic analysis (table 6).Support H1: borrowers make accounting changes that have more positive effects on income when the acc changes affect their debt contract calculation.Support H2: borrowers make acc changes that have a less positive effect on income when the acc changes affect their debt contract calculation,but the costs of covenant violation are lower because all of their bank debt contracts are with a single lender.Support H3 and H4: borrowers whose bank debt has performance pricing and dividend restrictions make acc changes that have a more positive effect on income and, in fact, these appear to be the most significant debt contracting factors explaining the magnitude of the income effect.The result on control variable largely conform to the result from previous analyses.The performance based-executive bonus compensation variable (COMP) is insignificant in rank regressions.Of covenant violation
39The Sensitivity of Rank Regression (Table 7) First specificationRe-estimate the regression result without ranking the data.After winsorizing the dependent variable for three outliers that fall more than 5 standard deviation from the meanObtain result similar to those in table 7Second specificationObtain similar result when re-estimate the rank regression using the unscaled income effect of the accounting method changes as dependent variable.
40Debt Contracting Variable (PUB_COV) equal to 1 for firm with covenants on non bank debt (another debt contracting variable)Coefficient (PUB_COV) is insignificantSee Smith and Warner, 1979(PUB_COV X (1-ACC_COV) equal to 1 if the borrower has public debt and accounting changes do not affect bank-debt calculation(PUB_COV X (1-ACC_COV) is insignificant indicating that covenant on public debt do not appear to affect whether borrower’ accounting changes are income increasing vs income decreasing regardless of whether borrowers’ acc changes affect bank debt calculations.
41Debt Contracting Variable One_LenderSee El-Gazaar and Pastena, 1991The number of covenants is not significant in this modelIndicate either that the initial covenant tighness is not an important of the subsequent acc choice decision, or that the number of covenants is not a good proxy for covenant tighness
43Fact(1) Many recent debt contract do not allow borrowers to use voluntary accounting method changes to affect contract calculation(2) Debt contracts often include performance pricing features as well as debt covenants(3) Debt contracting decisions may affect accounting choices of borrowerswho are not approaching covenant violations
44Conclusions Income Increasing When debt contracts allow these changes to affect contract calculation.The increase of income increasing lowerWhen the borrower expect cost of technical violation to be lower because all of the borrowers’ bank debt is from a single lender.These results, which hold even after controlling other motivesExecutive compensation incentives, incentives to meet earning benchmark, and incentives to reduces taxes.
45ConclusionsBorrrower that voluntary change their acc methods →Income increasing → if their debt contracts include acc-based-performance pricing or dividend restrictionIncentives to lower interest rate through performance pricing or to retain dividend payment influence borrower acc choicesAddresing Fields et al.(2001) fundamental question of whether, under what circumtances, and how accounting chice matters
46Data Limitations1Do not include borrower that do not file their bank debt contracts with SECTo mitigate this concern, provide evidence that these borrowers made voluntary acc changes2Cannot directly test whether an accounting changes