1. Decline of the isolation policy in the peripheries of Europe Libya and Belarus. Comparison of experiences in returning to the international stage.

2. PRESENTATION BY: JĘDRZEJ CZEREP (PULASKI FOUNDATION) JCZEREP@PULASKI.PL WARSAW, 07.05.2009

3. new internal developments? business? new international challenges?

4. 1. REASONS FOR THE LONG LASTING ISOLATION

5. LIBYA - Country hostile to the US / West since the early 80s - Of proven involvement in terror attacks (Berlin 86, Lockerbie 88) - Supporting rebel / terror groups from different countries - Developing nuclear program, weapons of mass destruction BELARUS - 1996 referendum on amendments to Constitution rejected by the US and EU - Involvement in disapearing of opposition figures - 2004 referendum on 3rd term for Lukashenko - political prisoners

6. 2. RECENT CHANGES IN EU, US POLICIES ON LIBYA, BELARUS

7. US ON LIBYA: - country listed on a black list of terrorist supporters /removed in June 2006/ (however: still alleged involvement in armed conflicts such as in Somalia) - economic sanctions (ban on direct import and export trade, commercial contracts /lifted April-July 2004 when weapons os mass destr. returned/ (however: May 2004 IAEA report: Libya still looking for nuclear technology) - no diplomatic relations /officials visiting Libya since 2003, ambassadors exchanged in January 2009/

8. EU ON LIBYA: - Political and limited economic sanctions /lifted in 2004 after compensations for Lockerbie families agreed/ (however: Libya expressed responsibility but „not being guilty”) - embargo on selling arms to Libya /lifted in 2004 on Italian request/ (however: still alleged involvement in armed conflicts such as in Somalia) - no diplomatic relations /officials visiting Libya since 2003, Qaddafi visiting Europe since 2004 (after 15 years)/

9. US ON BELARUS: - Diplomatic sanctions - economic sanctions on Belarusian firms (imposed on late 2006 / early 2007) /partially suspended September 2008 when political prisoners released/ (however: new political prisoners could possibly be detained)

10. EU ON BELARUS: - Diplomatic sanctions for members of the regime /suspended October 2008 when progress in elections and release of political prisoners observed/ (however: no opposition in the parliament, new political prisoners could possibly be detained) - no high level political contacts /officials visising Belarus since 2008, Lukashenko visiting Europe since April 2009 after 14 years/

12. 3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS

13. General: - Location on the peripheries of Europe - Great level of state control - Long lasting political isolation - Relatively high standard of life (compared to the rest of the respected sub region) - Limited role of the private sector - Low Economic Freedom Index - Corruption Perception Index- badly ranked (compared to sub regions) - Internal political stability (compared to sub regions) - Not being source of human migration

14. 3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, General (ANNEX 1) Location on the peripheries of Europe, map [SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA]

15. GDP (PPP) / capita Belarus 12,300 Azerb. 8,600 Ukraine 7,300 Armenia 5,300 Georgia 4,900 Moldova 3,100 (Region average ~ 5,800) Libya 14,500 Lebanon 13,000 Tunisia 7,900 Algeria 6,700 Egypt 5,900 Jordan 5,300 Syria 4,700 Morocco 4,300 (Region average ~ 5,900) 3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, General (ANNEX 2) [SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FOUND, 2008]

16. Corruption Perception Index 47. Jordan 5,1 62. Tunisia 4,4 80. Morocco 3,5 92. Algeria 3,2 102. Lebanon 3,0 115. Egypt 2,8 126. Libya 2,6 147. Syria 2,1 67 Georgia 3,9 109 Armenia 2,9 109 Moldova 2,9 134 Ukraine 2,5 151 Belarus 2,0 158 Azerbaijan 1,9 3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, General (ANNEX 3) [SOURCE; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2008]

17. Similarities in political systems: - Personal charisma of the leaders - No developed party system - Importance of ideology, though ideological shifts observed

18. 4. DIFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS

19. LIBYA Countries of special interest: US, Italy, EU BELARUS Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Germany, EU

20. LIBYABELARUS EU foreign policy framework related: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) (Libya not taking part), Union for the Mediterranean (2008) (Libya invited but very critical; not willing to take part) European Neighborhood Policy (2004) (Belarus not taking part), Eastern Partnership (2009) (Belarus invited to take part)

21. 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, EU Foreign Policy Framework (ANNEX 1) Union for the Mediterranean, map [SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA]

22. 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, EU Foreign Policy Framework (ANNEX 2) Eastern Partnership, map (originally not including Belarus) [SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA]

23. LIBYABELARUS as a regional actor: - Independent decision maker - Influential in Africa - Aid donor - Experienced and efficient diplomacy and intelligence - Strongly dependent on Russia in decision making - Not active as a regional political player

24. 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Libya as a regional actor (ANNEX 1) Libyan owned school of Arabic, Nouakchott, Mauritania [PICTURE BY JĘDRZEJ CZEREP]

25. 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Libya as a regional actor (ANNEX 2) [SOURCE: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6051320.stm ]

26. LIBYABELARUS Economic importance in hydrocarbone: Major producer and exporter of oil and gas Major transit country for oil / gas transportation

27. 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Economic importance in hydrocarbone (ANNEX 1) North African Pipelines to Europe, map

28. 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Economic importance in hydrocarbone (ANNEX 2) Russian Pipelines to Europe, map

29. 5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION

30. LIBYA’s EXTERNAL PRESSIONS (1): - Libia’s cooperation needed for combating illegal migrations /need of lifting EU arms embargo to equip Libya’s patrolling boats/

31. LIBYA’s EXTERNAL PRESSIONS (2): - Economic potential of Libya’s gas and oil resources (40 billion barrels of oil and 1500 trillion cube meters of gas; only 24% of the sites being exploited) /need to lift sanctions to launch extraction projects/ (ENI / Agip- launched Greenstream in 2004)

32. LIBYA’s EXTERNAL PRESSIONS (3): - Impact of 9/11 /need to declare support to US war on terror/

33. LIBYA’s INTERNAL MOTIVATIONS: - Need of new markets - Plans to build commercial ports, expand tourism

34. 5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION, Libya’s external pressions (ANNEX 1) Major migration routes to Europe, map [SOURCE: International Centre for Migration Policy Development]

35. BELARUS’ EXTERNAL PRESSIONS: Russia’s plans to become direct supporter to Europe /pressure to look for new role than only a transit country/ EU’s plans to include Belarus in Eastern Partnership (to promote democracy, challenge Russia)

36. BELARUS’ INTERNAL MOTIVATIONS: Bargaining game with Russia

37. 5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION, Belarus’ external pressions (ANNEX 1) Russian projected oil pipeline BTS-2 (Uniecza-Primorsk), map [SOURCE: GAZETA PRAWNA]

38. 5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION, Belarus’ external pressions (ANNEX 2) Russian projected gas pipelins (Nord Stream, South Stream), map [SOURCE: STRATEGIC FORECASTING, 2008]

40. 6. PROSPECTS FOR BELARUS DERIVED FROM THE LIBYAN EXPERIENCE

41. Negative prospects for Belarus: Threats it uses may not exist in near future. It needs to have an economic offer, economically predictable future (like Libya). Being an independent (like Libya) decision maker is essential for being a reliable partner.

42. Positive prospects for Belarus: Rhetoric level is secondary in the process of ending isolation. No serious change of system of values is required for ending isolation (Libya welcomed back despite far more serious problems) Chance in involvement in Eastern Partnership - related projects, developing trade route to Baltic Sea