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Security Testing & The Depth Behind OWASP Top 10

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Presentation on theme: "Security Testing & The Depth Behind OWASP Top 10"— Presentation transcript:

1 Security Testing & The Depth Behind OWASP Top 10
Yaniv Simsolo, CISSP Image: Hubble Telescope: The cat’s eye nebula

2 OWASP Top 10 2013 OWASP Top 10 – 2013 has evolved: 2013-A1 – Injection
2013-A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management 2013-A3 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 2013-A4 – Insecure Direct Object References 2013-A5 – Security Misconfiguration 2013-A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure 2013-A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control 2013-A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 2013-A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components (NEW) 2013-A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

3 OWASP Top 10 2013 OWASP Top 10 – 2013 Resources:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-Top_10 OWASP Top presentation by Dave Wichers, on the OWASP web site

4 Mapping Top 10: From 2010 to 2013 Source: OWASP Top presentation by Dave Wichers

5 Assumptions In Information Security – several top 10 exist
OWASP Top 10 is dominant “Top 3”: we all know about XSS’s Injections, CSRF’s etc. Most organizations are well aware of these issues

6 Assumptions OK. What now?
“Top 6” = (“Top 3”) + (“we test what we can”): Broken authentication and session management Unvalidated redirects and forwards Insecure direct object references Most organizations are aware of these issues OK, What now?

7 What did we miss? Security misconfiguration – A5.
Missing Function Level access control – A7. Using known vulnerable components – A9 A6 – sensitive data exposure now includes a merge of: Insufficient transport layer protection (2010 – A9) Insecure cryptographic storage (2010-A7)

8 What did we miss? Security misconfiguration – A5.
(almost) not Web Application but: Application/system Missing Function Level access control – A7. Partial Web Application, Partial Application/system Using known vulnerable components – A9 (almost) not Web Application but: Application/syste

9 What did we miss? A6 – sensitive data exposure now includes a merge of: Insufficient transport layer protection (2010 – A9) Insecure cryptographic storage (2010-A7) Is this just Web Application? Is the problem more severe once we look below the Web Layer?

10 What did we miss? Example
Security misconfiguration – A5 + Using known vulnerable components – A9 = Perimeter is not working

11 The Problem  Image: Hubble Telescope: The cat’s eye nebula

12 Over Complexity Too much data Endless attack possibilities
Too many security solutions, vendors, products No homogenous approach

13 The Attack Vectors Any (communication) channel Any system
Any infrastructure Any interface Any communication Any encryption Any language Any environment Any architecture Any site (including DR) Any component Any transaction Any information, any data Any log and audit trail Any archive Any physical layer Any process (operations, ongoing, development) Any logical layer Any storage device / facility

14 The Attack Types Any (communication) channel Any system
Takeover Data theft Data tampering System integrity disruption Business Logic manipulation Eavesdropping Backdoors – built in by design Backdoors – creation by attackers Unintentional attacks Intentional by authorized entities Attacks by non-human entities Denial of Service De Facto Denial of Service Authorization bypass Access bypass Smuggling, Splitting and evasion-type attacks Any (communication) channel Any system Any infrastructure Any interface Any communication Any encryption Any language Any environment Any architecture Any site (including DR) Any component Any transaction Any information, any data Any log and audit trail Any archive Any physical layer Any process (operations, ongoing, development) Any logical layer Any storage device / facility

15 The Problem Even the simplified security areas present a demanding challenge. For example - XSS: Very difficult to detect all variants in modern systems Almost impossible to retain high security level once achieved

16 Common Solutions Superficial security tests. Many “good reasons”:
Budget Time constraints Lack of understanding Over complexity

17 Common Solutions Impacts of superficial security tests in the long run? Partial to no security Poor security practices These organizations effect the security market, pulling downwards! Loss or partial integrity of security professionals Worse still: false sense of security

18 Where Did That Got Us? Ludicrous security warnings:
January 2013: Department of Homeland Security: Do not use Java. Remove the JRE. April 2014: Department of Homeland Security: Versions 6 – 11 of IE are not to be used. April 2014: OpenSSL is insecure

19 Where Did That Got Us? Poor security in design and architecture
(Almost) no security in Agile/Continuous Delivery developed code

20 Modern Systems Common Pitfall
Modern systems are more secured. ???

21 Where Did That Got Us? Challenging security presentations:
In-Depth Security is dead (RSA conference 2011) Security is dead (Rugged coding - RSA conference 2012) Ignorance is bliss….

22 Security Testing  Image: Hubble Telescope: The cat’s eye nebula

23 How to Test? This is messy. VERY messy. There are shortcuts

24 How to Test? Actually – most is quiet easy to test. Go back to theory.
Forget about the payloads.

25 The Fallback Common Option
Test the GUI Black Box testing methodology Exclude the difficult stuff from scope This is a “good” solution: it fits organizations and security professionals

26 The Fallback Common Option
“The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge.” ― Stephen Hawking Testing just the GUI illusion of knowledge Testing just the FE illusion of security Increasingly often we are requested to test much less than the actual scope. Consider carefully prior to testing – what should be the actual testing scope

27 How to test? “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.” Sun Tzu Common Mobile WCF architecture Where is the presentation layer? Which entities are granted access to business logic? “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.” Sun Tzu Common Mobile WCF architecture Where is the presentation layer? Which entities are granted access to business logic?

28 How to test? OWASP top 10 – mobile:
Source: OWASP Top 10 Mobile project

29 The Oracle Exadata Example
Oracle Exadata simplified: Data Warehouse platform Consolidation/Grid platform Storage platform Exadata security best practices consist of: The “regular stuff” Database standard security Data Warehouse specialized security Consolidation/Grid specialized security

30 The Oracle Exadata Example
Oracle Exadata (as a database platform) Security Testing Benchmark: Organization A tested: The databases The environments The Data Warehouse specialized security The Exadata itself Organization B tested: Just some deployed databases Partial security testing for each database Worse still: Exadata not to be tested as a policy Who said: 2013-A5 Security Misconfiguration?

31 Testing A5, A7, A9 “If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles”, Sun Tzu Do we really know ourselves? Where are A5, A7 and A9 implemented? Not testing the BE  illusion of knowing

32 The Windows XP Example Organization C, defines and enforces strict development and deployment security standards towards all its suppliers/customers. Over 60 pages of procedures and instructions. Insisting on supporting Windows XP based systems. Who said: 2013-A9 Using Known Vulnerable Components?

33 2013-A9 Using known Vulnerable Components
A vendor offers DBAAS Excellent: beat the market offering *AAS something... How can the organization trust the security of DBAAS? Will separation be enforced? Will compartmentalization be enforced? Did we really tested and can trust the Cloud on which the DBAAS is based?

34 Declarative Security What?
One of the foundations of modern languages run-time security. Mostly ignored or bypassed. Who said: Security misconfiguration – A5, Missing Function Level access control – A7?

35 Declarative Security “Deployment descriptors must provide certain structural information for each component if this information has not been provided in annotations or is not to be defaulted.” (Oracle docs.)

36 Declarative Security “Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their projections. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment — that which they cannot anticipate.” Sun Tzu Lack or weak declarative security: Once code access achieved – the extraordinary will be feasible.

37 Declarative Security Poor design due to no design
Cancelling off declarative security or ignoring declarative security  revoking language security fundamentals. Common real life deployment descriptors:  Killing my own code! // Do what you will. Totally permissive policy file. grant { permission java.security.AllPermission; };

38 Reverse Engineering (A5, A6, A9)
What for? Why for Mobile security testing ONLY? From Wikipedia: Reverse engineering is the process of discovering the technological principles of a device, object, or system through analysis of its structure, function, and operation.

39 Testing A2, A5, A6 2013 A6 – Sensitive data exposure
2013 A5 – Security misconfiguration 2013 A2 – Broken authentication Too much use of “third singulars” The actual minute details of the tested object dissolve

40 2013-A5 Security Misconfiguration
There is no external access! The intended users will only perform intended actions… Virtualization  Separation

41 2013-A5 Security Misconfiguration
How do organizations secure legacy unsecured systems? Install terminals (e.g. Citrix) as the presentation layer / access control layer. Challenge: manage multiple users across multiple systems. Result: the terminals are partially secure. Too many terminals to manage over long periods Some insecure The insecure terminals are the attacker entry points.

42 Critical Thinking Any (communication) channel Any system
Takeover Data theft Data tampering System integrity disruption Business Logic manipulation Eavesdropping Backdoors – built in by design Backdoors – creation by attackers Unintentional attacks Intentional by authorized entities Attacks by non-human entities Denial of Service De Facto Denial of Service Authorization bypass Access bypass Smuggling, Splitting and evasion-type attacks Any (communication) channel Any system Any infrastructure Any interface Any communication Any encryption Any language Any environment Any architecture Any site (including DR) Any component Any transaction Any information, any data Any log and audit trail Any archive Any physical layer Any process (operations, ongoing, development) Any logical layer Any storage device / facility

43 Critical Thinking Critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally. This requires reflective and independent thinking. (Philosophy field) For organization security is too difficult: over complexity, too much to orchestrate, etc. Increasingly often we are requested to test much less than the actual scope. Some organizations will not be educated. Push the industry back up with those organizations that can be educated.

44 Critical Thinking For the security professionals, security is a challenge. Hence, always employ critical thinking and review the process of testing itself. Flexibility under varying technologies Use automated testing tools to the max AND be always aware of their limitations Scoping accurately is mandatory

45 Qustions? Yaniv Simsolo, CISSP
Image: Hubble Telescope: The cat’s eye nebula


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