1. Figure 3 Rule of law and cost of enforcement EBA
Figure 3 Rule of law and cost of enforcement EBA. The histograms displayed above represent the empirical distributions of coefficient estimates on cost of enforcement of contracts and rule of law, which were obtained from and EBA implemented in R package ‘ExtremeBounds’. The blue line represents the kernel density curve and the green line represents a normal distribution with the same mean and variance as that of our coefficient estimates for comparison. Horizontal axis represents the values of coefficient estimates and the vertical axis represents the corresponding probability density. The full report of EBA is available in Table A3.
From: What turns cities into international financial centres? Analysis of cross-border investment banking 2000–2014
J Econ Geogr. Published online May 24, doi: /jeg/lbx008
J Econ Geogr | © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please

2. Figure 2 Effects of legal variables across conditional quantiles
Figure 2 Effects of legal variables across conditional quantiles. The horizontal axis represents conditional quantiles at which the coefficients were estimated. Vertical axis represents the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. The grey polygon with red borders represents the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimates. The black horizontal line represents zero and can be used to construct tests of statistical significance by examining whether the 95% confidence interval of coefficient estimates crosses this line. If the confidence interval crosses the black horizontal line going through zero, the given coefficient estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. Both plots are based on the model detailed in Table A5.
From: What turns cities into international financial centres? Analysis of cross-border investment banking 2000–2014
J Econ Geogr. Published online May 24, doi: /jeg/lbx008
J Econ Geogr | © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please

3. Figure 1 EBA results for selected institutional variables
Figure 1 EBA results for selected institutional variables. The histograms displayed above represent the empirical distributions of coefficient estimates of cost of enforcement of contracts, rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability and control of corruption. The blue line represents kernel density curve and the green line represents a normal distribution with the same mean and variance as that of our coefficient estimates for comparison. Horizontal axis represents the values of coefficient estimates and the vertical axis represents the corresponding probability density. Comprehensive EBA report is available in Table A2.
From: What turns cities into international financial centres? Analysis of cross-border investment banking 2000–2014
J Econ Geogr. Published online May 24, doi: /jeg/lbx008
J Econ Geogr | © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please

4. Figure 4 Relationship between market concentration and cross-border fees. The horizontal axis represents the full range of possible values of advisor Herfindahl index at a city level. The vertical axis represents the effect of concentration in the financial advisory cross-border market (at city level) on the natural logarithm of cross-border fees. The maximum of this quadratic function is at Herfindahl index of Coefficient estimates used for plotting this quadratic function were drawn from Table A5.
From: What turns cities into international financial centres? Analysis of cross-border investment banking 2000–2014
J Econ Geogr. Published online May 24, doi: /jeg/lbx008
J Econ Geogr | © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please