1. Voting Theory Part II: Solutions

2. Proposed Solutions Approval Voting Range Voting Instant Runoff Voting Borda Count Modifications –Borda Preferendum –Quota Borda Count –Matrix Vote Non-vote-centric solutions

3. Approval Voting For each candidate, each individual voter either indicates approval, or doesn't Voters can choose multiple candidates Chosen candidates are not ranked Just like Plurality Voting, but without the limitation to one choice The candidate with the highest approval rating wins

4. Approval Voting Approval Voting falls outside the scope of Arrow's Theorem, because the input is not individual preference rankings Approval Voting avoids Arrow problems by restricting the domain (inputs) to simple partitions of the candidate set

5. Approval Voting Advantages of Approval Voting –No Vote Splitting or spoiler effects –Simpler than ranking all the candidates –More informative than Plurality Voting –Permits voters to express their preferences more fully, e.g. indicating approval of third party candidates –Does not reward dishonesty

6. Approval Voting Problems with Approval Voting: –If everyone indicates approval of third party candidates on the assumption that those candidates won't win, those candidates might win, even when most people would really prefer someone else –Violates “reverse symmetry” - two individuals with opposite preferences do not cancel –Can violate IIA

7. Approval Voting Problems with Approval Voting: –Some say that determining the level of approval needed to warrant a vote is difficult –There are concerns that people will vote whimsically –People could also vote strategically, based on information from opinion polls

8. Range Voting Commonly used for product evaluations, internet polls, etc. (Amazon product ratings, movie evaluations) Individuals assign to each candidate a number from a specified range, with higher numbers being better The candidate with the highest average wins

9. Range Voting Range Voting already in use: Voting on Books Some real work towards establishing Range Voting in US politics: http://www.rangevote.net/ http://rangevoting.org/

10. Range Voting Range Voting falls outside the scope of Arrow's Theorem, because the input is not simply individuals' preference rankings Range Voting avoids the problems of Arrow by gathering extra information (i.e. how much candidates are preferred compared to others on the scale)

11. Range Voting Benefits of Range Voting: –Many people are familiar with it, and this will become truer as more people begin to use the internet –More expressive than Approval Voting, Plurality Voting, the Borda Count … –No Vote Splitting or IIA violations –Individual exaggerations have a small long- run impact

12. Range Voting Criticisms of Range Voting: –Dishonesty pays – the best strategy is to give your favorite the maximum score, their competitor the minimum score, and so forth –Some worry that educating the public on the new system would be difficult

13. Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) Voters rank candidates; if a candidate has a majority of 1 st place votes, they win If not, the candidate with the fewest 1 st place votes is eliminated, and those ballots count towards the 2 nd choice candidate This continues until a candidate earns a majority of ballots

14. Instant Runoff Voting Advocates of IRV are hard at work right now, and meeting with success: http://www.fairvote.org/instant-runoff-voting/

15. Instant Runoff Voting Advantages of IRV: –Avoids Vote Splitting –Does not reward dishonesty

16. Instant Runoff Voting Drawbacks to IRV: –The “center squeeze” - since so much emphasis is placed on 1 st place rankings, a moderate candidate with broad approval is likely to get many 2 nd place rankings and be eliminated in favor of more extreme candidates

17. Instant Runoff Voting Drawbacks to IRV: –The “winner turns loser paradox” - a candidate can lose by being ranked higher! –How could that happen? Suppose a liberal candidate takes votes from a conservative, with a moderate in the race If this transfer causes that conservative candidate to lose, their votes will be transferred to the moderate, who may win The liberal would have been happier to keep the conservative in the race, and let them keep those votes

18. Instant Runoff Voting Drawbacks to IRV cont. –Must wait for all ballots to be collected and recorded to start calculating the winner, which would delay election results –When there are many candidates as well, the whole process is time consuming for voter and calculator

19. The Borda Count Recall the standard Borda Count: Voters rank all the candidates, rank numbers are converted to points, and the candidate with the fewest points wins The Borda Count had some problems: –Dishonesty pays –Violates IIA

20. The Borda Count Some Borda Count advocates have tried to improve the system in various ways, and argue that Borda is superior to the other proposals: http://www.deborda.org/ Improvements include embedding Borda voting in a multi-part discussion process

21. Non-Vote-Centric Solutions More generally, broadening democratic participation beyond voting solves many problems. Voters who have previously deliberated may be: – More civic-minded, less selfish voters – Better informed and more rational, e.g. single-peaked preferences – Hence, able to avoid Arrow's Theorem in some cases

22. Non-Vote-Centric Solutions Deliberative polling also has benefits beyond the ballot box: – Results can be given to representatives, and perhaps taken more seriously than non-deliberative polls or petitions – Deliberative experience may promote critical thinking, citizenship and community

23. Other Solutions Electoral reform to embrace third party candidates, reduce gerrymandering, etc. could improve the voting experience independent of changes in how we vote Voting may be less degenerate, and deliberation more practical, on a smaller scale, e.g. with focus on specific community issues, greater individual impact, less special interest money, more sense of shared interests