1. A summary of the SPES Safety Technical Advisory Committee SSTAC Richard Catherall ISOLDE Technical Coordinator 5 th December 2014 INFN, Legnaro

2. The review panel Panel Members – M. Pelliccioni, CNAO, Italy (chair) – R. Catherall, ISOLDE, CERN – A-P Bernardes, ISOLDE, CERN – J. Vollaire, Radiation Protection, CERN – P. Ninin, Access & Safety, CERN – S. de Sermet, CEA, France – R. Levallois, GANIL, France Overall impression – Very impressed with the progress made. The SPES team have fully understood the issues associated with the commissioning and operation of a radioactive ion beam facility and are taking the necessary actions to address them.

3. Outline General Safety Documentation Optimization Safety systems Targets and handling Radiation Protection Vacuum and gas exhaust systems Ventilation

4. General Safety Planning and building layout, decisions already taken but may affect safety aspects – E.g. ventilation of exhaust gas system Would like to see an overall 3D integration of the project – This would be a good starting point for identifying potential safety issues – Help to identify general safety issues Fire detection Sectorisation Power cuts Emergency escape access Give priority to safety study needed for operation of the cyclotron

5. Documentation Although the presentations were very good, the Review Panel felt that there was a lack of official documentation describing specific safety issues. A documentation structure needs to be put in place – Sector description – Functions – Identification of risks – Protective measures…

6. Functional Safety Methodology Preliminary Risks and Hazards Analysis Protection barriers definition and allocation of their respective safety functions Specification of the safety functionsDesign and realisationInstallation, commissioning, validation Operation and maintenanceModificationDismantling 6 P. Ninin

7. Optimisation Move from a conceptual approach to a practical one Iteration of the design process to improve on all safety issues Identify failure scenarios – Then find solutions/barriers Coordination – There was sometimes an impression of a lack of coordination between different groups – Clearly define responsibilities

8. Safety systems Clearly separate between machine safety and personnel protection Minimize the interlocks between the separator operation and cyclotron operation Clear difference between safety chain and interlocks – The latter should be kept to a minimum Target temperature should be one of the few interlocks that stop the beam. Identify different operational modes and access requirements/interlocks – Non-operational – Test mode – Operation modes Planning with milestones for access integration Redundancy with different operating systems Risk analysis should define the safety goal. On-line check if people are allowed in zone?

9. Target Handling Safety engineer is an excellent start – Good that tests have started and scenarios being addressed Should be taken further and test full cycle – Check with other interfaces – doors, storage – Keep slot in planning to test in situ Worse case scenarios – Targets OK, robot OK -combined issues? – Recovery systems Optimisation – Simplify movements – Obtain more information on maintenance/operation – Should the “sarcophage” boxes be seal tight? – no – Should the target storage be ventilated? - yes

10. Scenario – Excessive contamination of the Primary Proton Beam channel 1. Rupture of the graphite window of the PPB channel (mechanical handling of the target) 2. Redundancy of the graphite window located in the target block 3. No detection possible of rupture of the graphite window during beam operation Beam ON Action from the interlocks Proton beam 4. No beam interruption Additional measures: 1.Operating procedure in case of rupture of the graphite window (e.g. closing of PPB and RIB vacuum valves to isolate the target, extraction electrode back to initial position and closing of the shutter) 2.RP procedure to decontaminate the PPB channel 3.How can we detect a rupture of a graphite window in order to assign an interlock (interruption of beam)? Introduction Safety issues regarding the UCx target Safety issues regarding the handling system D. Phan

11. Radioprotection Well understood and good progress is being made Define access requirements to Cyclotron area. Evaluate consequences on interventions and maintenance – Racks inside/access to equipment/ situation of equipment Intervention/maintenance management with respects to RP – Work and dose planning/procedures Make space available for further pumping/collimator etc to limit propagation of volatile radioactivity. – At exit of bunker

12. Radiation Protection Radioactive inventory along beam line Should be a clear document defining boundary conditions – To be used for access, vacuum and ventilation – Cross examination between ISOLDE and SPES on radioactive inventory. Help proposed by J. Vollaire In terms of monitoring, the area is well-covered. Would be nice to have a clear map to overlap with hotspots. Storage – Convinced by the radiation protection issues as presented – Not so convinced by the concept

13. The temporary storage design View from top 44 dedicated locations in order to house irradiated targets inside their shielding boxes (2,5 cm Lead). The target is remotely handled and placed in the farthest available position from corridor The “hottest” target is always put in the farthest place so be shielded by the previous boxes Passage for personnel Courtesy of D. Zafiropoulos

14. Vacuum and gas exhaust systems Appreciate the amount of work invested Optimize the number of oil pumps near FE – Check pumps contamination further down stream Gas storage critical – Monitor in case of leaks – increase in quantity Benchmark calculations against reality – Other facilities or when on-line Estimate hydrogen content – verify Target window not protected – critical scenario Lab dedicated to maintenance – Most vacuum equipment (and others) will be contaminated and a Class A type laboratory should be available – Think about storage of used parts

15. Ventilation Document/Interface to process safety and integration Zoning of the confinement areas – Fire risk analysis, sectors for implementation of fire dampers ISO 17873 – norm for architecture for non reactors Cost for assembly and operation Redundancy Separate air inlet when doing maintenance on the system Filters should be near as possible to equipment Ventilation to be considered for: – Gas storage, target storage, separator areas Ventilation zoning in general 1Bq/g of activated air release is critical to the operation of SPES

16. A Few Final Remarks Training was discussed – Will be working in radioactive areas – CERN welcomes those who want to learn The Panel is willing to review the technical documents – This will provide us with more detailed information. Safety milestone plan would be useful

17. Summary of priorities 1.System integration 2.Risk analysis 3.Documentation 4.Worst case scenarios 5.Optimize – mitigate 6.Test, test and when you’ve finished testing… 7.Test again Thank you for your attention