1. PHIL 340: ANCIENT ETHICAL THEORY Ben Hole, Winter 2016 Office hours after class.

2. Agenda ■Admin stuff? / Where we are and what we’re doing ■Bk. 4 ■Bk. 8 Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 (357-376) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 (357-376); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book 6.13 5, 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non- Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus (278-281); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" 9, 10In-Class Paper Conference

3. Where we are and what we’re doing Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 (357-376) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 (357-376); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book 6.13 5, 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non- Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus (278-281); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" 9, 10In-Class Paper Conference Participation & Reading Philosophy Writing Assignments & Final Paper Questions?

4. Main Argument of the Republic We are happier being just than unjust ■The challenge is for Socrates to show that justice is both valuable fo its own sake and for its rewards ■Does Platonic Justice answer this challenge? ■Immoralist Challenge (Thrasymachus at the end of Book 1) ■Justice by Agreement (Glaucon & Adeimantus in Book 2) ■Platonic Justice (Socrates in Books 2-10) “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 39

5. Book 4 “The kallipolis is pronounced established (427d). Since it is completely good (427e), it must have all the virtues of a city (see 352d-354a), namely, wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. Therefore the search for justice in it is guaranteed not to be futile. By the time that search has concluded (434d), wisdom, courage, moderation and justice have each been identified with distinct structural features of the kallipolis, but those identifications will not be secure until the very same features are shown to be identical to those virtues in the individual soul (434d-435a). This leads to the argument for division of the soul into three parts – appetitive, spirited, rational – corresponding to the three major classes in the kallipolis – producers, guardians, rulers (435c-441c). Once this argument is complete, it remains to find the virtues in the soul and to show that they are the same structural features of it as of the kallipolis (441c-444a).” Reeve, 94-5

6. Plato’s 4 Cardinal Virtues ■prudence: φρόνησις (phronēsis) ■courage: ἀ νδρεία (andreia) ■temperance: σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē) ■justice: δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē)

7. Psyche-Polis Isomorphism (Keyt) ■“if (i) two systems have the same number of parts, ■if (ii) the parts of the one system can be paired one to one with the parts of the other on the basis of the kinds to which the parts belong, ■if (iii) these kinds of parts are the seats of certain affections, ■and if (iv) the one system has a quality in virtue of its parts having such an affection, ■then (v) the other system has the same quality if its parts have the same affection” (Keyt, Plato on Justice, 2006, 349)

8. Platonic Moral Psychology Three Stages of Argument 1.Individual psychic activities can be collected and divided naturally into three kinds, “desiring”, getting angry, and reasoning 2.Examples are given of evident conflicts among such activities 3.From these conflicts, the principle of contrariety, and the unspoken assumption that psychic activities of a given kind imply psychic powers of that kind, the non identity of three powers is inferred, each power being named after the kind of activity it uniquely performs: “naming that by which reasons the reasoning, that by which it erotically loves, hungers, thirsts and feels the flutter and titillation of other appetites, the a- rational and appetitive… and that by which we feel anger, spirit (439d.ff).” (Santas, 80)

9. Platonic Moral Psychology ■Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) ■Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439-441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

10. Platonic Moral Psychology ■Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) ■Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439-441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

11. Platonic Moral Psychology ■Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) ■Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439-441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

12. Platonic Moral Psychology ■Principle of Contraries: “the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time” (436b) ■Santas: “evidence of psychic conflicts within the following pairs of psychic activities: (1) between desiring food, drink, or sex and refusing to indulge due to reasoning, from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and of desiring these things is inferred (439); (2) between desiring something and being angry at one’s desiring it (the case of Leontius who desired to see dead bodies and was angry at himself for that (439-441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of desiring and of feeling angry is inferred; (3) between feeling angry at something and calculating that it is best not to act on one’s anger (the case of Ulysses who became furious at his betraying servants but was held back from punishing them at one by reasoning about what is better to do (441)), from which the non-identity of the powers of reasoning and feeling anger is inferred.” (80)

13. Books 5, 6 & 7 ■5: “Socrates returns to the issue of political rule by asking what change in actual cities would bring the ideal city closer to realization. The famous answer is that philosophers should rule as kings (473d).” SEPSEP ■6: questions about philosopher- kings; epistemology; form of the good; the divided line ■7: allegory of the caveallegory of the cave

14. Book 8 “The description of the kallipolis and of the man whose character resembles it – the philosopher-king – is now complete, and Socrates … describes four individual character types and the four types of constitutions that result when people who possess them rule in the city (544d-545d). He presents these as four stages in the increasing corruption and decline of the kallipolis, and he explains, by appeal to the mathematical myth of the geometrical number (546a-b), why the kallipolis will decline. However, embedded in the myth is a serious philosophical suggestion that the kallipolis will decline because the philosopher-kings have to rely on sense perception in putting their eugenics policy into practice (546b-c)” (Reeve, 213)

15. Plato's Digression of Regimes and Souls 1.Aristocracy (ruled by philosopher kings) 2.Timocracy (ruled by the high spirited, 550b.ff) 3.Oligarchy (ruled by people with necessary appetites, 554a.ff) 4.Democracy (ruled by people with unnecessary appetites, 561a.ff) 5.Tyranny (ruled by people with lawlessness and unnecessary appetites, 571a.ff) ■First, identify the kind of soul that corresponds with each constitution ■Second, describe how that kind of soul is virtuous/vicious or happy/unhappy ■Third, describe analogous elements in the correlative constitution

16. Plato’s Criticism of Democratic Character ■“Plato’s criticisms of the democratic person, though not entirely explicit, assume … psychic equality of desires and freedom of desires from reason’s or spirits constraints –His first objection is that since the democratic person has no dominant desire but treats them all alike, he has no rational way for making choices when his desires conflict –His second objection is that some desires are for things known to be bad ■My suggestion is that [Plato] is criticizing a version of desire satisfaction theory of the human good.” Santas 177-8

17. Main Argument of the Republic We are happier being just than unjust ■The challenge is for Socrates to show that justice is both valuable fo its own sake and for its rewards ■Does Platonic Justice answer this challenge? ■Immoralist Challenge (Thrasymachus at the end of Book 1) ■Justice by Agreement (Glaucon & Adeimantus in Book 2) ■Platonic Justice (Socrates in Books 2-10) ■Find social justice in order to describe psychic justice.

18. Argument for Justice in the City 1.A city is just when each of the natural kinds of people in it performs its own (its optimal) social function. This is the abstract of formal principle of social justice (433, 435b). 2.The city has three main functions: to rule, to defend, and provision itself (369b.ff, 374.ff, 428d.ff). 3.There are three natural kinds of persons in the city, persons of inborn high intelligence, persons of inborn high spirit, and those of inborn abilities for arts and trades (415, 435). 4.The optimal social function of persons of high intelligence is to rule the city; those of high spirit to defend it; and those of abilities in arts and crafts to provision the city. 5.Therefore, a city is just when it is so organized that those of high intelligence (and appropriate education) are assigned to rule, those of high spirit (and appropriate educate) to defend, and those of artisan abilities (and appropriate education) to provision the city. This is the full definition of the just city; it puts together the formal principle and relevant information (from premises 1 to 4, 433) Santas 90

19. Argument for Justice in the Soul 1.A person is just when each of the natural psychic kinds (parts) in his/her psyche performs its own (its optimal) psychic function. This is the abstract or formal principle of psychic justice, fully parallel to the abstract principle of social justice (435a-c, 441e). 2.The human soul has three main functions, to rule oneself, to defend oneself, and to provide for one’s bodily needs (441e, 442). 3.There are three natural psychic kinds (parts) in the human soul: reason, spirit, and appetite (by an independent argument, 436-41). 4.The optimal function of reason is to rule the person, of spirit to defend, and of appetite to provide for bodily needs (441a). 5.Therefore, a soul is just when it is so organized that reason is assigned to rule the person, spirit to defend it, and appetite to provide for one’s bodily needs. This is the full definition of psychic justice (441e-442a). Santas 90

20. Secondary Articles ■Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic” ■Smith, “Plato’s Analogy of Soul and State” ■Siewart, “Plato’s Division of Reason and Appetite” ■Cooper, “Plato’s Theory of Motivation” ■Keyt, “Plato on Justice” (not posted; library) ■Santas, “Understanding Plato’s Republic” (not posted, library)

21. Does Plato meet the challenge? “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 39 We are happier being just than unjust

22. Next week Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 (357-376) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 (357-376); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book 6.13 5, 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non- Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus (278-281); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" 9, 10In-Class Paper Conference