1. Dispositional Metasemantics Michael Johnson HAP HKU 1

2. Referential Vocabulary Name N refers to object O. Predicate P applies to object O. Sentence S is true in conditions C. 2

3. Metasemantic Questions In virtue of what does name N refer to object O, rather than referring to some other object, or no object at all? In virtue of what does predicate P apply to object O, rather than not applying to it, and perhaps not applying to anything? In virtue of what is sentence S true in conditions C, rather than some other conditions C*, or in no conditions at all? 3

4. Speaker Meaning Today’s talk is about the metasemantics of linguistic expressions. I’m going to help myself to meaningful thoughts in my analysis of language. 4

5. Speaker Meaning In particular, I’m going to assume out the outset that these notions are unproblematic: Speaker S refers to object O with name N. Speaker S applies predicate P to object O. I’m concerned with semantic, not speaker reference. 5

6. A Common Principle 6

7. Whenever we have some object O to which we apply some term T, then a good guide to whether T does in fact apply to O is to ask whether we would persist in applying T to O when we were set right about our mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 7

8. Kripke Invokes the Principle [Discussing Kant’s claim that gold is analytically yellow] Suppose there were an optical illusion that made the substance appear to be yellow; but, in fact, once the peculiarities of the atmosphere were removed, we would see that it was actually blue… 8

9. Kripke Invokes the Principle Would there on this basis be an announcement in the newspapers: ‘It has turned out that there is no gold. Gold does not exist. What we took be gold is not in fact gold.’?... It seems to me that there would be no such announcement. [1980 p. 118] 9

10. Twin Earth “Why doesn’t ‘water’ apply to XYZ?” In the event that English speakers were exposed to XYZ,…. 10

11. Fodor Invokes the Principle … they would apply [“water”] to XYZ only when they would apply it to H 2 O; specifically, they would apply it only when they mistake XYZ for H 2 O; only when (and only because) they can’t tell XYZ and H 2 O apart. 11

12. Fodor Invokes the Principle Whereas, given a world in which they can tell XYZ and H 2 O apart…they will continue to apply ‘water’ to H 2 O and refrain from applying it to XYZ. [p. 115] 12

13. Idea Maybe the common principle is not just a good guide to the metasemantic facts, but it is the correct metasemantic theory itself. 13

14. A Common Principle Whenever we have some object O to which we apply some term T, then a good guide to whether T does in fact apply to O is to ask whether we would persist in applying T to O when we were set right about our mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 14

15. A Possible Analysis If T applies to O, then it does so in virtue of the fact that: we would persist in applying T to O when we were set right about our mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 15

16. Defense of the Principle Suppose a community of speakers applies a term T to all and only watery stuff. Suppose they know the science, know the justifications for the science, know how other communities talk, etc. But they say, “Yes, but our word applies to this and not to that.” It’s not impossible for words to mean ‘watery’ or ‘yellow metal.’ Neither is it impossible for them to mean ‘water’ or ‘gold.’ So on what grounds could we ever say their application was mistaken if they knew all the relevant facts?

17. Verbal Disputes 17

18. Second Motivation You and I are talking past one another when I am using term T with one meaning and you are using it with another. On my account this amounts to: were we to know all the relevant information, I would persist in applying T to things you wouldn’t (or vice versa). 18

19. Verbal Disputes “Intuitively, a dispute between two parties is verbal when the two parties agree on the relevant facts about a domain of concern, and just disagree about the language used to describe that domain.” [“Verbal Disputes”] 19

20. Some Caveats and Refinements 20

21. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S would apply T to O, when S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 21 analysandum analysans

22. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S would apply T to O, when S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 22 analysandum analysans

23. In Virtue Of I could not care less if you hate the philosophical grounders and like to pretend that you don’t know what “in virtue of” could possibly mean. 23

24. Come On Everyone recognizes or should recognize that there is something that Dretske, Fodor, Millikan, the reference magnetists, strong descriptivists, etc. are trying to do. I am trying to do that. 24

25. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S would apply T to O, when S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 25 analysandum analysans

26. Brief Methodological Interlude There’s no deep reason to think that you can express what one word means by some combination of other words in the language– that is, no deep reason to think (perfect) analyses are possible. I’m trying to say what reference and application are, while admitting that maybe that can’t be (perfectly) said. 26

27. Conditional Fallacy: “Friend” 27

28. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S would apply T to O, when S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 28 analysandum analysans

29. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to apply T to O, when S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 29 analysandum analysans

30. Remarks Dispositions exist. They’re clearly not reducible to counterfactuals for conditional fallacy/ finkish/ Kripkenstein sorts of reasons. I leave it to metaphysicians to analyze what they are, if that’s possible. 30

31. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to apply T to O, when S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 31 analysandum analysans

32. Disposed to Apply 32

33. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to apply T to O, when (a)S is sincere, reflective, non-reticent, etc. (b)S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 33 analysandum analysans

34. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to apply T to O, when (a)S is sincere, reflective, non-reticent, etc. (b)S has been set right regarding S’s mistaken beliefs (if any) regarding O. 34 analysandum analysans

35. Relevant Information Fact F is relevant to S’s T-application dispositions := there is some object O such that were F added to S’s knowledge, S would change her current disposition to apply T to O. S has all the relevant information regarding T := there is no fact F such that F is relevant to S’s T-application dispositions. 35

36. Relevant Information Fact F is relevant to S’s T-application dispositions := there is some object O such that were F added to S’s knowledge, S would change her current disposition to apply T to O. S has all the relevant information regarding T := there is no fact F such that F is relevant to S’s T-application dispositions. 36

37. Example: MJ and the Whales MJ’s ur-disposition: apply ‘fish’ to blue whales. 37

38. Example: MJ and the Whales Fact 1: MJ is more closely related to a whale than he is to a kangaroo. MJ’s Fact 1-updated disposition: don’t apply ‘fish’ to blue whales. 38

39. Example: MJ and the Whales Fact 2: a coelacanth is more closely related to MJ than it is to a tuna. MJ’s fact 2-updated disposition: apply ‘fish’ to blue whales, people. 39

40. Example: MJ and the Whales Fact 3: Nobody is with MJ on the cladism stuff. MJ’s Fact 3-updated disposition: in order to effectively communicate with fish human beings, MJ applies ‘fish’ paraphyletically. 40

41. Caveats and Refinements T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to apply T to O, when (a)S is sincere, reflective, non-reticent, etc. (b)S has all the relevant information regarding T. 41 analysandum analysans

42. Rolling with… T applies to O, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to apply T to O, when (a)S is sincere, reflective, non-reticent, etc. (b)S has all the relevant information regarding T. 42 analysandum analysans

43. And… Theory: T refers to O, in S’s idiolect, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to refer to O with T, when [S is sincere, reflective, non- reticent, etc. and also] when S has all the relevant information regarding T. 43

44. Circularity? In regard to whether some particular term T applies to O, is part of the relevant information that T does (not) apply to O? 44

45. The Causal-Historical Theory 45

46. Kripke’s Picture “Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends, other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. “A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman.”

47. Kripke’s Picture “Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends, other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. “A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman.”

48. Kripke’s Picture “A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An initial ‘baptism’ takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. “When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.”

49. Kripke’s Picture “A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An initial ‘baptism’ takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. “When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.”

50. The Causal-Historical Theory Let’s call that baby ‘Feynman’ Feynman

51. The Causal-Historical Theory Let’s call that baby ‘Feynman’ Feynman Historical Chain of Transmission

52. The Causal-Historical Theory Denotation Feynman

53. Meaning Change 53

54. The Story of Madagascar Let’s call that place ‘Mogadishu’ MadagascarMadagasceir Madagascu Madagishu 54

55. C.H. Theory Predicts Let’s call that place ‘Mogadishu’ MadagascarMadagasceir Madagascu Madagishu Denotation 55

56. C.H. Theory Predicts Let’s call that place ‘Mogadishu’ MadagascarMadagasceir Madagascu Madagishu Denotation Wrong!!! 56

57. Real Denotation Let’s call that place ‘Mogadishu’ MadagascarMadagasceir Madagascu Madagishu Denotation 57

58. Devitt-Kripke Reply “Today the usage of the name as a name for an island is so widespread, that it surely overrides any historical connection with the native name.” (NN p. 163) Devitt’s picture: initial baptism is one grounding of reference in a thing, future groundings matter. “Marco Polo’s mistake led finally to a systematic pattern of groundings in the island.” (D&S p. 76) 58

59. The Story of Deer Let’s call those things ‘deer’. deer 59

60. The Story of Deer Let’s call those things ‘deer’. deer 60

61. Modeling Meaning Change One day (maybe) it mattered to the Europeans how the natives used ‘Madagascar’. If so, then at that time they would have applied ‘Madagascar’ to the city and not the island had they been informed of the fact that native use was different from European use. Nowadays we don’t care how people long ago used the name, so that fact does not move us to change our practice. 61

62. Disjunctive Kinds 62

63. The Story of Madagascar Let’s call that stuff ‘jade’ jade 63

64. The Story of Madagascar Let’s call that stuff ‘jade’ jade 64 DEFECTIVE BAPTISM

65. Analysis of the Case Possible solution: revise the theory to say, “if there’s no one substance, but a disjunctive one, then the term refers to a disjunctive kind.” Issue: The disjunctive content runs through our dispositions to apply ‘jade’ and that those run through certain economic, cosmetic, and medical interests we have. 65

66. Other Cases GoldAir 66

67. Empty Terms 67

68. Phlogiston Theory 68

69. Here’s some questions for the standard sort of causal theory: Why doesn’t phlogiston turn out to be oxygen? Why does ‘air’ have an application? Why don’t unicorns turn out to be narwhals? 69

70. Anti-Individualism 70

71. I have arthritis in my thigh. 71

72. No, you’ve got semantic confusions in your brain. 72

73. Anti-Individualism At the end of the story, “[t]he patient is surprised, but relinquishes his view and goes on to ask what might be wrong with his thigh.” This is supposed to show that other people’s thoughts/ dispositions to apply terms are relevant metasemantically. I don’t need to say that, however. Which camp is right though? I propose that the anti-individualist is obviously wrong. 73

74. 74

75. Anti-Compositionality & Dispositional Metasemantics 75

76. A Home for the Needy Suppose you’re an anti- compositionalist. You think the meaning of a sentence isn’t determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they’re combined. My view is for you! 76

77. The View Adapted to Truth Σ is true in circumstance C, in the idiolect of speaker S, in virtue of the fact that S is disposed to assert Σ in C, when (a)S is sincere, reflective, non-reticent, etc. (b)S has all the relevant information regarding C. 77 analysandum analysans

78. Frege Cases 1.Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. 2.Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. 78

79. Frege Cases 79

80. Armchair Philosophy 80

81. The Bad Old Linguistic Philosophy Problem: What is knowledge? Semantic Ascent: What does ‘knowledge’ apply to? Semantic Competence: A priori knowledge of what ‘knowledge’ applies to Semantic Descent: A priori knowledge of what knowledge is 81

82. The Bad Old Linguistic Philosophy Problem: What is knowledge? Semantic Ascent: What does ‘knowledge’ apply to? Semantic Competence: A priori knowledge of what ‘knowledge’ applies to Semantic Descent: A priori knowledge of what knowledge is 82 EXTERNALISM

83. Massage Chair Philosophy Rescued On the Chalmers/ Jackson view, semantic competence only delivers conditionals of the form: If the world is way X, then knowledge is such-and-so. If the world is way Y, then knowledge is such-and-so. And so on… 83

84. Not on My View! The case of the merely possible Tim Williamson book. 84

85. 85