1. PRIVATIZATION OF COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND IN MOROCCO Abdelkader EL GHRIB Office of the Head of Government

2. CONTENT I- LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH II- PRIVATISATION REFORMS III- DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF COLLECTIVE LAND PRIVATIZATION

3. I- LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH II- PRIVATISATION REFORMS III- DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF COLLECTIVE LAND (CL) PRIVATIZATION

4. LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MOROCCO A constraints to growth analysis completed in 2014 by Gov Morocco, ADB, and MCC highlighted three areas of constraints to private sector-driven growth: 1- Human Capital: Despite the considerable efforts being made by the Moroccan government, secondary and higher education enrolment rates remain lower than the average of countries with the same income level. 2- Microeconomic constraints: Access to land for private investment development Morocco’s judicial system The taxation system Labor regulation and work force cost 3- Potential additional constraints and risks : Innovation ; Coordination

5. Sample of root causes of weak agricultural land productivity compared to comparator countries LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MOROCCO

6. Situation and Challenges of land tenure Land ownership in Morocco is subject to a dual system: “Modern" land registration system “Traditional" system, governed by local customs and Muslim law principles Diversity of land status and oversight authorities: Land structures: Excessive fragmentation Small size Worrying joint ownership Weaknesses in land tenure security: Low level of investment in agricultural land: limited by the insecurity of rights to it Many land users aren’t willing to make land improvements, including small infrastructures LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MOROCCO

7. Among all agricultural lands in Morocco, the share that is classed as collective land are particularly fraught with the investment and productivity problem Origin: In the 17 th century, the Sultans granted land to Collectives in return for their protection and for participation to wars/invasions. Importance: Total of 15 millions ha of which 2 millions ha of agricultural land and 0.32 million ha in irrigated areas Beneficiaries : more than 10 millions inhabitants Specificity: Collective members have little freedom to use CL: Ownership and management under control of the Ministry of Interior Collectives have only he right of usufruct “Inalienable”, “Imprescriptible” and “Insaisissable” CL CHARACTERISTICS

8. Low level of investments linked to agricultural land, due to land insecurity particularly in CL, is exacerbated by joint ownership, fragmentation and low level of registration (<10%) Unwillingness of CL tenants to make land improvements or to undertake construction or fruit tree projects: CL are largely used for crops while plantations are very rare Comparison of land devoted to cereal crops to some countries: 67% in Morocco ; 48% in Tunisia and 38% in Malaysia Comparison of cereal yields shows the Moroccan level is very low CL CHARACTERISTICS

9. I- LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH II- PRIVATISATION REFORMS III- DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF COLLECTIVE LAND PRIVATIZATION

10. Morocco adopted in 1969 a series of laws to develop agriculture:  Agricultural investment Code  Law relative to CL located in irrigated area whose main objectives are to: transform CL status to privately-owned status (Melk) make CL more productive Following this legal reform, attempts to privatize CL had been taken. The most important is the experience of 36,000 ha in the Gharb region. Advances, but not complete : during more than 40 years, CL privatization experiences failed to reach the targets set. CL IN IRRIGATED AREAS

11. The main obstacles to privatization (melkisation) of CL under the 1969 law: Institutional: 1) lack of an entity responsible, 2) very weak coordination between the two main actors involved in the reform (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Agriculture) and 3) Imprecision of each stakeholder’s role and responsibility Financial: insufficient funds necessary for the payment of the high costs and fees related to subdivision of CL in plots and for the registration of individual properties Operational: the procedure contains too many steps rendering it very complex Social : 1) defining the eligibility criteria within collectives to be named as a “rights holder”, necessary to establish the lists of owners of the new individual parcels, 2) resolving transmission of rights in the context of inheritances within families, 3) resolving the inherent challenges of parcel boundary definition. CL IN IRRIGATED AREAS

12. 1- Dialogues on CL in 1994-1995 and 2014: Large consultations were hold in 1994-1995 at the regional level National conference in 1995. The majority of stakeholders and participants recommended privatizing agricultural land and keeping the "collective" status to rangeland and forests land Given the “status quo”, regional dialogues were hold again in 2014: Participants emphasized again the need to legally recognize the private property rights on agricultural CL (0.32 million ha in irrigated areas and 1.7 million in “rainfed” areas). RECENT REFORMS TO ENABLE CL PRIVATIZATION

13. 2- National conference on land in 2015: The Government organized, in December 2015, a national debate on land policy and its role in social and economic development. The Royal Letter sent to the organizers and participants provided guidelines for developing a land strategy and its action plan. Regarding CL, The King gave his instructions to the Government parties to : accelerate the legal reform regarding land policy management overall allocate CL in favor of rights holders Register the plots in favor of the right holders free of fees RECENT REFORMS TO ENABLE CL PRIVATIZATION

14. I- LAND CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH II- PRIVATISATION REFORMS III- DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF COLLECTIVE LAND PRIVATIZATION

15. The consistence of the project:  Privatization of up to 46,000 ha in the Gharb region with the technical and financial assistance of MCC, as a component of the Compact II  Completion during 5 years : 2 for the preparation the project, and the 3 last years for its implementation DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF CL PRIVATIZATION Design of an optimized procedure Analysis of the legal, institutional and procedural current framework Develop a new effective and efficient procedure Determine the time required for each step Define the role and responsibility of each stakeholder Elaborate a manual of procedures

16. Actions to maximise the impacts of the project: Support to farmers: training and credit provided by other GOM programs Assistance to exit co-ownership (indivision) for heirs interested Duplication of the tested model in other irrigated areas DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF CL PRIVATIZATION

17. The expected outcomes of the project:  Land property rights secured  Land marked more dynamic  Public investments in the irrigated areas optimized and private investments less costly  Higher productivity following the substitution of modern agriculture to traditional farming  Increased incomes and living conditions of the rural populations improved. DESIGN AND TEST OF A NEW MODEL OF CL PRIVATIZATION

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