1. PLATO VS. THE POETS

2. Although Plato begins his attack on poetry by talking about painting, it is important to recognize that Plato is not committed to banishing the painters from the ideal state—only the poets. So why does he bring up painting? To illustrate his view of art as imitation. ART AS IMITATION

3. The idea of art as imitation comes out in the discussion of three types of bed: (A) the bed itself (created by a God) (B) the bed you sleep in (created by a carpenter) (C) the bed depicted (created by an artist)  The latter is supposed to be an imitation, but an imitation of what, exactly? THREE TYPES OF BED

4. “If you look at a bed from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a different bed each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? And is that also the case with other things? —That’s the way it is—it appears different without being so. Then consider this point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that which is as it is, or does it imitate that which appears as it appears? Is it an imitation of appearances or truth? —Of appearances. Then imitation is far removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image.”  How might we extend this view of art as imitation to performances of tragedy? REPUBLIC 598AB

5. Plato begins with a minor worry about poetry and then moves on to a more serious worry. WORRIES ABOUT POETRY

6. On the assumption that artists are mere imitators, we have the worry that what they are doing is not really worthwhile (and so they have no real place in the ideal state). Why would anyone waste time producing imitations of fine things/action, when they could be doing the real thing? Response: This dismissive attitude is difficult to fit with the widely held view that the poets are very wise.  How does Plato respond to this response? THE MINOR WORRY

7. Plato’s response: The imitator knows only the appearance— unlike, say, the maker and the user of a horse’s saddle. He doesn’t possess a deeper understanding of the objects of imitation. At any rate, such knowledge is not required for exercise of the poet qua imitator. (This point follows straightforwardly from the illustration of painting at 598ab above.) THE MINOR WORRY

8. What we have so far: as imitators poets are doing nothing so great. Surely not an offense deserving of banishment! The deeper worry is that they are systematically doing harm. WHY BANISH?

9. The main argument against the poets rests on two premises: 1.Works of art, understood as imitations of appearances, are cognized by/enjoyed by/directed towards an inferior, non- rational side of the self. 2.The effect of tragic and comic poetry is to bolster the strength of the non-rational side, and thereby encourage weakness of will. Conclusion: Poetry ought to be banned from the ideal state. THE MAJOR WORRY

10. Plato’s defense of premise 1 appeals to yet another case of mental conflict. Partially deceptive illusions: someone subject to a visual illusion may at the same time make a correct judgment regarding what she sees. Plato insists that in such cases the subject has two opposed beliefs: a correct belief that issues from one’s rational side and an incorrect belief that issues from one’s non-rational side. DEFENSE OF PREMISE 1

11. THE MÜLLER-LYER ILLUSION

12. Opposed belief? It might sound strange to speak of the subject as believing what her experience is reporting. Note, though, that Plato is just as happy to speak of assent vs. dissent, if you prefer that way of talking. FIRST QUESTION

13. Opposed assent? We can agree with Plato that visual experience is like assertion, but why think that there is anything more than a superficial similarity here? Plato plausibly supposes that vision has the job of informing or reporting about the scene before the eyes. In the case of partially deceptive illusions, it is natural to suppose that the subject is rejecting precisely what experience is reporting. SECOND QUESTION

14. Who is the assenter? If we are going to take seriously the idea that experience asserts, we seem to have the problem that there is no asserter. It hardly makes sense to speak of assertion without an asserter. Plato seems to handle this sort of worry by suggesting that parts of the soul are not only sources of beliefs/desire; they are also subjects of these mental states. THIRD QUESTION

15. So beliefs and desires can both be non-rational, but what does that mean, exactly? FOURTH QUESTION

16. Plato tells us that the rational part always aim at the good in forming desires and always aims at the true in forming beliefs. desire formationGOODNESS REASON belief formationTRUTH Reason’s beliefs & desires can be rational or irrational. They are rational when they come about through deliberation or calculation that is generally conducive to the goal in question (goodness/truth); otherwise they are irrational. BELIEFS & DESIRES OF REASON

17. By contrast, beliefs and desires of the non-rational side arise independently of any aims/goals. They arise through physiological changes (πάθηματα). In having sensory states your non-rational side is informing or reporting about the (internal or external) environment. These states are non-rational: they come about through physiological changes, not with the goal of getting at the truth. As non-rational states, they cannot be assessed as rational or irrational. NON-RATIONAL BELIEFS & DESIRES

18. 1.Works of art, understood as imitations of appearances, are cognized by/enjoyed by/directed towards an inferior, non- rational side of the self.  Why are we supposed to accept this premise? RETURN TO PREMISE 1

19. 1.Works of art, understood as imitations of appearances, are cognized by/enjoyed by/directed towards an inferior, non- rational side of the self.  Why are we supposed to accept this premise? Works of art are partially deceptive illusions. The part of the self that is duped & drawn in is the non-rational side. RETURN TO PREMISE 1

20. Plato has established that imitations (e.g. paintings) mainly affect the non-rational part, not reason. He still needs to show that poetry as imitation routinely has a negative impact on us. His claim is that poets like Homer end up bolstering our non- rational impulses and weakening rational resolve. His principal example is once again a case of mental conflict. DEFENSE OF PREMISE 2

21. The case of the restrained mourner once again illustrates the division of the soul into rational and non-rational sides.  Someone struck by personal tragedy is drawn by affection (πάθος) to mourn. Why might reason dictate that we resist (openly) weeping & wailing in the face of tragedy? THE RESTRAINED MOURNER (604A-D)

22. “First, it isn’t clear whether such things will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, it doesn’t make the future any better to take them hard; third, human affairs aren’t worth taking very seriously; and, finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need in such circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible… Deliberation. We must accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best. We musn’t hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when the trip. Instead, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure.” FOUR POINTS (604A-D)

23. Exposure to epic & tragic poetry has the effect of making us more likely to act in a weak-willed manner! Illustration: Achilleus in The Illiad. BACK TO POETRY

24. “If you reflect, first, that the part of the soul that is forcibly controlled in our private misfortunes and that hungers for the satisfaction of weeping and wailing, because it desires these things by nature, is the very part that receives satisfaction and enjoyment from poets, and, second, that the part of ourselves that is best by nature, since it hasn’t been adequately educated either by reason or habit, relaxes its guard over the lamenting part when it is watching the sufferings of somebody else. The reason it does so is this: It thinks that there is no shame involved for it in praising and pitying another man who, in spite of his claim to goodness, grieves excessively. Indeed, it thinks that there is a definite gain involved in doing so, namely, pleasure. And it wouldn’t want to be deprived of that by despising the whole poem. I suppose that only a few are able to figure out that enjoyment of other people’s sufferings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others, won’t be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer.”(606ab) THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT

25.  Why does this consideration lead to a wholesale ban on poetry (other than hymns to the gods and eulogies)? Why not just object to corrupting tragedy? (See 604e.)  How does Plato extend his argument to the case of comedy? (See 606c.)  Plato’s argument is not empirically well grounded. What if it were? Would his paternalism be warranted in that case? SOME QUESTIONS