Lecture 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP: Rationality, Power and Power PEDU 7206 1.

Lecture 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP: Rationality, Power and Power PEDU 7206 1

zTheoretical/pure reason: It refers to human capacities of obtaining reliable and valid knowledge/theories of their environment. It basically belongs to the epistemological and methodological domains of human endeavors. zPractical reason: It refers to human capacities of constructing (with other human fellows) acceptable and feasible actions (and/or interactions.) It basically belongs to the action (practical) domain of human endeavors. Distinction between Theoretical & Practical Reasons 2

zAs Herbert Simon underlines in his book Administrative Behavior (1997/1951) that administration and policy studies are both theoretical and practical sciences. (Simon, 1997, P. 160) It implies that administrative and policy studies are to deal with both factual propositions and ethical imperatives of human affairs. On the one hand, as a theoretical science A&P studies is supposed to render factual propositions which have been verified as “objective, empirical truth.” …. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 3

Nobel laureate in Economics 1978 (1916-2001) 4

z…. On the other hand, as a practical science, it is expected to put forth ethical imperatives which endorse “subjective human values.” (Simon, 1997, P. 62) Hence, for the practical aspect, EAP studies can be construed as human efforts deliberately undertaken by human agents to intervene particular aspects of the current educational environment with the intention to bring about improvement to the status quo or to bring about desirable and novel situations. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 5

zAccordingly, educational administration and policy are human efforts with “in-order-to” intents, which point to the future. As a result, educational leaders who practice educational administration and policy are obliged to give reason for their “in-order-to” intents, in other words, to provide “reasons” to their actions. Therefore, practical reason is one of the foundations of study as well practice of educational administration and policy. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 6

zConceptions of action, project and agency yAction can be discerned as one’s intentionality that has been consolidated into protention and anticipation, according to which she will make effort to its fulfillment. It can simply be construed as a single “in-order-to” intention. yProject can be understood as a series of actions, which work in a sequence of “in-order-to” intents. If all go well, they will probably lead to the fulfillment of the anticipated goal. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 7

zConceptions of action, project and agency yAgency is the project organized and undertaken by an agent. The concept puts particular emphasis on the conception of the agent, who is supposed to be a knowledgeable, rational, reasonable and capable actor. xKnowledgeability: To be knowledgeable, the agent is supposed to have sufficient if not full knowledge of the action or even project to be undertaken as well the environment (both physical and social) in which her project is to be carried out. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 8

zConceptions of action, project and agency yAgency is …. xRationality: To be rational, the agent is supposed to have identified the objective to be attained, to have chosen an effective (or even the most efficient) action plan to be undertaken, and finally to have concrete idea and/or belief of the chance for success. xPower: Power refers to the agent’s’ capacities of controlling and mastering the environments, in which the agent is supposed to carry out his project. These capacities include possibilities in mobilize both physical and social resources which can contribute to the success of his project. At the same, they also include ability to avoid and containing those factors which may hinder and/or jeopardize the possibility of success of his project. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 9

zConceptions of action, project and agency yAgency is …. xReason and reasonable: To be reasonable, the agent will not only have to be rational but must justify her actions and/or project to be socially acceptable. In other worlds, she must provide a normative justification to the public (both partners and audiences) within the respective institutional context. Practical Foundation of Educational Administration and Policy 10

Topic 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP (I) Concepts of Rationality 11

zWeber’s ideas of rationality: The concept of rationality has been conceived by Weberians as well as sociologists in general as the mastery concept in Weber’s work. However, “the notion of rationality is far from unequivocal.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 1) As Weber underlines in a footnote to The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism, “if this essay makes any contribution at all may it be to bring out the complexity of the only superficially simple concept of the rational.” (Weber, 1958, P. 194, n. 9; quoted in Brubaker, 1984, P.1) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 12

zWeber’s ideas of rationality: … In fact, it has been well documented by Weber’s followers that Weber’s specifications of the idea of rationality vary in his empirical studies in different domains of modern society, such as capitalist enterprising and calculation, legal formalism, bureaucratic administration, and asceticism and the ethic of vocation. (e.g. Brubaker, 1984; Collins, 1981; Kalberg, 1980) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 13

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: yIn a summary essay of Max Weber’s conception of rationality, Stephen Kalberg’s writes “however much they may vary in content, mental processes that consciously strive to master reality are common to all types of rationality.” (Karlberg, 1980, p. 1159) Taking Kalberg’s conception as a point of departure, we may conceptualized rationality as a state of mind and a mental process, in which modern men are consciously and methodically try to take control different domain of their lives. …. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 14

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: y……. As these conscious and methodical efforts of mastery spread infiltrate into different domains in modern societies, the process of rationalization began to take shape first in Western Europe in the eighteenth century. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 15

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: yA number of definitive features have been characterized by Weber in his empirical studies of the rationalization of the occidental societies. xCapitalism and calculability and controllability: Weber underlines that the “rational capitalist establishment is one with capitalist accounting, that is, an establishment which determines its income yielding power by calculating according to the methods of modern bookkeeping and the striking of a balance.” (1961, P.207; quoted in Collins, 1981, P927.) …… Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 16

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: yA number of definitive features … xCapitalism and calculability and controllability: … It implies that calculability is capitalists’ efforts of monitoring carefully and methodically the processes and operations of their production (i.e. the means) in attaining their goal (i.e. profit maximization). Accordingly, capitalists can then be able to have total control over the productive and distributive processes. This in turn can minimize their cost and maximize their profits. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 17

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: yA number of definitive features …. xScientific-technical development and knowledgeability: In order to act rationally and to have exact calculation and full control of their actions, modern men are require to possess certain if not full knowledge of the reality that they are supposed to master. They include “knowledge of means- ends relations and the probable reactions of their physical and social environment to their actions.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 30) The institutions which provides such a knowledge base for the growth of rationalism in modern society are enterprises of scientific and technological research sponsored by both public and private fund. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 18

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: yA number of definitive features …. xModern legal system and Formalism: Roger Brubaker underlines that “modern capitalist rationality is rooted in calculability, modern legal rationality in formalism.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 16) By formalism, it refers to the legal and social orders which are “bound to fixed and inviolable ‘rules of the game’.” (Weber, 1978, P. 811; quoted in Brubaker, P. 17) These social orders and their ‘rules of the game’ will not only provide all their participants with formal and standard guidelines for their calculations and actions but will also render formal devices for settlements of conflicts. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 19

zThe conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: yA number of definitive features …. xPredictability: The developments of scientific-technical knowledge, legal formalism, and calculability and controllability of capitalism have greatly enhanced the certainty and predictability of modern men’s capacities of mastery of reality. As a result, predictability has become the core of technical efficiency in most of the domains of modern society. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 20

yThe Weberian concept of rationality: In summary, Weber and his followers have construed the concept of rationality as a kind of conscious and methodical human efforts, through which human agents can master different aspects of reality (i.e. external world) in knowledgeable, mans-ends calculable, controllable, formalized, and predictable manners. Accordingly, when we say that a man acts rationally, we are in fact measuring the human action in point with Weber’s conception of an “ideal type”. That is, we are assessing the extent to which the action has met with knowledgeability, calculability, controllability, formality, and predictability. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 21

Actor The External World To act on & to master Consciously & methodically in knowledgeable, mans-ends calculable, controllable, formalized, and predictable manners Rationality Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 22

zWeber’s typology of rationality: Stephen Kalberg has summarized Weber’s specifications of rationality into four types (1980). They are yPractical rationality… Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 23

zWeber’s typology of rationality: … yPractical rationality: It refers to the human efforts which strive to consciously deal with reality in terms of “individual’s purely pragmatic and egoistic interests”. (Kalberg, 1980, P. 1151) To be practical and pragmatic, it means that a man “accepts given realities and calculates the most expedient means of dealing with difficulties they present.” (P. 1152) “Thus, this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man’s capacity for means-ends rational action.” (P. 1152) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 24

zWeber’s typology of rationality: … ySubstantive rationality: “Like practical rationality…, substantive rationality directly orders action into patterns. It does so, however, not on the basis of a purely means-end calculation of solutions to routine problems but in relation to a past, present, or potential ‘value postulate’.” (Kalberg, 1980, P. 1155) By ‘value postulate’, it refers to “entire clusters of values that vary in comprehensiveness, internal consistency, and content. Thus, this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's inherent capacity for value-rational action.” (P. 1155) ….. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 25

zWeber’s typology of rationality: … ySubstantive rationality: …. In short, it represents human effort of striving for conscious mastery of reality through ordering action into pattern of priority in accordance with a set of “value postulate”, e.g. Calvinism, Buddhism, Hinduism, communism, or socialism. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 26

zWeber’s typology of rationality: … yTheoretical rationality (Weber also refers it as intellectual rationality): “This type of rationality involves a conscious mastery of reality through construction of precise abstract concepts rather than action.” (Kalberrg, 1980, P. 1152) This type of rationality can most typically be found in the act of enquiry among philosophers and scientists. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 27

yFormal rationality: Formal rationality can be construed as a particular type of practical rationality, which specifically corresponded “with industrialization: most significantly, the economic, legal, and scientific spheres, and the bureaucratic form of domination.”(Kalberg, 1980, P. 1158) “Whereas practical rationality always indicates a diffuse tendency to calculate and to solve routine problems by means-end rational patterns of action in reference to pragmatic self- interests, formal rationality ultimately legitimates a similar means- end rational calculation by reference back to universally applied rules, laws, or regulations.” (P. 1158) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 28

zWeber’s typology of social actions: yOn the beginning pages of Economy and Society (1978) under the section entitled “Types of Social Action”, Weber writes, (Weber, 1978, P. 24-25) “Social action, like all action, may be oriented in four ways. It may be: (1) instrumentally rational (purposive-rational), that is, determined by expectations as to behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends; Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 29

zWeber’s typology of social actions: y……..Weber writes, (Weber, 1978, P. 24-25) (2) value-rational, that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently for its prospects of success; (3) affectual (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor’s specific affects and feeling states; (4) traditional, that is, determined by ingrained habituation.” Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 30

zThis typology has been interpreted by Weberians as classification of social action by descending order in regards to the degree of instrumental rationality. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 31

Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality 32

zHabermas’ critique of Weber’s conception of rationality and action: In his two-volume work The Theory of Communicative Action (1984 & 1987) Habermas underlines that “Through his basic action-theoretic assumptions Weber prejudice this question in such a way that processes of social rationalization could come into view only from the standpoint of purposive (instrumental) rationality. I would like, therefore, to discuss the conceptual bottleneck in his theory of action and the use this critique as the starting point for analyzing further the concept of communicative action.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 273) ….. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 33

zHabermas’ critique of Weber’s conception …. The conceptual bottleneck and prejudice that Habermas has accursed Weber’s theory of action mainly fall into two aspects: y“It conceptualizes action on the presupposition of exactly one world of existing states of affairs and neglects those actor-world relations that are essential to social interaction.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 274) Within Habermas conception of “actor-world relations”, which he adopts from Piaget’s cognitive development theory, more specifically Piaget’s theory of “decentration of an egocentric understanding of world”, the concept of ‘world’ can in fact be demarcated into “three worlds”. ….. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 36

zHabermas’ critique of Weber’s conception …. The conceptual bottleneck and prejudice …. y…….According to Piaget’s theory, as a human’s cognition develop, his concept of world will simultaneously differentiated into (1) the “subjective world” of the Ego of a human, (2) the “objective world” which consists of “facts”, i.e. “what he regards as existing states of affairs of the objective world”, (3) the “social world” which consists of “certain normative expectations”, i.e. “what he regards as legitimate elements of the common social world.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 69) And what has been neglected in Weber’s conception of actor-world relation is exactly social world or in Habermas conception the “lifeworld”. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 37

zHabermas’ critique of Weber’s conception …. The conceptual bottleneck and prejudice …. y“As actions are reduced to purposive interventions in the objective world, the rationality of means-ends relation stands in the foreground.”(Habermas, P. 274) As a result, within Weber’s conception of rationality, there is no place for the “communicative rationality” and “communicative action”, which Habermas has delegated a two-volume work of nearly one thousand pages to signify. (1984 and 1987) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 38

Actor (Subjective World) The Objective World The Social World (Lifeworld) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality To act on & to master To understand & to research agreements Purposive/ Instrumental Rationality Communicative Rationality 39

zHabermas’ conceptions of rationality y“When we use the expression ‘ration’, we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge. Rationality has less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge. In linguistic utterances knowledge is expressed explicitly; in goal- directed actions an ability, an implicit knowledge is expressed. … The close relation between knowledge and rationality suggests that the rationality of an expression (or action) depends on the reliability of the knowledge embodied in it.”( Habermas, 1984, P.8) y“Rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behavior for which there are good reasons or ground.”(p.22) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 40

zHabermas’ classification of rationality yCognitive-instrumental rationality: x“A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actors satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his intention to intervene successfully in the world.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 11) Accordingly, there are two conditions for the success of an teleological (goal- directed) action Cognitive condition: True propositions of the conditions necessary for the realization of the intervention. Instrumental condition: The effectiveness of carrying out the interventions, i.e. teleological actions. xDefinition of cognitive-instrumental rationality: “The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality …carries with it connotations of successful self-maintenance made possible by informed disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to, conditions of a contingent environment.” (p.10) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 41

zHabermas’ classification of rationality yCommunicative rationality: x“An assertion can be called rational if the speakers satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least one other participant in communication.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 11) xDefinition of communicative rationality: “Concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotation based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.” (p. 10) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 42

zRationality and the world yRealist's objective world: The realist worldview “starts from the ontological presupposition of the world as the sum total of what is the case and clarifies the conditions of the rational behavior on this basis....On this model rational actions basically have the character of goal-directed, feedback-controlled interventions in world of existing states of affairs.” (1984, p. 11-12) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 43

zRationality and the world yPhenomenologist's lifeworld: “The phenomenologist does not...simply begin with the ontological presupposition of an objective world; he makes this a problem by inquiring into the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a community. The world gains objectivity only through counting as one and the same world for a community of speaking and acting subjects....Through communicative practice they assure themselves at the same time of their common life-relations, of an subjectively shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the members as knowledge.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 12-13) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 44

zCommunicative rationality and theory of argumentation: y“I believe that the concept of communicative rationality...can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation.” (1984, p. 18) y“We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through arguments. An argument contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic expression.” (1984, p. 18) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 45

zConstituents of communicative rationality: yBy bringing in the theory of argument, Habermas expands his conceptualization of communicative rationality by asserting that “Well-grounded assertions and efficient actions are certainly a sign of rationality; we do characterize as rational speaking and acting subjects who, as far as it lies within their power, avoid errors in regard to facts and means-ends relations. But there are obviously other types of expressions for which we can have good reasons, even though they are not tied to truth or success claims. In the context of communicative action, we can call someone rational… Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 46

zConstituents of communicative rationality: “In the context of communicative action, we can call someone rational… yif he is able to put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it by pointing to appropriate evidence,… yif he is following an established norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate expectation… yif he makes known a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a secret, confesses a deed, etc., and is then be able to reassure critics in regard to revealed experience by drawing practical consequences form it and behaving consistently thereafter.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 15) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 47

zConstituents of communicative rationality: yAccordingly, Habermas has differentiated forms of argumentation and the validity claims of the argument i.e. constituents of communicative rationality as followings xTheoretical discourse: It refers to the form of argumentations in which controversies over validity claims of “truth of propositions and/or efficacy of teleological actions” are thematized and if positive settled. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 48

zConstituents of communicative rationality: y…forms of argumentation and the validity claims of the argument … xPractical discourse: It refers to form of argumentations undertaken in existing normative contexts or moral-practical spheres. Accordingly, controversies over validity claims are appealed to the “rightness” of expressions within particular normative contexts and moral-practical rules. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 49

zConstituents of communicative rationality: y…forms of argumentation and the validity claims of the argument … xEvaluative criticism: There are situations in which the validity of an expressions is neither appealed to the truth or efficacy in objective world nor to the rightness in normative contexts but to specific set of value standards shared among members of particular culture and language communities. Habermas has specified aesthetic criticism as the prototypical case of this form of argumentation. In this form of argumentation the adequacy of the set standard of values to be used will be asserted, criticized, debated and if possible accepted. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 50

zConstituents of communicative rationality: y…forms of argumentation and the validity claims of the argument … : xTherapeutic critique: In the case of private and/or self- presenting expressions, their validity claims will be based on the truthfulness and sincerity of the speakers. The prototypical case of therapeutic critique, which Habermas specifies, is critique employed by psychotherapists to distinguish their clients’ self- deceptive and/or illusive utterances from truthful and/or sincere expressions. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 51

zConstituents of communicative rationality: y…forms of argumentation and the validity claims of the argument … : xExplicative discourse: It refers to “ a form of argumentation in which the comprehensibility, well- formedness or rule-correctness of symbolic expressions is no longer naively supposed or contested but is thematized as a controversial claim.” (1984, p.22) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 52

zHabermas’ typology of action: Based on his theory of communicative rationality and action, Habermas asserts that “The theory of communicative action can make good the weakness we found in Weber’s action theory, inasmuch as it does not remain fixated on purposive rationality as the only aspect under which action can be criticized and improved.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 332) Accordingly, he reformulates the typology of action into Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 54

zHabermas’ typology of action: yTeleological action: xBy teleological action, it refers to that “the actor attains an end or brings about the occurrence of desired state by choosing means that have promise of beings successful in a given situation and applying them in a suitable manner.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 85) xMoreover, “the teleological model of action is expanded to a strategic model when there can enter into the agent’s calculation of success the anticipation of decisions on the part of at least one addition goal-directed actor.” (P. 85). Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 55

zHabermas’ typology of action: yTeleological action: x… xAccordingly, The rationality, upon which the critiques and defenses of teleological and strategic actions are based, is their truth and effectiveness claims. In Habermas’ own words, “teleological action can be judged under the aspect of effectiveness. The rules of action embody technically and strategically useful knowledge, which can be criticized in reference to truth claims and can be improved through a feedback relation with growth of empirical-theoretical knowledge.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 333) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 56

zHabermas’ typology of action: yCommunicative action: xIt “refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 86) xAccordingly, the rationality of communicative action is made up of not only the truth claim of the content of the referents involved in the exchanges between participants, but also the comprehensibility of the utterances made, the mutual understanding thereby reached, and the coordination subsequently sustained. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 57

58 Action Orientation Action Situation Oriented of Success Oriented to Reaching Understanding NonsocialInstrumental action _ _ _ SocialStrategic Action Communicative action Types of Action (Source: Habermas, 1984, P. 285)

zHabermas’ typology of action: yNormatively regulated action: xIt refers “to members of a social group who orient their action to common values. The individual actor complies with (or violate) a norm when in a given situation the conditions are present to which the norm has application. All members of a group for whom a given norm has validity may expect of one another that in certain situations they will carry out (or abstain from) the action commanded (or proscribed).”(Habermas, 1984, P. 85) xAccordingly, the rationality working behind normatively regulated action and supporting its validity claims is “the moral-practical rightness” of the norms which are applied to the situation at point. y. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 59

zHabermas’ typology of action: yDramaturgical actions: xIt refers to “participants in interaction constituting a public for one another before who they present themselves. The actor evokes in his public a certain image, an impression of himself, by more or less purposefully disclosing his subjectivity. …Thus the central concept of presentation of self does not signify spontaneous expressive behavior but stylizing the expression of one’s own experience wit a view of the audience.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 86) x“Dramaturgical actions embody a knowledge of the agent’s own subjectivity. These expressions can be criticized as untruthful, that is reject as deceptions or self-deceptions.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 334) Hence, the rationality behind this type of action is the claim of truthfulness. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action 60

Actor (Subjective World) The Objective World The Social World (Lifeworld) Weber’s Conceptions of Rationality & Action Purposive/ Instrumental Rationality Communicative Rationality 61 Teleological Actions Communicative Actions Normatively Regulated Actions Dramaturgical Actions

Topic 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP (II) Concepts of Power 62

zMax Weber’s formal definition of power "In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, 1948, p.180) zThe constituents of the concept of power yA and B in interaction yA’s will yB acts in compliance with A’s will even it is against B’s own will Max Weber’s Definitions of Power: The Origin of the Inquiry 63

Formal Definition of Power Actor A Actor B Realization of A’s will Against B’s 64

zRobert Dahl’s behavioralistic and pluralistic definition of power yDahl’s definition of power: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, p. 203) yThe analogy of billiard ball and example of traffic policeman yDahl’s conception of political community as polyarchy and pluralism Different Perspectives of Power 65

zDenis Wrong’s conception of power of intention yWrong defines power as “the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others.” (Wrong, 1979, p.2) yAdditional constituents Wrong inserted in the concept of power xIntentionality in power xEffectiveness of power Different Perspectives of Power 66

zDenis Wrong’s conception of power of intention yWrong’s distinction between intended and unintended influences x Dominant and overprotective mother does not intend to feminize the character of her son x A boss does not mean to plunge an employee into despair by greeting him somewhat distractedly x A woman does not mean to arouse a man’s sexual interest by paying polite attention to his conversation in a cocktail party Different Perspectives of Power 67

zBachrach & Baratz’s thesis on Two Faces of Power (1962) yCriticism on Dahl pluralistic decision –making thesis yDistinction between power of decision making and “non-decision making” xA non-decision making situation refers to "A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.” In this way, they suggest, B is hindered in raising issues which may be detrimental to A’s preferences. (Clegg, 1989, p. 76) Different Perspectives of Power 68

zBachrach & Baratz’s thesis on Two Faces of Power (1962) yMechanism of non-decision making in organization xMobilization of bias and non-issue xRule of Anticipated reaction xNegative decision-making Different Perspectives of Power 69

Potential cause for B to formulate a grievance Not formulatedFormulated Mobilization of bias Not articulated Anticipated reaction Articulated Not resolved Resolved Negative Decision-making Decision RefusedAccepted 70

zSteven Lukes defines “the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.” In this definition “the notion of interests” is given a significant and evaluative position. (Lukes, 2005, p. 37) Accordingly Lukes differentiates power into three dimensions. Different Perspectives of Power 71

zLukes’ three dimensions of power and the radical approach y1 st dimension of power: It involves "a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interest, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation" (Lukes, 2005, p.19). This dimension of power assumes a liberal ontological position, which "takes man as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation." (2005, p.37) Different Perspectives of Power 72

zLukes’ three dimensions of power and the radical approach y2 nd dimension of power: It involves "consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests, seen as express policy preferences and sub-political grievances." (p. 25) This dimension of power assumes a reformist ontological position in "seeing and deploring that not all men's wants are given equal weight by the political system, also relates their interest to what they want or prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways – in the form of deflected, submerged or concealed wants and preferences." (p.37) Different Perspectives of Power 73

zLukes’ three dimensions of power and the radical approach y3rd dimension of power: It assumes a radical ontological position, in which people in subordination and their real interest hampered or “may not express or even be conscious of their interest.” (p. 28) That is because “people's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice." (p. 37) Hence, this dimension of power set out to theorize and evaluate actual behavior by revealing models of what people would do if they knew what their real interests were. Different Perspectives of Power 74

zDebates on Lukes' three-dimensional conception of power yDebate on the notion of real interest xBradshaw suggests that Lukes has confused “choices of preferences of autonomous individuals with 'real interests'” (1976, quoted in Clegg, 1989, p.94). It is difficult to distinctively differentiate the two, especially in cases of substantiating individual’s autonomous choice is not of her “real interest” or her non-preference is of her “real interest”. xWall's example of heroin addicts’ choice to continue taking the drug (1975, quoted, Clegg, 1989, p.95) or smokers, etc. Different Perspectives of Power 75

zDebates on Lukes' three-dimensional conception of power yTed Benton’s criticism on Luke’s conception of the unconscious real interest of the dominated xBenton queries that “the judgment as to which class of wants, preferences, choices, etc. do constitute the interests of an actor who is subjects to an exercise of power has to be made by the external observer, or analyst on behalf of the actor. The judgment that has to be made is how the actor would feel or behave under conditions which do not now hold, and may be never have, nor ever will hold. No matter how well-intentioned the observer, this is still other-ascription of interest and not self-ascription.” (1981, p. 167) Different Perspectives of Power 76

yTed Benton’s criticism on Luke’s conception of the unconscious real interest of the dominated xBenton's concept of paradox of emancipation “In its simplest form this is the problem of how to reconcile a conception of socialist practice as a form of collective self-emancipation with a critique of the established order which holds that the consciousness of those from whom collective self-emancipation is to be expected is systematically manipulated, distorted and falsified by essential features of the order. If the autonomy of subordinate groups (classes) is to be respected then emancipation is out of the question; whereas if emancipation is to be brought about, it cannot be self- emancipation. I shall refer to this problem as the ‘paradox of emancipation’.” (Benton 1981, p.162) Different Perspectives of Power 77

zDebates on Lukes' three-dimensional conception of power yGaventa’s mechanism of the 3 rd dimension of power xApathy or fatalism xUnderdevelopemnt of political consciousness xPolitical consciousness having been disorganized chronically and/or systemically Different Perspectives of Power 78

Foucault’s Studies of Power (1926-1984) 80

zFoucault’s conception of power “Power must be understood in the first instance (1) as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; (2) as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverse them; (3) as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them form one another; and lastly, (4) as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.” (1978/90, Pp. 92-93) Foucault’s Studies of Power 81

zThe “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power: The subject y“I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different mode by which, in our culture, human being are made subjects... Thus it is not power, but the subject, which is the general them of my research.” (1982, 208-209) Foucault’s Studies of Power 82

zThe “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power: The subject y“My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human being into subjects.” (1982, p. 208) x“The first of the modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of sciences for example, the objectification of the speaking subject in grammaire generale, philology and linguistics;.... the objectification of the productive subject, the subject who labors, in the analysis of wealth and economics;..... the objectification of the sheer fact of being alive in natural history and biology.” (p. 208) (The most representative work is The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences, 1966) Foucault’s Studies of Power 84

Foucault’s Studies of Power 85

zThe “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power: The subject y“My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human being into subjects.” (1982, p. 208) x“In the second part of my work, I have studied the objectivizing of the subject in what I shall call ‘dividing practices’....Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys.” (p. 208) (The representative works are Madness and civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 1961; The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perspective, 1963; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1975) Foucault’s Studies of Power 86

zThe “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power: The subject y“My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human being into subjects.” (1982, p. 208) x“Finally, I have sought to study...the way a human being turns him or herself into a subject....I have chosen the domain of sexuality - how men have learn to recognize themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality’.” (p. 208) (History of Sexuality, vol. 1-3, 1982-1-84 are of course the representative works) Foucault’s Studies of Power 88

zFoucault’s typology of power: In Foucault’s studies of power, four conceptions of power may be found: yDisciplinary power yBiopower yPastoral power ySovereign power Foucault’s Studies of Power 90

zDisciplinary Power: Technology of the body and power (Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, 1977/75) yThe project of docility: “In every society, the body was in the grip of very strict power, which imposed on it constraints, prohibition or obligations.” “Docility …joins the analyzable body (intelligible body) with the manipulatable body (useful body).” (1979/75, p. 136) Foucault’s Studies of Power 91

zDisciplinary Power: yDisciplinary power as techniques on “manipulatable and useful body”: Foucault has specified a list of techniques of disciplinary power, “which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon then a relation of docility-utility.” (1979/75, p. 137) Foucault’s Studies of Power 92

zDisciplinary Power: yDisciplinary power as techniques on “manipulatable and useful body”: They include xThe art of distributions xThe control of activity xThe organization of geneses xComposition of forces x“To sum up, it might be said that discipline creates out of the bodies it controls four types of individuality: …it is cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the composition of forces).” (Foucault, 1977, p.167) Foucault’s Studies of Power 93

zDisciplinary Power: yDisciplinary power as training on analyzable and intelligible body x“The chief function of disciplinary power is to ‘train’. …Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units. It ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless multitude of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements ─ small, separate cells, organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments. Discipline ‘makes’ individuals.” (Foucault, 1977, p.170) Foucault’s Studies of Power 94

zDisciplinary Power: yDisciplinary power as training on analyzable and intelligible body x“The success of disciplinary power derives …from the use of simple instruments: (1) hierarchical observation; (2) normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, (3) examination.” (Foucault, 1977, p.170; my numbering) Foucault’s Studies of Power 95

zDisciplinary Power: yDisciplinary power in the Panoptic on: The self-surveillant body x“Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure ….. We know the principle on which is was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then is to place a supervisor in the central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man a worker or a schoolboys. By the effect of blacklighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive showers in the cells of the periphery. …. Visibility is a trap." (Foucault, 1977, p. 200) Foucault’s Studies of Power 96

zDisciplinary Power: yDisciplinary power in the Panoptic on: The self-surveillant body x“The major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that is architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmate should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.” (, p. 201) Foucault’s Studies of Power Distinction between A and B practically vanished 99

zBiopower: Power/Knowledge on Life (History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 1978/76) yThe institutionalization of biopower "Starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life involved in two basic forms: –One of these poles …centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo- politics of the human body. Foucault’s Studies of Power 100

zBiopower: yThe institutionalization of biopower "Starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life involved in two basic forms: –The second, somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, birth and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population." (Foucault, 1978, p.139) Foucault’s Studies of Power 101

zBiopower: yThe institutionalization of biopower x"During the classical period (i.e. 17th century)…there was the emergence in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence, there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of x'". (Foucault, 1978, p. 140) Foucault’s Studies of Power 102

zBiopower: yThe institutionalization of biopower xThe concept of biopower: "Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate domination was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. If one can apply the term bio-history to the pressure through which the movement of life and the processes of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of bio-power to designate what brought life and its mechanism into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life." (Foucault, 1978, p. 142-433, original italic) Foucault’s Studies of Power 103

zBiopower: yThe constitution of sexuality and the power/knowledge on life xThe relationship between power and discourse “It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together.” (1978/76, p.100) “Discourse can be both instrument and an effect of power. …Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it.” (1978/76, p.101) Foucault’s Studies of Power 104

zBiopower: yThe constitution of sexuality and the power/knowledge on life xThe relationship between power and discourse “In a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.” (1994/76, p. 31) Foucault’s Studies of Power 105

zBiopower: yThe constitution of sexuality and the power/knowledge on life xSex become a political issue and subject to power: It is within the historical context of the institutionalization of biopower, it "enable us to understand the importance assumed by sex as a political issue." (Foucault, 1978, p.145) That is because "sex was a means of access both to life of the body and the life of the species." (Foucault, 1978, p. 146) "At the juncture of the 'body' and the 'population', sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather that the menace of death." (Foucault, 1978, p.147) Foucault’s Studies of Power 106

zBiopower: yThe constitution of sexuality and the power/knowledge on life xThe constitution of sexuality: "Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it is an object and a target." (Foucault, 1978, p. 147) As a result, sexuality has gradually developed into the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and the regulations." (Foucault, 1978, p. 148) It is in this conjunction of power and knowledge (i.e. power/knowledge) that sexuality can be understood as "the correlative of that slowly developed discursive practice which constitutes the scientia sexualis." (Foucault, 1978, p.68) Foucault’s Studies of Power 107

zPastoral power: From confessional to modern-state apparatuses y“Since the Middle Ages at least, Western societies have established the confession as one of the main ritual we rely on for the production of truth, …with the resulting development of confessional techniques. …The confession became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth. …Western man has become a confessing animal.” (Foucault, 1978, p. 58-59) Foucault’s Studies of Power 108

zPastoral power: y“The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfold within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribe and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. … By virtue of the power structure immanent in it, the confessional discourse cannot come from above, …through the sovereign will of a master, but rather from below, as obligatory act of speech which under some imperious compulsion, break the bonds of discretion or forgetfulness. … The agency of domination does not reside in the one speak, but in the one who listens and says nothing, not in the one who knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is not supposed to know.” (Foucault, 1978, 61-62) Foucault’s Studies of Power 109

zPastoral power: yThe concept of pastoral power: Confessional discourse as part of the institution of Christianity, it has espoused "a very special form of power", which Foucault called "pastoral power." Foucault’s Studies of Power 110

zPastoral power: yThe concept of pastoral power: It is made up of the following features. (Foucault, 1982, P. 214) x"It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world." x"Pastoral power is not merely a form of power which commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock." x"It is a form of power which does not look after just the whole community, but each individual in particular, during his entire life." xFinally, this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's mind, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the individual himself." Foucault’s Studies of Power 111

zPastoral power: yTwo aspect of pastoral power: xThe ecclesiastical institutionalization aspect: This aspect of pastoral power, according to Foucault's analysis, "has ceased or at least lost its vitality since the eighteenth century." (Foucault, 1982, p. 214) xThe functional aspect: Foucault contends that the function of pastoral power, has spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical institution." Foucault underlines that it is the state, which has become "a new form of pastoral power." (Foucault, 1982, p. 215) Foucault’s Studies of Power 112

zPastoral power: yInstitutionalization of pastoral power in the modern state: Since the eighteenth century, functions of pastoral power have gradually been transferred from the Church to the state. Therefore, "we can see the state as a modern matrix of indiviudalization, or a new form of pastoral power.” (1982, p. 215) xIn the context of this new form of pastoral power of the state, "the word salvation takes on different meanings, health, well- being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accident. A series of 'worldly' aims took the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate." (Foucault, 1982, p. 215) As in the state project of establishment of mass education for all its future citizens, it can be construed as a new form of salvation to literacy, civil army and productive labor force. Foucault’s Studies of Power 113

zPastoral power: yInstitutionalization of pastoral power in the modern state: x"Concurrently the officials of pastoral power increased. Some times this form of power was exerted by state apparatus or, in any case, by a public institution such as the police." (Foucault, 1982, p. 215) In the case of education, it is evidenced in the development of public schooling systems and implementation of compulsory education policy in European countries in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Foucault’s Studies of Power 114

zPastoral power: yInstitutionalization of pastoral power in the modern state: x"Finally, the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the development of knowledge of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual." (Foucault, 1982, p. 215) The establishment of the knowledge and field of study of education since the eighteenth century signified the emergence and development of the knowledge/power (i.e. discourse) around the pastoral power of education. Furthermore, the field of education has accordingly differentiated, as Foucault indicated, into areas of studies focusing on knowledge globalizing aspect of pastoral power, such as education policy and planning, economics of education, etc.; and areas of studies emphasizing the analytical and individualizing aspect of pastoral power, such as psychology of education, curriculum and instruction, etc. Foucault’s Studies of Power 115

zSovereign power and the subject of rights and liberty (Two Lectures, 1994/77; and The Final Foucault, 1988) yTwo approaches to power: Disciplinary power vs. sovereignty power (power of law) Foucault’s Studies of Power 116

zSovereign power yTwo approaches to power: “I believe that the process which has really rendered the discourse of the human sciences possible is the juxtaposition, the encounter between two lines of approach, two mechanisms, two absolutely heterogeneous types of discourse: on the one hand there is the reorganization of right that invests sovereignty, and on the other, the mechanics of the coercive forces whose exercise takes a disciplinary form. And I believe that in our own times power is exercise simultaneously through these courses, to which the disciplines give rise, invade the area of right so that the procedure of normalization come to be ever more constantly engaged in the colonization of those of law. I believe that all this can explain the global functioning of what I would call a society of normalization.” (1994/76, p.44) Foucault’s Studies of Power 117

zSovereign power yThe historical development of the juridical-political theory of sovereignty and the rule of rights in Western societies xSovereign power of feudal monarchy and the rights of the King: “In Western societies since medieval times it has been royal power that has provided the essential focus around which legal thought has been elaborated. It is in response to the demands of royal power, for its profit and to serve as its instrument or justification, that the juridical edifice of our own society has been developed. Right in the West is the King’s right.... Foucault’s Studies of Power 118

zSovereign power yThe historical development of the juridical-political theory of sovereignty and the rule of rights in Western societies x...And when this legal edifice escapes in latter century from the control of the monarch, when, more accurately, it is turned against that control, it is always the limits of this sovereign power that are put in question, its prerogatives that are challenged....When it comes to the general organization of the legal system in the West, it is essentially with the King, his rights, his power and its eventual limitations, that one is dealing.” (1994/76, p. 32-33) Foucault’s Studies of Power 119

zSovereign power yDemocratized sovereign power and the rights of the public: This mechanism of power and theory of rights, according to Foucault, were invoked along two lines of developments undertaken in Western societies. x"It has been, in the eighteenth and again in the nineteenth century, a permanent instrument of criticism of the monarchy and of all the obstacles that can thwart the development of disciplinary society” (p. 42-43) Foucault’s Studies of Power 120

zSovereign power yDemocratized sovereign power and the rights of the public: x“At the same time, the theory of sovereignty, and the organization of a legal code centered upon it, have allowed a system to be superimposed upon the mechanism of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights.” (p. 43) Foucault’s Studies of Power 121

zSovereign power yFoucault’s final words on the relationship between power and freedom xThe inherent relationship between power and freedom: “In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of liberty. Even though the relation of power may be completely unbalanced or when one can truly say that he has ‘all power’ over the other, a power can only be exercised over another to the extent that the latter still has the possibility of committing suicide, of jumping out of the window or of killing the other. That means that in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance...there would be no resistance of power....If there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere.” (1988, p. 12) Foucault’s Studies of Power 122

zSovereign power yFoucault’s final words on the relationship between power and freedom xThe liberating-dominating nature of power: x“Power is not an evil. Power is strategic games....Let us...take something that has been the object of criticism, often justified: the pedagogical institution. I don’t see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you are to avoid in these practices － where power cannot not play and where it is no evil in itself － the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian professor, and so forth.... Foucault’s Studies of Power 124

zSovereign power yFoucault’s final words on the relationship between power and freedom xThe liberating-dominating nature of power: x"...We must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic game between liberties － strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others － and the states of domination, which are what we ordinary call power. And between the two, between the games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies.” (Pp. 18-19) Foucault’s Studies of Power 125

zSovereign power yFoucault’s final words on the relationship between power and freedom xThe notion of governmentality: “In the idea of governmentality, I am aiming at the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organize, institutionalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other. It is free individuals who try to control, to determine, to delimit the liberty of others, and in order to do that, they dispose of certain instruments to govern others. That rests indeed on freedom, on the relationship of self to self and the relationship to the other. But if you try to analyze power not from the point of view of liberty, of strategies and of governmentality but from the point of view of a political institution, you cannot consider the subject as a subject of rights.” (1988, Pp. 19-20) Foucault’s Studies of Power 126

zIn recent years a number of scholars have redefined the A-over-B conception of power in a number of fashions. Recent Revisions of Conception of Power: Dialectic nature of Power Relation 127

zSteven Lukes revision of his radical view on power: yLukes admits that “the definition of ‘the underlying concept of power’ offered in PRV (Power: A Radical View, 1974) is, plainly, entirely unsatisfactory in several respects.” One of these respect is that “it equates such dependence-inducing power with domination, assuming that ‘A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interest’. thereby neglecting what we have seen to be the manifold ways in which power over others can be productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity.” (Lukes, 2005, p. 109) Recent Revisions of Conception of Power: Dialectic nature of Power Relation 128

zSteven Lukes revision of his radical view on power: yLukes specifically quoted Charles Taylor to substantiate his assertion. “Charles Taylor has helped to clarify this essential point. ‘If some external agency or situation wreaks some change in me that in no way lies athwart some such desire/purpose/aspiration/interest, then there is no call to speak of an exercise of power/domination. Take the phenomenon of imprinting. In human life, it also exist after a fashion. We generally come to like the foods that have assuaged our hunger, those we are fed as children in our culture. Is this an index of the domination of our culture over us? The world would lose all useful profile, would have no more distinctiveness, if we let it roam this wide.’” (Lukes, 2005, Pp. 113-4) Recent Revisions of Conception of Power: Dialectic nature of Power Relation 129

zJohn Scott’s conception of signification and legitimation bases of power (2001) Scott indicates that apart from coercive force or political manipulation, power can be constituted by means of “persuasive influence, which “depends on arguments, appeals and reasons that cause subaltern (in a power relation) to believe that it is appropriate to act in one way rather than another....This may involve a commitment to or recognition of ideas or values that are accepted as beyond question, as providing intrinsically appropriate reasons for acting.” Recent Revisions of Conception of Power: Dialectic nature of Power Relation 130

zJohn Scott’s conception of signification and legitimation bases of power (2001) Bases of this form of power have been differentiated by Scott into ySignification: The compliance of B (i.e. the subaltern) in a power relation is induced by the fact that a subaltern accepts the expertise of the system of knowledge or cognitive symbol of A. yLegitimation: B’s compliance is subscribed to the value and/or normative systems of a particular social or cultural context in which B has identified with. Recent Revisions of Conception of Power: Dialectic nature of Power Relation 131

zThe legacy of Weber’s conception of power: For a century, the theoretical discourse of power (as discussed above) has been dominated by Weber’s coercive concept of power, i.e. the chance and capacity of fulfilling one’s will in a social relationship against the opposition of one’s partners. Habermas’ Concept of Communicative Power 133

zHabermas distinction between coercive and communicative power: In a review essay on “Hannah Arendt’s communicative concept of power”(Habermas, 1977), Habermas suggests y“Max Weber takes the teleological model of action as his point of departure: an individual subject ( or a group that can be regard as an individual) chooses the appropriate means to realize a goal that it has set for itself. Goal-attainment or success consists in bringing about a state in the world that fulfills the goal in question. To the extent that his success depends on the behavior of another subject, the actor must have at his disposal the means to instigate the other to the desired behavior. Weber calls his disposition over means to influence the will of another ‘power’. …As Weber puts it: ‘Power means every chance within a social relationship to assert one’s will even against opposition’.” (Habermas, 1977, P. 3-4) Habermas’ Concept of Communicative Power 134

zHabermas distinction between coercive and communicative power: …Habermas suggests … y“Hannah Arendt starts from another model of action, the communicative: ‘Power corresponds to the human ability not just act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remain in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.’ The fundamental phenomenon of power is not the instrumentalization of another’s will, but the formation of a common will in a communication directed to reach agreement.” (Habermas, 1977, P. 4) Habermas’ Concept of Communicative Power 135

zBy locating Arendt’s communicative power within his grand theoretical framework of communicative action, communicative rationality, public sphere, and lifeworld (1984; 1987; 1989; and 1996); Habermas has given the concept of communicative power a much wider scope, yCommunicative power can be conceived as one of the organic components of the theory of communicative action. The three concepts: Communicative rationality, communicative action and communicative power form a tripod, within which action and power can be communicatively rationalized, rationality and power can be communicatively activated, and in turn both action and rationality can be communicatively empowered. (Habermas, 1984) Habermas’ Concept of Communicative Power 136

z…..Habermas has given the concept of communicative power a much wider scope, y… yCommunicative power can also be taken as the power-base for the formation of the public sphere and the lifeworld. (Habermas, 1987; 1989) yFinally, communicative power can be viewed as the very foundation of legitimation for the judiciary power, administrative power and law-making power of the democratic state (Habermas, 1996) Habermas’ Concept of Communicative Power 137

Actor (Subjective World) The Objective World The Social World (Lifeworld) Weber’s Conceptions of Rationality & Action Purposive/ Instrumental Rationality Communicative Rationality 139 Teleological Actions Communicative Actions Normatively Regulated Actions Dramaturgical Actions

140 Purposive/ Instrumental Rationality Communicative Rationality Communicative Actions Teleological Actions Communicative Power Coercive Power Medium- Steering System Lifeworld Money- Steering System: Market Power- Steering System: State Public Sphere Private Sphere Colonization of the Lifeworld

Topic 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP (III) Concepts of Reason 141

John Rawls distinction between rational and reasonable z“Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. ….The reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation and that its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of reciprocity.” (1993, 49-50) 142

z“The rational is, however, a distinct idea from the reasonable and applied to a single, unified agent (either an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own. The ration applies to how these ends and interests are adopted and affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority. It also applies to the choice of means, in which case it is guided by such familiar principles as: to adopt the most effective means to ends, or to select the most probable alternative, other things equal.” (1993, p. 50) John Rawls distinction between rational and reasonable 144

zMore specifically, “what rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation. …Rational agents approach being psychopathic when their interests are solely in benefits to themselves.” (1993, p. 51) As in everyday speech, we may characterize rational agents that “their proposal was perfectly rational given their strong bargaining position, but it was nevertheless highly unreasonable.” (1993, 48) John Rawls distinction between rational and reasonable 145

zIn light of Rawls’ distinction, practical reason can then be construed as reasons that reasoning agents attributed to their actions. It goes beyond the principle of rationality and means-end calculation. It conforms to the principle of reciprocity and fairness, which members of a given community mutually accepted. John Rawls distinction between rational and reasonable 146

zAccordingly, practical reason can be defined as human capacity to attribute their actions to yThe principle of rationality, yThe principle of reciprocity, and/or even yThe principle of fairness John Rawls distinction between rational and reasonable 147

zDistinction between theoretical (pure) and practical reasons: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of system of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. …Being first virtue of human actives, truth and justice are uncompromising.” (Rawls, 1971, Pp. 3-4) John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 148

zJustice as fairness: One of the fundamental justifications of Rawls’ theory of justice is to base his concept of justice on the idea of fairness. y“It might seem at the first sight that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, and that there is no reason to distinguish them, or to say that one is fundamental than the other. I think that this impression is mistaken. In this paper I wish to show that fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness; and I wish to offer an analysis of the concept of justice from this point of view.” (Rawls, 1999[1958], p. 42) John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 149

zJustice as fairness: …. yThe meaning of fairness: “Fundamental to justice is the concept of fairness which relates to right dealing between persons who are cooperating with or competing against one another, as when one speak of fair games, fair competition, and fair bargains. The question of fairness arises when free persons, who have no authority over one another, are engaging in a joint activity and among themselves settling or acknowledging the rules which define it and which determine the respective shares in its benefits and burdens. …. John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 150

zJustice as fairness: …. yThe meaning of fairness: “….. A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels that, by participating in it, they or any of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which they do not regard as legitimate. This implies that each has a conception of legitimate claims which he thinks it reasonable for others as well as himself to acknowledge. …A practice is just or fair, then, when it satisfies the principles which those who participate in it could propose to one another for mutual acceptance under aforementioned circumstances.” (Rawls, 1999[1958], p. 59) John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 151

zThe idea of original position yIn reality, most of the situations in which humans enter into cooperation or competition are not in fair terms. That is they are not in equal footings when engage in a bargain and one of the parties may has an upper hand over their partners. The worst scenario the parties found themselves in a situation where they have to strike a balance not in the most favorable terms of both parties. In other words, “the best that each can do for himself may be a condition of lesser justice rather than of greater good. …It is at this point that the conception of the original position embodies features peculiar to moral theory.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 120) John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 152

zThe conception of the veil of ignorance y“The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odd and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 136) John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 153

zThe conception of the veil of ignorance y“It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. xFirst of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 154

zThe conception of the veil of ignorance y“It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. x… xMore than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.” (Rawls 1971, p. 137; the Roman numberings are mine) John Rawls’ Conception of Justice as Fairness 155

zTwo Principles of Justice y“First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with similar system of liberty for all. y“Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both xto the greatest benefits of the least advantaged, …and xattached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunities.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 302) John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 156

zApplications of the principles: “These principles primarily apply …to the basic structure of society. They are to govern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages….These principles presuppose that the social structure can be divided into two more or less distinct parts.” (Rawls, 1871, p. 61), John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 157

zApplications of the principles: …. yThe First Principle applies to those distinct “aspects of the social system that define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship. …The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of person along with right to hold (personal) property; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. These liberties are all required to be equal…, since citizens of just society are to have the same basic rights.” (p.61) John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 158

zApplications of the principles: …. yThe Second Principle applies to those aspects of social system “that specify and establish social and economic inequalities.” More specifically, it “applies…to the distribution of income and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command.” (p. 61) John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 159

zInterpretation of the second principle yRawls qualifies that the two constituent phrases in the Second Principle, namely to “everyone’s advantage” and “equally open to all” need further interpretation. yRawls interprets the two phrases as follows (Rawls, 1971, p. 65) John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 160

161 John Rawls’ Theory of Justice

zPriority and lexical orders between principles of justice yThe priority of liberty: The First Principle, namely the principle of liberty) has lexical priority over the Second Principle: This ordering means that a departure from the institutions of equal liberty require by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages.” (p. 61) yThe priority of democratic equality over the other three systems, in other words, the priority of difference principle and equality as equality of fair opportunity over principle of efficiency and equality as careers open to talent. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 162

zCritiques on the liberal assumptions of Rawls’ theory of justice yThe misconception of the conception of person qua person: In Rawls’ original position a person is but a chooser of no conception of ends and good of life; of no identity, lived experiences and lifeworld; and of no origins, history and tradition. yMisconception of asocial individualism: In Rawls’ original position, person but a chooser located in a game situation, in which she is totally independent of any social affiliations, social roles, social responsibilities, social identity, and conceptions of common goods. Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 163

zCritiques on the liberal assumptions of Rawls’ theory of justice yMisconception of ahistorical universalism: The decision emerged from the original position, i.e. principles of justice, is assumed to be universally applicable across human cultures and social institutions. yMisconception of aempirical subjectivism: The decision arrived at by rational choosers in original position is assumed be based purely on their subjective preferences, totally in disregard of the empirical grounds, in which this decisions are supposed to unfold and to be implemented. Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 164

zAlastair MacIntyre’s conception of communal virtue yMacIntyre in his book After Virtue (2007) outlines a trajectory through which human virtue such as the concept of justice can be constituted in human communities. Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 165

zAlastair MacIntyre’s conception of communal virtue yIn brief, MacIntyre suggests that “the complex, historical, multi-layered character of the core concept of virtue” can be logically developed in three stages. “The first stage requires a background account of what I shall call a practice, the second an account of what I have …characterized as the narrative order of a single human life and the third an account …of what constitutes a moral tradition. Each latter stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa. Each earlier stage is both modified by and reinterpreted in the light of, but also provides an essential constituent of each later stage. The progress in the development of the concept is closely related, although it does not recapitulate in any straightforward way, the history of the tradition of which it forms the core.” (Pp. 186-87) Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 167

zJohn Rawls’ responses to his critics: In his book Political Liberalism published twenty-one years after A Theory of Justice, he has made numbers of important concessions to his original formulation. yThe revision of the “political conception of justice”: Rawls retreats from his original stance that his theory of justice is the comprehensive doctrine applying to all spheres and domains in human society; instead his suggests that the theory apply only to public sphere in modern polity. Furthermore, he underlines that the theory is implicit to be at work in “the public political culture of democratic society.” (Rawls 1993, P. 15) Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 168

zJohn Rawls’ responses to his critics: … yThe conception of political constructivism: Rawls has basically abandoned his conception of original position in replacement he put forth the conception of political constructivism. Rawls suggests that “Justice as fairness is best presented in two stages. In the first stage it is worked out as a freestanding political (but of course moral) conception for the basic structure of society. Only with this done and its content ― its principles of justice and ideals ― provisionally on hand do we take up, in the second stage, the problem whether justice as fairness is sufficiently stable.” (Pp.140-41) Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 169

zHas Rawls become a communitarian liberal? In view of these concessions a Rawls has made in Political Liberalism, one may conclude that he has relocated his theory of justice from the foundation of liberalism to the institutional foundation of democratic community within which ythe institutional practices of public reasonability of a constitutional-liberal democracy have been firmly in place; ythe narrative of citizenship of civil-constitutional democracy has been commonly shared by its citizens ythe culture of democratic reasonability from which overlapping consensuses have been reached from generation to generation and has been a tradition. Debate on the Foundations of Practical Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism 170

End Topic 6-7 Practical Foundations of EAP: Rationality, Power, & Reason 171

Lecture 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP: Rationality, Power and Power PEDU 7206 1.

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Lecture 6 & 7 The Practical Foundations of EAP: Rationality, Power and Power PEDU 7206 1.

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