1. Do Conduit Neutrality Mandates Promote or Hinder Trust in Internet- mediated Transactions? Do Conduit Neutrality Mandates Promote or Hinder Trust in Internet- mediated Transactions? A Presentation at the ICRI Conference on Trust in the Information Society Leuven, Belgium November 14-15, 2011 Rob Frieden, Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law Penn State University rmf5@psu.edu Web site : http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/m/rmf5/http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/m/rmf5/ Blog site: http://telefrieden.blogspot.com/http://telefrieden.blogspot.com/

2. 2 Internet Conduit Neutrality ISPs and Internet-mediated service providers rail against network neutrality mandates, but embrace “safe harbor” exemption from liability when subscribers use their networks to commit a crime, tort, or infringe a copyright. ISPs and Internet-mediated service providers rail against network neutrality mandates, but embrace “safe harbor” exemption from liability when subscribers use their networks to commit a crime, tort, or infringe a copyright. Sec. 230 of the Communications Decency Act and Sec. 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act create incentives for Internet carriers and service providers to emphasize their conduit function and to downplay their role in creating, editing, packaging and distributing content. Sec. 230 of the Communications Decency Act and Sec. 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act create incentives for Internet carriers and service providers to emphasize their conduit function and to downplay their role in creating, editing, packaging and distributing content. The U.S. Congress wisely did not want to burden market entrants with costly network management duties. Now the cost for such vigilance has diminished greatly, e.g., DPI, and new incentives favor greater network management, price and QOS discrimination. The U.S. Congress wisely did not want to burden market entrants with costly network management duties. Now the cost for such vigilance has diminished greatly, e.g., DPI, and new incentives favor greater network management, price and QOS discrimination. ISPs have to calibrate their proactiveness lest they lose “safe harbor” liability exemptions. Overall this increases risks to upstream content creators and downstream end users. ISPs have to calibrate their proactiveness lest they lose “safe harbor” liability exemptions. Overall this increases risks to upstream content creators and downstream end users. Absent obligations to investigate and take down harmful content, self- imposed ISP neutrality creates disincentives for content creators to make available their most valuable products and for subscribers to rely on assurances about network trustworthiness, safety and privacy. Absent obligations to investigate and take down harmful content, self- imposed ISP neutrality creates disincentives for content creators to make available their most valuable products and for subscribers to rely on assurances about network trustworthiness, safety and privacy.

3. Source: George Ou, Digital Society, http://www.digitalsociety.org/2010/12/division-of-labor-between- broadband-and-cdn/ 3

4. A Recent “Smoking Gun”? For added leverage in a dispute over compensation for retransmission of broadcast content, Fox temporarily blocked access to specific web sites by all Long Island, New York Cablevision customers, including broadband- only subscribers. Network neutrality concerns have focused on ISP access issues, but in this case a content provider targeted and blocked end user access. Social networks and other web services also have the incentive and ability to use DPI and other techniques to “mine” subscriber data; these tactics may violate one’s reasonable privacy expectations, and/or promote enhanced and specialized service. 4

5. 5 Four Phases in Internet Development 1)Incubation--government administration, first through the United States Defense Department and later through the United States National Science Foundation and universities and research institutes throughout the world (1980s-1995); 2)Privatization--governments eliminate financial subsidies obligating contractors to assess whether and how to operate commercially (1995- 1998); 3)Commercialization—private networks proliferate as do ventures creating software applications and content that traverse the Internet. The “dotcom boom” triggers irrational, excessive investment and overcapacity (1998- 2001); and 4)Diversification—after the dotcom bust and market re-entrenchment, Internet survivors and market entrants expand the array of available services and ISPs offer diversified terms, conditions and rates, including price and quality of service discrimination needed by “mission critical” traffic having high bandwidth requirements, e.g., full motion video content. ISPs and even content providers can use deep packet inspection to identify traffic for “better than best efforts,” and other forms of prioritization at one extreme and blockage/throttling at the other.

6. Incentives in Phase Four ISPs consider price and QOS discrimination essential for generating new profit centers; the Internet largely shifts from “best efforts,” “one size fits all” into a largely differentiated medium. ISPs consider price and QOS discrimination essential for generating new profit centers; the Internet largely shifts from “best efforts,” “one size fits all” into a largely differentiated medium. Content providers increasingly trade off maximum market penetration for smaller shares of paying customers; without firewalls and effective authentication, premium content won’t be offered. Content providers increasingly trade off maximum market penetration for smaller shares of paying customers; without firewalls and effective authentication, premium content won’t be offered. Even end users want “better than best efforts” routing of mission critical bitstreams, e.g., movies, pay per view, full motion video. Even end users want “better than best efforts” routing of mission critical bitstreams, e.g., movies, pay per view, full motion video. But ISPs are tempted to act on their incentives and abilities to discriminate in anticompetitive ways, e.g., Comcast’s throttling of P2P traffic that offered a competitive alternative (lawful or not) to video-on-demand. But ISPs are tempted to act on their incentives and abilities to discriminate in anticompetitive ways, e.g., Comcast’s throttling of P2P traffic that offered a competitive alternative (lawful or not) to video-on-demand. 6

7. Finding the Right Balance--ISPs Many network neutrality advocates appreciate the need for ISPs to manage their networks to guard against spam, denial of service and other attacks. National Regulatory Authorities’ concerns about open access should not foreclose legitimate network management, including DRM enforcement. Many network neutrality advocates appreciate the need for ISPs to manage their networks to guard against spam, denial of service and other attacks. National Regulatory Authorities’ concerns about open access should not foreclose legitimate network management, including DRM enforcement. However, an ISP can frame as legitimate network management tactics designed to handicap competitors whose traffic transits the ISP’s network. Note that while upstream content providers can choose among several Tier-1 ISPs, end users may have limited options and they select only one carrier to provide all first and last km service. However, an ISP can frame as legitimate network management tactics designed to handicap competitors whose traffic transits the ISP’s network. Note that while upstream content providers can choose among several Tier-1 ISPs, end users may have limited options and they select only one carrier to provide all first and last km service. NRAs likely to receive consumer complaints about service disruptions, the cause of which might be obscured attempts by an ISP to handicap a competitor. NRAs likely to receive consumer complaints about service disruptions, the cause of which might be obscured attempts by an ISP to handicap a competitor. 7

8. Finding the Right Balance—Content Providers/Social Networks Content providers and social networks provide service under enforceable contracts, albeit non-negotiable ones. Subscribers can willingly waive privacy rights. But checking a box may evidence an unreasonable “contract of adhesion” and not constitute informed consent. Content providers and social networks provide service under enforceable contracts, albeit non-negotiable ones. Subscribers can willingly waive privacy rights. But checking a box may evidence an unreasonable “contract of adhesion” and not constitute informed consent. While some content providers/social networks consider privacy an old person’s concern, Facebook and others have faced substantial subscriber pushback when they were perceived as going too far. While some content providers/social networks consider privacy an old person’s concern, Facebook and others have faced substantial subscriber pushback when they were perceived as going too far. The combination of ability and incentive to operate anticompetitively requires consumer safeguards, particularly because DPI and other techniques can occur without easy detection and prevention. The combination of ability and incentive to operate anticompetitively requires consumer safeguards, particularly because DPI and other techniques can occur without easy detection and prevention. If content providers/social networks join ISPs in pushing the line, the overall utility of the Internet may suffer as real, or perceived risks to privacy, identity theft, etc. increase. If content providers/social networks join ISPs in pushing the line, the overall utility of the Internet may suffer as real, or perceived risks to privacy, identity theft, etc. increase. 8

9. 9 Does the FCC Have Jurisdiction to Resolve Internet Cloud Disputes? Arguments in Favor: While the ISP-end user link constitutes a largely unregulated information service, upstream constitutes telecommunications service, subject to Title II of the Communications Act. The FCC has streamlined long haul telecommunications service regulation, but is statutorily constrained from abandoning requirements that carriers price service on fair terms and conditions without unreasonable discrimination. The Commission has direct statutory authority to resolve service complaints, both in terms of blocked access to content by end users and allegations of discriminatory pricing. While prone to over-extend its ancillary authority, the FCC has a direct statutory link for resolving cable television retransmission content disputes (Title VI) that morph into end user content blocking, e.g., Fox could not prevent Cablevision subscribers from erecting antennas.

10. 10 Does the FCC Have Jurisdiction to Resolve Internet Cloud Disputes? Arguments Against: The FCC lacks jurisdiction over Internet transactions at all levels. Congress rewards conduit neutrality, but did not mandate it. The Internet has thrived thanks to government incubation and timely privatization. The Comcast-Level 3 dispute involves a peering contract. The Cablevision-Fox dispute involves a content access and carriage dispute for which Congress favors market-driven negotiations with limited FCC review. These two disputes do not trigger network neutrality concerns, because the parties have voluntarily entered into commercial interconnection negotiations, not common carriage. ISPs can de-peer or migrate from barter to payment and video content providers can decide when and how intermediaries can secure access.

11. 11 What Should the FCC and Other NRAs Do? Provide its “good offices” to resolve disputes when a stakeholder or end user files a complaint. While most conflicts will get resolved through commercial negotiations, intractable disputes do occur necessitating limited, ad hoc intervention. Provide its “good offices” to resolve disputes when a stakeholder or end user files a complaint. While most conflicts will get resolved through commercial negotiations, intractable disputes do occur necessitating limited, ad hoc intervention. Reframe the debate away from open Internet and network neutrality to straightforward resolution of interconnection disputes and complaint resolution. Reframe the debate away from open Internet and network neutrality to straightforward resolution of interconnection disputes and complaint resolution. Had the Cablevision-Fox dispute persisted the FCC could have invoked its Title VI jurisdiction to frame the matter in terms of the duty to deal in good faith established by must carry/retransmission rules. The FCC would have had a solid foundation for invoking ancillary jurisdiction if necessary. Had the Cablevision-Fox dispute persisted the FCC could have invoked its Title VI jurisdiction to frame the matter in terms of the duty to deal in good faith established by must carry/retransmission rules. The FCC would have had a solid foundation for invoking ancillary jurisdiction if necessary. The FCC wisely refrained from immediately intervening in the Comcast-Level 3 dispute. Had a service disruption occurred the FCC could have framed the matter as an interconnection dispute subject to Title II. The FCC wisely refrained from immediately intervening in the Comcast-Level 3 dispute. Had a service disruption occurred the FCC could have framed the matter as an interconnection dispute subject to Title II.

12. 12 Conclusions NRAs like the FCC have lawful statutory authority to remedy disputes among carriers and between carriers and subscribers when the parties cannot reach a timely settlement. This authority covers both telecommunications services and information services. However, they must act with restraint in light of limited statutory authority to act prospectively instead of responding to a complaint. Most disputes can get resolved through commercial negotiations. Intractable disputes may increase, particularly ones where stalling favors one side. For these type problems NRAs should have lawful authority to investigate and attempt to remedy anticompetitive and discriminatory practices.