1. Whether Justice be a Natural or an Artificial Virtue AP 5.5: 409-424 By: David Hakim

2. General Conclusions There is a natural judgment of conscience in man, i.e. we perceive by our moral faculty, that injustice is base This judgment, independent of considerations of utility or agreeableness, is the motive to justice Justice has a moral worth, which is independent of its utility or agreeableness

3. Justice and the Moral Faculty When men come to exercise of their moral faculty, they perceive injustice as an object of disapprobation “There is a voice within us that proclaims it [injustice] to be base, unworthy and deserving of punishment” One perceives of injustice in this way independent of considerations of utility “[one’s] indignation is…immediately inflamed against an atrocious act of villany, without the cool consideration of its distant consequences upon the good of society” This is proved by an appeal to the sentiments of man

4. Justice and the Moral Faculty The common good of society “hardly ever enters into the thoughts of the far greatest part of mankind” If a sense of the public good was the only motive to justice, only those in high ranks who are educated to serve the public good would be honest Some members of the lowest class of men are honest Therefore, there must be some other motive to justice than a sense of the public good

5. Justice and the Moral Faculty Hume acknowledges that all “ingenuous natures” perceive injustice as an object of disapprobation Hume acknowledges that, in some cases, without “reluctance and antipathy” to injustice, a sense of the public good is an insufficient motive to be just

6. Sensible Knave Problem: Should one perform “an act of iniquity or infidelity” when it would add to one’s fortune without “causing any considerable breach in the social union”? Hume’s response: “in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit”

7. Sensible Knave: Dilemma for Hume Either Hume takes the “antipathy, reluctance and rebellion of heart” to be: First Horn: “a natural judgment of conscience in man, that injustice and treachery is a base and unworthy practice” “But the principle, that justice is an artificial virtue, approved solely for its utility, is given up” Second Horn: merely an uneasy, artificial feeling that implies no judgment But then Hume’s answer “has no force to convince the knave, or any other man”

8. Justice and the Moral Faculty There is a natural judgment of conscience in man [the moral faculty] that injustice and treachery is a base and unworthy practice A clear and intuitive judgment, resulting from the constitution of human nature, is sufficient to overbalance a train of subtile reasoning on the other side So, “all the subtile reasoning of the knave against it ought to be rejected without examination, as fallacious and sophistical, because it concludes against a self-evident principle”

9. What is Justice? Favour: the use of power to promote the good and happiness of others Injury: the use of power to hurt the good and happiness of others “Justice fills up the middle between these two” It is such a conduct as does no injury to others; but it does not imply the doing them any favour

10. The Notion of a Favour Discovered by certain affections of the mind A favour naturally produces gratitude As we grow up to the use of reason, the notion of a favour grows more distinct and better defined A favour is a “good office” that is done from good will, and with a good intention A favour is not due (it goes beyond what one was bound to do) The conception of things not due implies the conception of things that are due The conception of things due and not due must therefore be found in every mind which has any rational conception of a favour, or any rational sentiment of gratitude

11. The Notion of an Injury Discovered by certain affections of the mind An injury naturally produces resentment As we grow up to the use of reason, the notion of an injury grows more distinct and better defined Implies more than being hurt There must be the will and intention of the agent to do the hurt (necessary but not sufficient) Executioner who does his duty is not an object of resentment; he does nothing unjust and therefore nothing injurious “An injury…implies in it the notion of injustice”

12. Justice is a Natural Notion (P1) The notions of a favour and an injury imply the notion of justice As soon “as men come to have any proper notion of a favour and of an injury…so soon they must have the conception of justice” (P2) The notions of a favour and injury are discovered by the affections of gratitude and resentment; both natural affections of the mind “I take it for granted that gratitude and resentment are no less natural to the human mind than hunger and thirst” (P3) “if gratitude and resentment be natural to man…the notion of justice must be no less natural” (C) Therefore, justice is a natural notion

13. Justice and Obligation The notion of justice carries inseparably along with it, a perception of its moral obligation “to say that such an action is an act of justice, that it is due, that it ought to be done, that we are under a moral obligation to do it, are only different ways of expressing the same thing” The obligation of justice is not derived from its utility; the very conception of justice implies its obligation

14. Justice, Motives and Moral Worth As in all moral estimation, every action takes its denomination from the motive that produces it Therefore, no action can be denominated an act of justice unless it be done from a regard to justice We perceive no high degree of moral worth in a merely just action, when it is not opposed by interest or passion Since there is an intrinsic worth in justice and demerit in injustice perceived by the moral faculty, Hume is wrong to say that justice has no merit beyond its utility and agreeableness “the whole of [Hume’s] laboured system must fall to the ground”