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L15-205_16-01-25.16 Problems with the theory of forms Parmenides: paradox of self predication Phaedrus: fundamental issue of method--diaresis
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The ART OF LOGIC, THE CHALLENGE OF METHOD What is right in the DDL? It identifies the problem of UNIVERSALS, and as such, provides a starting place for the logic of generalization. Plato’s interpretation of it (the Ontological / Metaphysical) identifies him as a REALIST—i.e. one who believes that Universals are real. The opposite is not IDEALIST, but NOMINALIST—i. e., one who believes that Universals are ‘merely’ NAMES, assigned arbitrarily to things. On the other side (Epistemic / cognitive), Plato’s view of the mental power that enables us to know UNIVERSALS identifies him as a RATIONALIST—i.e. one who believes that our Reason provides a privileged access to cognitive certainty, the opposite of which is not Irrationalist, but EMPIRICIST-i.e. one who believes that all knowledge comes from immediate sense experience. The core problem is that these two designations cannot be independently resolved
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PARMENIDES The anachronism of the prelude: placing this dialogue at a time when Socrates was 18 and Parmenides was about 80. Not a credible claim. As you will see, if Socrates (i.e. Plato) had had this discussion and understood it, the only conclusion is that he (both or either) was stupid, since it shows without any question the fundamental insufficiency of the theory of forms developed in Republic. Parmenides: fundamental positions: Do not assert the existence of that which is NOT; KNOWLEDGE and BEING are ONE; and that EXISTENCE is ONE.
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28. PARMENIDES OF ELEA P ARMENIDES of E LEA was in his prime about 475 B.C. (Socrates: 470/469 – 399 BC) He wrote a poem in hexameter verse, addressed to his pupil Zeno; it was divided into three parts: the Prologue, the Way of Truth, the Way of Opinion. 1. The mares which carry me conveyed me as far as my desire reached, when the goddesses who were driving had set me on the famous highway which bears a man who has knowledge through all the cities. Along this way I was carried; for by this way the exceedingly intelligent mares bore me, drawing the chariot, and the maidens directed the way. The axle in the naves gave forth a pipe-like sound as it glowed (for it was driven round by the two whirling circles (wheels) at each end) whenever the maidens, daughters of the Sun, having left the Palace of Night, hastened their driving towards the light, having pushed back their veils from their heads with their hands. There (in the Palace of Night) are the gates of the paths of Night and Day, and they are enclosed with a lintel above and a stone threshold below. The gates themselves are filled with great folding doors; and of these Justice, mighty to punish, has the interchangeable keys. The maidens, skilfully cajoling her with soft words, persuaded her to push back the bolted p. 42 bar without delay from the gates; and these, flung open, revealed a wide gaping space, having swung their jambs, richly-wrought in bronze, reciprocally in their sockets. This way, then, straight through them went the maidens, driving chariot and mares along the carriage-road. And the goddess received me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and thus she spoke and addressed me: 'Young man, companion of immortal charioteers, who comest by the help of the steeds which bring thee to our dwelling: welcome!— since no evil fate has despatched thee on thy journey by this road (for truly it is far from the path trodden by mankind); no, it is divine command and Right. Thou shalt inquire into everything: both the motionless heart of well-rounded Truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliability. But nevertheless thou shalt learn these things (opinions) also—how one should go through all the things-that-seem, without exception, and test them. 11 2. Come, I will tell you—and you must accept my word when you have heard it—the ways of inquiry which alone are to be thought: the one that IT IS, and it is not possible for IT NOT TO BE, is the way of credibility, for it follows Truth; the other, that IT IS NOT, and that IT is bound NOT TO BE : this I tell you is a path that cannot be explored; for you could neither recognise that which is NOT, nor express it. 3. For it is the same thing to think and to be. 22 4. Observe nevertheless how things absent are securely present to the mind; for it will not sever Being from its connection with Being, whether it is scattered everywhere utterly throughout the universe, or whether it is collected together. 5. It is all the same to me from what point I begin, for I shall return again to this same point.
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The argument The opening: Zeno argues Parmenides’ point in the negative: Socrates recognizes that it is the same argument. The point is fundamental. To assert that A exists and to assert that ~A does not exist is convertible. “Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is not that your meaning?” “Yes,” said Zeno. “Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible. Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many? ”
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THE paradox: THIRD MAN The paradox that emerges was known even in antiquity by this name, though it is general, and applies to the whole of Plato’s claim for EIDOS or FORM in Republic. The argument is a disaster for the theory. FIRST, the belief that the form or EIDOS is ONE, over many. SECOND, the problem of PARTICIPATION. The problem here is self-predication: does the Form have the quality of that which it putatively identifies? Is the form MAN itself HUMAN
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Method One does not abandon FORMS: why not? Stability of terms in discourse. But the problem that emerges is a deeper issue of MEANING. Do words have meaning, as, for example, a Peach has a FLAVOR? Is Meaning a property of words, or something more complex? PLATO’s PROBLEM: What can be reasonably say about a FORM? PHAEDRUS & DIVISION
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