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CPT Micah Baker Mr. John Agoglia CPT Rob Snyder CW3 Chad Machiela
PURPOSE To familiarize attendees with the need to determine sources of instability within a village and apply economic development activities that are relevant to local communities and enduring in nature. CPT Micah Baker Mr. John Agoglia CPT Rob Snyder CW3 Chad Machiela
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Terminal Learning Objectives
TLO #1: Attendees familiar with how CERP and local SOF economic development activities were not conducive to long term stability. TLO #2: Attendees familiar with the lessons learned from past CERP and economic development and familiar with the recommended principles of CERP and economic development within VSO, while conducting VSO in transition and beyond. TLO #3: Attendees familiar with how the District Stability Framework (DSF) can assist SOF in determining Sources of Instability (SOIs), create tactical design to address the SOI’s, used for coordinating civilian development support.
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Terminal Learning Objectives
TLO #4: Attendees familiar with how to leverage DSF training in PMT. TLO #5: Attendees familiar with how to use Micro-Grants in support of VSO economic development. TLO #6: Attendees familiar with a Micro-Grant vignette that demonstrates how micro-grants can be applied within VSO. TLO #7: Attendees familiar with how NPS Core Lab Methodology can assist in mapping key human terrain and achieving key stability effects.
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Development as a Source of Instability
American counterinsurgency efforts have been based on three basic principles since the 1960’s – clear, hold, and build. In the build phase, Americans tend to do what they have always done best: build huge infrastructure projects. - Some success, but overall failure. The faulty application of development, expectation management, and project management fuels instability. - Wrong solution to the right problem. Clear the area of insurgents. Hold the area with forces sufficient to prevent the insurgents return. Provide development projects to the contested population in order to demonstrate to them the value of dropping any residual support for the insurgency. There is nothing inherently wrong with this methodology. We ruin it. Large infrastructure projects polarize the nation-building tribes and the rural tribes. Importing national highways and railways, health centers and hospitals, massive irrigation projects like canals and dams were and are drivers of instability. This has set the stage for failure at the village level due to coalition lack of experience and military top-down emphasis.
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Development as a Source of Instability
Wrong solutions to the correct problems: Misunderstood and unused technology. Paying for projects that communities were traditionally responsible for. Wasting resources on large projects with little to no payoff. Pushing for projects not needed. Lack of oversight for projects. Wrong solutions to the problems: Misunderstood and unused technology (cold storage facilities, vegetable canning program). Paying for projects that communities were traditionally responsible for (karez). Wasting resources (time and money) on large projects with little to no payoff (dirt and gravel roads, wheat seed distribution). Pushing for projects not needed (schools lacking teachers or community buy in). Lack of oversight for large scale development projects (if you take it on, you need to babysit it. Counters FOM.). Leads to the next point. Unfulfilled expectations: Benefit one population group more than another (tribal, familial, positional, ASF). Poor quality of finished work (check dams that collapsed during first heavy rain). Intended result not met (repair of clinic, but people can’t use it because no doctor will show. Can’t get replacement because of MOPH interference). Affecting follow on forces: The cost of the buy-in. The poker game illustration. Necessary to think through the shifts in personal power and prestige. While this can be damaging it can also be a very valuable tool.
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Development to Address Instability
Correct solutions to the correct problems: Proposals and procedures are mutually consistent. Must have thorough knowledge of community values. Consider the whole community. Stated in terms understandable to community. Community must be active partner. Project should begin with community resources. Earn the respect of the community. Don’t be indispensable in the process. Coordination is essential when multiple agencies involved. - Ward Goodenough, Cooperation in Change, 1963 Wrong solutions to the problems: Misunderstood and unused technology (cold storage facilities, vegetable canning program). Paying for projects that communities were traditionally responsible for (karez). Wasting resources (time and money) on large projects with little to no payoff (dirt and gravel roads, wheat seed distribution). Pushing for projects not needed (schools lacking teachers or community buy in). Lack of oversight for large scale development projects (if you take it on, you need to babysit it. Counters FOM.). Leads to the next point. Unfulfilled expectations: Benefit one population group more than another (tribal, familial, positional, ASF). Poor quality of finished work (check dams that collapsed during first heavy rain). Intended result not met (repair of clinic, but people can’t use it because no doctor will show. Can’t get replacement because of MOPH interference). Affecting follow on forces: The cost of the buy-in. The poker game illustration. Necessary to think through the shifts in personal power and prestige. While this can be damaging it can also be a very valuable tool.
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Why a District Stability Framework ?
There is no standard assessment & planning process across stabilization actors Isolated planning results in COIN actors focusing on core competencies not stability There is no standardized method for monitoring impact of activities towards stability goals Sources of stability are not reinforced Sources of instability are often not targeted The local population is often not the focal point
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COIN as a Stability Operation
As a counterinsurgent, what is your plan to defeat: Tribal violence Sectarian violence Criminal violence These are symptoms of instability, not insurgency
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Sources of Instability
Sources of instability are local factors that: Decrease support for GIRoA Increase support for Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) Disrupt the normal functioning of society Explain the three criteria. What are examples of SOIs in your area of operations? Examples: Taliban manipulate/settling blood feud, corrupt police shake down locals Transition:
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District Stability Framework
A joint civil-military process developed by USAID-OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives) and the COIN Training Center-Afghanistan. Provides the common inter-agency program management framework, language, method and tools that enables unity of effort and coordination. Is optimized for tactical commanders and planners, field grade military officers and senior enlisted personnel, agency field program officers and GIRoA officials who plan, design and implement activities at district level.
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District Stability Framework (DSF)
Introduction to the District Stability Framework (DSF) Situational Awareness Analysis Design Monitoring & Evaluation
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DSF Roadmap SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MONITORING & EVALUATION ANALYSIS
ASCOPE/ PMESII M &E Matrix Factors Matrix SOI Analysis Tactical Stability Matrix –Pt1 Activity Design W’sheet Tactical Stability Matrix –Pt2 Cultural Matrix Stability Indicators Local Perceptions Sync Matrix SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MONITORING & EVALUATION ANALYSIS DESIGN
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Situational Awareness Four Filters
1) Operating Environment ASCOPE/PMESII 2) Cultural Environment Cultural Matrix 3) Local Perceptions Perception Data 4) Stability/Instability Dynamics Factors Matrix
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Analysis 1) Identify SOIs SOI Analysis Matrix 2) Identify Causes
Tactical Stability Matrix 3) Develop Objective 4) Determine Impact Indicators and Data Sources
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Causes To identify systemic causes, ask yourself:
What circumstances led to community perceptions? What circumstances allow the SOI to continue? What conditions prevent the SOI from being addressed? Transition: Be careful not to confuse symptoms with causes Water example: -Perceptive cause: no water for crops -Systemic cause: Taliban control check dams and have diverted the water
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Design 2) Identify Output Indicators 3) Synchronize Activities
1) Design Activities Tactical Stability Matrix & Activity Design Worksheet 2) Identify Output Indicators and Data Sources Tactical Stability Matrix 3) Synchronize Activities Synchronization Matrix
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Seven Design Principles
1) Sustainability 2) Local ownership 3) Short vs. Long-term results 4) Leverage support from other organizations 5) Culturally and politically appropriate 6) Accountability and transparency 7) Flexibility
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Monitoring & Evaluation
1) Monitor and Evaluate Output M&E Matrix 2) Monitor and Evaluate Impact Against the Objective and Systemic Causes 3) Monitor and Evaluate Overall Stability Stability Indicators
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Impact vs. Output Impact
How will I know if the proper change in the environment has been achieved? Output How can I confirm that the proposed activity is progressing or completed? Increased presence of police in a village Number of police trained Increased public use of the road Number of road miles improved Increased production of licit crops Number of crop substitution shuras held Increased number of girls being educated Number of schools built for girls
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Overall Stability Indicators
District Government Recognition Civilian Security Bazaar Activity ANSF Presence Freedom of Movement Perception of Governance Perception of Security
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Questions/Contact John Agoglia – Cell PH# Office PH#
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ASK AFGHANS WHAT THEY NEED
FACILITATE A SHURA UTILIZE LOCAL WORKERS ASK AFGHANS WHAT THEY NEED DON’T FORCE PROJECTS
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Development Lessons Learned
Learn and understand how the village solves problems. Utilize projects to gain trust and demonstrate commitment to the Village. Understand the human terrain. Make sure all tribes in a village are receiving a benefit from projects (or be intentional if you choose to exclude a tribe).
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Development Lessons Learned
Clearly identify desired second and third order effects of all projects. All projects identified, nominated, planned, resourced, supervised, and executed by locals under the supervision of locals. Long term sustainability. Help facilitate Afghan solutions.
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Development Lessons Learned
Make sure you plan for economic development and understand the numerous resources available to help facilitate development. Be creative in helping to build human capital in your area. Regularly assess your development activities and adjust as required to maximize your desired effects.
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QUESTIONS? CPT Rob Snyder
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CERP Micro-Grants In Support of VSO
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Micro-Grant Process: Step-by-Step (1 of 2)
Identify village business owner/service provider. Complete application (MAAWS-A, pg. 153). Pay attention to detail to reduce delays in legal review and funding. Submit to SOTF S9 to process for legal review, Commander’s application approval, PR&C submission, entry into CIDNE, and Commander’s approval for ADR. SOTF S9 forwards complete and approved packets to CJSOTF-A J9 CERP Accountant for QA and funding. Afghanistan Development Report (ADR) All funding comes from RC-E. Every packet goes through CJSOTF-A J9 office. If the SOTF S9 is lazy or not paying attention, he hurts the team.
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Micro-Grant Process: Step-by-Step (2 of 2)
Once funding is obligated, SOTF S9 provides team with funded PR&C. The team takes the PR&C and the approved application to the Disbursing Office to receive funds. Utilize SOTF S9 or a trusted agent to purchase goods with Micro-Grant funds if possible. Handing over cash should generally not be the first course of action. Supervise business or service to ensure intent is being met. Update CIDNE accordingly. Clear funds like all other CERP or Bulk Fund draws. Clearing – SF44, closure ADR, Commander closure memo, clear 1081 and 1034.
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Micro-Grant Vignette: South
A SOF Team utilized the services of a local diesel mechanic to repair a well pump at the embed site. They learned that he had owned a shop, but INS had destroyed it and stolen his tools and equipment. The mechanic was a supporter of VSO and GIRoA. The team suggested he ask the DG for assistance in re-building his mechanic shop. After the District Development Shura vouched for his character, a Micro-Grant Application was completed and submitted to the SOTF. After approval, a trusted agent was sent to the city to procure a list of tools and equipment for the shop in accordance with the amount of the grant. As a condition of receiving the grant, the mechanic had to prepare the shop and ensure it was secure before he could receive the goods. Once up and running, the mechanic was able to provide a community service and earn a living for his family. You just bought friends in the village for $5K instead of $500K on a gravel road or $2 million on a bridge that takes a year to complete.
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Micro-Grant Vignette: Southeast
A SOF Team damaged a man’s shop during a clearing operation. During discussions with the owner and village elders regarding compensation, the team determined this could be used as an opportunity to build relations in an area planned for VSO expansion. The team determined that helping the man repair his shop and re-stock it with merchandise was the preferred COA for two reasons. First, paying the owner cash for battle damage did not guarantee he would resume business in the community, thereby damaging the local economy. Second, working through the Micro-Grant process allowed the team to develop a positive relationship with village leadership and residents, who later stated that they would support VSO and ALP.
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Farmers’ Cooperative Micro-Grants
SOTF-W Bala Baluk, Pusht-e Rod, Khake Safed Districts
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CERP Micro-Grants Defined
The Micro-Grant program expands the flexibility of CERP and authorizes commanders to provide cash, equipment, tools, or other material support to small businesses lacking available credit or financial resources. - MAAWS-A, Chapter 9, Micro-Grants Why? It’s all targeting You can’t hit what you can’t see Assistance provided is intended to allow disadvantaged individuals to grow existing businesses or re-establish disrupted enterprises which will create lasting economic activity in a community. Within the MAAWS-A guidelines, Commanders are encouraged to be creative and adapt the Micro-Grant program to local conditions in order to achieve the best local results.
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Sources of Instability
Afghanistan’s wheat price crisis represents a strategic opportunity for CFSOCC-A to make Village Stability Operations (VSO) more relevant to its target population. Unless rural Afghans are provided an alternative, the wheat crisis will force many families into deep debt bondage to powerbrokers and narco-traffickers who often demand poppy cultivation as a condition of lending. CFSOCC-A J2 Production Wheat Price Rise Presents VSO Opportunity With the lack of water for our fields, our crops did not produce much. But now is the time to begin cultivating our fields and we are lacking supply of seeds that we were promised to plant in our fields. The government keeps talking about producing food supplies in our fields but without the seeds to plant, we have nothing. Atmospheric Report 17OCT11 (U) One bad crop, a medical emergency, or a significant rise in the price of staple products can cause subsistence families to fall into significant debt bondage to local powerbrokers.xii In the context of modern Afghanistan, this means local powerbrokers and narco-traffickers have the ability to compel the planting of poppy crops as part of the salam informal credit system. Rural subsistence farmers who lack access to an alternative means of borrowing to meet immediate food survival needs thus find themselves locked in a set of financial and cultural obligations that make it nearly impossible for them to consider planting licit or alternative crops. --CFSOCC-A J2 Production Wheat Price Rise Presents VSO Opportunity
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Areas do not receive enough seeds to satisfy all requirements
As an additional argument to encourage development of community-based seed production cooperatives, CAT 652 conducted a KLE with the emerging leadership of Sar Puzeh Village, to discuss the Wheat Seed Distribution Program. Despite earlier projections that the program would increase Sar Puzeh support for GoA and Afghan-run programs, the program is currently angering residents due to its susceptibility to corruption. A large group of seed recipients, from both of the major sub-tribes in Sar Puzeh, stated that they were unable to get seeds because a district government leader named Haji Bazid is controlling the allocation of seeds, distributing only to members of a corrupt patronage network. VSCC-W SITREP 30OCT11 GOA wheat seed distribution program decreases perception of effective governance: Encourages dependence upon government handouts rather than self-supporting communities Seeds generally go to landowners living in cities, rather than to farmers sharecropping in the villages, resulting in seeds sold in the bazaar for profit PGOV,DGOV,PCOP,DCOP and other officials find it difficult to refuse the temptation to direct distribution to friends and other selected community members rather than those most in need. The Taliban then point to this graft as typical for the Afghan Government Areas do not receive enough seeds to satisfy all requirements Transportation costs overwhelm poorer provincial offices, lessening available seeds 5 JAN 12 The Afghan Government’s wheat distribution continues to destabilize communities, even more so in the less trafficable northern provinces than in the south. The usual negative factors affecting the program in the south include the fact that the recipients of the seeds are largely land owners living in the cities (who sell the seeds rather than sending them to the workers outside the security bubbles on the farms), the distribution is negatively influenced by corrupt officials throughout the process, and the program encourages the dependence on outside entities for community sustainment. These factors are compounded in the northern regions by the lack of trafficable roads and inflated prices of goods due to transport costs. Once the seeds are distributed at inflated cost (and corruption) the need-based distribution lowers the cost of seeds in the area, ruining prices for farmers attempting to sell seeds as part of normal farming agri-business, discouraging farmers from planning for future self-sustaining crops. Encouragement of MOI officials to consider purchasing seeds from local farmers who have grown them for distribution to those in need might allow for acquisition of seed without having to pay transport costs for seeds brought in from outside areas. If timed correctly, the MOI might even be able to identify farmers willing to raise seeds for later purchase prior to planting of poppy. SOTF-West currently has a farmers’ cooperative seed production project in three districts in Farah, the success of which may provide a model for reducing dependence upon the destabilizing seed distribution program, as well as the effort in Badghis to use the Shukofan educational farm to directly support the establishment of pistachio and other orchards in conjunction with employment of reintegrees to provide security for developing orchards. 6 JAN 12 In further demonstration of the inefficacy of the Afghan Government’s wheat distribution continues to destabilize communities, The BMG DAIL, Abdul Aziz, met with the Morghab DoS rep today concerning the wheat seed currently in QEN for Morghab. The problem of finding transportation to BMG at the right price has supposedly prevented the wheat seed from leaving QEN. Abdul Aziz wants to fly to QEN, sell the wheat seed (set aside for Morghab) in the QEN bazaar, return with the proceeds and purchase seed locally IOT distribute to the local farmers. The transaction in QEN will supposedly be witnessed by the MAIL, NDS Chief, Provincial Prosecutor and a rep from the PGOV’s office. The DAT’s major concerns after discussing the issue with CAT-653 TL are the expected amounts of money that will be lost due to kickbacks, the large difference in price of wheat seed in BMG compared to QEN (3 times as much) and the small amount of wheat seed actually in the BMG bazaar. The DAT will discuss the matter further with the Morghab DoS rep tomorrow. 11 JAN 12 As an update to the wheat seed distribution drama in BMG, during the BMG Provincial Disaster Management Committee (PDMC) meeting the MAIL suggested selling the BMG wheat seed in QEN and using the money to buy wheat seed in BMG, a less than ideal option given the graft, lower quantity available for purchase at BMG, and higher price resulting in less seed for distribution than on hand in QEN. Local transport companies will ship the 450 MT of wheat seed to BMG for $216,000 USD (1MT/480 USD QEN to BMG w/ISAF escort), an amount no one at the meeting was willing to pay. Elders from Daudi and Khowji Ahkdan will pick up their wheat from Khairkhana while elders from Panjawb and Gilrekhta will pick up their wheat from DiB. GOV Arman wants to have a meeting with the transport companies and explain to them that their prices are too high and unrealistic. If a compromise is not reached with the transport companies, the wheat might be stored in QEN until a better solution is agreed upon for the next growing season. If an Afghan solution to the transport problem cannot be worked out, additional support may be required to prevent total loss of program legitimacy (a program already looked at as corrupt and ineffective). Program officials might evaluate a seed distribution program through select farmers in target regions, providing seeds based on contracts with district DAILs to produce the seeds for sale at a set profit at maturation.
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Design Cooperation in Change, An Anthropological Approach to Community Development Want assessment Need assessment Felt need Observed need* Why? It’s all targeting. Assistance provided is intended to allow disadvantaged individuals to grow existing businesses or re-establish disrupted enterprises which will create lasting economic activity in a community. Within the MAAWS-A guidelines, Commanders are encouraged to be creative and adapt the Micro-Grant program to local conditions in order to achieve the best local results.
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DSF Design 2) Identify Output Indicators 3) Synchronize Activities
1) Design Activities Tactical Stability Matrix & Activity Design Worksheet 2) Identify Output Indicators and Data Sources Tactical Stability Matrix 3) Synchronize Activities Synchronization Matrix
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The National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry
Formed in the 1860s as an educational and social organization Transformed into a political organization as the voting power increased enough to apply pressure to force governmental assistance Cooperative purchasing lowered prices for equipment Educational component increased efficiency Cooperative storage held crops viable longer for optimum sale prices Pooling of savings protected members from mercenary lenders
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Sustainment training is provided via MISO radio broadcasts
SOTF-W elements provided fertilizer, training, and high-resistance wheat seed to farmers selected by the Khake Safed, Bala Baluk, and Pusht-e Rod Farmers’ Cooperatives for establishment of seed production farms. These farmers agreed to each set aside one jerib of land for seed production rather than wheat cultivation, and to sell those seeds to their fellow cooperative members at discounted prices KEY ELEMENTS: Farmers were selected by their peers and fellow members of their cooperatives, to increase normative pressure to participate in accordance with the agreements Participation was made formally normative. Selected farmers participated in public shuras and attended training as prerequisites to grant issue Participating farmers agreed to be overseen by the district DAIL, to prevent default and to tie community efforts to district governance Materials were purchased by the DAIL, assisted by ISAF advisors to ensure fair prices. Farmers were issued necessary seeds and fertilizer, not cash, to prevent graft Training and issue were public events to ensure transparency and increase normative pressure to produce the seeds as agreed upon rather than default Farmers submitted “applications” which provided initial social mapping of networks directly influenced through the program. Sustainment training is provided via MISO radio broadcasts 9 NOV 11 PAT Farah submitted District Capital Investment Microgrant proposals for three trial districts, Khake-e Safed, Bala Baluk, and Pusht-e Rod, now being staffed at VSCC-W. These programs will support development of community-based farmer’s unions, through the mechanism of enabling community-selected farmers to grow small seed production plots for future sustainment. This will reduce local dependence on the oft-maligned government seed distribution program (highly susceptible to graft, malign influence, and misuse) as well as encouraging development of community-based cohesive subgroups with group solidarity and social capital sufficient to resist external negative influence, such as that posed by INS, TB, or malign government officials. 14 NOV 11 Funding for the Pusht-e Rod Farmers’ Cooperative Capital Investment Microgrant is complete, and the project can begin immediately in this district. The Khak-e Safed FCCIM should be complete today, and TF Lonestar can proceed with the Bala Baluk CCIM on their own schedule. As previously discussed, these programs will reduce dependency on government handouts of seeds (and the corruption associated with that program) for the farmers growing the seed plots as well as all the members of these cooperatives. This initiative will also develop cohesive subgroups tied to the community, empowered to resist negative influence from external actors or corrupt government officials. As an additional benefit, teams will tie participation in the program to providing sociocultural information of participant to allow mapping of key influencers within these affected communities. 27 NOV 11 PAT-Farah and DAT-Bala Boluk/Bakwah hosted training and the first disbursement of capital for the Farah Farmers’ Cooperatives Capital Investment Micro-grant. Khak-e Safayd was the only district with its eight farmers in attendance, due to a communication mix up with the Pusht-e Rod District Agricultural Outreach officer, and because the PRT’s micro-grant request for Bala Boluk is still undergoing legal review. In addition to the KeS Farmers, the Farah Farmers’ Union Director, the KeS District Agricultural Outreach officer, the PRT’s US Department of Agriculture representative and two Human Terrain Team analysts were present. The USDA Rep provided instruction on the intent and operation of the business plan, which was reiterated and reinforced by the Director of the FFU. After all the farmers showed they had a clear understanding of the program, they filled out applications and then received their investments of the wheat seed, DAP fertilizer and Urea fertilizer. The applications will assist in identifying the recipients of this aid, but will also help to identify the communities that this assistance will influence (as well as suggest brokerage and leadership structures, as these recipients were selected by the community and peers).
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Seed cleaning & Inoculants Ton $80.00 Seed quality wheat Kilo $0.53
INPUTS: Seed Metric Ton $720.00 DAP Fertilizer 50 Kilo Bag $68.00 Urea Fertilizer 50 Kilo Bag $55.00 Seed cleaning & Inoculants Ton $80.00 Seed quality wheat Kilo $0.53 $4,900 per district OUTPUTS: Cohesive subgroups of farmers beholden to their communities, resistant to both Taliban and corrupt government officials through their self-sufficiency and bloc influence Communities with access to wheat seed produced by their selected peers, free from negative influence of current GOA program Sociocultural maps of pro-GOA community members, identified networks to leverage in support of local governance Increased perception of effective district governance, as DAIL’s act as honest brokers to monitor performance Vehicle for additional agricultural training Radio broadcasts providing sustainment training benefit all community members and further advertise program (building legitimacy and increasing normative pressure to perform) 21 SEP 11 PAT Farah’s engagement of farmers’ cooperatives will likely serve as a model for one line of effort for VSCC-W’s community engagement through the winter. Taking advantage of the lull in fighting and growing seasons to educate farmers, encourage sustainable farming such as seed production, and development of cohesive social farmer networks will provide both economic development and positive social structures in support of local governance. Development and distribution of seeds by farmers’ unions rather than government programs will also reduce the influence of power brokers over the distribution process and reduce opportunity for corruption by officials, a current complaint about the seed distribution process. 12 OCT 11 Continued engagement in support of social development through agricultural development, such as development of models farms based on educational farms, and expansion of farmer’s cooperatives to ensure future seed distribution not dependent upon government programs and foreign aid. Initial wheat seed distribution programs bring an immediate presence of government, but are targets for corruption and promote dependency, making them useful for increasing access to a new area but a program to marginalize as cooperative farming networks are developed. 13 OCT 11 Efforts in Farah to employ microgrants to encourage development of positive normative social structures such as farmer’s unions will not only increase economic potential and reduce dependence upon government programs, but will also create cohesive subgroups organic to the community with a stake in community development that will be resistant to outside influence—from both INS and corrupt government officials. These efforts will serve as a model for future community development efforts. 1 DEC 11 The decision to issue radios in conjunction with the Farmers’ Cooperative Microgrant materials will not only allow the DAIL to provide additional training to microgrant participants (training which can benefit any farmers who choose to listen), it will further tie district and provincial governance to what is otherwise a community program. It will also serve as free advertising for the cooperative, letting the public know of local community-based sources of seeds, and reduce dependence upon the government seed-distribution program and reduce the frustration caused by the program’s current corruption and supply shortcomings.
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Farmers' Cooperative Microgrant Application
First Name: Application Date: Middle Name: Gender: Last Name: Date of Birth: Maiden/Tribal Name: Place of Birth: Nickname/Alias: Ethnicity: Nationality: Hair Color: Passport #: Eye Color: Passport Country: Height (cm): Passport Issue Date: Weight (kg): Passport Exp Date: Scars/Disfigurements: Marital Status: Tattoos: Spouse's Tribe: Cell Phone: Taskera #: Address: VEHICLES Make Model Year Color Plate # N/A WEAPONS Type Total Serial Purchase Date Current Location of Weapon ACTIVE FARMING LIST (RELATIVES) List relatives that will assist you in developing this seed production farm Full Name Father's Name Village Occupation Cellphone ACTIVE FARMING LIST (FRIENDS & NEIGHBORS) List friends or neighbors (not related to you) that will assist you in developing this farm CUSTOMER LIST (BUSINESS) Who will be the primary customer base for your seed production farm?
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Potential bridges between groups
Members of the Farah Farmers’ Cooperatives Selected to Receive Micro-Grants The use of detailed application packets allows the commander to directly measure the effects of CERP spending through the most important measure of effectiveness, it’s influence upon behavior of the community. Rather than relying on broad statements of identified CERP recipients such as “the community,” the commander can see exactly which community members are directly influenced by the program, and through full spectrum intelligence operations measure the change in behavior over time. The more detailed information insisted upon by the program administrators, the more useful the model generated. Understanding of the commander’s intent is crucial to mission success, as development for the sake of development has rarely proven successful in increasing capacity and altering behavior. Tribal Ties of Members of the Farah Farmers’ Cooperatives Selected to Receive Micro-Grants
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Community Network Directly Influenced by the Farah Farmers’ Cooperative Microgrants
While the direct recipients of this program numbered only 24, the extended network of beneficiaries include the families and tribal members of the grant recipients, as well as the future customers of the seed production farms. When this data is coupled with mapping of governance networks, commanders can be developing predictive models for behavior based on solidarity and response to previous inputs. SNA assists the commander by rapidly identifying high value influence nodes to maximize effective employment of resources, in this case taking advantage of the heavy Nurzai demographic, targeting members with multiple solidarity influence (secondary association through marriage, business, and governance)
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Development to Address Instability
Correct solutions to the correct problems: Proposals and procedures are mutually consistent. Must have thorough knowledge of community values. Consider the whole community. Stated in terms understandable to community. Community must be active partner. Project should begin with community resources. Earn the respect of the community. Don’t be indispensable in the process. Coordination is essential when multiple agencies involved. - Ward Goodenough, Cooperation and Change, 1963
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Further Information Naval Postgraduate School, Common Operating Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory, Enabler Expo Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological Approach to Community Development. Ward Goodenough. Russell Sage Foundation, Software: ORA, CASOS, Dr. Kathleen Carley (free download) UCINET, Harvard Analytics (shareware) Pajek, (free download)
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www. stabilityinstitute
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