Presentation on theme: "Quantum Communications Hub"— Presentation transcript:
1 Quantum Communications Hub National Network of Quantum Technologies Hubs:Quantum Communications HubDirector: Professor Tim SpillerAffiliation
2 Quantum Communications Hub: Partners Note: standard slide format – flexible - e.g text and image (if needed an image can be sized and placed as suits to illustrate/balance text).Quantum Communications Hub: PartnersAcademic partners:York (lead), Bristol, Cambridge, Heriot-Watt, Leeds, Royal Holloway, Sheffield, StrathclydeIndustrial partners:R&D: Toshiba Research Europe Ltd. (TREL), BT and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL)Network: ADVA, NDFISSupplier/Consultancy (optical): Oclaro, ID QuantiqueCollaboration/Consultancy (microwave): Airbus, L3-TRLStart-ups (exploitation): Qumet (Bristol), Cryptographiq (Leeds/IP Group)Standards/Consultancy: ETSI, GCHQUser engagement: Bristol City Council, Knowle West Media Centre, Cambridge Science Park, Cambridge Network Ltd
3 Quantum Communications Hub Note: standard slide format – flexible - e.g text and image (if needed an image can be sized and placed as suits to illustrate/balance text).Quantum Communications HubVision:“To develop new quantum communications (QComm) technologies that will reach new markets, enabling widespread use and adoption in many scenarios – from government and commercial transactions through to consumers and the home.”Delivery:First generation: Take proven concepts in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and advance these to commercial-ready stages. (Work packages 1-3)Next generation: Explore new approaches, applications, protocols and services – beyond QKD. (Work package 4)
4 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Note: standard slide format – flexible - e.g text and image (if needed an image can be sized and placed as suits to illustrate/balance text).Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)Secure sharing of a key between two parties (Alice and Bob!)The quantum part is the distribution of the key, with a promise from quantum physics that only Alice and Bob have copies.Once distributed, the (non-quantum) uses of the key(s) cover a wide range of secure information tasks: communication or data encryption, financial transactions, entry, passwords, ID/passports…The keys are consumables (use once only for security), so need regular replenishment, which is “quantum”.
5 Quantum Communications Hub: Work packages WP1 Short Range Consumer QKD (WP Lead: John Rarity (Bristol))Near infra red, line-of sightMicrowaveWP2 Chip Scale QKD Components (WP Lead: Mark Thompson (Bristol))Chip scale opticsNetwork switchesWP3 Quantum Networks (WP Lead: Andrew Shields (TREL))Quantum Core NetworksQuantum Metro NetworksQuantum Access NetworksWP4 Next Generation QComm (WP Lead: Gerald Buller (Heriot-Watt))Quantum digital signaturesQuantum Relays, Repeaters and AmplifiersDevice Independent and Measurement-device independent QKD
6 Quantum Communications Hub: Work packages Note: standard slide format – flexible - e.g text and image (if needed an image can be sized and placed as suits to illustrate/balance text).Quantum Communications Hub: Work packages[IMG]Image legend
7 WP1: Quantum secured key exchange for consumers <€3000<€10Could use one-time-pad to protect the PINGenerate one-time-pad using quantum secured key exchangeKey exchange at ATM allows user to ‘top-up’ a personal one-time-pad.
8 WP1: Why?Weekly ‘top-up’ a personal one-time-pad into a personal phone/card.Protects against ‘skimming’Type your PIN into YOUR deviceAbsolute security for PIN onlineLow cost: free to all customersThe competition:present readers provide simplistic security based on ‘toy’ codes.In shops: data between card and reader NOT encrypted during a transaction, PIN is sent in the clear!SeeSee also google/vodafone: phone=walletHacking demo
13 WP2: Compact chip-based QKD Chip-based devices for:Low costCompactEnergy efficientMass-manufactureCompatibility with current microelectronic devicesHub will target:Fully integrated and packaged QKD devices with control electronicsDeployment in real networking situations
14 WP2: Targeted Applications Mobile devicesComputer networksCity wide communications network
15 WP2: Chip-based QKD/WDM switches 4x4 building block16x16 integratedswitchCompact switching device for reconfigurable quantum networksInGaAsP devices based on Clos switching architecture
17 WP3: Quantum NetworksExplore integration of QKD in different network segments(long-haul, metro, access)Key management and security analysis of extended trusted node networkApplication development, eg layer 3 encryption, quantum digital signaturesMultiplex quantum signals on conventional DWDM grid..dataProvisioning of quantum and data channelsquantumDWDMDWDM
18 WP3: UK Quantum NetworkEstablish large-scale Quantum Network test-bed in UKImplemented in stagesMetro networks in Cambridge and BristolLong-haul network connecting Cambridge-London-Bristol (NDFIS) with possibility to extendAccess networks providing multi-user connectivityTRELCambridgeMartlesham(BT)UCLBristolReadingTelehouseNPLSouthamptonA focus for application development, industrial standardisation and user engagementPotential test-bed for the other QT Hubs and associated projects
19 Untrusted Measurement Unit WP 4: Emerging Quantum Communications TechnologiesQuantum Digital Signatures Information Theoretic Secure Digital SignaturesQuantum Repeaters Amplifiers for Quantum Communications Systems𝑝𝑥Noiseless amplifierQuantumlimitedamplifierClassicalCoherent states|ΨAlice>BobVerifyAlice|ΨAlice>CharlieMeasurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution Cryptographic Key Exchange in an Untrustworthy WorldSeveral kmAliceBobUntrusted Measurement UnitSeveral km
20 Quantum Comms Hub: Theory and Security Analysis Contributes to all four Technology Workpackages:Identify and remove security vulnerabilities at an early stageContribute to ETSI standards for QKD and other Qcomm systemsPhysical level security analysisMatch physical models for analysis to practical implementationsWidely applicable channel analysis with side channel information leakage studiesAnalysis of attacks and countermeasure designProtocol level security analysisAnalysis of protocol stacks, incorporating low-level quantum and higher level conventional protocolsAnalysis of practical security advantages of new protocols such as QDS and MDIQKD“Quantum-immune” conventional (classical) protocolsHybrid system analysisHigh speed (Gb/s upwards) systems combine QKD and conventional secure communications protocols, trading unconditional and forward security for speedDetailed security analysis of such hybrid systems (and mitigation against security “loss”) is needed
21 Quantum Communications Hub: Work package targets “Commercial-ready” QKD technologies...WP1 Short Range Consumer QKDHandheld system, leading to minimal mobile phone modification for AliceMicrowave quantum secure communications analysed and demonstratedWP2 Chip Scale QKD ComponentsChip scale Alice with semi-bulk Bob, leading to fully packaged chip scale QKD optical modulesNetwork switches demonstrated on the UKQNWP3 Quantum NetworksHigh bit rate link encryptionQuantum Metro Networks demonstrated in Bristol and CambridgeEstablishment and operation of the UKQNWP4 Next Generation Quantum CommunicationsQuantum digital signatures deployed at Metro Network levelQuantum Relays/Repeaters for weak pulse QKD demonstrated on UKQNDevice Independent and Measurement-device independent QKD deployed at QAN level
22 Note: standard slide format – flexible - e Note: standard slide format – flexible - e.g text and image (if needed an image can be sized and placed as suits to illustrate/balance text).TitleText
23 Note: standard slide format – flexible - e Note: standard slide format – flexible - e.g text and image (if needed an image can be sized and placed as suits to illustrate/balance text).TitleText[IMG]Image legend
24 Partners Note: Logos to add/be supplied. 8x University, and industry / funding body partners.Grid format – and locked in place (master template option).Partners[PARTNER LOGO]
25 Quantum Communications Hub The UK National Quantum Technologies Programmeaims to ensure the successful transition of quantum technologiesfrom laboratory to industry. The programme is delivered byEPSRC, Innovate UK, BIS, NPL, GCHQ, DSTL and the KTN.National Network of Quantum Technologies Hubs:Quantum Communications HubDirector: Tim SpillerMain partners: York (lead), Bristol, Cambridge,Heriot-Watt, Leeds, Royal Holloway, Sheffield,Strathclyde,Toshiba Research Europe Ltd. (TREL),BT and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL)
26 QCrypto – Example Key Distribution Alice and Bob use alternative bases of individual photonic qubits(e.g. plane polarization) to keep Eve guessing (BB84 protocol).Alice sends photons one by one, chosen at random fromBob chooses to measure polarization in basis or chosen at random.Bob announces publicly his list of bases used, but not his results! (Null results are identified and discarded.)Alice tells Bob which data to keep, those where he used the basis in which she transmitted.They agree a protocol for 0,1 in each basis to obtain a shared bit string, the raw quantum transmission (RQT).| >| >| >| >
28 QCrypto – Eavesdropping Eve cannot clone qubits, but she can try the same as Bob --- guess a basis at random from or , measure the polarization and then send on a photon to Bob polarized as per her result.Out of the results which Alice and Bob keep, Eve will guess wrong (on average) half of the time. Out of these (through measurement in the wrong basis), Bob will (on average) project half of these photons back to the original state transmitted by Alice. Eve therefore corrupts 25% of the RQT which she intercepts.More involved eavesdropping strategies also leave evidence: the irreversibility of quantum measurement ensures that Eve cannot gain information without causing disturbance.
29 QCrypto – Errors and key distillation Using the public channel, A and B can:- Estimate Eve’s activity- Detect and eliminate errors in the RQT- Distil a highly secure keyHowever, this costs! For every bit of information revealed publicly, a component bit is discarded to avoid increasing Eve’s information.-6e.g. 4% RQT errors: > 754 bits (Eve knows ~10 bit)8% RQT errors: > 105 bits (Eve knows ~10 bit)-6
30 WP4: MDI-QKDCurrent QKD systems secure the fibre, but equipment must be physically secure& several “hacks” on detectors demonstratedAliceBobEve’s domainMeasurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD relaxes the requirement to trust the detectors. (The detectors can even be operated by Eve)AliceBobMeasurement UnitBSPBSD1D2D3D4Mitigates all attacks on the detectors.We plan to demonstrate a practical and efficient system for MDI-QKD.Complimented by theoretical analysis of MDI-QKD, as well as complete DI-QKD.
31 WP 4: Quantum Digital Signatures Bob|ΨAlice>Alice|ΨAlice>CharlieAuthenticationA receiver believes the message was from a known sender.Non-repudiationA sender cannot deny sending a message, without claiming that the private key has been compromised.IntegrityThe message was not altered in transit.TransferableThe message is transferrable: Bob can be sure that if he forwards the message to Charlie, then Charlie will also accept the message as genuinely from Alice.
32 Phase encoded coherent states: “A quantum one-way function” WP 4: Quantum Digital SignaturesPhase encoded coherent states: “A quantum one-way function”AliceClassicalList of PhasesDifficultEasySet phasesMeasure phasesππ/23π/2PhaseIntensityBob & CharlieCoherent StatesThe lower the intensity, the harder it is to distinguish between the phases of the coherent states
33 WP 4: Quantum RepeatersClassical amplifier: Increases the amplitude of the signalQuantum amplifier: A perfect amplifier would violate the No-cloning TheoremOriginalPerfect copyImperfect copyWe pay the price in the form of noise:Classical: noise is added from the technical limitations of the equipmentQuantum: Heisenberg’s relation prevents exact knowledge of the signal, i.e. intrinsic noiseSolution: Non-deterministic (or probabilistic) amplifierKeep the success probability low𝑝𝑥Noiseless amplifierQuantumlimitedamplifierClassicalCoherent states
35 WP 4: Quantum Teleportation RM Stevenson, J Nilsson, AJ Bennett, J Skiba-Szymanska, I Farrer, DA Ritchie, AJ ShieldsarXiv preprint arXiv:
36 References for WP 4P J Clarke, R J Collins, V Dunjko, E Andersson, J Jeffers and G S Buller, Nature Comm. 3, 1174 (2012).V Dunjko, P Wallden and E Andersson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, (2014).E Eleftheriadou, S M Barnett and J Jeffers, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, (2013).R J Donaldson et al., Experimental Implementation of a Quantum Optical State Comparison Amplifier, arxiv:C L Salter et al. An entangled-light-emitting diode, Nature 465, 594–597 (2010).M Stevenson et al.,Nature Comm. 4, 2859 (2013).