Communication Based Train Control Systems

Communication Based Train Control Systems
28th AUG 2015 IRSTE Seminar NEW DELHI

Topics for discussion. Introduction High Level System Architecture,
Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

Introduction Topics for discussion. High Level System Architecture,
Thales. CBTC. High Level System Architecture, Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

WHEREVER SAFETY AND SECURITY ARE CRITICAL, THALES DELIVERS.
Mission statement WHEREVER SAFETY AND SECURITY ARE CRITICAL, THALES DELIVERS. TOGETHER, WE INNOVATE WITH OUR CUSTOMERS TO BUILD SMARTER SOLUTIONS. EVERYWHERE.

Our mission Get the most out of our infrastructure
Optimise operational efficiency Increase passenger satisfaction Thales can address 2 different types of customer requests: Stand-alone products/solutions: Signalling or Supervision or Telecoms or Ticketing or Road tolling, etc. Integrated solutions for turnkey projects: Signalling/Supervision/Telecoms/Fare Collection including interfaces with equipment and vehicles

Our core values Going for the long term Cultivating expertise
Nurturing a partnership approach with customers Reliable and trusted trustworthy In-depth knowledge of customers’ operating parctices An international pool of experienced technical specialists Cultivating expertise Ability to design and deliver complex engineering projects Project management skills and processes to tackle successfully the most complex turnkey implementations Human and financial resources Managing complexity

GROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
Thales GROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS A WORLDWIDE PRESENCE billion euros Group Revenues in 2014 13 Employees 61,000 Over 100 Customers in more than 50 countries 26 Large local centres all over the world 7,000 Employees worldwide 5 CAPABILITiES FOR A COMPLETE TRANSPORTATION OFFER 5 SIGNALLING FOR MAINLINES REVENUE COLLECTION SYSTEMS SIGNALLING FOR URBAN RAIL SERVICES INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPERVISION countries Global presence 56 Self-funded R&D 675 million euros THALES GROUND TRANSPORTATION MARKETS MAINLINE RAIL URBAN RAIL TRAMWAY AND LRT BUS ROAD

Thales Ground Transportation Systems by the numbers
60 metro lines over 30 major cities secured by the Thales Seltrac® CBTC systems 16,000 km of track equipped with the Thales AlTrac ETCS solutions . 219,949 Thales rail field equipment installed worldwide. 15% traction energy savings with Thales train management system. ARAMIS Traffic Management System is currently controlling: 72,000 kms of route, 52,000 trains per day in 16 countries of which 4 are total national networks. Up to 500,000 control points supervised from a single OCC Real-time video surveillance transmission to OCC from all transport modes. Over 50 million ticketing transactions in 100 cities processed daily by Thales. 3 billion passengers carried annually by the ThalesSelTrac® CBTC systems Thales supervises more than 100 metro lines in 46 cities throughout the world

Thales worldwide Main Line references
In Europe Outside Europe Austria Luxembourg Bosnia-Herzegovina Netherlands Bulgaria Norway Croatia Poland Czech Republic Portugal Denmark Romania Germany Slovakia Greece Slovenia Finland Spain France Switzerland Hungary United Kingdom Italy Latvia Algeria Australia China India Mexico Morocco Nigeria Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Taiwan Turkey Tunisia

Urban Transportation References.
Dublin London Manchester Newcastle Bergen Oslo Copenhagen Lisbon Coimbra Bilbao Madrid Marseille Paris Strasbourg Brussels Lausanne Turin Brescia Palermo Napoli Florence Milan Thessalonica Istanbul Ankara Athens Denmark Netherlands Mt St Michel Lyon Nantes CBTC signalling Santiago Panama Mexico Vancouver San Francisco Las Vegas Sao Paulo Santos Santo Dominguo Montreal Toronto New York & JFK Cairo Mecca Algiers Johannesbourg Caracas Dubaï Istanbul Ankara Mumbai Hyderabad New Delhi Bangalore Sydney Auckland Brisbane Bangkok Manila Kuala Lumpur Singapore Taïwan Budang, Busan, Incheon China Beijing Chongqing Guangzhou Hefei Hong Kong Nanjing Nanchang Shanghai Shenzhen Wuhan USA LRT Detroit Newark Orlando Tampa Washington & Dulles Jacksonville Edmonton Ottawa Tokyo Doha Integrated Communications and Supervision Fare collection Signalling Integrated Communications and Supervision Ticketing & Tolling THALES provides supervision and communications solutions in more than 20 countries 100 CBTC projects in 46 cities

Thales, a trusted partner

Introduction Topics for discussion. High Level System Architecture,
Thales. CBTC. High Level System Architecture, Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

Introduction - Public Authorities Challenges
Growing urbanisation 1950 2010 2050 Urban population (billions) 7 9 World population (billions) 2,5 b. Urbanization ratio 28 % 50 % 77 % Source : UNDESA Train control for urban rail

Introduction - Metro Operators Challenges
Increase performance, cost effectiveness & Services Increase public transport attractiveness Offer appealing comfort & design Increase service quality (punctuality, frequency, reliability and availability) Highest safety level Reduce life cycle costs Less trackside infrastructure to reduce maintenance costs Scalable systems and expansion capabilities Face traffic increase Build reliable and efficient new lines Improve capacity of existing lines Control & optimise the cost per passenger Unattended operations Reduce labour costs with increased automation Reduce energy consumption Optimized braking curves Regenerative braking Smooth driving mode Train control for urban rail

Introduction - Thales SelTrac CBTC
Fully automated integrated and upgradeable Communications Based Train Control solutions Meets diverse requirements including continuous ATP, cab-signaling, or driverless operations Applies to new infrastructures or resignaling Applicable to any type or size of rolling stock Incorporates built-in computer redundancy Can deliver headways of under 60 seconds, safely Provides high reliability and availability Optimizes maintenance and life-cycle costs Energy saving functions Train control for urban rail

Introduction - CBTC Applications
29 Septembre 2011 Heavy urban rail lines: Dense traffic, dedicated & separate lines Light rail: Medium traffic, dedicated lines Automated People Movers (APM) Urban monorails Tramways : Semi-dedicated lines with high density traffic Urban & suburban networks: Shared with main lines traffic. Train control for urban rail Systèmes de Transport

Introduction - CBTC: Benefits
Ensure safe train movement with or with out Driver Maximise line throughput/capacity & quality of service San Francisco’s MUNI Metro: from 23 trains per hour to a sustained 48 with the overlay of CBTC Reduce overall energy consumption Energy savings of up to 18% Sky Train in Vancouver delivers 9.5 passenger kilometers for every kilowatt-hour, against the North American average of 5.2 Train control for urban rail

Reduce Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
CBTC: Benefits Reduce Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 2004 APTA subway per passenger operating cost data Average cost per passenger: US $2.39 Vancouver Sky Train cost per passenger US $0.86 Facilitate overall metro system operation Train control for urban rail

Thales CBTC Proven Performance
Proven for High Reliability Driverless Operations Vancouver, Detroit, London DLR, Kuala Lumpur, New York JFK Air Train, Las Vegas Monorail, Hong Kong Disney Resort, Dubai Red and Green Line, Mecca, Istanbul , Washington Dulles Airport APM, Seoul Sin Bundang .. Proven Resignaling Experience London DLR Revenue 1992 San Francisco Muni Revenue 1992 London Tubes Lines Jubilee line Revenue 2009 Northern line (phase 1) Revenue 2014 Paris Line Revenue 2015 Paris Lines interlocking replacement (L11, 3bis, 1…) Revenue 2006 Santiago L1 & 5 interlocking replacement Revenue 2009 Edmonton Revenue 2015 Singapore Revenue 2016 New York Flushing line Revenue 2014 Ampang line Revenue 2016 Disney World Florida Revenue 2015 Train control for urban rail 19

Operational Flexibility: Rolling Stock Independence
SelTrac CBTC runs each train in accordance with its performance characteristics Additional rolling stock, with significantly different performance characteristics, can be easily integrated, with no changes to existing infrastructure. Signal design not constrained by worst-performing train. SelTrac CBTC Systems are installed on, and control rolling stock from many suppliers: Adtranz, Alstom, Ansaldo-Breda, Bombardier, CAF, ChangChun,Cammell, Kawasaki, Kinki Sharyo, Mitsubishi, Rotem, Siemens, Vossloh, Von Roll, etc. Train control for urban rail 20

High Level System Architecture,
Topics for discussion. Introduction High Level System Architecture, System Components, Automatic Train Supervision (ATS), and Zone Controller (ZC), Solid State Interlocking (SSI) Overview, Data Communication Subsystem (DCS) Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC), Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

High Level system Architecture - CBTC .
High Level Architecture. DCS - Data communication system, ZC – Zone controller, SSI – Solid state Interlocking, VOBC – Vital Onboard Computer, AP – Access Point, IFB – Interface Board

System Components Primary Components: Automatic Train Supervision (ATS), Typical Equipments: Redundant Central ATS Servers Redundant Local ATS Servers ATS Workstations ATS Timetable Compiler Workstation ATS Maintenance Workstation ATS MIMIC Workstation ATS Datalogger ATS Playback Server DCS Backbone (Server, Switch) Configuration Redundant Central Servers per Corridor (located in CER) Redundant Depot Servers (located in DER) Redundant Local Servers at IXL (located in SER) Non-redundant Server per Corridor (located in RSS/BOCC) Workstations (located in OCC, DCC, SCR, RSS/BOCC) ATS Over view Top level management component performing Schedule and headway regulation Automatic and Manual routing Data logging Interfacing with external systems Operator control Responsible for monitoring System status and display.

System Components – Way Side
Zone Controller/Solid State Interlocking (ZC/SSI), Typical Equipments: Redundant Zone Controller Redundant Solid State Interlocking Input/Output Ports Changeover Switch Interface Board ECPC DCS Backbone (Server, Switch) Field Elements (Signals, Points, Transponder Tags, Proximity Plates)

System Components - Zone Controller Over view.
Core component of wayside vital train control performs Automatic Train Protection (ATP) Movement Authority determination Interlocking functions (in CBTC mode) Responsible for controlling and monitoring: Status of field devices in its territory using IFB Trains in its territory via continuous communication with CBTC on-board equipment and DCS network Trains’ access entering or exiting its territory from neighboring Zone Controllers or Solid State Interlocking area Redundancy architecture with 2x2oo2 configuration Redundant 2 times 2oo2 (2x2oo2) ensures high availability of at least two CPUs Notion of Active & Passive ZC (ZCa, ZCb) Automatic switchover from Active to Passive for instance of CPU failure(s)

System Components - Way Side
Solid State Interlocking SSI Over view Core component of wayside vital train control performing Interlocking functions (in Fallback mode) Responsible for Interlocking Functions: Route setting, locking, releasing Point movement, locking, and position monitoring Flank protection Approach locking Others… Responsible for controlling and monitoring: Status of field devices in its territory using Interlocking Module (IM) and Field Element Controller (FEC) Status of block occupancies using Axle Counter Evaluator (ACE) Trains’ access entering or exiting its territory from neighboring Zone Controllers or Solid State Interlocking area 2oo3 Architecture IM operates in 2oo3 architecture Fully operational in case of failure of one unit

System Components - DCS Overview
Core Component of CBTC communication responsible for Secure, bi-directional, and dependable communication between subsystems Transfer of data and information between subsystem using wired and/or wireless means using Security protocol Utilizing security protocol to protect CBTC equipment from potential attacks DCS Blocks Wayside Wired Network Interconnection of LANs at each station for wayside-to-wayside communication Provide access to radio network for communication with trains On-Board Network Provide VOBC access to radio network for communication with wayside Provide VOBC access for on-board to on-board communication Radio Network Consists of Wayside Radio Unit (WRU) on trackside and Mobile Radio Unit (MRU) on-board train

System Components - DCS Overview On Board
Primary Component: Data Communication System (DCS) Typical Equipments-On Board Redundant Mobile Radio Unit (MRU) Antenna at each end . Typical Equipments -Track side: Access Points (Antenna) Wayside Radio Unit (WRU)

System Components - DCS Overview On Board
Redundancy Architecture Wayside Radio Unit (WRU) layout provides geographical redundancy Onboard radio provides diversity through antenna on each end

System Components - Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC)
Typical Equipments:- Redundant VOBC, Train Operator Display (TOD), Transponder Interrogator Unit (TIU), Local Data Collector (LDC), Speed Sensors, Accelerometers, Proximity Sensors. VOBC Over view. Core component of onboard vital train control performs Driverless Train Operation ATP & ATO functionality Safe train movement in Controlled mode Automatic Turnback Station stopping Responsible for Generating safe stopping location from destination and/or obstruction Commanding Emergency Brakes for violation of Movement Authority and ATP Automatic Door Operation. Redundancy architecture with 2x2oo2 configuration Redundant 2 times 2oo2 (2x2oo2) ensures high availability of at least two CPUs Notion of Active & Passive VOBC Automatic switchover from Active to Passive for instance of CPU failure(s)

Operating Modes Topics for discussion. Introduction
High Level System Architecture, Operating Modes CBTC/Fallback) CBTC/Fallback Switchover, ATP Functionality.

Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback
Primary Operating Mode: CBTC (ZC active, SSI inactive) ATS used to send commands to ZC, and receive status from ZC ATS used to send commands to VOBC, and receive status from VOBC ZC responsible for determining all routing and interlocking decisions within its territory VOBC is responsible for operating according to define route and adhering to ATP & ATO Train operation can occur in Controlled / Non-Controlled modes Secondary Operating Mode: Fallback (ZC inactive, SSI active) ATS used to send commands to SSI, and receive status from SSI ECPC used to send route and point commands to SSI, and receive status from SSI SSI responsible for determining all routing and interlocking decisions within its territory Train operation can occur in Non-Controlled mode only

Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback Switchover
CBTC  Fallback Transition Steps Objective: To provide capability of operating the Metro with Primary system down Transition is necessary as a result of non-recoverable complete ZC failure (eg. redundancy failure) Controlled mode trains are Emergency Braked Non-Controlled mode trains are requested to stop from OCC ZC is powered down and CBTC change-over box is switched from CBTC to Fallback at Interlocking station SSI (IM) is started by powering on the CPUs After startup, SSI will provide status of field elements to ATS For previously Controlled trains, Control Operator re-arranges train spacing according to fixed block operating rules Control Operator sets the appropriate route and follow Manual Operating procedures to continue operation in Fallback mode (line-of-sight)

Operating Modes - CBTC/Fallback Switchover
Fallback  CBTC Transition Steps Objective: To revert System back to Primary mode once failure has been normalized Transition is mandatory* once ZC failure has been normalized Trains are requested to stop by Control Operator SSI (IM) is powered down and CBTC change-over box is switched from Fallback to CBTC at Interlocking station ZC is powered on After startup, ZC will obtain status of field elements from FEC and will provide their status to ATS Blocks occupied by Train will be displayed as Non-Communicating Obstruction (NCO) on ATS NCO is cleared by driving train in Non-Controlled mode out of the affected block Standard Operating procedure is followed to initiate movement in Controlled mode * Operation can continue in Fallback mode, but major Operator interventions in Central and Onboard are required. Transition to CBTC mode would eliminate the operator intervention.

CBTC Functionality. Topics for discussion. Introduction
High Level System Architecture, Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. ATP Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

CBTC Functionalities CBTC Functionalities. ATP ATO ATS.
This presentation will discuss only the ATP functionality in detail, as the discussions can be useful in adapting the technology for the already dense Sub-Urban Services on metro cities like Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Delhi.

ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality.
Wheel Diameter Calibration Upon VOBC start up, default wheel size (defined in database) is used until wheel calibration is performed Successful wheel calibration requires traveling through pair of calibration transponders 100m apart VOBC calculates wheel diameter through inputs from two speed sensors (number of pulses measured), distance between transponders and pulse per revolution defined Diameter is accepted if it is within tolerance (between 780mm and 860mm) Wheel calibration is in effect when VOBC loses position Wheel calibration is not in effect when VOBC is powered off, or is reset Default wheel size is 820mm Defined pulse per revolution is 80

ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality.- (cont’d)
Wheel Rotation & Travel Direction Direction of wheel rotation is positive or negative, depending on the inputs from speed sensors Travel direction is determined to be either: Guideway Direction 0 (GD0) Guideway Direction 1 (GD1) Direction is determined once VOBC has established position Zero Speed, Stationary and Position Determination VOBC provides zero speed indication to RS if speed is less than 0.5km/h for 200ms Stationary is determined when zero speed is detected for 400ms GD0 is revenue traffic direction GD1 is reverse traffic direction Direction is determined once going over two positional transponders and calibration tags

ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality (cont’d)
Traveled Distance, Speed & Acceleration Loss of Position causes VOBC to apply Emergency Brakes Two speed sensors and two accelerometers are used to: Calculate distance travelled Calculate train speed Calculate acceleration Inputs from speed sensors and accelerometers are compared to previous cycle and with system valid ranges to check plausibility Implausible data is logged by VOBC Persistent implausible data will result in loss of position Slip / Slide is detected by comparing speed from speed sensors and accelerometers Accelerometer inputs are used to determine speed for slip/slide Speed sensors inputs are used to determine speed when no slip/slide is detected When slip/slide is detected, accelerometer inputs are used to determine speed If difference between two wheel speed is greater than 4km/h, then it will cause loss of position and EB. If difference between two wheel speed is 2km/h for 1s (application cycle being 70ms), then it will cause loss of position and EB. Resolution of speed is 10mm/s. Maximum allowed change in speed in 0.196m/s (based on acceleration of 1m/s^2) Max acceleration defined at 2.8m/s^2

ATP Functionality - Train Speed Determination Functionality (cont’d)
Zero Speed, Stationary and Position Determination VOBC provides zero speed indication to RS if speed is less than 0.5km/h for 200ms Stationary is determined when zero speed is detected for 400ms If difference between two wheel speeds is greater than 4km/h, then it will cause loss of position and EB. If difference between two wheel speed is 2km/h for 1s (application cycle being 70ms), then it will cause loss of position and EB. Resolution of speed is 10mm/s. Maximum allowed change in speed in 0.196m/s (based on acceleration of 1m/s^2) Max acceleration defined at 2.8m/s^2

ATP Functionality - Train Position Determination Functionality (cont’d)
Position is determined based on Location of last transponder read Number of revolutions crossed since reading last transponder Measured distance is compared with distance in database Train traversal over Point with “disturbed” status will result in loss of position Detection of first invalid transponder not in its path implies crosstalk Detection of valid transponder concludes crosstalk While the train position is established, if the VOBC detects a transponder and this transponder cannot be found on a possible path for the train that is consistent with its current, calculated position (within a reasonable distance), then the VOBC concludes that it must have detected transponder crosstalk from an adjacent track. Once VOBC concludes crosstalk, any other crosstalk transponders detected later on are ignored. If crosstalk is not concluded, then another additional crosstalk transponder will result in unknown position (EB). While the train position is established, if the VOBC detects a transponder and this transponder cannot be found on a possible path for the train that is consistent with its current, calculated position (within a reasonable distance), then the VOBC concludes that it must have detected transponder crosstalk from an adjacent track. Once VOBC concludes crosstalk, any other crosstalk transponders detected later on are ignored. If crosstalk is not concluded, then another additional crosstalk transponder will result in unknown position (EB).

ATP Functionality - Train Position Determination Functionality (cont’d)
Train Length and Train Image Active Cab determines Forward travel direction Vehicle type is determine based on VID plug VID is checked with valid ranges in VOBC database Train ID is determined based on VID Information required for determining train length, front & rear upon entry VOBC ID Stationary status Coupler status Orientation Reference position Train Integrity must be established and train must be stationary to determine train length. Vital ID (VID) plug is located at back of VOBC rack. Loss of TI after establishing position results in train image being “unknown”. Once TI is restored, the image is restored. Vital ID (VID) plug is located at back of VOBC rack Loss of TI after establishing position results in train image being “unknown”. Once TI is restored, the image is restored.

ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality. (cont’d)
Communicating Train (CT) Tracking VOBC reports position to ATS & ZC VOBC sends front & rear position, rollback distance and positional uncertainty to ZC Concept of Extended CT position Positional Uncertainty used to determine Extended CT position Used to represent area that could be occupied by train Example: exiting a block, traversing over Point Concept of Contracted CT position Position Uncertainty used to determine Contracted CT position Used to represent minimum area that must be occupied by train Example: sweeping a NCO Extended/Contracted CT position is transparent to Operator

ATP Functionality - Train Tracking Functionality (cont’d)
Non-Communicating Train (NCT) Tracking Secondary train detection is used to detect NCT Two main components of NCT tracking: Vital tracking by ZC Responsible for tracking obstructions using NCOs Non-Vital tracking by ATS Responsible for tracking train IDs on ATS line overview NCT image timer used to provide capability of VOBC to recover communication with ZC Example of NCT CT loses communication and last known position becomes NCT position NCT timer is run by ZC (60s) Upon completion of NCT timer, ZC creates NCO on block occupied by NCT train ACB is used to detect location of train in CBTC system.

ATP Functionality - Interlocking Functionality
Route Locking ZC route reservation provides route locking where guideway elements within route are reserved. Approach Locking Element of the guideway authorized for a train cannot be released if the route is cancelled When a route is cancelled, movement authority is pulled back to train front. Approach locking will remain until train stops or timer expires Point Locking Point locking is activated based on route reservation over said Point Overpoint locking may be activated when CT or NCT overlapping the Point Zone, or NCO overlapping overpoint blocks Automatic point movement is prohibited if overpoint locking is activated Manual point movement is permitted if overpoint locking is activated (eg: to sweep NCO) Timer for route cancellation is 90s (CBTC), 30s (SSI).

ATP Functionality - Interlocking Functionality - (cont’d)
Flank Protection Locking of point in a particular position to protect the flank of another route to prevent sideswipe hazard with a train LMA will not be set if Flank conditions are not satisfied for the route Point Control & Supervision Position and status of Points are always monitored by IFB to ZC/SSI ATS provides capability to move Points automatically or manually Conflict Zone Prevents simultaneous routing of multiple trains through a particular area of guideway Prevents conflicting train movements at turnbacks and crossovers Two configurations Single train reservation Fleeting train reservation Automatic movement of points: setting a route across point requiring it to move Manual movement of points: manually issue Point move command from ATS Single train reservation CZ: First train reserves and occupies CZ. Second train’s LMA will be obstructed by beginning of CZ Fleeting reservation CZ: First train reserves and occupies CZ. Second train’s LMA will be obstructed only if its route is on a conflicting path.

ATP Functionality (cont’d)
Overspeed Protection VOBC determines authorized speed based on ATP speed profile and defined speed restrictions ATP speed profile is calculated based on: ATP speed profile Temporary Speed Restriction Maximum speed for current train operating mode End of movement authority EB curve is dynamically calculated based on ATP curve and overspeed tolerance. Overspeed tolerance = 3.6km/h (1m/s)

Overspeed Protection VOBC adheres to ATP speed profile Violation of ATP speed profile results in over speed, and a warning alarm is sounded on the TOD Violation of EB curve results in application of Emergency Brakes Overspeed Alarms Overspeed 1 Alarm: Raised for ATO train when speed is approaching Authorized Speed Overspeed 2 Alarm: Raised for ATO train when speed is greater than ATO Target Speed EB curve is dynamically calculated based on ATP curve and overspeed tolerance. Overspeed tolerance = 3.6km/h (1m/s)

Rollback Protection VOBC supervises movement in opposite direction than commanded travel direction in Controlled and Non-Controlled modes Rollback of more than 3m results in application of Emergency Brakes Obstructed Motion VOBC detects motion obstruction if train does not travel a minimum of 1m within 5s after propulsion has been commanded Emergency Brakes are applied when VOBC detects Motion Obstruction Motion Obstruction is cleared when Emergency Brakes are reset When resetting motion obstruction, the Ebs can be reset from onboard the train, or from ATS.

Departure Interlock and Authorization VOBC provides Departure authorization in Controlled mode Authorization is provided when the following conditions are met: The dwell has expired Train Operator has pressed the departure button (for ATO mode only) Train doors are detected as being closed and locked and disabled PSD conditions are met LMA is provided and is greater than zero “Train Hold” is not in effect Emergency Brake is not commanded Emergency Brake is not applied

Emergency Brake (EB) Control Once EB is activated, it can be released only when train is stationary and condition causing EB to be activated has been eliminated Conditions resulting in application of EB Speed exceeding Target speed plus over speed tolerance Train position is unknown in Controlled mode Train passes LMA in Controlled mode Rollback tolerance is exceeded Loss of Train Integrity is detected Invalid operating mode is selected Unscheduled door opening Uncommanded motion in ATO mode Obstructed motion Crawlback maneuver selected when Crawlback is not authorized Uncommanded motion happens when: Train is operating in ATO mode The full service brakes are applied The propulsion is disabled Train changes from stationary to non-stationary and the accumulation of train movement is greater than 10cm.

Crawlback Functionality Crawlback is a low speed maneuver in Reverse direction to align at platform in case of overshoot Overshoot of less than 10m can be complemented with Crawlback. Train operator will be provided with message on TOD System prevents Points within Crawlback area from being moved and prevents trains from being routed into Crawlback area Train performing the Crawlback maneuver is fully protected by ZC Crawlback speed is limited to 10km/h Crawlback permitted when position is not established Emergency Brakes applied when total distance travelled exceeds 10m Train operator will read message on TOD indicating Crawlback available. ZC protects the train by preventing other trains or conflicting paths from entering platform’s Crawlback protection zone until the train requesting Crawlback protection arrives at platform.

Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view.
Topics for discussion. Introduction High Level System Architecture, Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

Hyderabad Metro Rail Project.
Thales CBTC System for Signaling. Project scope – design, supply, install, test and commission, provide training and DLP support for a radio based CBTC train control and signalling system for 3 new Corridors (lines) in Hyderabad India. Hyderabad Metro Lines 1, 2 & 3 Greenfield project , 72 Km / 3 Lines/ 64 Stations 1 OCC / 1 BOCC / 2 Depots / 1 Stabling Radio – based CBTC moving block solution with separate interlocking Design headway 90 seconds 3 car Trains initially – 6 car Trains in future (mixed fleet). 57 Trains in initial fleet Status of Works in progress, Thales have already demonstrated the successful operational trials of this system over the stage 1of the Hyderabad Metro rail Project between Nagole to Mettagudda, covering 10 Kms and with 7 Stations.

Hyderabad Metro Rail Project.

Conclusion. Topics for discussion. Introduction
High Level System Architecture, Operating Modes CBTC Functionality. Hyderabad Metro Rail Project – over view. Conclusion.

Conclusion - Communication Based Train Control solutions for IR.
Indian Railways will in the future need to explore every technology and techniques in Railway signaling solutions to: Increase the Line capacity. Increase the Safety shield at higher speeds. Centralized control and management of Train operations. Provide/enhance the online Train running information to a passenger, Integrate the Signaling, Telecommunication and Fare collection systems. While IR already have plans to move from the fixed Block signaling to Automatic signaling in dense “A” routes, state of art proven technology will be needed to further increase the Train density and provide Automatic Train Protection As an overlay system on the existing signaling systems, ETCS Level 1 or Level 2 are available technologies that have been successfully implemented widely. Radio based CBTC moving block provide an interesting option to consider on the Mumbai Metro system as an overlay on the existing system.

Conclusion. Radio based Train Control technologies is a state of art and proven signaling solution for increasing the density (Reduction in headways, and increase in asset utilization capacity). The implementation of such systems for Metro Rail Projects should give the opportunity for the IR main line operators to explore these technologies and adapt it over the IR Mainline networks. Thales looks forward to sharing this knowledge and experience with IR in modeling solutions for the Indian railways.

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Non-Communicating Obstructions Conditions when NCO is created: NCT train enters system where block adjacent to non-CBTC territory becomes occupied NCT moves across blocks (a block is occupied and adjacent block has NCO) CT loses communication with ZC

CT  NCT  CT

Train Tracking Functionality. NCT Tracking over Disturbed Point

ATP Functionality - Movement Authority Functionality. – (Cont’d)
Limit of Movement Authority (LMA) LMA calculation with no Point LMA calculation with Point LMA with no point: ZC calculates the LMA (from rear of train) required to support the route and adds an overrun (150m). LMA calculation with Point: The point is considered an obstruction, thus initially LMA is only granted upto the Point. Once point is commanded to move in required position and is locked, it is no longer considered an obstruction thus the LMA is extended.

Movement Authority Functionality Limit of Movement Authority (LMA) Conflicting bi-directional routing Both trains A and B are routed to Platform A. Train A is routed first, then train B. ZC computes LMA for train A first to platform A and takes into account overrun. ZC computes LMA for train B upto the overlap of train A reservation, but does not extend into the overlap.

ATP Functionality - Movement Authority Functionality (cont’d)
Limit of Movement Authority (LMA) Two trains following each other Train A is routed to Platform B. Train B is routed to Platform B. LMA for train A is computed upto train B, as this is treated as an obstruction. LMA for train B is computed upto Platform B and will include overrun. LMA will dynamically change and be consumed based on train movement.

Movement Authority Functionality Limit of Movement Authority (LMA) Obstruction within route Train A routed to Platform B. LMA is computed upto Point (which is treated as Obstruction), then Point is commanded to required position, and then LMA is extended upto platform to include overrun. Obstruction occurs within the route causing LMA to be pulled back, such as Point status becoming Disturbed. New LMA is calculated upto the obstruction. Existing route still exists past the disturbed Point. VOBC received the new LMA and calculates a new stopping point, a new braking curve to ensure it can stop at the new stopping point. If VOBC determines it cannot adhere to the braking curve (ie. exceeding the curve), EB is applied.

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