1. PolicyMorph: Interactive Policy Model Transformations for a Logical ABAC Framework Michael LeMay Omid Fatemieh Carl A. Gunter

2. Outline Motivation Introduction Logical Attribute-Based Policies Logical Constraints Access Control Models Model Transformations Prototype Implementation and Test Case Conclusion 2

3. Motivation Difficult or impossible for policy administrator to formally encode all desired policy constraints: All Possible Policy Models Models Accepted by Formal Constraints Models Desired by Administrator 3

4. Motivation: Example Consider: Access control policy for Personally-Identifiable Information (PII) contained in online retailer’s database –Regulated by retailer’s privacy policy: “maintain confidentiality of customer information from third party partners and marketing” Assume some employees employed in both information systems support and marketing departments –Such an employee could be responsible for customer email list –Privacy policy prohibits this separation of duty violation, and constraint checker detects violation. 4

5. Motivation: Example (cont.) Task must be assigned to some other employee Constraint checker unaware of external considerations essential to task reassignment, such as existing workloads of employees, relevant skills, etc. Policy model administration tool presents administrator a list of possible employees to which task could be reassigned, and administrator selects most suitable option. 5

6. Introduction Model transformation tool for logical attribute-based policies Uses first-order logical constraints to detect bad model configurations Suggests possible model transformations to bring model into conformance Evaluates effects of transformations 6

7. Access Control Architecture Logical Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) Policy Access Control Model Subjects Objects Attributes Attribute Assn. Actions Context 7

8. Logical Attribute-Based Policies Order-sorted first-order logic: –S: subjects (σ) –O: objects (δ) –Entities: supersort of S and O (ε) –Actions: performed by subjects upon objects (η) –Contexts: runtime information incorporated into decisions (γ) –Justifications: compound terms specifying every reason a positive access decision was made (κ) 8

9. Policy Models 5-tuple: –A: sort containing attributes – : reflexive, transitive, anti- symmetric relation defining attribute hierarchy: : – : associates attributes with entities 9

10. Major Concepts Policies: Contexts: Justifications: –Set of Reasons: –Set of rule names 10

11. Sample Justification Reasons 11 AmberCurtiss TA(CS423) RA Possible reasons in justifications: HasAttr(TA(CS423)) HasSubAttr(TA) IsNamed(Amber) HasAttr(RA) NotHasSubAttr(TA) IsNamed(Curtiss) NotIsNamed(Amber)

12. Logical Constraints Signature: –f : any first-order formula –κ: justification specifying why constraint has been violated 12

13. Model Transformations Generated from constraint justifications to bring model into conformance: 13

14. Transformation Animations 14 AmberCurtiss TA(CS423) RA EliminationIntroductionEgress TransferIngress Transfer

15. Transformation Suggestions Framework “suggests” possible transformations based on reasons in justifications from constraints: 15

16. Transformation Suggestions (cont.) 16

17. Sample Suggestions 17 Curtiss RA Possible suggestions for reasons: HasAttr(Curtiss, RA) => Eliminate(Curtiss, RA) NotHasSubAttr(TA) => Introduce(Curtiss, TA(CS423))

18. Prototype Implementation SWI-Prolog access control engine Text-mode interactive model validation and transformation tool 18

19. Model Validation Tool 19

20. Test Case Scenario #1 TA separation of duty enforcement Constraint: It should never be true that any TA shares a TA room with another TA from one of the courses in which the first TA is enrolled. Model: –408 subjects –172 objects –Similar to CS department at UIUC 20

21. Constraint Encoding 21

22. Constraint Violations Sample: Curtiss and Amber are assigned to the same TA room, and Amber is Curtiss’ TA! 22

23. Scenario Curtiss Amber Course: CS523Course: CS461 Room 4023 TA Student TA room 23

24. Suggested Solutions remove ta(cs461) from the subject curtiss transfer ta(cs461) to amber transfer ta(cs461) to corwin transfer ta(cs461) to alice... remove student(cs523) from the subject curtiss transfer student(cs523) to alice... remove ta(cs523) from the subject amber transfer ta(cs523) to curtiss transfer ta(cs523) to corwin transfer ta(cs523) to alice … remove ta_room(cs523) from the object room(rm4023) transfer ta_room(cs523) to room(rm4001) transfer ta_room(cs523) to room(rm4002)... remove ta_room(cs461) from the object room(rm4023) transfer ta_room(cs461) to room(rm4001) transfer ta_room(cs461) to room(rm4002)... 24

25. Scenario Curtiss Amber Course: CS523Course: CS461 Room 4023 TA Student TA room Room 4001 TA room 25

26. Prototype Interface with Janus Uses Prolog foreign-language interface to allow a Java Building Automation System (BAS) simulator (Janus) to use the Prolog Access Decision Function (ADF), as a test case Complete system and demo video available at http://seclab.uiuc.edu/policymorph http://seclab.uiuc.edu/policymorph 26

27. Test Case System Architecture 27

28. Selected Related Works Fisler, K., Krishnamurthi, S., Meyerovich, L. A., and Tschantz, M. C. 2005. Verification and change-impact analysis of access-control policies. In Proceedings of the 27 th international Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ‘05). 28

29. Selected Related Works (cont.) Boyer, J. P., Tan, K., and Gunter, C. A. 2006. Privacy Sensitive Location Information Systems in Smart Buildings, In Proceedings of the 3 rd International Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing (SPC ‘06). 29

30. Conclusion PolicyMorph leverages an administrator’s human knowledge to select a desirable policy model from among all those that satisfy a set of constraints 30

31. Questions? Contact info: mdlemay2@cs.uiuc.edumdlemay2@cs.uiuc.edu Project webpage: http://seclab.uiuc.edu/policymorph http://seclab.uiuc.edu/policymorph Thank you! 31