1. 1 Query-Flood DoS Attacks in Gnutella by Andreas Legrum based upon a paper by Neil Daswani and Hector Garcia-Molina

2. 2 Overview What does DoS mean? How does Gnutella work? (simplified) Policies to select queries What is a good/malicious node? How to measure the damage inflicted? Examples for network topologies Which policies/topologies work best? Summary Questions

3. 3 What does DoS mean? DoS: abbreviation for Denial of Service Normally done by flooding a PC with (useless) requests in order to cut CPU time for the other running processes including GUI. The PC seems to be frozen although he’s only trying to cope with the incoming data and so he’s no longer offering any useful service.

4. 4 How does Gnutella work? (simplified) Network of supernodes Clients send their queries to the node they are connected to Nodes forward incoming queries to their neighbors and clients Queries have a TTL specifying the max. number of nodes to travel

5. 5 Policies to select queries Reservation Ratio Incoming Allocation Strategy (IAS) Drop Strategy (DS) Reservation Ratio A fractal defining how many percent of a nodes query processing capacity is reserved for local peers. If there aren’t enough queries from local peers, left over capacity is used for remote peer’s queries (queries received from other supernodes).

6. 6 Policies to select queries Incoming Allocation Strategy (IAS) Weighted IAS Nodes sending more queries will be given more processing capacity. So each connected node will have approximately the same percentage of queries served. Fractional IAS The available capacity is equally distributed among among all connected nodes, no matter how many queries they’ve sent. Leftover capacity is distributed by reapplying the strategy.

7. 7 Policies to select queries Drop Strategy (DS) Queries are grouped by same source IP and TTL Proportional Each group has the same percentage of queries served. Equal Each group has the same amount of queries served. OrderByTTL (PreferHighTTL / PreferLowTTL) Queries with high/low TTL are served first. Again, leftover capacity is redistributed by reapplying.

8. 8 What is a good/malicious node? not serving / forwarding incoming queries -> structural damage sending out lots of useless queries -> flooding damage Best modeled by setting the reservation ratio to 1 and having the node generate as much queries possible Characteristics of a malicious node: Characteristics of a good node: The model presented is simple enough to be modeled. To do so, we have to specify two kinds of nodes. Most nodes in the network are good nodes Trying to maximize the networks service by setting its reservation ratio close to the optimal value Modeled as a normal node; all good nodes are modeled having the same processing capacity and using the best average reservation ratio

9. 9 How to measure the damage inflicted? The damage of query-flood DoS attacks is mainly a reduction of the amount of remote service the network is offering. To measure this damage, the service capacity has to be calculated before and after turning a good into a malicious node.

10. 10 Examples for network topologies

11. 11 Which policies/topologies work best? In order to test the effectiveness of the policies, tests had been run on simulated networks of 14- 16 nodes at worst-case conditions. This table shows the percentage loss in service after a node was turned into a malicious one: It’s easy to see that fractional/equal has the lowest loss.

12. 12 Which policies/topologies work best? When comparing fractional/equal with weighted/proportional while the malicious node is at the worst possible point in the network, you see that the better policies might be up to 4.4 times better than worse ones.

13. 13 Which policies/topologies work best? It also can be seen that the complete (K) topology takes the lowest damage when using the best policies. Unfortunately it may not be practically used in networks with thousands of clients. Also, malicious nodes at center positions may inflict higher damage then those at the borders of the network.

14. 14 Summary It’s impossible to save an open network from malicious nodes, but by using efficient query selection policies the damage dealt may be reduced. Also some of the damage might be prevented by selecting an optimal topology and not having these nodes easily take a center position in the network.

15. 15 Questions? Are there any questions?