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Lecture 6 Page 1 CS 236 Online Certificates An increasingly popular form of authentication Generally used with public key cryptography A signed electronic.

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Presentation on theme: "Lecture 6 Page 1 CS 236 Online Certificates An increasingly popular form of authentication Generally used with public key cryptography A signed electronic."— Presentation transcript:

1 Lecture 6 Page 1 CS 236 Online Certificates An increasingly popular form of authentication Generally used with public key cryptography A signed electronic document proving you are who you claim to be Often used to help distribute other keys

2 Lecture 6 Page 2 CS 236 Online Public Key Certificates The most common kind of certificate Addresses the biggest challenge in widespread use of public keys –How do I know whose key it is? Essentially, a copy of your public key signed by a trusted authority Presentation of the certificate alone serves as authentication of your public key

3 Lecture 6 Page 3 CS 236 Online Implementation of Public Key Certificates Set up a universally trusted authority Every user presents his public key to the authority The authority returns a certificate –Containing the user’s public key signed by the authority’s private key In essence, a special type of key server

4 Lecture 6 Page 4 CS 236 Online Checking a Certificate Every user keeps a copy of the authority’s public key When a new user wants to talk to you, he gives you his certificate Decrypt the certificate using the authority’s public key You now have an authenticated public key for the new user Authority need not be checked on-line

5 Lecture 6 Page 5 CS 236 Online Scaling Issues of Certificates If there are billions of Internet users needing certificates, can one authority serve them all? Probably not So you need multiple authorities Does that mean everyone needs to store the public keys of all authorities?

6 Lecture 6 Page 6 CS 236 Online Certification Hierarchies Arrange certification authorities hierarchically The single authority at the top produces certificates for the next layer down And so on, recursively

7 Lecture 6 Page 7 CS 236 Online Using Certificates From Hierarchies I get a new certificate I don’t know the signing authority But the certificate also contains that authority’s certificate Perhaps I know the authority who signed this authority’s certificate

8 Lecture 6 Page 8 CS 236 Online Extracting the Authentication Using the public key of the higher level authority, –Extract the public key of the signing authority from the certificate Now I know his public key, and it’s authenticated I can now extract the user’s key and authenticate it

9 Lecture 6 Page 9 CS 236 Online A Example Give me a certificate saying that I’m Should Alice believe that he’s really ? Alice has never heard of But she has heard of So she uses to check How can prove who he is? Alice gets a message with a certificate Then she uses to check

10 Lecture 6 Page 10 CS 236 Online Certificates and Trust Ultimately, the point of a certificate is to determine if something is trusted –Do I trust the request to perform some financial transaction? So, Trustysign.com signed this certificate How much confidence should I have in the certificate?

11 Lecture 6 Page 11 CS 236 Online Potential Problems in the Certification Process What measures did Trustysign.com use before issuing the certificate? Is the certificate itself still valid? Is Trustysign.com’s signature/certificate still valid? Who is trustworthy enough to be at the top of the hierarchy?

12 Lecture 6 Page 12 CS 236 Online Trustworthiness of Certificate Authority How did Trustysign.com issue the certificate? Did it get an in-person sworn affidavit from the certificate’s owner? Did it phone up the owner to verify it was him? Did it just accept the word of the requestor that he was who he claimed to be?

13 Lecture 6 Page 13 CS 236 Online What Does a Certificate Really Tell Me? That the certificate authority (CA) tied a public/private key pair to identification information Generally doesn’t tell me why the CA thought the binding was proper I may have different standards than that CA

14 Lecture 6 Page 14 CS 236 Online Showing a Problem Using the Example Alice likes how verifies identity But is she equally happy with how verifies identity? Does she even know how verifies identity? What if uses ‘s lax policies to pretend to be ?

15 Lecture 6 Page 15 CS 236 Online Another Big Problem Things change One result of change is that what used to be safe or trusted isn’t any more If there is trust-related information out in the network, what will happen when things change?

16 Lecture 6 Page 16 CS 236 Online Revocation A general problem for keys, certificates, access control lists, etc. How does the system revoke something related to trust? In a network environment Safely, efficiently, etc.

17 Lecture 6 Page 17 CS 236 Online Revisiting Our Example Someone discovers that has obtained a false certificate for How does Alice make sure that she’s not accepting ‘s false certificate?

18 Lecture 6 Page 18 CS 236 Online Realities of Certificates Most OSes come with set of “pre-trusted” certificate authorities System automatically processes (i.e., trusts) certificates they sign Usually no hierarchy If not signed by one of these, present it to the user –Who always accepts it...

19 Lecture 6 Page 19 CS 236 Online An Example Firefox web browser Makes extensive use of certificates to validate entities –As do all web browsers Comes preconfigured with several certificate authorities –Hundreds of them

20 Lecture 6 Page 20 CS 236 Online Firefox Preconfigured Certificate Authorities Some you’d expect: –Microsoft, RSA Security, Verisign, etc. Some you’ve probably never heard of: Unizeto Sp. z.o.o., Netlock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft.,ABA.ECOM

21 Lecture 6 Page 21 CS 236 Online The Upshot If Netlock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft. says someone’s OK, I trust them –I’ve never heard of Netlock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft. –I have no reason to trust Netlock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft. –But my system’s security depends on them

22 Lecture 6 Page 22 CS 236 Online The Problem in the Real World In 2011, a Dutch authority (DigiNotar) was compromised Attackers generated lots of bogus certificates signed by DigiNotar –“Properly” signed by that authority –For popular web sites Until compromise discovered, everyone trusted them

23 Lecture 6 Page 23 CS 236 Online Effects of DigiNotar Compromise Attackers could transparently redirect users to fake sites –What looked like Twitter was actually attackers’ copycat site Allowed attackers to eavesdrop without any hint to users Apparently used by authorities in Iran to eavesdrop on dissidents

24 Lecture 6 Page 24 CS 236 Online How Did the Compromise Occur? DigiNotar had crappy security –Out-of date antivirus software –Poor software patching –Weak passwords –No auditing of logs –Poorly designed local network A company providing security services paid little attention to security

25 Lecture 6 Page 25 CS 236 Online Another Practicality Certificates have expiration dates –Important for security –Otherwise, long-gone entities would still be trusted But perfectly good certificates also expire –Then what?

26 Lecture 6 Page 26 CS 236 Online The Reality of Expired Certificates When I hear my server’s certificate has expired, what do I do? –I trust it anyway –After all, it’s my server But pretty much everyone does that –For pretty much every certificate Not so secure

27 Lecture 6 Page 27 CS 236 Online The Core Problem With Certificates Anyone can create some certificate Typical users generally have no good basis for determining whose certificates to trust –They don’t even really understand what they mean Therefore, they trust almost any certificate

28 Lecture 6 Page 28 CS 236 Online Should We Worry About Certificate Validity? Starting to be a problem –Stuxnet is one example –Compromise of DigiNotar and Adobe also –Increasing incidence of improper issuance, like Verisign handing out Microsoft certificates Not the way most attackers break in today With all their problems, still not the weakest link –But now being exploited, mostly by most sophisticated adversaries

29 Lecture 6 Page 29 CS 236 Online The Web of Trust Model Public keys are still passed around signed by others But your trust in others is based on your personal trust of them –Not on a formal certification hierarchy –“I work in the office next to Bob, so I trust Bob’s certifications” –Attempt to establish understandable basis for trust in certificates

30 Lecture 6 Page 30 CS 236 Online Certificates in the Web of Trust Any user can sign any other user’s public key When a new user presents me his public key, he gives me one or more certificates signed by others If I trust any of those others, I trust the new user’s public key

31 Lecture 6 Page 31 CS 236 Online Limitations on the Web of Trust The web tends to grow –“I trust Alice, who trusts Bob, who trusts Carol, who trusts Dave,..., who trusts Lisa, who trusts Mallory” –Just because Lisa trusts Mallory doesn’t mean I should Example of transitive trust problems Working system needs concept of degrees of trust

32 Lecture 6 Page 32 CS 236 Online Advantages and Disadvantages of Web of Trust Model +Scales very well +No central authority +Very flexible –May be hard to assign degrees of trust –Revocation may be difficult –May be hard to tell who you will and won’t trust

33 Lecture 6 Page 33 CS 236 Online More General Use of Web of Trust Web of trust model usable for things other than certificates –Social networking sites –Peer systems –Security alert systems Really, any distributed system where trust plays a role

34 Lecture 6 Page 34 CS 236 Online When Is Web of Trust Good? When it links people who know each other –Or have other reasons to trust each other When use matches level of trust –If casual trust, limited risk –If high risk, great trust required When use allows adjustment based on observable behavior –Penalize those who don’t behave well

35 Lecture 6 Page 35 CS 236 Online What Can Go Wrong? Generally, model doesn’t provide any built- in costs for misplaced trust –Other than downgrading it within system Only penalties for a bad recommendation are social Dangerous if new identities easy to fabricate –Bad actor can keep coming back under new identities

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