Urgent and Emergent Operational Needs and Their Fulfillment

Urgent and Emergent Operational Needs and Their Fulfillment
Presented by JS / J8, Joint Capabilities Division and OSD - Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell Jul 2015

Operation RED WINGS CC-0278, Netted Iridium
UHF IO Sat is Fixed ~ 175’AZ : 50’ El from N.E Afghanistan 66 Iridiums, in ~Polar Orbits Constantly moving overhead N UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO Requirement: Theater communications for disadvantaged users Challenging terrain limits satellite communications MCWL initiated work on “netted iridium” capability Matching seedling technology development efforts to relevant operational problems is essential

Lesson Objectives Describe Urgent and Emergent Operational Need situations, procedures, and lessons learned Recognize situations that call for a Rapid Response List the differences between urgent/emergent requirements and the deliberate “lane” of JCIDS Describe actions to transition from an urgent/ emergent requirement to an enduring capability requirement Discuss the funding, process and oversight of Rapid Acquisition

Many steps are done in parallel
UON High Level Process JEONs JUONs Army ONS Marine UUNS Navy – Urgent Need AF - UON ARMY REF 10-Liner UON Initiated Review UON Component involved in an ongoing contingency (deployed or prior to deployment) or in advance of a contingency operation Chain of Command JOINT ? Component Validation Acquire / Deploy Operate / Sustain No Yes CCMD Approve Joint Staff Validation JRAC Assign for Action W-SIG Management / Direction DoDD UON Requirements JCIDS CJCSI H Execution - Rapid Acquisition DoDI (January 7, 2015) (e.g.) Final Disposition SOCOM CMNS Many steps are done in parallel

Urgent Operational Needs
Urgent Operational Need (UON) – capability requirements identified by a DOD Component as impacting an ongoing or anticipated contingency operation. If left unfulfilled, UONs result in capability gaps potentially resulting in loss of life or critical mission failure. DoD Components, in their own terminology, may use a different name for a UON. Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) – UONs that are identified by a Combatant Command as inherently joint and impacting an ongoing contingency operation. Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) – UONs that are identified by a Combatant Command as inherently joint and impacting an anticipated or pending contingency operation. Requirements Managers and Program Managers must work together to ensure success The DOD 5000 and CJCS 3170 series acquire weapons systems using a traditional, deliberate process, usually taking a few years even when the system uses maximum streamlining. Sometimes, the warfighters need a new capability as soon as possible. What does DOD and the JCIDS process do when warfighters need something NOW? Each Service uses various methods to shorten the acquisition timelines to meet urgent and compelling needs during crisis and conflict, but service policies and procedures do not provide an opportunity to address theater-wide multi-Service combatant commander joint urgent operational needs. The action officer or NCO who writes the JUON for the combat command becomes a de-facto Requirements Manager; however, Requirements Managers must be involved in follow-on actions for recurring or ongoing requirements. Underline loss of life or mission failure………good bumper sticker

CJCSI 3170.01H Three JCIDS Process “Lanes”
Established Three Lanes to Requirements Development to Respond to Capability Gaps within Acceptable Timeframes and Risks Urgent Requirements Combatant Command (CCMD) (JUON) or Other DoD Component Driven Urgent and compelling to prevent loss of life and/or mission failure during current operations Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Requirements (DDR) validates Joint Needs; DoD Components assess/validate other urgent needs Emergent Requirements CCMD Driven Supports accelerated acquisition of capabilities needed for an anticipated or pending contingency operation VCJCS verifies, JCB or JROC validates Deliberate Requirements Service, CCMD, or Agency Driven Traditional route for capabilities that require significant tech development or are not urgent or compelling

Deliberate Requirements vs. Urgent/Emergent Requirements Lanes
4/25/2017 Deliberate Requirements ICD, CDD, CPD, DCR Future Focused, ACAT Programs Very Structured Process Evolved Requirements (KPPs, KSAs) Capabilities Based Assessments Analysis of Alternatives Lengthy Development High Visibility on Program Large Investment Urgent/Emergent Requirements Loss of life Critical mission failure Contingency operations Now-focused, ACAT II or below Streamlined process Quick assessment of alternatives Limited development if feasible High visibility on results <100% solution acceptable

Urgent/Emergent Staffing
Sponsor (CCMD) Gatekeeper Termination Acquisition (JRAC) Urgent/Emergent (JUONs/JEONs) 15 Days (JUONs) 31 Days (JEONs) 1 Day Total: 15-31 days JUONs: J8/DDR JEONs: JCB/JROC Functional Capability Board JRAC participation SME inputs from DOD Prioritization within this portfolio CCMD Inputs Non-material change recommendations FCB Chair: Ready for Validation? Recommend Different Process Validation Rejection For JEONs, VCJCS approves use of the emergent lane. JUON and JEON staffing begins when the Gatekeeper receives the document from the Sponsor. The Gatekeeper has one day to perform initial review. Following confirmation that the JUON meets the appropriate entry criteria, JUONs are assigned directly to a Lead FCB for review. JEONs are first confirmed by the VCJCS, via the Gatekeeper and DJ-8. The VCJCS will identify the validation authority as the JCB or JROC. Once the VCJCS provides confirmation that the JEON may use the emergent process, JEONs are assigned to a Lead FCB and JRAC for collaborative review. The Lead FCB, in collaboration with the JRAC, assesses the validity of the JUON or JEON and identifies potential solution approaches which could satisfy the capability requirement in the requested timeframe. The Lead FCB updates the FCB Joint prioritization to reflect the placement of the new capability requirement(s) within their priority list. At the end of their assessment, the Chair of the lead FCB, with a JRAC representative makes a recommendation to the validation authority either for or against validation. The validation authority will make one of the following decisions: 1) Validate and proceed to a solution sponsor. 2)Validate part – proceed through a mix of urgent and deliberate processes. 3)Reject – recommend accept risk, adopt a non-materiel approach, or pursue through deliberate process. Title 10 definition: Contingency Operation - a military operation that— (A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, (a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or of this title, chapter 15 of this title, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress. [10 USC 101 (a) (13)] Time is of the essence: 15 days staffing for JUONs, 31 days for JEONs Gatekeeper reviews CCMD submission Functional Capabilities Boards conduct triage in conjunction with the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) from OSD (AT&L) Validation authority decides: proceed to solution, redirect, or reject Knowledge Management / Decision Support (KM/DS) System JUON/JEON – Monitor All Tab

JUON/JEON Format Administrative Data:
a. Title: (Unclassified version); b. Submitted by: (e.g. CENTCOM); c. Authorized by: CCMD Commander, Deputy/Vice, or Chief of Staff; d. Primary and secondary POCs: RMCT trained POCs; e. Date submitted: Timing is essential Operational Context and Threat Analysis Describe the nature of the urgency and operational impact – loss of life / critical mission failure Required Capability Describe the capability required – not a specific solution – as well as duration of need Flexibility Is a partial solution on time acceptable? Potential Non-Materiel Solutions Were non-materiel options considered and instituted? Potential Materiel Solutions Identify/discuss any known viable capability solutions Required Quantities Identify quantity and distribution requirements Constraints Identify logistics, maintenance, training, manpower issues that could inhibit closing the gap Reference: JCIDS Manual, 12 Feb 2015, p D-86 Title: (Unclassified version) CCMD Submitted by CONOPS Summary Required Capability - Flexibility – is a partial solution preferred quicker? Mission and Threat Analysis – highlight loss of life or critical mission failure Potential Non-Materiel Solutions – describe non-materiel alternatives considered Potential Materiel Solutions Required Quantities – total number or breakdown by unit Constraints Primary and secondary POCs – POCs should have completed appropriate level of RMCT see Enclosure H Authorized by – must be endorsed by CCMD Commander, Deputy Commander, or Chief of Staff

JUONs/JEONs in Media Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops What They Need, Dr. Ash Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense MV Cape Ray Deploys on Syrian Chemical Weapons Disposal Mission US Transcom Unveils Ebola Isolation Units for Cargo Planes U.S. Air Force Faces Capability Decision On Urgent F-16 AESA Upgrade

Rapid Acquisition and Actions to Fulfill Urgent Operational Needs
When wars end, leaders are often eager to move on to the next challenge. That is why it is crucial to make permanent the institutional innovations resulting from the hard-earned lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, while the experiences are still fresh. Too many lives were lost in the early years of those wars because the Pentagon failed to keep up with a changing battlefield. Never again should it make the same mistake. Ashton Carter, Foreign Affairs. January 2014

What does it take to “field” a capability quickly?
Know what it is that you’re trying to field “Requirements” – but, may be incomplete as submitted by requester Know how it’s going to be used and who’s going to use it DOTMLPF, force management (e.g., boots on the ground) considerations, contractor operated, contractor owned Have mature technology in the bank, rapid integration, rapid development, focused and rapid science & technology Non-material solutions. Interim solutions. Multiple simultaneous approaches Have a responsive and accountable “acquisition” structure Analysis, program management, contracts, industrial base, supply chain, logistics, etc… “Rapid Fielding of Capabilities” policy issued in Encl. 13 to DoDI , Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, January 7, 2015. Have access to money to execute when you need it “Budgets” - current execution year, future year, color Training, logistic, and operational support Know capability delivered meets user needs (operational & other assessments) A sense of urgency and clear authorities

Transition to Normal Acquisition System
4/25/2017 Who decides if a solution to an Urgent Operational Need should enter the formal acquisition process? ACAT I – Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) makes the decision ACAT II or below – Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) / Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), or component established process makes the decision (in accordance with Enclosure 13, DoDI , section 4.e.(5)) Funding for additional quantities and sustainment are generally a Service responsibility as part of the normal budgeting process. Within one year of entering operation and sustainment phase a “disposition analysis” is required for all UONs – Terminate, Sustain, or Transition to normal acquisition system (program of record (POR)). Disposition Decision must be documented (acquisition decision memorandum (ADM)) for all UONs Disposition Decision ADM should specify point of entry into the Defense Acquisition System, required acquisition and JCIDs documentation, as well as funding required to transition to POR.

Inherent Risks 4/25/2017 Solution Failure – rapid fielding may result in a solution that does not perform as planned Short-term success may not meet longer-term needs Inadequate sustainment planning: May result in requirements for multiple upgrades or for more costly improvements Creates issues if we must transition to a new sustainer other than the initial provider - Steep learning curve Transition to Normal Acquisition Program may require backward development of required DoDI and JCIDS documentation.

DoD Directive 5000.71 “Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs”
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued Directive August 24, 2012. Establishes Warfighter Senior Integration Group (SIG) to lead and facilitate agile and rapid response to Combatant Commander (CCMD) UONs and to recognize, respond to, and mitigate the risk of operational surprise associated with ongoing or anticipated near-term contingency operations DoD’s highest priority to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties Solution must be capable of being fielded within 2 years of the validation of the urgent need Requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes and decisions will be linked to support a timeline appropriate to the need Actions to resolve UONs will be accomplished by using parallel, rather than sequential, processes. Communication of UONs to the acquisition community will not be unduly delayed to resolve information shortcomings that could be addressed by direct interaction between the requestor and the responsible acquisition organization Assigns Responsibilities for implementation DoD Components will establish supporting policies and procedures, for the expeditious identification, submission, evaluation, validation, and resolution of UONs and provide visibility to the Warfighter SIG of their efforts to resolve UONs.

Warfighter SIG Responsibilities
Lead and facilitate agile and rapid response to CCMD UONs Recognize, respond to, and mitigate the risk of operational surprise associated with ongoing or anticipated near-term contingency operation. Facilitates the resolution of other urgent warfighter issues Prioritize and direct actions to meet urgent requirements and to integrate department wide efforts to manage the institutional response to operational surprise. Overarching entity through which OSD’s previously established urgent needs organizations and task forces and any future OSD level urgent needs task forces will report to the Secretary of Defense regarding the status of UON related actions NOTE: On May 8, 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Work delegated the responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary of Defense listed and described in Department of Defense Directive , to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). This delegation includes the Principal Deputy USD(AT&L).

Rapid Fielding of Capabilities
DoD’s highest priority is to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties, as described in DoD Directive 17

Contact Information Joint Staff J8/JCD CDR Robert E (Rooster) Loughran, USN, Joint Capabilities Division, JS J8 Address: Telephone: JCIDS on Intellipedia at Knowledge Management and Decision Support System (KM/DS) on SIPRNET: -- SIPR token required for registration & login Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell Address: for NIPRNET for SIPRNET Telephone: / NIPRNET Site: Note: Need Intelink Passport user name and password; User name and password can be requested through: SIPRNET IntelShare Site: Note: Need Intelink Passport user name and password; User name and password can be requested through:

Questions

Backup Slides

JUON Section Descriptions
Title: (Unclassified version) CCMD Submitted by: (e.g., CENTCOM) Date submitted by the CCMD CONOPS Summary. Provide a CONOPS for which the capabilities requested in the JUON/JEON contribute, including information regarding the coalition environment within which the capability solution will need to operate. Required Capability: Describe in detail the nature of the urgency and the operational impact, if not immediately resolved, in terms of critical mission failure or loss of life. Identify where the operational deficiency exists. Describe what capabilities are required, and whether they support a discrete operation, must be sustained for an extended period of time, or must be sustained until the end of the conflict. What is the target, threat or operational deficiency? What cannot be done without new or improved equipment or materiel? Include threshold/objective performance requirements for any key attributes. This description must also specify the latest acceptable date to address the capability requirements and capability gaps.

JUON Section Descriptions (cont)
Flexibility. In the event of technological or other challenges, indicate whether receiving a partial solution on schedule is preferred to a delayed solution which satisfies a greater portion of the capability requirement. Estimate acceptable percentages of reduced performance and/or acceptable delay timeframes. Mission and Threat Analysis: Describe the mission deficiency or capability gap. Indicate the initial operational capability requirement, desired date and any impacts to safety, survivability, personnel, training, logistics, communications, etc. Potential Non-Materiel Solutions: Describe any non-materiel options and alternatives that were considered. If applicable, discuss any market survey or similar related information developed by document Sponsor or during the validation process. If market research details are available, provide along with the JUON or JEON to facilitate reuse during rapid acquisition activities. Potential Materiel Solutions: If known, identify and discuss viable solutions – from US or Allied/Partner nation sources – that could improve operational capabilities or system performance.

JUON Section Descriptions (cont)
Required Quantities. For viable solutions, identify quantities required and distribution among applicable DoD Components. Include expected quantities required for spares and/or training activities. Constraints: Identify any known constraints that could inhibit satisfying the need -- such as arms control treaties, logistics support, transportation, manpower, training or non-military barriers. Primary and secondary POCs for the document Sponsor: Include name, title/rank, phone, and both NIPRNET and SIPRNET addresses. POCs must have completed the appropriate level of RMCT in accordance with Enclosure H. Authorized by: Release authority’s name, rank and title. New JUONs and JEONs, and modifications to the capability requirements in previously validated JUONs and JEONs, must be endorsed by the CCMD Commander, Deputy Commander, or Chief of Staff. Administrative modifications to previously validated JUONs or JEONs may be endorsed by the CCMD J8.

Military Service Rapid Response Procedures
Army: Operational Needs Statement (ONS). Initiated thru operational commander’s chain-of-command, endorsed by 06 or higher, submitted via SIPRNET to HQDA (DCS G-3/5/7) (AR 71-9) Navy & Marine Corps: Urgent Need Process (UNP) / Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) / Rapid Development and Deployment (RDD). Initiated via Service chain-of-command. Certified by Naval Component Commander or Marine Corps component commander of supported COCOM. DON UNP encompasses Navy urgent operational need (UON) and Marine Corps urgent universal need statement (UUNS), and processes joint urgent operational needs (JUONs) that are assigned to the Department of the Navy. (SECNAVINST E). Air Force: Urgent Operational Need (UON) from warfighting commander to lead command and HQAF. Validated by AFROC (AFI ) . Army (AR 71-9, 28 Dec 2009): Operational Needs Statement (ONS). Submitted through the operational commanders chain of command, endorsed by a O–6/Colonel or higher for DCS, G–3/5/7 validation and sourcing. ONS will be submitted using the equipment common operating picture (ECOP) collaborative planning information technology system. ECOP is a SIPRNET, collaborative web-based database and documentation library for requesting and sourcing materiel and nonmateriel solutions to urgent warfighter needs. Operational field commanders submit and track ONS and equipment sourcing documents (ESD) submitted. Navy & Marine Corps (SECNAVNOTE 5000, DON Urgent Need Process, 12 March 2009): An urgent need is an exceptional request from a Navy or Marine Corps component commander for an additional warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested is likely to result in the inability of units to accomplish their missions or increases the probability of casualties and loss of life. Also, see MCO B, 10 Mar 2008, Urgent Universal Need Statement Processing. Air Force (AFI , Rapid Response Process,12 June 2008): Urgent Operational Need (UON) process begins when a Warfighting Commander identifies a capability gap/ shortfall that could result in loss of life and/or prevent mission accomplishment and requests Air Force assistance. The lead MAJCOM validates the UON and determines the most expeditious and effective solution. UONs may be answered by the lead MAJCOM using any one of several different processes, of which Combat Capability Documents (CCD) and the Rapid Response Process (RRP) is only one. The MAJCOM usually documents UON requirements with an AF Form 1067, Modification Proposal, or a CCD; however, other requirements documents may be used. A CCD is used when the MAJCOM requires CSAF assistance with the reprogramming or identification of funds and/or PMD actions.

U.S. Special Operations Command Rapid Response Process
USSOCOM Combat Mission Need Statement (C-MNS) supports urgent new or existing materiel needs Operational unit prepares the C-MNS C-MNS endorsed by Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Commander and USSOCOM component HQ USSCOM forms rapid response team to rapidly identify, validate, approve and field a solution. Normally fields new or existing materiel within 180 days of C-MNS approval. The USSOCOM Combat Mission Need Statement (C-MNS) process, documented in USSOCOM Directive 71-4, “Combat Mission Need Statement (CMNS) Process,” supports urgent and compelling new or existing materiel needs identified during preparation for or active special operations force (SOF) combat and/or contingency operations. A C-MNS must satisfy at least one of two criteria: (1) critical shortfall on the overall success of the mission (mission failure); or (2) critical combat survivability deficiency (loss of life). The C-MNS process supports expeditious acquisition of new or existing materials, normally fielded within 180 days of C-MNS approval. The solution must be sustainable through duration of combat or contingency operations. C-MNS materials are no longer maintained or sustained after the operation unless a capability document is approved in accordance with Directive C-MNS approval includes resourcing to finance a rapid capability solution affordably. A C-MNS is prepared by the operational unit in the field, endorsed by the theater special operation command (TSOC) commander and endorsed by the USSOCOM component for USSOCOM validation and approval. Although the process parallels the JCIDS process in format, the C-MNS does not substitute for this process. Upon C-MNS receipt, a HQ USSOCOM rapid response team is formed from subject matter experts in each USSOCOM staff directorate and applicable components to identify, validate, approve and field a solution rapidly.

Additional Definitions
Validation - The review and approval of capability requirement documents by a designated validation authority. The JROC is the ultimate validation authority for capability requirements unless otherwise delegated to a subordinate board or to a designated validation authority in a Service, Combatant Command, or other DOD Component. From CJCSI H

Contingency Operation Defined
Title 10 United States Code (USC) 100 a (13) The term “contingency operation” means a military operation that— (A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, (a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or of this title, chapter 15 of this title, section 712 of title 14, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.

Contingency Operation Defined (cont.)
10 USC § Retired members: authority to order to active duty 10 USC (a) In time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter. 10 USC (a) In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months. 10 USC § Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency. Notwithstanding the provisions of section (a) or any other provision of law, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission or that it is necessary to provide assistance referred to in subsection (b), he may authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, without the consent of the members concerned, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section (a) of this title), or any member in the Individual Ready Reserve mobilization category and designated as essential under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, under their respective jurisdictions, to active duty for not more than 365 days 10 USC § Authority of President to suspend certain laws relating to promotion, retirement, and separation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during any period members of a reserve component are serving on active duty pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of section 12301, 12302, or of this title, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of the United States. 10 USC § National Guard in Federal service: call. Whenever— (1) the United States, or any of the Commonwealths or possessions, is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation; (2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States; or (3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States; the President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State in such numbers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress the rebellion, or execute those laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia 10 USC Chapter 15 – INSURRECTION 14 USC Section 712 – Active duty for emergency augmentation of regular forces by United States Coast Guard (NEW)

DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendations
22 July 2015 29

Objectives Define Joint DCRs and their uses
Describe the Joint DCR generation and staffing process Review Joint DCR content and format requirements Describe the Joint DCR implementation process Provide best practices and common pitfalls for DCR drafting, staffing and implementation

DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendations
Joint DCRs document and validate non-materiel solutions as an alternative to, or complement of, materiel solutions (JCIDS Manual, 19Jan12) Required when: A non-materiel solution addresses a capability gap A materiel solution requires changes that impact DOTmLPF-P areas outside of the materiel program A material solution exists in the joint force, but must be organic to the sponsor (i.e. cannot be satisfied by an RFF or RFC) ICD DCR CBA, Studies, Lessons Learned, JROC, JIEDDO, etc… DCR

F.A.R.M. And TSOC DCR’s

Staffing a DCR Gatekeeper will identify the appropriate FCB (and supporting FCB if necessary) (JCIDS Manual, 19Jan12) One of 4 JSDs will be assigned (change pending in JCIDS manual rewrite) JROC Interest JCB Interest Joint Integration Joint Information

Basic Parameters and Format
Maximum Length: 30 Pages Structure Executive Summary: 1 Page (1) Purpose (2) Background (3) Description (4) Analysis Process (5) Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plan Recommendation OPR Implementation Timeframe ROM Cost (6) Constraints (7) Policy (8) Issues (9) Recommendation Summary Appendices

Basic Parameters and Format
Maximum Length: 30 Pages, including Appendix A (NR-KPP) Structure Executive Summary: 1 Page (1) Purpose (2) Background (3) Description (4) Analysis Process (5) Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plan Recommendation OPR Implementation Timeframe ROM Cost (6) Constraints (7) Policy (8) Issues (9) Recommendation Summary Appendices The critical section of a DCR

Approved Alternate DCR Format
Provides more logical flow with reduced redundancies Operational Context. Includes former Purpose, Background, part of Description, and part of Appendix A (Architecture Data) Threat Summary. Includes part of Description for the threat environment information and some clarifying verbiage from CJCSI (Intel Certification) Capability Discussion. Includes part of Description and all of Analysis Process Change Recommendations and Implementation Plans. Includes Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plans, Constraints, Policy, Issues, part of Recommendations Summary related to recommendations and implementation, and part of Appendix A (Architecture Data) Alternatives. Includes part of Recommendations Summary related to alternative approaches and options More information available at:

Approved Alternate DCR Format
Provides more logical flow with reduced redundancies Operational Context. Includes former Purpose, Background, part of Description, and part of Appendix A (Architecture Data) Threat Summary. Includes part of Description for the threat environment information and some clarifying verbiage from CJCSI (Intel Certification) Capability Discussion. Includes part of Description and all of Analysis Process Change Recommendations and Implementation Plans. Includes Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plans, Constraints, Policy, Issues, part of Recommendations Summary related to recommendations and implementation, and part of Appendix A (Architecture Data) Alternatives. Includes part of Recommendations Summary related to alternative approaches and options More information available at: The critical section of a DCR

Section 5, Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plan
What makes a good DCR? Format and length conforms to JCIDS manual Recommendations: Discrete, actionable tasks Examples Stronger: “Update Joint Pub 3-03 to reflect…” Weaker: “Update joint doctrine to reflect…” OPR Specific organization with oversight or authority over assigned task Stronger: “STRATCOM J7” Weaker: “Combatant Commands” Implementation Timeframe Specific, realistic yet minimized to maintain momentum Stronger: “30 September 2013” Weaker: “FY2013 plus 60 months” ROM Cost Realistic, conservative Myth: DCRs don’t have a cost Section 5, Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plan

Implementation of Validated DCRs
Approved recommendations from DCR Section 5 become JROC Memo (JROCM) actions Overall lead designated in JROCM; responsible for leading completion of actions with OPRs Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs) provide oversight of execution Extensions for action deadlines approved by Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Requirements via JROCM

Why DCRs Fail in Implementation
Common Implementation Failures: OPRs fail to meet suspense dates Actions reported complete, yet intent is not met Causes: Failure to properly review draft DCRs Arbitrary or unrealistic action suspense dates “Lead Organization” fails to lead Recommendations: Sponsor is the Lead Organization POCs for OPRs identified prior to validation and engaged in drafting process Determine suspense dates by developing a POAM for each action Lead Organization forms an implementation working group upon validation Leverage all available resources to complete actions within suspense dates

DCR Help Joint Staff J8 Joint Capabilities Division: JCIDS Process Owners JCIDS Gatekeeper: CDR J.R. Hill, , DCR Lead: CDR Greg “Sluggo” Leland, , Functional Process Owners (FPOs): Provide advice to sponsors during staffing of DCRs; oversee implementation of recommended changes DOTmLPF-P Area Functional Process Owner POC Joint Doctrine Joint Staff/J-7 CDR Todd Glasser, , Joint Organizations Joint Staff/J-8 Col Frank Latt, (843) /7509, Joint Training Dan Abahazy: (703) / Joint Materiel Mr. Fred Gregory, , Joint Leadership and Education Mr. Jack Roesner, , Joint Personnel Joint Staff/J-1 Mr. Andy Rivera, , Joint Facilities Joint Staff/J-4 LTCOL Tom Bongiovi, , Joint Policy Joint Staff/J-5 Mr. Jim Raycraft, , Functional Capabilities Boards FCB POC Battlespace Awareness Mr. Chris Hall, , C4/Cyber Ms. Becky Gentry, , Force Application Mr. Ben Vaught, , Force Support Mr. Joe Coleman, , Logistics Mr. Rick Gallagher, , Protection Mr. Mike Shalak, , KM/DS Help Desk: Mr. Mike Farmer, ,

Summary Joint DCRs document and validate non-materiel solutions as an alternative to, or complement of, materiel solutions Joint DCRs follow the standard JCIDS process for staffing (~83 days) 9 Sections (5 Sections for Alternate Format) Maximum 30 pages plus 1 page Executive Summary Critical Section: “Joint DCR Findings and Proposed Implementation Plan” Lead Organization coordinates implementation of validated Joint DCRs with FCB oversight Successful implementation is dependent on comprehensive staffing and a pro-active Lead Organization

RQM 310 Intelligence Support to Acquisition and Requirements Management
Good morning, my name is Mike Reynolds I am a career military and intelligence officer. I retired after 24 years of service and then joined the ranks of the Defense Intelligence Agency. I was first assigned as the Deputy J2X with US Joint Forces Command. Following the USJFCOM disestablishment I was realigned to the Joint Staff J28 and ultimately aligned to the Intelligence Requirements Certification Office, or IRCO, in July 2012. I speak from the Intelligence and Requirements sides of the house; my background in Acquisition is admittedly weak. None the less, please feel free to stop me if you have questions. I will do my best to answer your question now, maybe with the help of the DAU staff. My intent is to take all questions back with me and provide you with specific responses prior to your departure. Next slide ….

Lesson Objective TLO (Overall Objective) ELOs (Sub-areas)
Examine ways to build better partnerships between requirements, acquisition, and intelligence communities to better address changes in threats ELOs (Sub-areas) Address changing threat picture during development Engage the Intelligence Community early in the process The learning objective presented here actually embraces a larger movement within Defense to encourage closer collaboration and coordination between Intelligence , Requirements and Acquisition. Let’s call it the “New Provisional IRA” but hopefully without the Troubles. It is absolutely essential to continually assess threat throughout the process as it arguably will have the greatest effect on development … it is the aspect of intelligence that is inherent to design. However, all intelligence support categories, those external factors that make the capability work, must also be considered. What is leveraged from another community must be considered in the overall program cost. Furthermore, fielding a new capability … or even arriving at the Test and Evaluation phases is the wrong time to discover the Intelligence community is not resourced to provide the support the new capability requires. The F-35 is a prime example ……

Take Aways … Intelligence, Requirements, and Acquisition Communities
Greater community coordination; however, Acquisition DOES NOT take a queue from Intelligence Importance of realizing, codifying intelligence requirements early in development process Functional Requirements must codify intelligence support Intelligence must be considered in all sections of JCIDS documents Engage the Intelligence Community early Intelligence Requirements Certification Office (IRCO) Insight into the intelligence certification process IRCO is the organization responsible for intelligence certification IRCO is your resource and can assist in the process

Intelligence Support Categories
Threat Incorporated into design Addresses operational environment – and – Must be considered during R&D Adds to program cost Intelligence Support Products and support leveraged from external sources to support the capability in development Frequently not considered in program cost Should be identified early to ensure support in place Intelligence Support Categories (Enclosure – B, Appendix I) Intelligence Manpower Support Intelligence Resource Support Intelligence Planning and Operations Support Targeting Support Intelligence Mission Data (IMD ) Support Warning Support Space Intelligence Support Counter Intelligence Support Intelligence Training Support Tasking Collection Management Processing Exploitation Dissemination Signatures EWIR OOB C & P GEOINT Areas to be assessed as part of the AoA More Relevant Support Area Categories (incorporated in updated CJCSM 3170) Section 8 provides the Demand Signal … Talk to slide : “As Is” vs “Soon To Be” … to be codified in the updated 3170 More relevant support categories that will hopefully make it easier for the Sponsor, PM and developers to understand support requirements. Highlight : The “INTs” are addressed in the Intelligence Planning and Operations Support … to include GEOINT … “Signatures” migrated to “IMD” Signatures EWIR Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming OOB Order of Battle C&P Characteristics and Performance GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence

Importance of Threat to Development
DIA coordination office – TLA-3 Capabilities are developed against the adversaries’ capability Threat(s) can change during the development cycle The enemy can develop new threats faster than we can develop new systems Potential enemies access our media and exploit unprotected repositories of Defense related information Potential adversaries have observed US capabilities in the field after more than a decade of hostilities They know a great deal about the capabilities we employ and the major systems we are developing Threat information must be updated at CDD and CPD Critical Program Information related to capability must be protected throughout development Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs) must be identified early Talk to slide : TLA-3 coordination highlight CI issues in threat bullets CPI protection

Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs)
Definition: CIPs are those key performance thresholds of foreign threat systems which, if exceeded, could compromise the mission effectiveness of the US system in development. Identified in the System Threat Assessment Report (STAR); monitored by the IC; Breaches declared when applicable adversary threat advances observed CIP Breach Process: Breach reviews use similar procedures to JROC/JCB tripwire reviews; intent is for Risk Mitigation Teams to address breach impacts on capability and associated programs CIP Breach #5 briefed to Force Application (FA) WG, FA FCB CIP Breach #5 did not present significant concern for sponsor or program Review of the breach provided excellent opportunity to test and follow procedures Mitigation Team participation included JS J8, DIA TLA-3, MSIC, NASIC, and JS J283 Incorporated throughout JCIDS Manual; OSD Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) in coordination for incorporation in acquisition process IRCO and DIA facilitating CIP Breach inclusion in FCB capability reviews Talk to slide : …

Counterintelligence (CI) Challenges
IRCO observations of CI requirements and supportability in capability development Inconsistent and insufficient identification of CI support needed to mitigate foreign threat vulnerabilities and provide program protection Lack of supporting threat assessments and plans – Multi-Discipline CI Threat Assessment, Technology Transfer Risk Assessment, Supply Chain Threat Assessment, CI Support Plan – augment the Program Protection Plan (PPP) Insufficient Sponsor understanding of CI support issues Supporting assessments and plans are primarily acquisition requirements; however, serve to inform CI support category requirements Possible capacity issues across the Intelligence Community (IC) to process threat assessments Assessment complements the USD(I) and AT&L Joint Acquisition Protection Exploitation Cell (JAPEC) task to protect against loss of technical information Sponsor / PM should initiate CI-related vulnerability assessments early in development Take into account programs with foreign participation (or involvement); and use them to make a determination of risk to the Supply Chain Talk to slide : Highlight foreign threat Threat assessments (conducted by component CI agency) and associated timelines (example, NCIS cites 18 months) Acquisition requirements but inform CI support requirements

Intelligence Mission Data (IMD)
DIA coordination office – TLA-4 Sensor fusion is a characteristic of advanced weapons systems Platform Mission Data (MD) drives functionality; requires significant amount of intelligence data to be effective Advanced platform intelligence data Signatures Order of Battle (OOB) Geographical Intelligence (GEOINT) Characteristics & Performance (C&P) Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprograming (EWIR) EWIR components: Foreign (“Red/Grey”) – Produced by the Service intelligence centers US Military (“Blue”) – US military data provided by each Service Commercial (“White”) – US and foreign commercial data User Data Needs Military Non-Military Blue Grey White Red Non-Hostile Hostile US Non-US Talk to slide : Highlight TLA-4 … considerable potential for hidden costs and delays LMDP should include a full articulation of requirements, not just the gaps in production …. Highlight bumper sticker Intelligence data requirements are increasing, production centers challenged to meet need – articulation of full requirements creates demand signal

Intelligence Requirements Certification Office
Mission Evaluate and analyze intelligence support requirements for completeness, supportability and impact on Joint intelligence strategy, policy and architectural planning Identify, as early as possible, all likely intelligence support requirements and shortfalls; ensure threat capability information is incorporated into program planning throughout the JCIDS and DAS processes Roles and responsibilities identified in CJCSIs CJCSI B incorporated into updates to CJCSI , CJCSI , and JCIDS Manual Intelligence Certification Working Group (ICWG) ensures all intelligence supportability issues for developing Joint capabilities are addressed across the IC and with Program Offices ICWGs used to update membership on capability review issues, potential changes in certification process, or discussion of proposed enhancements to address supportability or certification The Genesis of the Intelligence Requirements Certification Office, or IRCO, came about in the 1990’s; the DEPSECDEF directed the Chairman provide for the certification of intelligence requirements. The Chairman directed DIA to resource the office which eventually was established within the Joint Staff J2. When the Joint Capability Integration and Development System, or JCIDS, was established, IRCO, through J2, supported J8 by providing Intelligence Certification. We’ll define Certification in a moment … Our mission, in the broadest sense, is stated here … to identify at the earliest opportunity all likely intelligence support requirements and shortfalls; and to ensure threat is considered throughout development. Our roles and responsibilities are defined in the Joint Resources Oversight Council, JROC, Charter (5123) and CJCSI However, 3312 will be canceled as its key provisions will be incorporated in updated 5123 and 3170 (JCIDS Manual) soon to be released. IRCO chairs the ICWG whose membership is primarily comprised of the Battlespace Awareness WG participants. The ICWG provides a forum ……

Intelligence Certification
Certification is a statement of adequacy and assesses whether the intelligence architecture and infrastructure will be available, suitable, and sufficient to support joint military requirements. Certifies: (1) DIA or Service validation of threat information and references; and, (2) adequacy of requirements and supportability in nine Intelligence Support Categories Conditional Certification requires sponsors provide additional information prior to next milestone to receive final certification Endorsement provided in lieu of certification for service-only operated and funded capabilities Granted for programs with Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) of Joint Integration and above ICD is certified for validated Threat alone CDD and CPD are certified for Threat and Intelligence Support Requirements Under current process intelligence requirements are not certified until Milestone B, relatively late in the development process Highlight : Certification is a statement of adequacy … the process involves an assessment as to whether the intelligence architecture and infrastructure will be available, suitable, and sufficient Talk to slide : Certification vs Conditional Certification. In Conditional Certifications conditions are established that must be fulfilled in order to receive final certification prior to the next Milestone. Examples include LMDP, IMD requirements, PPP. You may note that the PPP is an Acquisition document; however, such documents serve to inform support requirements when the requirement was not otherwise articulated in the JCIDS documents. In most circumstances the Sponsor will be required to provide proof of completed or missing documentation 90 days prior to the Milestone date. Language to that effect is now being included in the JROCMs. Endorsements … Air Force Cyber Weapons Systems … Talk to slide : Certification is granted …. With regard to the last bullet it is important to note that requirements are not certified until Milestone B … remember the example of the F-35? ……

Timeline Intelligence Certification review for each JCIDS document DAS
Production & Deployment Operations & Support Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction Engineering & Manufacturing Development Warfighter Needs Joint Concepts Capabilities - Based Assessment OSD/JCS CCMD Strategic Guidance Materiel Solution Analysis Technology Opportunities & Resources A B C CDD CPD ICD DAS Technical Reviews Technical Readiness Assessments Program Reviews AoA Study Three Principle JCIDS Documents: Initial Capability Document (ICD) Capability Development Document (CDD) Capability Production Document (CPD) Milestones: 3 Decision points: 4 Phases: 5 Program Reviews: 2 Technical Reviews: 12+ Technical Readiness Assessments: 2 Milestone documents: 40+ FCB RFP – Request For Proposal CDR – Critical Design Review FPR – Full Rate Production Leverage Intelligence Related Activities Already Occurring Milestone Decisions Intelligence Certification review for each JCIDS document MDD RFP Release CDR FRP Decision Review IOC FOC Highlight : ICD, CDD, CPD for certification Highlight : as before, while threat is (and should be) considered throughout the process, it is not until this point [ use laser or other pointer ] that intelligence requirements are considered and certified. We would submit to you that the possible intelligence requirements should have been considered here [ highlight MDD and AoA ] in order to more fully understand potential costs and supportability of a capability. We are currently attempting to drive review of intelligence support requirements as far to the left as feasible.

IRCO Certification Flow Chart
Final Adjudication Accepted J8 Task via KM/DS Yes AO Closes Task Certification Signed and Posted GO/FO Reviews Advise JCB J283 IRCO AO assignment 21 Days (Stage I) 14 Days (Stage II) No Forward to J28 for Signature Adjudication Accepted and included Yes AO acknowledges task (Portal & KM/DS) J283 Cert Review Advise FCB ISSA Review Initiate Certification No Walk through slide … Stage II review : IRCO will request response from DIA, TLA-3 and TLA-4, to ensure threat and IMD is addressed … Certification is signed by an SES … Red Diamond : a “NO” response does not automatically require a request for extension … IRCO will frequently assist the Sponsor with a “just in time” rewrite of support sections or otherwise facilitate the update of references in order to maintain the certification schedule. Sometimes, however, the extent of the updates required drive to an extension … Whatever the outcome, IRCO will advise the DJ8, appropriate FCBs and Sponsor that certification, full or conditional, is forth coming or that problems remain and must be resolved … Yes Adjudication Accepted and included Stage 1 review: IRCO reviews Documents for Intelligence Supportability Yes Adjudication Accepted and included No Convene ICWG Upload Comments/ Matrix to KM/DS Sponsor Adjudicates Comments Stage II Review: Adjudication for Certification Request extension from J8 Close Stage I Review 30 Days

Identifying the Problem
Any changes to requirements post-CDD approval / Milestone B will have significant impact on cost and schedule – natural reluctance to propose changes Budgetary pressures and statutory requirements to develop to threshold inhibit the Services and Program Managers from either making changes or expending additional funds to build in flexibility Prudent design vs. “Gold-plating” issues Nunn-McCurdy Implications True excessive cost growth versus “fact-of-life” changes (such as N-M breaches for just buying more/less of a solution) To foot stomp … the implied message on this slide is that we operate on thin margins, early engagement with the intelligence community is crucial to fully appreciate costs and ensure that potential delays are minimized.

Other Considerations CIP Breach risk mitigation processes – Service and Joint leads Program and Capability Portfolios must both be considered in mitigation options When should we accept a partial solution due to the speed of change of the threat? Last bullet … sometimes development just will not out pace threat … sometimes it is appropriate to accept a partial solution and or risk

“Marinating Intelligence Support In” rather than “Brushing It On”
Solutions Requirements that allow for more flexibility to respond to dynamic threats Better solutions demand strong teaming with Intel, Requirements, and Acquisition Earlier engagement with the Intelligence Community at key check points prior to decision points Build partnerships/relationships within the Service, OSD and beyond to ensure everyone understands why costs, schedule, and requirements might change Early analysis Post-ICD input to the AoA CDD formulation of final KPPs and increments Development of Critical Intelligence Parameters First bullet restates “foot stomp” on previous slide Talk to slide Highlight bumper sticker …… “Marinating Intelligence Support In” rather than “Brushing It On”

Points of Contact & References
Joint Staff J283 (Intelligence Requirements Certification Office) Mr. John Kittle, IRCO Chief, (757) , Mr. Mike Reynolds, (757) , DIA Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) Support Office Mr. Richard Castrop, DIA/DO, Battlespace Awareness/Future Capabilities, (202) , DIA TLA-3 (Technical & Long-range Assessments - Threat) Mr. Jeff Vales, Chief, (434) , Mr. Christopher Boggs, (434) , DIA TLA-4 (Technical & Long-range Assessments - IMD) Mr. Don Bellah, Chief, (434) , References: DoDI , Operation of the Defense Acquisition System DoDI O , Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Supporting Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) CJCSI , Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) JCIDS Manual DIAI , Intelligence Threat Support for Major Acquisition Programs

Questions?

Milestone B to Full Operational Capability (FOC) Requirements Management Activities
Date: June 8, 2015 Presented by: Thomas Fritz

Lesson Objectives Assess the major requirements management activities during the acquisition process from Milestone B to Full Rate Production / Full Deployment, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC) Explain the purpose and major activities of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase and the Production and Deployment phase Describe the role of the Requirements Manager (RM) to assure a successful Critical Design Review (CDR) and response to CDR Assessment(s) Describe role of the RM in preparing for Milestone C, the Full-Rate Production / Full Deployment Decision Review, and Sustainment

Milestone B to FOC EMD and Production & Deployment
AoA review and Portfolio Assessment Production / Full Deployment Full Rate Joint Concepts President SECDEF CJCS Joint Community Strategic Guidance Disposal CDR PDR Capabilities - Based Assessment Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction Engineering & Manufacturing Development Production & Deployment Operations & Support A MDD Draft CDD ICD AoA report B C CPD Materiel Solution Analysis Sustainment CDD Validation RFP Release IOC FOC High-Cost First Article Combined Milestone B and C Decisions. Some programs, notably spacecraft and ships, normally do not produce prototypes during EMD for use solely as test articles because of the very high cost of each article. The first articles produced will be tested and then fielded as operational assets. These programs may be tailored by measures such as combining the development and initial production investment commitments. When this is the case, a combined Milestone B and C will be conducted.

Milestone B to FOC Requirements Management Activities
Purpose: Develop, build, and test to verify all operational & derived requirements were met. Major Activities: T&E of production representative test articles Purpose: Produce & deliver requirements compliance products Major Activities: T&E of production systems, production, deployment B C CDD CPD LRIP & IOT&E Engineering & Manufacturing Development Production & Deployment Operations & Support IOC FOC FRP/FD EMD Contract Award CDR Requirements Management Activities Develop: CPD , Update to CONOPS / OMS / MP Participate in IPTs and Technical Reviews PDR ( If pre - MS B PDR was waived) Milestone & Decision Reviews; Configuration Steering Board Monitor/provide input Test and Evaluation: DT/OA/OT, Live Fire, Interoperability Updated: OMS/MP, SEP, TEMP, APB, AS, ISP, Cost Estimate, PPBE, LCC

Critical Design Review (CDR)
CDR establishes the initial product baseline* to ensure that the system has a reasonable expectation of satisfying the requirements of the CDD within current cost and schedule constraints Any changes during EMD are incorporated and after CDR the CDD evolves to the CPD required at Milestone C CDR also approves the product baselines for maintainability, supportability, and logistics elements. After CDR, production-representative articles will be produced for testing against the KPPs and technical requirements Once the initial product baseline is established, opportunities to improve performance or reduce life-cycle costs are severely limited *Product Baseline—describes the detailed design for production, fielding/ deployment, and operations and support. It prescribes all necessary physical (form, fit, and function) characteristics and selected functional characteristics designated for production acceptance testing and production test requirements. It is traceable to the system performance requirements contained in the CDD..

CDR Assessment MDAP and MAIS programs require a CDR Assessment. For ACAT ID and IAM - PM invites Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) to system-level CDRs and makes available CDR artifacts. Office of the DASD(SE) prepares a brief assessment of the program’s design maturity and technical risks that may require MDA’s attention MDA : Reviews Post-CDR assessment Determines whether additional action is necessary RM CONCERN: What is the effect on the CPD if CDR trade-offs result in KPP Change? KSA Change? Increment Change? CONOPS/OMS/MP Change? - Proactive method? Reactive method?

Test & Evaluation Activities During EMD & LRIP
T&E during EMD: Feedback to PM on progress of design process Compliance with contract requirements (specs) Ability of system to achieve KPPs and KSAs Developmental Testing (DT) Operational Assessments (OA) Live Fire T&E (LFT&E) of components/subsystems Interoperability testing of components/subsystems T&E during LRIP demonstrates that system is operationally effective, suitable, and mission capable IOT&E Full-Up System Level LFT&E Interoperability testing and certification

Milestone C Program is reviewed by MDA for entrance into Production & Deployment, or Limited Deployment for software systems. Approval Criteria: Satisfies EMD exit criteria approved at MS B Updated & approved Acq Strategy DT & OA results that demonstrate stable design that meets requirements Mature software capability No significant manufacturing risks Validated CPD (or equivalent) Demonstrated interoperability and supportability Costs within affordability caps Full FYDP funding Other MDA considerations: New threat(s) not in CPD? Requirements authority indicates capability requirements are current. MDA documents MS C decision in an ADM

Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
Establishes initial production base Provides IOT&E test articles Provides efficient ramp-up to full-rate production Maintains continuity in production pending IOT&E completion RM’s High Interest Concerns: Use as IOC systems? Training base assets?

Full Rate Production / Full Deployment (FRP/FD) Decision Review
Program reviewed by MDA to approve entry into Full Rate Production or Full Deployment Approval criteria: Results of IOT&E Demonstrated control of manufacturing process Acceptable performance & reliability Establishment of adequate sustainment & support systems Other MDA considerations: Any new validated threat environment that may impact operational readiness May consult with requirements validation authority to ensure capability requirements are current MDA documents decision in an ADM

Linkage: CPD, APB, TEMP & Contract for LRIP/Production
Full Rate Production / Full Deployment Milestone B Milestone C Cost Estimate & $$ TEMP COIs, MOEs, MOPs, CTPs Production Representative Articles Production Systems Contract KPPs KSAs CDD KPPs KSAs CPD SPECs “build-to” SPECs “build-to” CDR IOC FOC APB KPPs IOT&E MOEs/ MOPs DT OA LRIP/ Production Specs MOEs/ MOPs Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase Production & Deployment Phase 70

Resources BBP 3.0 http://bbp.dau.mil NSS
QDR Joint Electronic Library + JDEIS CAC enabled JCIDS CAC enabled DoD

Intelligence Supportability
Definition: Supportability refers to the availability, suitability, and sufficiency of intel support required by a capability. Availability: whether the intel data, information, infrastructure, or resources are, or are expected to be, available throughout the capability solution’s projected life cycle. Suitability: whether the required intel data, information, infrastructure, or resources are, or are expected to be, appropriate to support the capability. Sufficiency: whether the intel data, information, infrastructure, or resources are, or are expected to be, adequate to support Sponsor’s capability. Sufficiency may apply to quantitative as well as qualitative aspects of intel support.

Intelligence Supportability Categories
ICD, Threat Paragraph. Ensure intelligence support requirements necessary to enable the concepts and CONOPS in the scope of the ICD are identified in terms of the broad intelligence supportability categories. CDD and CPD, Intel Supportability Paragraph. Identify and address support requirements, potential shortfalls, and efforts to satisfy shortfalls. Categories: Intel Manpower Support Intel Resource Support Intel Planning and Operations Support Targeting Support Intel Mission Data Support Warning Support Space Intel Support Counter Intel Support Intel Training Support

Certification for Intel Supportability
Purpose of J-2 Certification of intel supportability (ICD, CDD and CPD) during the staffing of validation process: Preclude fielding capabilities, systems, or programs that are unsupportable by the national and defense intelligence communities. Prevent scientific and technological surprise by ensuring Sponsors consider and incorporate the most current, applicable intelligence information, analysis, and findings into their capability development efforts. Ensure that national and defense intelligence architectures remain capable of, and agile enough, to support future warfighting by identifying and assessing possible intelligence support requirement shortfalls created by, or existing shortfalls aggravated by, programs and capabilities being reviewed.

Test and Evaluation and the Requirements Process
Mike Bohn Professor of Acquisition Management

Agenda Purpose of T&E TEMP T&E/ Requirements Collaboration
T&E Update in Interim (Nov 13) T&E collaboration with Requirements Managers Backups

Purpose & Policy of Test & Evaluation (T&E)
Help Reduce Risk Provide Information to Decision Makers Policy per Interim DoDI The fundamental purpose of test and evaluation (T&E) is to enable the DoD to acquire systems that work. T&E provides engineers and decision makers with knowledge to assist in managing risks, to measure technical progress, and to characterize operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. Primary purpose of T&E is provide decision- makers with adequate information, as soon as practable, with which to make informed decisions. In order to take advantage of T&E expertise, it must be brought into program development as early as possible in the acquisition process. Final results of T&E information is determine operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability as required by Title X U.S. Code T&E information helps determine whether systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for intended use.

Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
Describes total T&E planning from development through operational T&E into production and fielding Identifies the required type and amount of T&E events, along with their resource requirements Program Manager, along with T&E WIPT, is responsible for producing Considered a contract between PM, OSD, and T&E Activities Must be consistent with other key acquisition documents For MDAPs, must be approved by DASD(DT&E) & DOT&E In order to prevent ambiguity, requirements personnel must be intimately involved in the development and execution of the TEMP Provides the roadmap for evaluations, integrated test plans, and resource requirements to successfully accomplish the T&E program objectives

TEMP Development Requirements Document CONOPS ACQ Documents TEMP
TEMP is driven by incorporation of COE/COO; the Requirements Document; and other ACQ documents, such; Acq Strategy SEP LCSP From the TEMP, Critical Operational Issues are derived and the these COIs are further parsed into MOEs and MOSs COI- high level tasks that a system must be capable of executing to accomplish its mission - Normally phrased as a question “ Will the system detect…” -MOE- Measures mission accomplishment and includes not only system under test but all interrelated systems -MOS- Measure of a system’s ability to be supported in its intended environment Future Test Plans will seek to gather data to answer questions posed by COIs Critical Operational Issues (COI) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Measures of Suitability (MOS)

Mission Oriented Testing
More robust and mission related testing is during DT: Better chance of successfully executing OT Better operational knowledge about the system, earlier in the program System must be evaluated within the context of the system of systems they will operate Requirements documents do not normally address systems out of their program of record Operational testing is about Mission accomplishment Individual systems do not have missions Units equipped with a system have missions End-to-end testing assesses system’s impact on mission accomplishment

Mission Oriented Metrics
Typically, most system requirements are mostly technical in nature While important, technically expressed requirements do not adequately capture actual mission of the systems KPPs should: Provide a measure of mission accomplishment Lend themselves to good test design Capture reasons for procuring a system Suggested metrics for KPPs should: Should be quantitative and mission oriented Lend themselves to efficient test design Encapsulate the reason for procuring the system Accurately represent the desired operational performance of the system

Leveraging T&E Knowledge in Developing Requirements
T&E community has knowledge of legacy system performance and capabilities Help ID unrealistic, unaffordable, and untestable requirements Knowledge of current threat and test infrastructure can help understand needed test resources Testers have experience with difficulty and cost associated with testing to certain metrics Probability metrics expensive to test Continuous metrics that relate to probability requirements can reduce test resources Need to understand the “So What” factor Early involvement between testers and requirements personnel increases understanding

DoDI 5000.02 (1/7/15) Changes- T&E planning moved to left
Prior to completion of Material Solutions Analysis Phase, Combat Developer will provide a CONOPs/OMS/MP to PM. It will be provided to Industry as as an attachment to next Acquisition phase RFP (pg17) Chief Developmental Tester for MDAPs and MAISs (pg 91) Lead DT&E (Government) Organization for MDAPs (pg 91) DT&E activities will start when requirements are being developed to ensure key technical requirements are measureable, testable, and achievable (pg 92) TEMP will be a source document when developing the request for proposal (pg 93) All programs will plan for the conduct of DT&E and /or Integrated Testing (pg 94) Reliability Growth Curve(s) included in the MS B TEMP (updated in all future TEMPS) (pg 94) Beginning at MS B, the TEMP will include T&E for reliability growth and reliability growth curves for the whole system and the reliability of critical systems, sub-systems, components, and sub-components (pg 103) For software (in any system) reliability growth will be measured by software maturity at regular intervals (pg 103) Describe developmental evaluation methodology in TEMP at MS A; include developmental evaluation framework in MS B TEMP (pg 95)

DoDI 5000.02 (1/7/15) Changes- (cont.)
Requires the use of Government T&E capabilities, unless an exception can be justified (pg 95) For accelerated acquisition and urgent programs, levels of developmental testing required will be highly tailored to emphasize schedule over other considerations (pg 96) For programs on oversight, DASD(DT&E) will provide MDA with a program assessment at Developmental RFP release Decision Point, MS B/C, & OTRR (pg 96) Unless specifically waived, the test-related documentation that is required for MDAP programs will be required for all programs on the DOT&E Oversight List (pg 99) Force protection equipment will be subject to DOT&E oversight, as determined by DOT&E. DOT&E will approve required LFTPs and/or LF strategies for such systems (pg 99) The lead OTA for the program will provide an assessment of the the T&E implications of the initial concept of operations provided by the user as soon as practical after the MDD (pg 101) Beginning at MS A, lead OTA will provide an active link in the TEMP to a living document in which the Component’s rationale for the requirements in the Draft CDD or equivalent requirements document (pg 101) Requirements for early use of Operational Assessment in support of Acquisition Decision Points (pg 102) An up to date TEMP will be provided prior to release of RFP for MS B/C (pg 103) New section on Software Testing (pg ) Use of Operational Assessments (OA) for Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Program model ; all limited deployments require OT or OA (pg 105) Includes Human-Systems Interface (HIS) assessment and realistic test environment (pg 104) OTA requires DOT&E coordination on the required level of test at all levels of risk (pg 104)

DoDI 5000.02 (1/17/15) Changes- (cont.)
Added discussion of use of Scientific Test and Analysis Techniques throughout T&E Program Planning(pg 101) Revised Modeling and Simulation (M&S) discussion (pg 103) Require any M&S that utilize or portray threat characteristics or parameters must have that portrayal accredited by the Defense Intelligence Agency For programs under DOT&E oversight, its use for the operational evaluation will be approved by DOT&E Clarified Integrated Testing (pg 107) DOT&E must approve OTAs plan for use of integrated testing data before the start of testing; approval will be based on understanding of the realism of the test scenario(s) used and the pedigree (test conditions and methodologies) of the data Added discussion that cybersecurity testing applies to all systems, not just software systems (pg 105) (while this was original intent, previous organization made this unclear) PM and OTA conduct periodic risk assessments to determine appropriate testing (pg 105)

Requirements Managers Role in T&E Activities
Participate in T&E WIPT at Pentagon level and T&E IPT at PM level Ensure KPPs, KSAs and Other Performance Attributes are Measurable and Testable Ensure COE/COO are realistic and current Ensure Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profiles are current and realistic Review Critical Operational Issues (COI) for the TEMP Monitor DT&E/OT&E/LFT&E and Interoperability test Activities; Obtain Test Reports – Review CDD/CPD Against Test Results

T&E Backups

Interoperability Certification
IT and NSS employed by U.S. Forces shall, where required (based on capability context), interoperate with existing and planned, systems and equipment, of joint, combined and coalition forces and with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, as appropriate. DoD Directive Document Certification System Test & Certification Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) Certification J-8 Interoperability & Supportability Certification CDD CPD ISP TEMP/ Test Results JITC Certification -Block on the left refers to “document” certification. Do the CDD, CPD and the ISP (for the NR-KPP only) follow the guidance in CJCSI _ and the JCIDS Manual -Block on right refers to certification as a result of testing. -Interoperability testing starts as soon as subsystems can be tested – normally during EMD, and continue thru full-up system testing on LRIP systems prior to the FRPDR. -Testing may be done by JITC, or overseen by JITC (or both). JITC witnesses/conducts interoperability tests, and Provides Joint Interoperability Test Certification. Valid for 4 years or until changes occur that affect interoperability of the certified capability Departments, Agencies & COCOMS Joint Staff J-8 Certification (document staffing in KM/DS) Certification verifies compliance with the Net-Ready KPP

Types of Test and Evaluation
Developmental Testing Any engineering-type test designed to mature a system’s design and measure its technical progress Assist Program Manager in system development At OSD, responsibility of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Developmental Test and Evaluation) Operational Testing Consider Operational effectiveness as the “overall degree of mission success of a properly trained and manned unit equipped with a system when employed in the operationally realistic environment planned for its use.” Determines Operational Effectiveness, Operational Suitability, and Operational Survivability Responsibility of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation DT is to LEARN, OT is to CONFIRM 10 10 10 10

Examples of DT&E Temperature/Vibration/Shock Humidity/Water Intrusion
Stress/Loads/Durability/Fatigue Rough Terrain Power Generation/Frequency Distribution Weapon Accuracy Flying Qualities & Performance Radar Cross-Section 90

Follow-On Operational Test & Evaluation (FOT&E)
OT&E AFTER FRPDR OBJECTIVES VERIFY SYSTEM CONTINUES TO MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS EVALUATE LIMITATIONS / CORRECTED DEFICIENCIES EVALUATE MODs AND UPGRADES DEVELOP TACTICS & DOCTRINE TRAIN OPERATORS & MAINTAINERS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT LIFE CYCLE FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONAL T&E IS THAT OPERATIONAL TESTING CONDUCTED AFTER THE PRODUCTION DECISION. OBJECTIVES ARE SHOWN HERE: AS SYSTEMS AGE, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS ARE ALTERED. SYSTEMS MUST BE TESTED TO ASSESS HOW THE SYSTEM IS REACTING TO AGE. DEFICIENCIES ARE SOMETIMES IDENTIFIED IN IOT&E THAT ARE CORRECTED IN PRODUCTION. THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE TESTED IN FOT&E PRE-PLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENTS ARE TESTED IN FOT&E TACTICS AND DOCTRINE ARE DEVELOPED AND REFINED DURING FOT&E FOT&E TESTS ARE FREQUENTLY CONDUCTED BY OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL WHO BENEFIT FROM TRAINING INCLUDING ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT OF A SYSTEM. FOR EXAMPLE, BOMBER FLIGHT & GROUND CREWS ARE RANDOMLY SELECTED TO CONDUCT A FOT&E TEST. FOT&E IS CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM LIFE

OSD’s T&E Oversight List
Published jointly by DOT&E and DASD (DT&E)* - Updated Annually Identifies Acquisition Programs Whose T&E Efforts Will Receive OSD Oversight: Includes ACAT I (MDAP and pre-MDAP), ACAT IAM (MAIS and pre-MAIS), ACAT II, Live Fire T&E programs, some ACAT III, and Programs designated by OSD based upon Congressional interest Programs designated by OSD due to need for multi-service T&E Small programs designated by OSD because they are closely related to an MDAP Any program, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level, can be considered for inclusion, and can be added to or deleted from the list at any time during the year. OSD criteria for determining whether or not a program should be on formal T&E oversight includes: - ACAT level; - Potential for becoming an acquisition program (such as the Technology Projects identified in Enclosure 3 of DoD Instruction or a pre-Major Defense Acquisition Program); - Stage of development or production; - Whether program is subject to Defense Acquisition Executive Summary reporting; - Congressional and DoD interest; - Programmatic risk (cost, schedule, performance); - Past history of the developmental command with other programs; - Relationship with other systems as part of a system-of-systems; and - Technical complexity of system. DOT&E can place any program it deems necessary on T&E oversight *DASD (DT&E) is an element of ASD R&E

OT&E REPORTS (Oversight List)
DOT&E Report on Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (10 USC §2399) Submitted by DOT&E to SecDef and Congress Assesses adequacy of OT&E and Confirmation of Operational Effectiveness and Suitability Annual OT&E Report (10 USC §139) Submitted by DOT&E Concurrently to: SecDef, USD(AT&L) and Congress NLT 10 days after transmission of President’s Budget Summarize all Operational and Live Fire T&E Joint Interoperability Certification Report Submitted by JITC to J-6 annually listing C4I systems certified fully and partially interoperable Provided to comply with requirements of CJCSI E DOT&E Report on IOT&E required to ensure OT completed prior to movement to Full Rate Production. The issue of Effectiveness and Suitability relates to use of system in combat. N/A to ACAT 1A Programs. LFT&E report has ample detail in CH 9 of Know about waiver to full-up system level LFT&E and the need to have them approved <MS B or must have act passed by Congress. These reports are combined under same cover when appropriate. 93

Certification of Readiness For IOT&E (DoDI 5000.02)
For Programs on the OSD T&E Oversight List, Components Must Establish an Operational Test Readiness Process That considers: DT&E results Progress against critical technical parameters documented in the TEMP Analysis of technical risks to verify those risks were retired during Developmental Testing IOT&E entrance criteria specified in the TEMP DASD (DT&E) conducts an independent Assessment of Operational Test Readiness (AOTR) for all ACAT ID and special interest programs designated by the USD(AT&L)

Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E)
OT&E Completed Before Full-Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) Legal Requirement (ACAT I & II) Report to Congress before FRPDR decision (Beyond LRIP report submitted by DOT&E for ACAT I) Operationally realistic “combat” environment Typical users to operate and maintain system during test No contractor involvement (unless contractor will accompany system into combat) Use production representative assets (LRIP quantity designated by DOT&E) Use threat/threat representation forces, targets, and threat countermeasures IOT&E Test Plan Must be Approved by DOT&E Before IOT&E Can Start For Any Program On OSD T&E Oversight - DoDI requires a final independent phase of operational testing referred to as IOT&E: (the “I” stands of “initial”). The Navy refers to IOT&E as “OPEVAL”. IOT&E is required by statute for ACAT I and II programs prior to the full-rate production decision. . -DOT&E does an independent assessment of the IOT&E test report called a “Beyond LRIP Report (BLRIP)” because a major defense acquisition program (ACAT I) cannot proceed beyond LRIP until the DOT&E report is submitted to the SECDEF and is received by the congressional defense committees. -System contactors cannot participate in IOT&E unless the contractor will accompany the system into combat. -The BLRIP Report addresses the ability of the system to meet the minimum performance requirements and makes a statement regarding the systems operational effectiveness and suitability. -Development of tactics/doctrine and the CONOPS take place prior to IOT&E and are used during the test scenario. -IOT&E provides the first look at a system in a realistic OP-TEMPO, and also looks at the results of operator and maintainer training. - DASD (DT&E) must conduct an Independent Assessment of Operational Test Readiness prior to OTRR which precedes IOT&E

Live Fire T&E (ACAT I & II)
Determine Lethality and Survivability for “Covered” Systems Under Realistic Combat Conditions Against Actual Threats (Title 10 USC § 2366) ACAT I or II programs that include features designed to provide protection to the crew Conventional munitions or missile program; ACAT I or II, or > 1M rounds A modification to a covered system that is likely to affect significantly the survivability or lethality of such a system Correct Design Deficiencies and Assess Battle Damage Repair Capabilities and Issues Before Full Rate Production Per NDAA 2007, All Force Protection Equipment Must Conduct Survivability Testing Responsibility of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation -Title 10 lists Lethality and Survivability. DOD has taken Lethality and Vulnerability as the attributes examined during LFT&E. This disconnect is based upon the DT focus of LFT&E, with survivability being an OT attribute. -Survivability includes the elements of susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability. Survivability is a contributor to operational effectiveness and suitability. A survivability assessment should be conducted for all systems under OT&E oversight that may be exposed to threat weapons in a combat environment or to combat-induced conditions that may degrade capabilities, whether or not the program is designated for LFT&E oversight. For example unmanned systems would not be LFT&E systems, but would be assessed for survivability during OT&E. -LFT&E gives decision-makers data regarding: --Ability of the covered system to perform in the operational environment against realistic threats taking into equal consideration susceptibility to attack and combat performance --User casualties and system vulnerabilities derived from testing accomplished under realistic combat conditions --Correction of design deficiencies prior to movement beyond LRIP --Assessment of recoverability from battle damage and battle damage repair capabilities. -The threats which the system has to perform against come from intelligence estimates (Check the STA/STAR) of principal threats which the opposition force could “reasonably” bring to bear in combat.

LFT&E Waivers If Full-Up System-Level LFT&E is Both “Unreasonably Expensive and Not Practical,” under Title 10 USC a Waiver Can Be approved by SECDEF (SAE for ACAT II) Prior to MS B. After MS B, Requires Legislative Relief From Congress If Waiver Approved, Requirement to Accomplish Other Than Full-Up System-Level LFT&E Remains; Must Be Service Planned/ Budgeted, and Approved by DOT&E Title 10 gives authority to SECDEF. He has delegated this to USD(A&T) for ACAT ID and to the CAE for ACAT IC and II. Chance of having a bill passed by the Congress to give relief slim at best, but happened to the F-22 and V-22. Waiver does not alleviate need to do component testing to include modeling and simulation as approved in the TEMP.

DASD(DT&E) Dr. C David Brown Dr. Steven J. Hutchison Mike Ginter
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Developmental Test & Evaluation Dr. Steven J. Hutchison Principal Deputy (703) Mike Ginter Special Assistant (703) Col Paul Henderson, USAF Staff Director (703) Tom Simms Deputy Director, T&E Competency and Development (703) mail.mil George Axiotis Deputy Director, Air Warfare (703) mail.mil Steven Lopes Deputy Director, Land and Expeditionary Warfare (703) mail.mil Patrick Clancy Deputy Director, Naval Warfare (703) mail.mil Jamie Wells Deputy Director, Cyber and Information Systems (Acting) (703) mail.mil Darlene Mosser-Kerner Deputy Director, Space and Missile Defense Systems (703) darlene.s.mosserkerner T&E Workforce Policy Competency Development Performance Metrics Air Combat Systems Strategic Air Systems Air Launched Munitions Endurance UAVs Air Warfare C4ISR Systems IR/UV/RF Def Combat Sys Airlift Systems Land Warfare Systems Expeditionary WF System Battle Command Land Munitions Rotary & Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Tactical UAV Chem-Bio Defense Program Surface Ships Aircraft Carriers Submarines & UUVs Navy Combat Systems Radars/CEC Sonars EW System Naval Munitions Missiles Net-Centric Systems Strategic C4ISR Systems Major Automated Info Syst. Chemical Weapons Demil Space & Strategic Systems Ballistic Missile Defense Syst.

DOT&E Organization Honorable J. Michael Gilmore David W. Duma
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation David W. Duma Principal Deputy Director Dr. Catherine Warner Science Advisor Col. Steven Staats Senior Military Advisor Stephen C. Daly Deputy Director Land & Expeditionary Warfare Michael D. Crisp Deputy Director Air Warfare John Allen Deputy Director Naval Warfare Dr. James Streilein Deputy Director Net-Centric, Space and Missile Defense Systems Richard G. Sayre Deputy Director Live Fire Land Warfare Systems Expeditionary WF System Battle Command Land Munitions Rotary & Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Tactical UAV Chem-Bio Defense Program Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell T&E Threat Resource Activity Joint Test Board Air Combat Systems Strategic Air Combat Systems Aircraft Carriers Air Launched Munitions Endurance UAVs Air Warfare C4ISR Systems IR/UV/RF Def Combat Sys Airlift Systems Joint T&E Program Center for Countermeasures Surface Ships Submarines & UUVs Navy Combat Systems Radars/CEC Sonars EW System Naval Munitions Missiles Guided Projectiles Torpedoes OT Infrastructure, Resources Space & Strategic Systems Net-Centric Systems Strategic C4ISR Systems Major Automated Info Syst. Chemical Weapons Demil Ballistic Missile Defense Syst. Network Information Assurance & IO Assessment Live Fire – Land, Air, Naval Lethality & Survivability Joint IED Defeat Joint Live Fire Program Joint Aircraft Survivability Joint Technical Coordinating Group-Munitions Effectiveness 99

RQM 310 Developing Requirements CDDs

Explain the elements of a CDD
Lesson Objectives Explain the elements of a CDD Explore the linkages between ICD, CDD and CPD Given CDD data, critique KPPs for clarity ICD – Initial Capabilities Document CDD – Capability Development Document CDP – Capability Production Document KPP – Key Performance Parameter 101

CDD in Timeline

Document Centric View Temporary slide used as a vehicle to bring draft JCIDS manual into the class room. Figure A-4. JCIDS and DAS Touch Points (Deliberate Process)

Capability Development Document (CDD)
The CDD: Is sponsor’s primary means of proposing capability solutions to satisfy validated capability requirements and close capability gaps identified in the ICD Describes one or more technologically mature and affordable increments of a militarily useful capability that has been demonstrated in an operationally relevant environment. Defines authoritative, measurable, and testable parameters across one or more increments of a materiel acquisition by Setting KPPs and KSAs necessary for acquisition community to design and propose systems Establishing performance in programmatic baselines First bullet comes from first paragraph of CDD section of Encl B JCIDS manual page B-27 Second bullet comes from CDD paragraph on Page B-1

CDD Validated CDD is required for the Pre-EMD Review and MS B decision
A Draft CDD is required to support the TMRR phase Validated CDD will support subsequent CPD CDD may be revalidated for MS C decision if CDD accurately reflects the performance of the system to be delivered at LRIP Approval at Pre-EMD Review supports RFP release for EMD Phase Now Developmental RFP Release CDD addresses a single system or System of Systems Each system in a FOS will have its own CDD TMRR – Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction LRIP – Low-Rate Initial Production RFP – Request For Proposal(s)

CDD CDD is not submitted for staffing until AoA is complete
CDD must clearly articulate if each increment has unique KPPs/KSAs or if KPPs/KSAs apply to all increments CDD will be updated: Changes to KPPs are made after validation or changes CONOPs Before each increment if CDD describes more than one capability increment CDD is not a required successor document following an IS ICD (May be an RDP or CD) A CDD with significant IS component may permit alternate document formats and delegated approval authority described with IS ICD AoA – Analysis of Alternatives IS CD – Information Systems ICD RDP – Requirements Development Package CD – Capability Drop

Elements of a CDD CDDs - NTE 45 pages w / 16 sections & 4 appendices
Executive Summary NTE 2 pages CDD includes citation to ICD or other source documents Operating environment – how and where on the battlefield CONOPs – UCP-assigned mission / Joint Concepts Threats KPP / KSA table is similar to ICD Capability Gap Table Tier 1&2 JCAs PLUS Threshold / Objective KPP / KSA values CONOPS – Concept of Operations UCP – Unified Command Plan JCA – Joint Capability Area

Elements of a CDD Capability – CDD – CPD Table – provides linkages between documents and Tier 1 / 2 JCAs Technology Readiness Assessment should support IOC / FOC dates DOTmLPF-P considerations must be addressed Affordability = RDT&E + procurement costs ( this includes operations and sustainment) IOC – Initial Operational Capability FOC – Full Operational Capability DOTmLPF-P – Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy

CDD The CDD addresses a single system or SoS only, although it may refer to any related systems needed in an FoS or an SoS approach necessary to provide the required capability. When the selected materiel approach consists of an FoS, each individual system will have its own CDD. An SoS will normally be treated as if it were a single system using a single CDD to describe highly interdependent systems that provide the capability using an SoS SoS – Systems of Systems FoS – Family of Systems

Documents/Events that Guide Development of the CDD
Predecessor Documents and Information JOpsC and CONOPS ICDs Technology Development Strategy System Threat Assessment AoA Report DOD Enterprise Architecture and solution architecture Complete Automated Standards Profile as Required in references MUAs/final demonstration report for JCTD and qualified prototype project JOpsC – Joint Operations Concepts CONOPS – Concept of Operations JCTD – Joint Capability technology Demonstrations

Documents/Events that Guide Development of the CDD
Dependent Documents APB for Milestone B of the Current Increment Acquisition Strategy Update Cost Analysis Requirements Description Test and Evaluation Master Plan Update DD Form 1494 (Required to Obtain Spectrum Certification) ISP System Engineering Plan Manpower Estimate CPD APB – Acquisition Program Baseline DD Form Application For Equipment Frequency Allocation ISP – Information Support Plan

Basic Process Basic ICD-CDD-CPD flow
Only one increment of development and production

Incremental (Block) Upgrades
Incremental Upgrade Strategy One ICD Multiple development efforts (blocks of development) Each block has a CDD and CPD

Multiple ICDs/CDDs Multiple ICDs supporting a single CDD
Single ICD supporting multiple CDDs/DCRs Single CDD supporting multiple increments (lots) of production Each increment requires no dedicated development effort

TEAM KPP Exercise Joint Light Tactical Vehicle v3.6
Be prepared to discuss : Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment ALL: Read the Executive Summary. (pp 2-3) , assess page length, assess section 6 including a count of KPPs and KSAs Group 1: Force Protection and System Survivability (page 15, 51 and JCIDS Manual D-A-2) Group 2: Net Ready – Emphasis on looking at GAPS, 3 attributes in JCIDS Manual g to procedure described in Manual (page 16, 51 and Appendix A, JCIDS Manual D-A-3) Group 3: Energy – including Fuel Efficiency KSA ( page 17,22, 51, JCIDS Manual D-A-3) Group 4: Materiel Availability, Operational Availability, Reliability and Operating and Support Cost (page 16, 17, 21-23, 51,53, JCIDS Manual D-A-3) Group 5: Transportability ( page 18-19, 24-27, 52, 55, JCIDS Man D-A-19)

JLTV KPP Force Protection (Group 1)
(page 15, 51 and JCIDS Manual D-A-2) Force Protection: The JL TV shall provide essential protection to mounted personnel. The JL TV shall have scalable protection …. See the …Classified …Appendix F for definition of the Threshold and Objective values … Critical Technologies: Crew Structure and Ceramic Armor both at TRL 6 Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

JLTV KPP System Survivability (Group 1)
(page 15, 51 and JCIDS Manual D-A-2) Survivability: The JLTV FoV (at GVW) should provide a crashworthy vehicle structure capable of maintaining structural integrity in a rollover …capable of supporting 100%(T) 150% (O)… Critical Technologies: Crew Structure and Ceramic Armor both at TRL 6 Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

JLTV KPP Net Ready (Group 2)
(page 16, 51 and Appendix A, JCID Manual D-A-3) Page 16 “Refer to Appendix A, Architecture Products.” Appendix A: “Net-Ready KPP Compliance Statement” and 93 more pages GAPS 1 – 5: All include dependency on “Network” Could you find? Support Military Operations. Entered and Be Managed On the Network Effective Information Exchanges Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

JLTV KPP Energy (Group 3) ( page 17,22, 51, JCIDS Manual D-A-3)
“Energy Efficiency is covered as a Key System Attribute. Assigning Efficiency System Attribute. …. Fuel Efficiency KSA: JL TV should achieve 10 (T), 15 (O) payload ton-mpg at GVW over representative OMS/MP terrain; and shall have a maximum of a 1.6 (T), 1.0 (O) gal / hour idle fuel consumption rate while providing 10 kW total of power to on-board systems Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

JLTV KPP Sustainment. (Group 4)
(page 16, 17, 21-23, 51,53, JCIDS Manual D-A-3) Sustainment Materiel Availability: JLTV FoV (vehicle only) shall have a Materiel Availability (Am) of 80% (T), 85%(O). Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

(page 16, 17, 21-23, 51,53, JCIDS Manual D-A-3) Sustainment Operational Availability: JLTV FoV (vehicle only) shall have an operational availability (Ao) of 95%(T), 98%(O). Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

(page 16, 17, 21-23, 51,53, JCIDS Manual D-A-3) Sustainment Reliability KSA: … (T) 90% probability of completing its 250 mile mission…. MMBOMF of 2400 and does not include mission equipment or GFE. (O)… MMBOMF … does not include…. O&S Cost KSA: Table 6-2 (in Billions) Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

JLTV KPP Transportability: (Group 5)
( page 18-19, 24-27, 52, 55, JCIDS Manual D-A-19) The JL TV FoV shall be transportable worldwide by air and sea modes to support strategic deployment and operational maneuver in accordance with service concepts and programs. Rotary Wing. Table 6.1 defines thresholds and objectives for rotary wing transportability. Sealift. Transport by sea is an essential part of force deployment and a hallmark aspect of USMC Expeditionary capabilities. The USMC JLTV (CTV variants and the CSV Utility) shall be capable of being loaded into all deck spaces of the repositioning and amphibious ships force projection naval ships where current HMMWVs are loaded, including height restricted deck spaces of the MPF Maritime PrePositioning Squadron (MPS) and amphibious class ships (T=O) Clarity, measurability, testability, ect, What other KPP could impact your KPP and why Top reason you might Re-write your KPP KPP(s) is affected by Technology Readiness Assessment EX Sum, page length, Section 6 overall, count of KPPs and KSAs, attributes

JLTV KPPs, KSAs, and Attributes
System Training Force Protection Survivability Net-ready Energy Efficiency Sustainment Materiel Availability Sustainment Operational Availability Sustainment Reliability Mobility KPP Transportability KPP Payload KPP Cross Country Performance Defensive Measures Intra-Vehicle communications Operate in CBRN environment Companion Trailers Traffic ability Turning radius Forward Speed Recover from CBRN Mobility with Modular armor Operational Range Recovery Measures Speed on Grade Recover from Kinetic Vehicle Stability Fixed Wing transport Maintenance ratio Vertical Acceleration over Obstacles Rotary Wing MTTR Sealift transport Commonality Cross-Country ride quality Landing Craft and Lighterage transport Fuel Usage Protection, Front-End / Underbody On board Power Generation Rail transport Slope .. Overland Ground Transport Silent Watch + 51 or 58 more Exportable Power Low Velocity Aerial Delivery Initial Operator Training Occupants C4ISR component Interface Self Sustainment Payload Ownership Cost KSA Reliability KSA Fuel Efficiency KSA Unit cost KSA 11 (8) + 4(3) = 110

Urgent and Emergent Operational Needs and Their Fulfillment

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Urgent and Emergent Operational Needs and Their Fulfillment

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