1. Concepts in the Light of Evolution Session 3 Reza Maleeh Institute of Cognitive Science University of Osnabrück smaleeh@uos.de University of Osnabrueck1

2. Animals Approach Human Concepts Induction, Generalization, and Abstraction 2 Necessary condition Necessary condition Proto-Concepts Pre-Linguistic Concepts Linguistic Concepts

3. Reflex Actions Involve Generalization University of Osnabrueck3 Even reflex actions involve some kind of generalization over stimuli. No two stimuli are ever exactly the same. The various slightly different stimuli prompting reflex actions are at the bottom of a scale of complexity in classifying things or events. Such stimuli can be readily classified as the same because they involve a small number of easily measured physical parameters, such as the strength of the airpuff giving rise to an eyeblink, or the force of the hammer blow giving rise to a kneejerk (Hurford, 2007, p. 22).

4. Reflex Actions Involve Generalization University of Osnabrueck4 Even reflex actions involve some kind of generalization over stimuli. No two stimuli are ever exactly the same. The various slightly different stimuli prompting reflex actions are at the bottom of a scale of complexity in classifying things or events. Such stimuli can be readily classified as the same because they involve a small number of easily measured physical parameters, such as the strength of the airpuff giving rise to an eyeblink, or the force of the hammer blow giving rise to a kneejerk (Hurford, 2007, p. 22).

5. Reflex Actions Involve Generalization University of Osnabrueck5 Even reflex actions involve some kind of generalization over stimuli. No two stimuli are ever exactly the same. The various slightly different stimuli prompting reflex actions are at the bottom of a scale of complexity in classifying things or events. Such stimuli can be readily classified as the same because they involve a small number of easily measured physical parameters, such as the strength of the airpuff giving rise to an eyeblink, or the force of the hammer blow giving rise to a kneejerk (Hurford, 2007, p. 22).

6. Evolutionary Succession: From Proto- Concepts to Linguistic Concepts Regular and systematic behaviour in connection with a thing Sufficient condition Possession of Language Sufficient condition Generalization Free access and control over mental states 6 Necessary condition Necessary condition Proto-Concepts Pre-Linguistic Concepts Linguistic Concepts No Clear Border

7. Some Generalizations Are Far More than Reflex Actions ◦ Example 1: Swallows ◦ Example 2: Omnivorous animals ◦ Semantic hierarchy: rhesus monkeys ◦ Classification of paintings: pigeons 7 Picasso Braque&Matisse Monet Cezanne&Renoir ObjectsFood High quality Low quality Not- Food

8. Some Generalizations Are Far More than Reflex Actions University of Osnabrueck8 Reversal Learning Stimulus 1Reward Stimulus 2Lack of Reward Stimulus 1Lack of Reward Stimulus 2Reward If an animal can quickly reverse its associations, it does so on the basis of some concept of oppositeness.

9. Reversal Learning University of Osnabrueck9 With animals that make no use of the opposite conceptual shortcut, the better they have learned the first set of associations, the longer they will take to unlearn it and learn the reverse matchings. On the other hand, with animals that seem to make use of this conceptual trick, the better they have learned the first set, the more quickly they will be able to reverse it. ApesMonkeysProsimians

10. Relational Concepts Premack and Premack (1983): Match-to- Sample; MTS Thompson (1997): relation between relations 10

11. An Important Point University of Osnabrueck11 These chimpanzee subjects were said by the authors to be ‘language-naive’, i.e. they had not been given language training; but they had been previously trained with symbols for the concepts same and different. This is important, because the animals had been artificially given ‘mental tools’ labelling the same pairs and the different pairs. It seems likely that they called up these mental tools in the more abstract decision-making task.

12. An Important Point University of Osnabrueck12 In Clark (2003, p. 70)’s terms, the chimpanzees were provided by humans with a ‘cognitive shortcut’: a shortcut or mental tool that doesn’t come to them in their wild state. By contrast, humans, in initiating their babies into a linguistic environment, provide them with thousands of such cognitive shortcuts. Artificial Non-Linguistic Linguistic

13. Alex Again 13

14. Alex and Second Order Logic University of Osnabrueck14 GREEN (X): First order logic COLOUR (GREEN): second order logic

15. Alex and Judgment University of Osnabrueck15

16. An Important Point University of Osnabrueck16 Shettleworth (1998, p. 227) has expressed the cautious experimental psychologist’s view that ‘consideration of this line of research suggests that the line between abstract concepts and direct perception of relationships may not be easy to draw. Implicit knowledge of some abstract relationship may be embedded in a highly specific perceptual module without the animal being able to access it to control explicit, arbitrary, discriminative responses.’

17. An Important Point University of Osnabrueck17 Shettleworth (1998, p. 227) has expressed the cautious experimental psychologist’s view that ‘consideration of this line of research suggests that the line between abstract concepts and direct perception of relationships may not be easy to draw. Implicit knowledge of some abstract relationship may be embedded in a highly specific perceptual module without the animal being able to access it to control explicit, arbitrary, discriminative responses.’

18. An animal governed entirely by a set of simple reflexes has, we agree, no concepts. Having a concept involves some ability to ‘stand outside’ one’s immediate behaviour, possibly to choose one’s next move, or evaluate alternative possibilities. This is at the heart of Davidson’s insistence, quoted earlier, on the necessity of judgement or belief. Concepts should be ‘stimulus free’; working with them (i.e. thinking) should be somewhat voluntary, not completely involuntary or reflexive or automatic. Of course, the very term ‘voluntary’ is problematic; I shall use it as a scalar term, where a more voluntary act is one less immediately subject to external stimuli, and correspondingly more determined by hidden inner mental processes. This allows, of course, that these hidden processes are subject eventually and indirectly to external stimuli. Simple Reflexes & Concepts University of Osnabrueck18

19. An animal governed entirely by a set of simple reflexes has, we agree, no concepts. Having a concept involves some ability to ‘stand outside’ one’s immediate behaviour, possibly to choose one’s next move, or evaluate alternative possibilities. This is at the heart of Davidson’s insistence, quoted earlier, on the necessity of judgement or belief. Concepts should be ‘stimulus free’; working with them (i.e. thinking) should be somewhat voluntary, not completely involuntary or reflexive or automatic. Of course, the very term ‘voluntary’ is problematic; I shall use it as a scalar term, where a more voluntary act is one less immediately subject to external stimuli, and correspondingly more determined by hidden inner mental processes. This allows, of course, that these hidden processes are subject eventually and indirectly to external stimuli. Simple Reflexes & Concepts University of Osnabrueck19

20. An animal governed entirely by a set of simple reflexes has, we agree, no concepts. Having a concept involves some ability to ‘stand outside’ one’s immediate behaviour, possibly to choose one’s next move, or evaluate alternative possibilities. This is at the heart of Davidson’s insistence, quoted earlier, on the necessity of judgement or belief. Concepts should be ‘stimulus free’; working with them (i.e. thinking) should be somewhat voluntary, not completely involuntary or reflexive or automatic. Of course, the very term ‘voluntary’ is problematic; I shall use it as a scalar term, where a more voluntary act is one less immediately subject to external stimuli, and correspondingly more determined by hidden inner mental processes. This allows, of course, that these hidden processes are subject eventually and indirectly to external stimuli. Simple Reflexes & Concepts University of Osnabrueck20

21. An animal governed entirely by a set of simple reflexes has, we agree, no concepts. Having a concept involves some ability to ‘stand outside’ one’s immediate behaviour, possibly to choose one’s next move, or evaluate alternative possibilities. This is at the heart of Davidson’s insistence, quoted earlier, on the necessity of judgement or belief. Concepts should be ‘stimulus free’; working with them (i.e. thinking) should be somewhat voluntary, not completely involuntary or reflexive or automatic. Of course, the very term ‘voluntary’ is problematic; I shall use it as a scalar term, where a more voluntary act is one less immediately subject to external stimuli, and correspondingly more determined by hidden inner mental processes. This allows, of course, that these hidden processes are subject eventually and indirectly to external stimuli. Simple Reflexes & Concepts University of Osnabrueck21

22. ‘When an organism knows what it knows, its actions are different from an organism that is locked out of its library of knowledge’ (Hauser 2003, p. 80). Metacognition University of Osnabrueck22

23. Free Will or Metacognition Uncertainty-monitoring: Capacity to recognize how sure or unsure one is in making a judgment. It has been shown that these higher animals are not only able to register a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer to a challenge put to them by a researcher, but also to register an ‘I don’t know’ response. 23

24. Free Will or Metacognition Uncertainty-monitoring reveals a degree of awareness, or metacognition The capacity for metacognition involves the ability to take different attitudes to the content of propositions. 24