1. Cantwell & Chaplinsky Why is Chaplinsky punished for his speech but Cantwell is not? What was the result of each of their statements? How is the content of their speech different? How are the laws under which the are punished different? Why does the Court distinguish between “offensive ideas” and “fighting words” – i.e., why punish the latter but not the former? What is the purpose of the fighting words doctrine – i.e., why would we hold that it is okay to punish fighting words because they are “low value”)?

2. Chaplinsky & the definition of fighting words “The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.…The English language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are ‘fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile.…The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker—including ‘classical fighting words’, words in current use less ‘classical’ but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats.”(p. 85) Is this an objective or contextual test? Is there such a thing as “objectively-determinable” fighting words? What problems arise with using an objective test? Should Marshall Bowering be held to a higher standard than ordinary citizens?

3. Post-Chaplinsky Regulation of Fighting Words – Cohen, Gooding & Johnson Post-Chaplinsky – government officials can punish fighting words only if they include: Personal insult Directed to an individual (identifiable group) Face-to-face Likely (& intended) to cause an immediate breach of the peace How do these further Cantwell’s primary goal of protecting expression of offensive ideas while allowing punishment of abusive epithets?

4. Post-Chaplinsky Doctrine & Emotional Distress To what extent is Chaplinsky’s recognition that gov’t could regulate based on possible emotional harm gone after post-Chaplinsky cases? Is that a good or bad thing? State v. Meadors, 2012 WL 309175 (Kan. App. 2012) – husband verbally abused wife (serious profanities among other things) when she was delivering the children for visitation. Wife and children were frightened, called police. H abused police too. H eventually arrested for disorderly conduct under statute Kansas SCT has interpreted this statute as allowing punishment only of fighting words. Were D’s words fighting words as post-Chaplinsky cases define them? Is that a bad or good thing? How does Meador Court deal with this? How should we deal with this kind of verbal abuse?