1. Oct. 26, 20061 Crisis Communications Lessons Learned from TMI (and Katrina) Presentation to Oak Ridge Regional Emergency Management Forum Harold R. Denton

2. Oct. 26, 20062 Crisis Communications n Purpose: Immediate protection of public health and safety n How: Provide accurate, complete and timely information to decision makers, media and public

3. Oct. 26, 20063 Unique Aspects of TMI Accident n Small utility unable to handle managerial, technical, and public relations challenges n Magnitude of potential public health effects n Protracted time of crisis development n Media inexperience with nuclear energy

4. Oct. 26, 20064 Magnitude of Potential Health Effects n Large-scale public evacuation a real possibility n Considerable departure of general population n Continuing community stress and demoralization n Economic future of area threatened

5. Oct. 26, 20065 Protracted Time of Crisis Development n Constantly changing story n Wide variety of sources sought n Conflicting messages led some to conclude media was problem

6. Oct. 26, 20066 Media Inexperience in Nuclear Matters n 300/400 reporters on scene n Overall complexity of event n Skepticism n Demand for immediate news n “What if” questions and “maybe” answers n Growing understanding was often mistaken for cover-up

7. Oct. 26, 20067 Multiple Sources of Information n Utility n Federal agencies n State n Individuals and interest groups n Best source of information is at source/site

8. Oct. 26, 20068 Technical Issues From Today’s Perspective n Extensive core melting in the first few hours n Importance of a containment in mitigating accident consequences n Unnecessary hydrogen bubble scare n Significantly reduced risks of a future accident

9. Oct. 26, 20069 Likelihood of Hydrogen Bubble Explosion n Hydrogen produced by metal water reaction n Burned in Containment n Large RCS bubble at 1000 psi / 280  F n Removed by steam stripping and venting into containment n Little or no oxygen ever present n No explosive risk

10. Oct. 26, 200610 Actual Radiological Consequences n Noble gases released 2.5 MCi n Radioiodines released 15 Ci n Max probable off site Dose 100 mrem n Downtown Harrisburg dose rate 15 mrem/hr n Airborne level over stack- 1200 mrem/hr n Collective 50 mile dose – 2400 manrem n Max Occupational Dose – 4 Rem

11. Oct. 26, 200611 What you need to learn from TMI n Don’t become a complacent organization n Assure accurate, complete and timely information available n Elected Officials have ultimate responsibility n Put credible technical source on the firing line n Prepare systematic Public Information program

12. Oct. 26, 200612 Spokesperson Guidelines:  Be Candid  Admit uncertainties exist  Act on best estimate of situation  Be Non-Judgmental  Refrain from making “value judgments”  Don’t point fingers  Maintain Credibility  Don’t speculate  Be accurate, honest and reasonable

13. Oct. 26, 200613 Aegis of President Unexpected but invaluable  President’s micro- management style bypassed hierarchy  Presidential involvement resulted in unparalleled Federal cooperation

14. Oct. 26, 200614 Obstacles to Success  Decision making may be more bureaucratic  Sheer numbers of reporters today  Media no better informed  Public more risk adverse  Less Presidential Involvement

15. Oct. 26, 200615 Contrasts in Federal Response to TMI and Katrina  Massive communication failures  Presidential leadership lacking  No principal official  No Federal spokesperson  Bureaucracy overwhelmed