1. Substance Dualism

2. Reading
Read Chapter 2 of Kim (Can skip or skim over 35-46) Read Descartes Selections (pgs 1-15) in the reader. Focus especially on pages 1-3, 5-7 and

3. The mind body problem
The mystery is how minds could possibly arise out of seemingly mindless matter.
Atoms, molecules, photons, etc. do not have minds.
Humans do.
But a human being is just a particular kind of animal.
Animals are physical things: they are entirely composed of molecules, atoms, etc.
If you bunch up a bunch of mindless particles in some super special way you get something that things, feels, believes, and fears.
How can this be?

4. The mind body problem These issues are the focus of this course.
What is the relationship between minds and physical things?
Are minds physical things?
If not, how are they related to physical things?
If so, how are they differentiated from other physical things? What makes them so special?
How do you get minds from mindless matter?

5. The three ways it could be
Monism
Physicalism: All that exists are physical things. At bottom there is nothing but the sorts of things that figure in the language of physics. So minds are just some sort of complex physical thing.
Idealism: All that exists are minds and mental states. There is no such thing as physical objects. Tables, chairs, and so on are just ideas of one kind or another. (Berkeley) OR
Dualism: Both minds and physical things exist and they are fundamentally different kinds of things. That is minds could exist independently of physical things and vice versa.
We will be making some distinctions in (1) and (3), and ignoring (2) entirely.

6. Mind as Soul
Substance dualism is the theory of mind that has (by far) the most adherents. This is true both from a historical perspective, and as a report of people’s current beliefs.

7. Mind as Soul
On this view, the mind is something fundamentally different from the body.
It is not identical to the body
It can survive the death of the body
It could even inhabit a different body.
It could exist even if the physical world were entirely destroyed.

8. Mind as Soul
When people imagine their soul persisting after their deaths, it is typically the mental characteristics that they think are important.
Memories
Desires
Intentions

9. Mind as Soul
The idea of our minds or souls being separable from our body is deeply ingrained.
Possibility of existence after the death of the body
Freaky Friday style body-swap cases
Ghosts/spirits
Astral projection
Reincarnation
Post Armageddon existence

10. Substance Dualism
These things only seem possible if minds can exist entirely independently of physical bodies. Substance Dualism: There are two fundamentally different substances in the world: minds and bodies.

11. Substance Dualism Substance:
Is the stuff that has or instantiates properties
Has the capacity for independent existence
“Substance” in this sense is an incredibly basic concept, so definitions are difficult to come by. But it is typically assigned two sorts of features.

12. Substance Dualism According to the dualist:
Physical things have physical properties like mass, momentum, spatial location and so on.
Minds have mental properties like believing, desiring, having a sensation, and so on.
A human being has both a mind and a physical body.

13. Reasons to Be a Dualist
By far the most common reason for someone to be a dualist is their religion. As philosophers we must evaluate the arguments for and against the position.

14. Descartes’ Arguments
Descartes gives several arguments for substance dualism and others have been inspired by his writings.
We will look at three:
The Argument from Doubt
The Divisibility Argument
The Conceivability Argument

15. Cartesian Preliminaries
Descartes begins his Meditations on First Philosophy by attempting to call into question all his beliefs.
He is seeking a firm foundation on which to build the rest of his knowledge, so he will be certain of what he knows and what he doesn’t.
If he can possibly be deceived about something, he resolves to withhold judgment on the matter.

17. Cartesian Preliminaries
Evil Demon Suppose that you have no body at all, and there is nothing in the universe but you and an all-powerful evil demon. The demon deceives you by giving you a series of experiences as of a physical world in which you have a body, interact with other people and so on. But none of this is happening. Really, you are just a disembodied soul floating in the void being massively deceived. Can you rule out this possibility with absolute certainty?

18. Cartesian Preliminaries
Descartes concludes that it is possible that you are deceived about the existence of every physical thing, including your own body. Does this mean you could be deceived about everything?

19. The Cogito
“No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case too, I undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.” (Reader 1)

20. The Cogito
As he puts it elsewhere: Cogito ergo sum. I think therefore I am.

21. Cartesian Preliminaries
But what kind of thing is he? Easy! “A thing that thinks…A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is wiling, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.”

22. Argument from Doubt The Argument from Doubt
I cannot doubt that I exist. (Cogito)
I can doubt the existence of any physical thing. (Evil Demon)
Therefore, I am not identical to any physical thing.
Therefore, I am a thinking thing that is not identical to any physical thing.
If the argument is sound, it shows that there is at least one non-physical thing, and dualism is established.

23. Argument from Doubt The Argument from Doubt
I cannot doubt that I exist. (Cogito)
I can doubt the existence of any physical thing. (Evil Demon)
Therefore, I am not identical to any physical thing.
Therefore, I am a thinking thing that is not identical to any physical thing.
If the argument is sound, it shows that there is at least one non-physical thing, and dualism is established.

24. Argument from Doubt
What justifies the inference from (1) and (2) to (3)? Leibniz’s Law: For all x and y, if x is the very same thing as y, then x and y have all the same properties.

25. Argument from Doubt
Any physical thing has the property of possibly being doubted by Descartes. Descartes’ mind does not have this property. Therefore, by Leibniz’s law, they are not identical.

27. Lennay Kekua (Artist’s Approximation)

28. Ronaiah Tuiasosopo

29. A Fallacious Inference
Manti Te’o reasons as follows:
I believe that Lennay Kekua is dead.
I don’t believe that Ronaiah Tuiasosopo is dead.
Therefore, Lennay Kekua is not identical to Ronaiah Tuiasosopo.

30. Argument from Doubt
The problem is that what a person believes, doesn’t believe, or doubts doesn’t tell us very much about how things are.
For this reason you can’t apply Leibniz’s Law to intentional properties:
Properties that essentially involve intentional states of some subject (e.g. being believed, doubted, desired, etc.)

31. The Argument from Doubt
Therefore, the Argument from Doubt relies on a fallacious inference and should be rejected.

32. The Divisibility Argument
The Divisibility Argument (Version #1)
My body is divisible.
My mind is not divisible.
Therefore, my mind is not identical to my body.

33. The Divisibility Argument
In at least one sense, it seems the mind is divisible.
I have individual beliefs, memories, desires, and so on.
Some of these could be removed and replaced with others
I also have different cognitive faculties: reasoning, perception, sensation, memory, language comprehension, etc.
If I receive a brain injury I could lose some of these things in the same way I could lose an arm or a leg.
Descartes’ seems to deny that the mind can be fragmented in this way, though it isn’t clear why.
What D says about this is that they cannot be looked at as different parts, because “it is one mind” that does all of them. But why can’t that “one mind” lose the ability to do some of these things? He doesn’t say here. In any event, contemporary cognitive psychology is perfectly happy to talk in these terms, so we should follow the science here, as I am sure D would.

34. The Divisibility Argument
The Divisibility Argument (Version #2)
If you cut off my leg something has been taken from my body.
Nothing has been taken from my mind.
Therefore, my mind and body are distinct.

35. The Divisibility Argument
Two responses:
My mind does lose something, namely the capacity to feel my leg.
A physicalist need not say that the mind is identical to the entire body.
If the mind is the brain, say, then this is consistent with Descartes observations here.
But if you remove part of the brain this does (typically) have mental effects.

36. The Conceivability Argument
“First, I know that everything which I can clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence, the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separated, at least by God……On the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.” (Reader 7)

37. The Conceivability Argument
If I can conceive of some state of affairs without contradiction, then that state of affairs is possible. (Premise)
I can conceive of myself as existing without my body. (Evil Demon)
Therefore, it is possible for me to exist without my body.
It is not possible for my body to exist without my body existing. (Logic)
Therefore, I am distinct from my body. (by LL)

38. The Conceivability Argument
If I can conceive of some state of affairs without contradiction, then that state of affairs is possible. (Premise)
I can conceive of myself as existing without my body. (Evil Demon)
Therefore, it is possible for me to exist without my body.
It is not possible for my body to exist without my body existing. (Logic)
Therefore, I am distinct from my body. (by LL)

39. The Conceivability Argument
The entire force of the argument depends on premise 1: the claim that conceivability entails possibility.

40. Arnauld’s Triangle
Steve knows about right triangles, but does not know the Pythagorean theorem (a2+b2=c2) Suppose we ask him if it is possible to build a room in the shape of a right triangle with the following dimensions: 4x7x10. He may very well say yes!

41. Arnauld’s Triangle
Furthermore, he may try to imagine the room, plan where he would put furniture in it, etc. But such a room is impossible! Hence, the fact that Steve can conceive of such a room does not entail that the room is possible.

42. Amnesia Case
Suppose I have amnesia and don’t remember my name. I hear about this terrible instructor: Tim Butzer. I imagine a world in which Tim Butzer is dead and I am attending a party to celebrate his timely demise.

43. Amnesia Case
But since I am Tim Butzer, it is impossible for Tim Butzer to be dead, and for me to be attending a party! Hence, conceivability does not entail possibility.

44. Hesperus and Phosphorus
Hesperus is the first visible star in the evening and Phosphorus is the last visible star in the morning. Someone could imagine a case in which Hesperus is in the sky while Phosphorus is not. Indeed they may think this happens every evening!

45. Hesperus and Phosphorus
But Hesperus and Phosphorous are actually both Venus! So every time Hesperus is in the sky Phosphorous is too (they are the same thing).

46. Conceivability and Possibility
All three cases share a common feature: the subject in each is ignorant of some key facts about the case.

47. Conceivability and Possibility
But it seems as if Descartes (or we) could be in precisely the same situation with regards to the relationship between minds and bodies.

48. Conceivability and Possibility
Since conceivability does not entail possibility Descartes’ argument is not sound. Therefore, we have no good argument for substance dualism.

49. Arguments Against Dualism
We have not seen any argument that establishes that dualism is true. But this does not mean it is false.

50. Princess Elisabeth: Philosophical Badass

51. Elisabeth’s Objection
According to Descartes’ own physics physical things are causally affected by:
Momentum
Contact
Quality or shape of a surface
The these all require extension and/or spatial location.
But the soul has none of these properties. So how does it cause the body to move?

52. Elisabeth’s Objection
This is a problem because Descartes accepts the following:
Interactionism: Minds interact causally with physical things.
Minds can cause the body to move
Action on my body can cause mental states
And well he should!
This is an obvious and seemingly indubitable feature of minds: that they interact with physical things.

53. Elisabeth’s Objection
“I confess it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the soul, than the capacity to move a body and to be moved, to an immaterial thing.”

54. Reading
Read: Kim: Ryle “Descartes’ Myth” (Reader 30-37)

55. Descartes’ Picture of Mind/Body Causation

56. Descartes’ Picture of Mind/Body Causation
The idea seems to be that since the gland is so small and so central in the brain, that any little movement could have big results.

57. Descartes’ Picture of Mind/Body Causation
But thinking in this way completely misses the point of Elizabeth’s objection:
It isn’t that it would be very hard for an immaterial thing to move a material thing
Her point is that it is impossible, even in principle, an immaterial thing to move a physical thing!

58. Descartes’ Responses
Here is a (somewhat unfair) summary of Descartes’ responses to Elizabeth:
Mind-body causation is like gravity (but gravity isn’t like that).
Mind-body union is a third substance (maybe?)
Mind-body interaction can’t be understood by philosophizing, so stop it.

59. Causal Overdetermination
According to every systematic theory of physics since Newton, every physical event in the universe has a physical cause. This is in tension with the dualist’s claims that some physical events have mental causes.

60. Causal Overdetermination
Say that I raise my hand. According to our best physics, there is a physical cause sufficient to produce this action. According to the dualist there is also a mental cause for this action.

61. Causal Overdetermination
What the dualist has to say to be consistent with our best science is that my raising of my arm was causally overdetermined.
Naked Gun Video

62. Causal Overdetermination
Causal Overdetermination: An event A is causally overdetermined if it has multiple causes, each of which would have been sufficient on its own to cause A.
Naked Gun Video

63. Causal Overdetermination
There are many events in the clip that would prevent O.J. from making the arrest:
Getting his leg caught in the door
Getting shot 15 times
Burning his hand
Being blinded by cake
Getting caught in a bear trap
Falling off the boat

64. Causal Overdetermination
So, O.J.’s failing to make the arrest was causally overdetermined. Causal overdetermination is clearly possible and sometimes happens.

65. Causal Overdetermination
However, as the clip also illustrates, such cases tend to be a matter of total coincidence. As a result, though such cases are certainly possible, it seems that they are coincidental and rare.

66. Causal Overdetermination
The dualist must say that every time any person moves her arm, there is both a physical cause and a mental cause. But this amounts to saying that there are an enormous number of mere coincidences happening all the time.

67. Causal Overdetermination
This massive coincidence calls out for some sort of explanation on the part of the dualist. If mind’s and bodies interact, what explains the massive causal overdetermination that results?

68. The Moral
Elisabeth’s Objection and the problem of causal overdetermination seem to entail that dualism and interactionism are inconsistent. But why can’t the dualist just deny interactionism?

69. Denying Interactionism
The problem for any view like this is to explain observed facts:
Every time I decide to raise my arm it goes up.
Every time someone punches me I feel pain.
Every time I want to move to the other side of the room, my body walks over there.
Etc.

70. Denying Interactionism
If my mind does not causally interact with my body, how are we to explain these very common observations?

71. Occasionalism
Malebranche suggested that every time you want to make your body move, God takes it as an occasion to intervene and cause your body to move in the way intended. This doctrine is called occasionalism.

72. Occasionalism
According to occasionalism the laws of physics are violated every time I “move” my body. Every time any person move’s their body is literally a miraculous event!

73. Pre-Established Harmony
Leibniz suggested that the apparent interaction was due to a pre-established harmony:
God set up the universe with two distinct causal orders: the mental and the physical.
He set them up in such a way that though they never causally interact, they will always be in sync.
So when the mental event of my wanting to raise my arm happens, the pre-established harmony guarantees that my arm will go up.

74. Pre-Established Harmony
Think of two clocks set to the same time. They don’t causally interact, but they can be such that they always agree on the time. Leibniz’ idea is that the relationship between the mental and physical is a lot like that.

75. Acts of Desperation
Both Malebranche’s view and Leibniz’ seem to be theoretic acts of desperation.

76. Acts of Desperation
Since dualism is inconsistent with this kind of interaction, it must be rejected. Let’s adopt Elizabeth’s suggestion and consider the possibility that the mind is a material thing of some kind.