1. The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution Kenneth Mori McElwain University of Michigan kmcelwai@umich.edu Prepared for Conference: “Is Japan’s Constitution Suitable for the 21 st Century?”, University of Michigan, April 15 th, 2011 1

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5. Explaining the infrequency of amendments 1.Japan’s constitution is relatively VAGUE  Covers fewer topics, and in less detail  Allows for more statutory change 2.However, it is also becoming EASIER to amend  Electoral reform has increased size of Diet majorities  Public opinion backs reform, although fickle Prognosis: Public support linked with (unstable) foreign policy concerns. Revision more likely if bicameralism + decentralization become focal issues 5

6. Data: “Comparative Constitutions Project”  Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton (2009)  General data: 860 constitutions, 198 states (from 1789)  Birth / expiration dates  Number + year of amendments  # issues covered  Specific data: 184 current constitutions  13 categories  61 topics  ~800 variables  Codes WHETHER constitution specifies a particular provision  Codes WHAT the constitution says about provision 6

7. How detailed is Japan’s constitution?  Measuring “Scope” = % of issues mentioned 7 Sample Categories Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton sample = 92 issues ExecutiveDecree power; war power; immunity; replacement LegislatureElection method; political parties; special bills (tax, budget) JudiciaryConstitutional review; interpretation; independence SocietyEducation; religion; civil rights; media EconomyCentral bank; bankruptcy; economic plan (market, socialism)

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10. Guarantees: Education (4 var.) 10 Stipulate: (% Yes) Access Hi-Ed 30% Free School 64% Acad. Freedom 33% Spain, Italy, Brazil [N=24] Japan, Korea, Russia, [N=23] Sweden, India, Taiwan [N=45] Norway, Thai, USA [N=17]

11. Guarantees: Civil Rights (15 var.) 11 Stipulate: (% Yes) Censor 40% Privacy 83% Express 93% Press 64% Assembly 92% Germany, Korea, Brazil [N=46] Japan USA, Tonga Australia, Thai, France [N=6]

12. Mentioned: Religion (4 var.) 12 Topics: (% Mentioned) Official 44% Freedom 93% Separation 29% USA, Korea, Brazil, Mexico [N=27] Japan, Italy, Brazil, Poland, [N=26] Ireland, Indonesia, Spain, [N=49] France [N=1] Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen [N=6] Austria, NZL, Libya, Thailand, [N=5]

13. Mentioned: Judiciary (16 var.) 13 Topics: (% mentioned) Any crts 99% Special crts 23% Independ 78% C Review 33% Fiji, Swaziland [N=3] Austria, Germany, Korea [N=27] Japan, Eritrea, Bhutan [N=3] USA, Canada, Nauru [N=14] France, Sweden, Brazil [N=57]

14. Mentioned: Political Institutions (27 var.) 14 Electoral System LH ruleLH quotaUH ruleUH quota % of total, (in Japan?) 46% (No) 17% (No) 79% (No) 66% (No) Executive Powers DecreeTerm LimitDismissalVeto % of total, (in Japan?) 62% (Yes) 34% (No) 96% (Yes) 86% (No)

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18. Propensity for future amendments? 18  Japan has benefited from peace and prosperity  Cold War minimizes global / regional conflict  Constitutional legacy of Meiji (never amended either)  Low social / cultural heterogeneity, high economic growth  Political consistency under LDP  But the constitution has also been stretched pretty thin  Article 9  Malapportionment & electoral fairness  Decentralization of fiscal / administrative powers

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21. Is the amendment process prohibitive? UnamendQMVInterveneReferendumLocal 25%64%22%58%15% Subsample of 55 democracies 21 2/3 QMV (n = 23)Required Ref (n = 9) Japan, Korea, Iraq Referendum process only determined in 2007

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24. Why institutional structure matters 1947-1993: MMD-SNTV  Semi-proportionate electoral system  Small changes in vote share  medium changes in seat share  Encourages parties to splinter  multi-party system  1955: Liberals and Democrats merge  LDP  1956: Hatoyama tries to switch the electoral system  Wants to amend Article 9  First-past-the-post would generate large super-majorities 24

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27. Why institutional structure matters 1994- : “mixed-member majoritarian”  More disproportionate electoral system  Small changes in vote share  large changes in seat share  Less malapportionment  Plurality party should win 50%, plausibly 66% of seats  2005: LDP = 61.7%  2009: DPJ = 64.2%  Caveat: hurdles remain in Upper House, which produces more proportional results 27

28. LDP 2005 proposal: Making amendments easier!  Article 9: Peace Clause  Maintain a Defense Army (not “SDF”)  Permit forces abroad to…  Protect Japanese lives  Participate in internationally-coordinated actions  Article 96: Amendment Rule  Diet hurdle reduced to absolute majority  Keep 50% in voter referendum 28

29. So what’s the prognosis?  Partisan differences appear relatively small  Plurality of LDP, DPJ supporters have backed revision  Diet members strongly support revision (70-80%)  Caveat: easy to support in abstract 29 % ForIssues interestedIssues to fix DPJLDP 1) SDF, War: 42%1) Decentralization: 30% 41%42%2) Environment: 33%2) Self-defense military: 28% 3) Social insurance: 27%3) Environment: 26% Yomiuri Poll, March 2010

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32. Revision will be linked to LDP’s fate 32  If amendment hurdle stays at 50%, then revision more likely under LDP  LDP supporters more amenable to reform  DPJ in coalition w/ SDP  against Article 9 change  What issues will drive revision?  Foreign policy  fluctuates too much to be reliable  Fiscal decentralization  central to current political debate  Bicameralism  majority supports revision

33. Research agenda for constitutional analysis 33  What are the appropriate comparison groups?  Common histories, e.g. military occupation, civil war  Mimicking  Inception date  changing roles of state, human rights norms  One alternative: compare texts  Data: “scope” from CCP  Method: Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus, King, Porro 2008)

34. Rate of overlap with Japan [5+ yrs old] 34 TopUSAGermanyFranceBottom 3 All Nauru (70%), Palau, Iceland, Samoa, Tuvalu 48%52%50% Philippines, Colombia, Mexico Civil [21] Poland (90%), Macedonia, Portugal, Albania 48%67%29% France, Australia, Austria Courts [55] Australia (93%), Eritrea, Nauru, Trinidad 73%65%53% Bosnia, Gabon, Portugal Inst. [61] Bosnia (74%), Austria, Belize, Grenada 54%69%63% Costa Rica, Gambia, Kenya

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36. Bases of Comparison  Are there causal relationships underlying similarities?  Why so many island countries?  Why E. European nations on civil rights?  Parallel evolution, or conscious copying?  Do textual similarities matter?  Constitutions set parameters for legislative / judicial actions  But if same actors control all branches, then do constitutions function as institutional constraints?? 36