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Owen Flanagan James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience Co-Director Center for Comparative Philosophy Duke University.

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Presentation on theme: "Owen Flanagan James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience Co-Director Center for Comparative Philosophy Duke University."— Presentation transcript:

1 Owen Flanagan James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience Co-Director Center for Comparative Philosophy Duke University National Chung Cheng University Chia-Yi Taiwan June 3, 2009 Descartes’s Dualism and the Scientific Image

2 The Problem for Today Is there a conception of mind that satisfies the “demands” of the Humanistic and Scientific Images?

3 Mind-Body Dualism Three Theses: 1.Metaphysical Thesis = M&B are separate & distinct in some deep metaphysical way, e.g., mind or mental events is/are non-physical = does not/do not occupy space & is/are not subject to normal physical dissolution but they causally interact with bodies and bodily events. 2.Dualism is widely believed (“universal”) 3.Dualism is Glue: an essential/important part of the “web of belief” that glues or “holds together” or makes sense of many other common & cherished beliefs -- moral beliefs, spiritual beliefs, etc.

4 The Worry BUT DUALISM -- (All Forms -) IS FALSE from the point of view of the Scientific Image So, WHAT TO DO?

5 Varieties of Classical Dualism 1.Platonic Souls -- mind=soul is eternal with only one embodiment 2.Judeo-Christian-Muslim souls are immortal with only one embodiment 3.Indian souls (atman or anatman) are very long lasting across multiple embodied lives 4.Audience Participation Question/Extra Credit: Classical Chinese Heart-Minds?

6 Modern Period Cartesian Dualism: Mind and Body are separate and distinct substances (res extensa & res cogitans) and interact in both directions.

7 Descartes’ (1598-1650) Commitment To make/keep consistent Science & Humanism Provide a theory of the mind-body relation consistent with “the best science”

8 The Ghost “in” the Machine

9 Discourse IV 1.I know for certain that I have a mind (res cogitans) 2.I cannot be certain that I have a body (res extensa) 3.Suppressed premise: If I know that I possess a property “thinking” with certainty, but don’t know that I possess “extension” with certainty, then only the first is essential, the second is not. 4.Therefore, THINKING is essential to who/what I am, body is not. I could exist without body, etc.

10 Two Arguments in Meditation VI 1.I know for certain that my mind exists as a thinking and thing. 2. I know for certain (almost) that my body is and extended. 3. One and the same [metaphysical kind of thing] cannot have a property and its opposite. 4. Therefore, Mind and Body are separate and distinct things. [Second argument in Med VI has the same logical structure except substitute “Indivisible” and “Divisible” as the Logically/metaphysically incompatible properties of Mind and Body]

11 Spinoza’s Diagnosis Descartes puts too much weight put on phenomenological data, on how mental events or processes seem or feel first-personally or qualitatively

12 So, One Question Epistemic Status of Phenomenology What does how things SEEM have to do with how things ARE ?

13 Interaction Problem Question: How can something non- physical cause anything physical to happen or vice versa? Answer: It can’t. Interaction is inconsistent with Classical Physics

14 WAYS AROUND INTERACTION Leibniz and Malebranche Pre-established Harmony (Leibniz) God set two clocks at creation and they are perfectly coordinated Occasionalism (Malebranche) On each occasion e.g., that “I” decide to walk God causes my body to move to where I intend to go stay “Glue Problem”: In either case God permits an Illusion because there is a powerful seeming of interaction

15 Modern Responses Type Identity Theory: Type Physicalism Various Kinds of Functionalism: Token Physicalism

16 Epiphenomenalism

17 A Natural Mind

18 Subjective Realism

19

20 The Problem Remains Can the Naturalist, Scientific picture of Persons and Mind be worked out is a way that is truthful but not disenchanting? In a way compatible with Darwinism and our best Science(s) of the Mind?

21 The Problem Remains Can the Naturalistic, Scientific picture of Persons and Mind be worked out is a way that is truthful but not disenchanting? In a way compatible with Darwinism and our best Science(s) of the Mind?

22 Thank You Next time “Darwin’s Dangerous Idea”


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