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Copyright © 2005 - The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation.

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Presentation on theme: "Copyright © 2005 - The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation."— Presentation transcript:

1 Copyright © 2005 - The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. The OWASP Foundation OWASP AppSec DC October 2005 http://www.owasp.org/ In the Line of Fire: Defending Highly Visible Targets Jeremy Poteet, CISSP Chief Security Officer, appDefense jpoteet@appdefense.com 636.294.2774

2 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 2 Introduction  What is a highly visible application?  Begin at the beginning  Stories from the trenches  Hope - it can be done  OWASP

3 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 3 You might be a highly visible site if …  … the press shows up for the deployment of your app  … any error message shows up in hundreds of blogs  … you can’t count the number of sites whose sole purpose is to list attack plans and provide tools for breaking into your application  … every hacker, security want-to-be and activist would love to use your site to make a statement  … CNN displays when your site is sluggish on their tickertape

4 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 4 What makes a highly visible site  Crown Jewels  Money  Data  Notoriety  What it Represents  Making a Statement  Users + Focus

5 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 5 Signature of a highly visible site  Complex Systems  Multiples  Technologies  Developers  Servers  Applications  Highly volatile  Something to lose

6 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 6 Highly visible is the same  Still web applications  Same issues still apply  In ideal world, it doesn’t matter  Applications don’t always start as highly visible  Best practices still apply

7 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 7 Highly visible is different  Time to Impact  Coordination  Number of Cooks  External Visibility  Cascading

8 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 8 Begin at the Beginning  Learn from the past  Only as strong as the foundation  Know what is expected  Information is your best friend  Prepare for failure

9 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 9 Dealing With Application Complexity  Team based system  Geographic systems  Custom PDF Generation  File Upload and Downloads  Memory Leak, Scalability or DOS?  Powerful apps = High promotion  Quick resolution to issues

10 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 10 The Debates  Highest volume  Visibility  Outward - Press  Outward - Voters  Inward - Staff  Large volume of data  Real time responses  Debate timeline changes

11 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 11 Walling off failure  Isolating Systems From Impacting Each Other  Database Segregation  Application Separation  Access Toggling  Additional Monitoring  Scalability

12 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 12 Volume of Attacks  High Volume usage goes with High Volume attacks  Cover  Visibility  Assist in attacks  Convention/Debate/Elections  Maximum Impact

13 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 13 Caching  Minimize data access and processing  Bleed over  Client vs. Server  Shifting of responsibility  Level of Control

14 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 14 Complete Architecture Shift  Rapid Switch  Rules Reset  Configure Rather than Recode  Assume Nothing  Contingency Plan

15 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 15 Perception  Worst Case Scenario  Rising Visibility  Increased and Focused Attacks  Gut Check  Perception is Everything

16 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 16 No site is an island  Branding  Integrated Tools  Integrated Sites  Feeds  Applications are wide ranging  Perception and reality must meet

17 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 17 Beneath the noise  Constant Attacks  High Volume Pages  Concentrated Volume  Sub-Pages - Understanding how the application functions  Coordinated Attacks

18 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 18 Out of Your Control  Emails from application systematically spammed  Data is the system  Pandora’s Box  Containment  Damage Control

19 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 19 Data Mines  Elaborate system of mines  Access  Mechanism Used  Timestamp  Monitoring  Tracking  Allows the weak link to be located quickly

20 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 20 Hope - It Can Be Done  No Silver Bullet  Requires  Creativity  Commitment  Diligence  Begin With the Basics  Information is Key

21 OWASP AppSec DC 2005 21 OWASP  Guide  Top 10  Specific Tools  Put Back In  Take the Advantage

22 Copyright © 2005 - The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. The OWASP Foundation OWASP AppSec DC October 2005 http://www.owasp.org/ In the Line of Fire: Defending Highly Visible Targets Jeremy Poteet, CISSP Chief Security Officer, appDefense jpoteet@appdefense.com 636.294.2774


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