1. Welcoming Remarks The Year of Critical Decisions Prof. Alex Mintz Dean Lauder School of Government, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy IDC Herzliya January 31, 2010

2. In preparing these welcoming remarks, I glanced through a file in my office called The First Herzliya Conference. It includes documents and correspondence between Prof. Reichman, Prof. Uzi Arad, and the founding Dean of the Lauder School of Government, the late, Professor Ehud Sprinzak. Memories …

3. What impressed me most was that according to documents in the file, this trio already envisioned ten years ago what is actually happening TODAY at the Herzliya Conference: A leading international conference dealing with such dimensions of national resilience as security, military, economic, political, strategic, social and ethical.

4. The IDC has made a remarkable progress since The IDC has made a remarkable progress since the days of the first Herzliya Conference. the days of the first Herzliya Conference. We have here seven schools, 5500 students, We have here seven schools, 5500 students, including more than 1200 from 74 countries. including more than 1200 from 74 countries. The IDC is also unique in its vision, direction, The IDC is also unique in its vision, direction, philosophy, quality, and the way it is managed philosophy, quality, and the way it is managed so successfully. so successfully. The IDC

5. At the Lauder School of Government we offer a new program for the diplomatic corps stationed in Israel. Distinguished IDC professors teach in this program.At the Lauder School of Government we offer a new program for the diplomatic corps stationed in Israel. Distinguished IDC professors teach in this program. We also offer an MA in Diplomacy and Conflict Analysis, Public Policy, and Counter Terrorism Studies with students coming to us from Stanford, Berkeley, UCLA, Columbia, NYU, Oxford and Cambridge. We also offer an MA in Diplomacy and Conflict Analysis, Public Policy, and Counter Terrorism Studies with students coming to us from Stanford, Berkeley, UCLA, Columbia, NYU, Oxford and Cambridge. Lauder School of Government

6. The Herzliya Conference is an excitingevent for the IDC and the Lauder School. The Herzliya Conference is an exciting event for the IDC and the Lauder School. It seems that the uniqueness of the 10 Herzliya conference is that it takes place during what I call, the YEAR OF CRITICAL DECISIONS for Israel. It seems that the uniqueness of the 10 th Herzliya conference is that it takes place during what I call, the YEAR OF CRITICAL DECISIONS for Israel. The Year of the Critical Decisions

7. Whether to proceed with the peace process? Whether to proceed with the peace process? with whom? at what pace? with whom? at what pace? Critical decisions regarding the Iranian Critical decisions regarding the Iranian project: how long to wait for the world to project: how long to wait for the world to impose substantial sanctions? whether to impose substantial sanctions? whether to attack or refrain from attacking? What to attack or refrain from attacking? What to do about this treat? do about this treat? Decisions

8. Economic Peace Decisions on promoting joint projects with the Palestinians that PM Netanyahu enthusiastically advocated.

9. Critical decisions on domestic issues such asCritical decisions on domestic issues such as the rising crime rates and violence. the rising crime rates and violence. Decisions in the area of education Decisions that simply can not wait.Decisions in the area of education Decisions that simply can not wait. Decisions in the domestic arena

10. As a scholar of Decision Making in government and foreign and security policy, I am aware of the fact that alternatives and policy options such as: Do Nothing (e.g. on peace with Syria) Postpone a Decision Decision not to decide Are also viable options Decision Making

11. But only and as long as one assesses seriously and systematically the price of not making progress. Such systematic policy assessment should be done by a number of independent professional, and a-political bodies. Cost-Benefit of Doing Nothing

12. One can not ignore what is called in the academic literature: The Paradox of Power. More power does not necessarily translate to more resilience or influence. At a certain point, according to this principle, things may go the other way around – a boomerang effect, whereas more power can lead to decline in influence and resilience. The Paradox of Power

13. This is what happened to Israel in the first war in Lebanon and to the Americans in Iraq. When some actors which have always been hostile combine forces with those who were neutral or friendly. A result of the formation of a coalition of opposing groups working together against the main power. Explaining The Paradox of Power Explaining The Paradox of Power

14. We are facing such a reversal and a breaking point currently: Turkey is reaching closer to Iran Syria is reaching closer to Turkey and to Iran Lebanon towards Syria. Exactly as the Paradox of Power predicts. Breaking point Breaking point

15. From this point on, the process only intensifies and becomes irreversible. This is due to the incentives the players on the other side have to combine forces against the actor with the most power. Thus, assessing whether Doing Nothing on the Syrian front is preferable to moving forward on a courageous peace process with the Syrians. A process that will only intensify

16. Unfortunately, the coalitionary system in Israel does not allow a careful evaluation of policy options, especially those concerning the peace process. This system is narrowing considerably the number and type of options that a Prime Minister in Israel can even consider, regardless of the party in power. The Electoral System in Israel and its Consequences The Electoral System in Israel and its Consequences

17. This is a structural, political, governmental problem which has wide range implications on what the government wants to accomplish not only in the domestic arena, but also in foreign and defense policy. A Structural Problem that Affects Domestic and Foreign Policy

18. The paradox is that all realize that such a political system weakens national resilience, but do nothing to change it. A Paradox

19. It is inconceivable that decisions, even those who have majority public support, are not being taken, due to coalitionary and political structure. We ought to change the system. Domestic, coalitionary obstacles to national and foreign policy making Domestic, coalitionary obstacles to national and foreign policy making

20. In a symposium on What the Prime Minister should do in the First 100 Days, conducted here several months ago, a team that I chaired of distinguished experts made several recommendations that are still valid and highly relevant: Key Recommendations

21. Key Recommendations (cont.) Enter a peace process with Syria –which is easier to accomplish versus with the Palestinians as there are no veto players such as the Hamas on the Palestinian side or the objections of West Bank settlers. Head of IDF’s Military Intelligence also made such a supportive assessment.

22. Key Recommendations (cont.) One also needs to pay attention to what Syria’s Assad declared as two options: peace process or resistance.

23. An assessment of geo-strategic trends in the region shows that time is not on the side of Israel. Embarking on a peace process will accelerate positive regional processes, and reduce the pressure on Israel, at a relatively acceptable cost. Cost-Benefit

24. I dare to predict that if Do Nothing on the peace process will be Israel’s policy priority, Israel will face a vicious, coordinated military attack by its enemies in a few years. Cost-Benefit

25. Iran represents a real threat to Israel. There is a need to establish in the Prime Minister’s office an administrative unit to deal with all aspects of Iranian threat: legal, economic, financial, political, public diplomacy, military and security. A lot needs to be done and should be done. IRAN IRAN