1. SOCIAL DUMPING IN „NEW EUROPE”? LIMITS IN WEST-EAST TRANSFER OF WELFARE MODELS AFTER EE by Pal TAMAS HAS, Budapest

2. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER a.Ideal-type visions of Social Europe b.Institutional frames of social policy integration in Europe c.Motives for welfare state reforms d.Capability deprivation as policy target e.Reform frontlines f.CEC dilemmas: hard-soft law enforcement + opposition through the backdoor

3. IDEAL-TYPE VISIONS OF SOCIAL EUROPE A.EURO-CORPORATIST IMAGES a. enlarged traditional welfare state philosophies b. uniform social standards c. „social dialogue” of labour + capital [social contract] UNIONs, NGOs B.DECENTRALIZED CONCERTATION APPROACH a. coordinating national-level activity b. cross-country sensitivities CENTRAL EUROPEAN ELITES

4. FRAMES FOR INTEGRATION: MOBILITIES- RIGIDITIES EU MEMBERSHIP NOW MORE BONUS FOR DEMOCRACY, THEN CREATION OF A UNIFIED ECONOMIC SPACE: Employed labour mobility YES Social assistance mobility NO Service provider”s mobility LIMITED Agricultural benefits- mainly NATION- BOUNDED

5. SOCIAL POLICY INTEGRATION [SE- Social Europe] Until the late 90ies INTERNAL MARKET+MONETARY UNION highly visible SE- hardly visible Lisbon Summit- March 2000 more active social policy CEC EU images of the elites: basically pre-Lisbon vision

6. MOTIVES FOR WELFARE STATE REFORMS a.approach: external competition pressure forces governments to welfare state reforms b.approach: domestic structural- population, deindustrialization, fiscal crises, weakening the family as safety net CEC reform histories: early 90ies- external late 90ies –external + internal early 2000s- more internal

7. THEORETICAL PUZZLE Social policy integration – inclusion policies are better integrated, as others 1992- directive on Sufficient Measures in Social Assistance Systems 2001- OMC on social inclusion. Central element: ACTIVATION [re-integration into the labour market] Asymmetry in favour of negative integration [dismantling barriers] against positive integration [building new regulatory framework]

8. THE RIGHT QUESTION CENTRAL ISSUE Not whether a particular arrangement is better for all than no cooperation at all, but whether the particular divisions to emerge are fair divisions given the alternative arrangements that are made. J.F.Nash: The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18 [1950] THE RIGHT QUESTION: Are the empowered actors getting a fair share of the benefits of economic interrelations?

9. CAPABILITY DEPRIVATION POVERTY = CAPABILITY DEPRIVATION [CD] – A.SEN [lack of capability to live a minimally decent life] Or [Adam Smith…]: not „being able to appear in public without shame” Social exclusion = a. part of CD b. a cause of different capability failures [relational failure]

10. FAIRNESS IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SPACE VISIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE a.Grand universalism [classical utilitarism] b.National particularisms c.Plural affiliation [A.Sen] processing of multiply identities

11. CAPITAL FLOW- SOCIAL EXPENDITURE GLOBAL IMPACTS Open-and-smaller welfare state [liberal] Open-and-therefore-big welfare state [left] Net capital outflow –growth of social expenditure NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE GROWING WELFARE STATES ARE DOMESTIC REGIME MOTIVATED

12. REFORMS: MAJOR- MINOR FRONTLINES OMC ACTIVATION POLICIES, as social policy co-ordination: -fiscally marginal -not a major concern for the average voter REAL CONCERN: SOCIAL EXCLUSION in different national welfare capitalisms. BUT this is regime specific, internal reforms

13. WELFARE CONVERGENCE 90ies: Progressive dismantling of ideal-types of welfare state [ESPING-ANDERSEN typology] Focus on SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE, rather on the QUALITY OF SOCIAL POLICY Monetary union leads to less reform of the labour market fdistribution of the costs to the others]

14. THE „HARD” AND „SOFT” LAW DILEMMA OMC [European Employment Strategy] – informal sanctions, soft law Community Method- hard law Institutional debate: relative capacities of different modes to handle specific tasks Governance modes –policy options?? CEC- culturally hard law oriented [here the soft law is too informal]

15. CEC OPPOSITION THROUGH THE BACKDOOR? Basic: effects of Europeanization on domestic systems of governance Degree of misfit between European rules and existing institutional +regulatory traditions is high Non-compliance with EU directives in the new and old member states ?? Related/unrelated to opposition and/or due to administrative shortcomings CEC policy philosophies: tactics in interest representation of the week and latecomer