1. Thomas Losert HRTC Meeting 12 September 2002, Vienna Introduction to the TTA

2. 12 September 2002 / p.2 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

3. 12 September 2002 / p.3 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

4. 12 September 2002 / p.4 Thomas Losert Requirement: Small Jitter Control Model Sensor Processing Actuator Control Object (Vehicle) We must know the exact time difference between observing and acting

5. 12 September 2002 / p.5 Thomas Losert Requirement: Reduction of Complexity Design faults have their root in unmanaged complexity. If the mental effort required to understand a particular system function grows with the system size, there is an inherent limitation to the size of the systems we can build. Mental Effort (Perceived Complexity) Human Mental Capability System Size

6. 12 September 2002 / p.6 Thomas Losert Requirement: Composability Compose: “to make or form by combining things, parts, or elements” Composition: “the act of combining parts or elements to form a whole” Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1989, p. 302 Composability: “The ease of forming a whole by combining parts” Parts: The component systems Whole: A system of systems (SOS). A composition brings into existence new emerging services of the SOS that are more than the sum of the prior services of the components. These emerging services are the result of the integration of the component systems.

7. 12 September 2002 / p.7 Thomas Losert Requirement: Safety Each device will fail sooner or later Thus an arbitrary single fault must be tolerated without degradation of service

8. 12 September 2002 / p.8 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

9. 12 September 2002 / p.9 Thomas Losert Composability We call an architecture composable with respect to a specified property, if the system integration will not invalidate this property provided it has been established at the subsystem level, e.g.:  Timeliness  Testability System properties should follow from subsystem properties. Otherwise the system integrator is left with the challenging task to find out why the system does not work, although all subsystems work according to their specifications.

10. 12 September 2002 / p.10 Thomas Losert How is the “Integration” achieved?  The component systems are integrated by the exchange of messages across the real-time service interfaces.  Our focus is on what are the contents of a message (data) and when a message is sent and received (time).  We abstract from the low-level (physical, coding) aspects of communication.  We assume that all property mismatches of the interacting systems have been resolved by a connection system.

11. 12 September 2002 / p.11 Thomas Losert The Four Principles of Composability  Independent Development of the Components (Architecture) The message interfaces of the components must be precisely specified in the value domain and in the temporal domain in order that the component systems can be developed in isolation.  Stability of Prior Services (Component Implementation) The prior services of the components must be maintained after the integration and should not fail if a partner fails.  Performability of the Communication System (Comm. System) The communication system transporting the messages must meet the given temporal requirements under all specified operating conditions.  Replica Determinism (Architecture) Replica Determinism is required for the transparent implementation of fault tolerance

12. 12 September 2002 / p.12 Thomas Losert Architecture Design is Interface Design A good interface within a real-time system  is precisely specified in the value domain and in the time domain,  provides the relevant abstractions of the interfacing subsystems and hides the irrelevant details,  leads to minimal coupling between the interfacing subsystems,  limits error propagation across the interface, and thus introduces structure into an architecture.

13. 12 September 2002 / p.13 Thomas Losert Structure Overview Real-time System: Computer System + Controlled Object + Operator The controlled object determines the temporal requirements. Cluster: A subsystem of the RT-system with high inner connectivity Operator (Environment Cluster) Real-Time Computer System (Computational Cluster) Controlled Object (Environment Cluster) Man-Machine Interface Instrumentation Interface

14. 12 September 2002 / p.14 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

15. 12 September 2002 / p.15 Thomas Losert Dense Time versus Sparse Time (1) It is impossible to perfectly synchronize the clocks of nodes in a distributed computer system. In a reasonable set of clocks each clock differs less than 1 granule g from each other clock. For reasonable clocks the timestamps of one single event can differ at most by 1 clock tick.

16. 12 September 2002 / p.16 Thomas Losert Dense Time versus Sparse Time (2) The temporal order cannot be established for events with a difference of 1 granule g. If the duration between two events is at least three granules, the temporal order can be established always because the timestamps differ at least by two ticks.

17. 12 September 2002 / p.17 Thomas Losert Dense Time versus Sparse Time (3) Duration of activity determined by the granularity of the global time In a sparse time base events occur only at predefined intervals (events occuring in the silence interval are delayed to the next activity interval).

18. 12 September 2002 / p.18 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

19. 12 September 2002 / p.19 Thomas Losert Communication System Paradigms Event-triggered (ET) communication systems  Temporal control signals primarily derived from non-time events  Flexibility  High average performance Time-triggered (TT) communication systems  Activities at predetermined points in time  Predictability  Dependability

20. 12 September 2002 / p.20 Thomas Losert Flow Control in Unidirectional Data Transfer Information push Information pull Time-triggered SenderReceiver SenderReceiver Control Data SenderReceiver

21. 12 September 2002 / p.21 Thomas Losert Control Flow and Data Flow in the TTA Sender CNI Memory CNI Memory Rcvr Information Push Ideal for Sender Information Pull Ideal for Receiver Time-Triggered Communication System

22. 12 September 2002 / p.22 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

23. 12 September 2002 / p.23 Thomas Losert Concept of a Temporal Firewall A temporal firewall is a unidirectional data-sharing interface with state-observations in the interface memory where at least one of the interfacing subsystems accesses the temporal firewall according to an a priori known periodic schedule. The interface between the host computer and the communication system can be seen as erecting two unidirectional temporal firewalls: an input firewall and an output firewall. A temporal firewalls eliminate control error propagation by design.

24. 12 September 2002 / p.24 Thomas Losert A Temporal Firewall is a Natural Concept  A temporal firewall is a high-level abstract concept.  It is a small and stable unidirectional interface that provides understandable abstractions of the relevant properties of the interfacing subsystems.  Timeliness is an integral part of the temporal firewall concept.  Conceptually, the RT images in the temporal firewall are closely related to the image presented by a sensor of an analog RT entity in the environment.  Temporal firewalls are thus based on an accustomed view of the world.

25. 12 September 2002 / p.25 Thomas Losert Stable Properties of Temporal Firewalls The following stable properties of temporal firewalls are known a priori to all interfacing partners:  The addresses (names) and the syntactic structure of the data items in the temporal firewall.  A (abstract) model explaining the meaning of the data items contained in the temporal firewall.  The points on the global time base when the data items in the temporal firewall are accessed by the TT communication system. This information enables the avoidance of race conditions between the producer and the consumer.  The temporal accuracy of the data items in the temporal firewall. This knowledge is important to guide the information consumer about the minimum rate of sampling of the temporal firewall.

26. 12 September 2002 / p.26 Thomas Losert Temporal Firewalls in an Automotive System CC: Communication Controller CNI within a node Body Electronics Network Driver Interface CC Power Train CC I/O Assistant System CC Steering Manager CC I/O Gateway Body CC I/O Suspen- sion CC I/O Brake Manager CC I/O

27. 12 September 2002 / p.27 Thomas Losert Temporal Firewall Contents Source: Kopetz and Thurner, SAE Paper 981107, 1998

28. 12 September 2002 / p.28 Thomas Losert TTA Interface: Temporal Firewall A temporal firewall interface  is a unidirectional elementary data flow interface for the exchange of state information.  is located in a dual ported RAM of a communication controller-- update-in-place semantics  the instants when data is fetched (delivered) from (to) the communication system are a priori common knowledge to all communicating partners (error detection!)  eliminates control error propagation since no control signal cross the temporal firewall interface Input Firewall: Assumptions Output Firewall: Guarantees

29. 12 September 2002 / p.29 Thomas Losert Temporal Firewall Characteristics The temporal firewall model of an interface is based on the following interface characteristics in order to minimize the cognitive complexity:  Information Content: State Message versus Event Message  Role: Linking Interface (LIF) versus Local Interface  Dependency: Elementary versus Composite  View: RT-Service versus Maintenance versus Configuration  Control: Information Push at Sender and Information Pull at Receiver  Error Detection: Sender versus Receiver

30. 12 September 2002 / p.30 Thomas Losert Localized View of Global System

31. 12 September 2002 / p.31 Thomas Losert Temporal Firewalls and Validation Assume a host that is encapsulated between two temporal firewalls, and input firewall and an output firewall. These two firewalls form the only interfaces of this host to its environment.  The stable properties of the input firewall form important preconditions for the validation of the component under consideration. Many assumptions about the environment are contained in the specification of this input firewall.  The stable properties of the output firewall form important postconditions of the validation.  In the validation process it must be demonstrated that the postconditions, given in the output firewall specification, are always TRUE, provided the preconditions associated with the input firewall hold.

32. 12 September 2002 / p.32 Thomas Losert Temporal Firewalls and Composability A composable architecture must support the  Independent development of components--relates to the architecture  Stability of prior services--relates to the components  Constructive integration of components--relates to the communication system.  Replica determinism--to support transparent implementation of fault tolerance. The temporal firewall concept supports these principles of composability.

33. 12 September 2002 / p.33 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

34. 12 September 2002 / p.34 Thomas Losert What is a “Single” Fault in the TTA?  A Fault-containment region in the TTA is a single chip (System- On-a-Chip--SOC--software and hardware) which is at a physical distance from the other fault containment regions.  Byzantine failures of chips are masked by a proper physical interconnection structure.  It is claimed that in a properly configured TTA-star system, every possible failure mode of any single chip (software or hardware) and nearly any possible failure mode of any single wire is tolerated, without a loss of the timely service.  Failures outside the fault-hypothesis (e.g., concurrent multiple chip failures) are detected with a high probability.

35. 12 September 2002 / p.35 Thomas Losert Priorities in the TTA  Safety without compromises No single point of failure Formal analysis of critical functions  Composability: Building systems out of prevalidated components-- Component reuse Fully specified interfaces in the temporal domain and value domain Two level design methodology  Flexibility Flexible reuse of existing components

36. 12 September 2002 / p.36 Thomas Losert Design Principles of the TTA  Provision of a consistent distributed computing base (Membership service)  Unification of Interfaces Real-Time Service Interface (TT) Diagnostic and Management Interface (ET) Configuration and Planning Interface (ET)  Temporal Composability  Transparent Fault-Tolerance  Scalability and Openness

37. 12 September 2002 / p.37 Thomas Losert The TTA supports  the provision of a global time base to all subsystems  a predictable temporal behavior that can be analyzed a priori.,  the partitioning of a large system into nearly autonomous composable subsystems by the introduction of stable interfaces.  the independent development and validation of these subsystems, based on these precise interface specification,.  the application transparent implementation of fault- tolerance by active redundancy.

38. 12 September 2002 / p.38 Thomas Losert TTA Services  Message transport with low latency, minimal jitter  Fault-tolerant internal clock synchronization  Membership service Tolerate arbitrary single faults  Replicated medium  Controller-state agreement  Fail silence (bus guardian)

39. 12 September 2002 / p.39 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

40. 12 September 2002 / p.40 Thomas Losert TTP/C TT communication system Periodic transmission of state messages Two redundant channels with TDMA  Sending slots  TDMA rounds

41. 12 September 2002 / p.41 Thomas Losert TTP/C Cluster Operation

42. 12 September 2002 / p.42 Thomas Losert Time Division Multiple Access Real Time

43. 12 September 2002 / p.43 Thomas Losert TTP/C Protocol Services Atomic broadcast and consistent membership Global time base of known precision Protection against faulty nodes (fault isolation)

44. 12 September 2002 / p.44 Thomas Losert Fault Hypothesis Fault-Error-Failure Component types Correctness of a component Type of component failures Frequency of component failures Number of faulty components & minimum configuration

45. 12 September 2002 / p.45 Thomas Losert Fault-Error-Failure Definitions from J.C.Laprie: Fault: Misbehavior of the environment or a subsystem Error: Faulty system’s state Failure: Consequence of an error, as misbehavior of a system’s service

46. 12 September 2002 / p.46 Thomas Losert Component Types in a TTA Network Node computer  Host computer  Communications controller Channel of the interconnection network Component instances fail statistically independently and as units (component instance fault containment region)

47. 12 September 2002 / p.47 Thomas Losert Correctness of Nodes Correctness of host computer Correctness of communications controller  Correctness as judged by omniscient observer (and, maybe, as seen by the application)  Correctness as judged by other nodes of the cluster: Correctness at interconnection network interface

48. 12 September 2002 / p.48 Thomas Losert Correctness of Nodes: Correctness at Network Interface A correct frame is received on the respective channel during the sending slot of the node A node has two network interfaces Correct frame  TX starts and ends within slot boundaries  Physical line signal obeys line encoding rules  CRC check is passed  Sender and receiver agree on the distributed state of the TTP/C protocol (C-state) At the TTP/C level a node is considered correct if it is correct on a least one of its network interfaces

49. 12 September 2002 / p.49 Thomas Losert Correctness of Channels Correct channel will deliver identical and authentic copies of a frame received from some node being correct at the network interface to all correct receivers with known delay provided there is only a single sender Channel may need a minimum time interval between successive transmissions

50. 12 September 2002 / p.50 Thomas Losert Types of Node Faults A transmission fault is consistent (on a correct channel) A node does not send data outside its assigned sending slots on both channels of the network A node will never send a correct frame outside its assigned sending slots A node will never hide its identity when sending frames

51. 12 September 2002 / p.51 Thomas Losert Types of Channel Faults A channel does not spontaneously create correct frames A channel will deliver a frame either within some known maximum delay or never

52. 12 September 2002 / p.52 Thomas Losert Frequency of Faults Nodes: Only one faulty node within the duration of a TDMA round A node may become faulty only after any previously faulty node either has shut down or operates correctly again Channel: Only one channel is faulty during a TDMA slot

53. 12 September 2002 / p.53 Thomas Losert Number of Faulty Components & Minimum Configuration Single faults: At most one component may be faulty during a slot Min. three synchronized correct nodes participating in clock synchronization I-frame frequency depending on requirements Correct I-frame sender (to allow for integration)

54. 12 September 2002 / p.54 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

55. 12 September 2002 / p.55 Thomas Losert The Tasks of the Guardian Correct guardian transforms failure modes at the interface of a fault containment region (i.e., component) At the interface failure modes of the supervised unit are replaced by failure modes of the guardian The goal is to handle arbitrarily faulty nodes, and, thus, to delete the assumptions on faulty nodes

56. 12 September 2002 / p.56 Thomas Losert The Tasks of the Guardian

57. 12 September 2002 / p.57 Thomas Losert The Tasks of a Guardian for TTA Networks SOS faults w.r.t. the line encoding rules SOS faults w.r.t. the timing of frame transmission Transmission outside the assigned sending slot (both in startup and synchronized operation) Masquerading Transmission of invalid C-state data

58. 12 September 2002 / p.58 Thomas Losert The Central Guardian Approach: Architecture Error Containment Region Fault Containment Region

59. 12 September 2002 / p.59 Thomas Losert The Central Guardian Approach: Architecture Components of the central guardian Failure mode transformation units  Reshape unit  Transmission timing supervision units (for startup & synchronous operation) TTP/C controller providing  Access to the global time base  Access to the distributed C-state of the cluster

60. 12 September 2002 / p.60 Thomas Losert Outlook Requirements Basic Principles  Composability  Dense Time versus Sparse Time  Communication System Paradigms  Temporal Firewall Time Triggered Architecture (TTA) TTP/C protocol Bus Guardian Conclusion

61. 12 September 2002 / p.61 Thomas Losert Conclusion The time-triggered architecture provides the requirements regarding composability, security, and scalability A central guardian is a both technically and economically promising approach to achieve fault isolation in time-triggered communication The concept is realized and available in hardware A C1-based hardware prototype is currently tested re-doing fault injection experiments where bus-based clusters suffered fault propagation (IST project FIT)

62. 12 September 2002 / p.62 Thomas Losert Ongoing Work Gigabit TTP/C: TTP/C based on Ethernet, using standard COTS Event-Triggered – Time-Triggered:  CAN over TTP/C  TCP/IP over TTP/C

63. 12 September 2002 / p.63 Thomas Losert Thank you for your attention!