1. Colombia’s Forward Energy Market Peter Cramton University of Maryland 5 November 2007

2. Purpose of market Improve efficiency of bilateral market for forward energy –Limited competition and high transaction costs Local, fragmented markets Non-standard contracts –Self-dealing between utility and affiliate supplier Centralized market with standard product

3. Two products, one auction Regulated customers (68% of load) –Small customers without hourly meters –Passive buyers in auction Nonregulated customers (32% of load) –Large customers with hourly meters –Active buyers in auction

4. Regulated product: Energy share of regulated load Pay as demand contract Supplier bids for % of regulated load Supplier that wins 10% share has an obligation to serve 10% of regulated load in each hour Deviations between hourly obligation and supply settled at the spot energy price

5. Price coverage of regulated customer Old market New market Bilateral energy contracts and spot market $260 >$500 $0 >$500 Forward energy market Firm energy market Price risk Market power High transaction costs Low transaction costs Little market power Full price hedge

6. Price coverage of nonregulated customer Old market New market Bilateral energy contracts and spot market $260 >$500 $0 >$500 Forward energy market Firm energy market Price risk Market power High transaction costs Little market power Full price hedge As bid Low transaction costs

7. Regulated demand participation Participation is mandatory and passive (no active bidding of demand) Regulated customer may decide to become a nonregulated customer –Purchase hourly meter –Actively participate in auction But switch to nonregulated status is permanent

8. Nonregulated demand participation Nonregulated demand participates in the same auction –Single nonregulated product Product: expected energy, not actual energy –Hourly, but based on expected energy demand –Hedges expected energy demand, but exposes customer to spot price on the margin –Requires hourly meter (and demand management) Participation benefits both regulated and nonregulated customers, as well as suppliers –Improved liquidity and price formation

9. Quarterly 2-year contracts, annual rolling

10. Price $120.0 = P0 P1 P2 P3 QuantityDemand Round 5 Round 4 starting price clearing price Aggregate supply curve P4 P5 $61.7 = P6 Round 3 Round 2 Round 1 excess supply $60.0 = P6’ Descending clock auction Price $120.0 = P0 P1 P2 P3 QuantityDemand Round 5 Round 4 starting price clearing price Aggregate supply curve P4 P5 $61.7 = P6 Round 3 Round 2 Round 1 excess supply $60.0 = P6’ Descending clock auction

11. Activity rule A bidder can only maintain or reduce its aggregate quantity as price falls (aggregate supply curve upward sloping) Allows full substitution between Regulated and Nonregulated products Bidders can express any linear substitution between products Any price separation reflects difference in serving regulated load and nonregulated load

12. Handling differences among nonregulated customers Customer forecasts demand for every hour Customer rate is auction clearing price scaled by quality factor of each nonregulated customer Quality factor reflects expected cost difference (at spot price) for particular customer Each supplier receives its share of payments Supplier obligation is its share of aggregate nonregulated expected load

13. Demand curve for nonregulated product is submitted before auction by each nonregulated customer Price Quantity Nonregulated demand 12.5%10.0% Demand target 0.0% $50 $60 $70 $75 Determined by summing bids of all nonregulated customers

14. Administrative demand curve for regulated product addresses insufficient competition Price Quantity Regulated demand 12.5% Demand target 0.0% $60 $90 90% chance price in this range 99% chance price in this range Demand curve determined by two prices: 1.High price: Only 1/10 chance clearing price is higher. 2.Very high price: Only 1/100 chance clearing price is higher.

15. Market design is important Simplify, improve liquidity Address potential market failures Motivate demand response with forward contracts that hedge expected load –Customer exposed to spot price on margin –Yet enjoys all the risk benefits of forward contracting