1. COMP3470 IS33 People-Centred Information Systems Development
School of Computing
FACULTY OF Engineering
COMP3470 IS33 People-Centred Information Systems Development
Week 5 : Lecture 1
Failure Case Study –
Denver International Airport
From the case studies so far, what stood out were:
Senior management involvement, and the need to communicate better amongst the people involved – management, front-line staff and IT specialists.
So far, we have established why we need to address people issues…we can start to look at what, how and when.
We only look at the ones focus on ‘people’ side of things….
Weeks 5(1) 2008
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2. The Denver International Airport Case Study
Why study this?
Any recent escalating IT project?
Search for ‘NHS IT project over budget’
In Google
In BBC News
12th Oct 2004 –
GP worries
An update May
Does it ring a bell?
See NAO’s value for money report on the National Programme for IT in the NHS published in June – CW2!
The 10-year IT programme includes plans to give 50 million patients in England an electronic health record.
The system is designed to link every GP's surgery and hospital in England and provide online records for patients. Patients should also be able to book appointments and operations using an electronic booking system.
The government hopes every patient will have their own online record by 2010.
But NHS IT director general Richard Granger says people will start to feel the benefits of the system by 2005.
The final cost of modernising NHS computer systems could rise to between £18.6bn and £31bn - three to five times the declared figure - it is reported. ==
Dr Paul Cundy, chairman of the joint British Medical Association and Royal College of General Practitioners' IT committee, said it was "an accepted fact that the profession had not been properly consulted".
"We know from past disasters and investigations that if you want to implement things successfully in the NHS you must engage clinicians first," he told BBC News.
"It is generally accepted in the IT industry that implementation costs are some three to five times the cost of procurements. That is reflected in the business case that was made for the national programme," said the spokesperson.
Public spending watchdog the National Audit Office is investigating the programme.
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3. The Denver International Airport Case study
Why study this?
Appreciate the range of issues in developing complex system
Introduce the concept of de-escalation
Appreciate the roles of people in complex projects
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4. Sources of information
Montealegre R & Keil M, De-escalating Information Technology Projects: Lessons from the Denver International Airport, MIS Quarterly, Vol 24, No. 3, Sept 2000, pp
Donaldson A.J.M., Narrative Case Study of the Denver Airport Baggage Handling System, SFC TR , May 2002 access via
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5. Business drivers (i)
Early 80s, City of Denver would like a ‘state-of-the art’ modern airport to act as a hub for major American airlines – a project for job and trade creation
Sept 89, $60m was authorised to build DIA with target opening date in Oct 93
Feb 90 & Dec 91, Continental and United Airlines sent their commitment to use DIA as hub (hence they have a concourse each, A & B)
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6. Business drivers (ii)
Traditionally, major airlines would look after their own system for handling baggage. UA commissioned BAE to build an automated baggage handling system for their concourse. Tug-&-cart was a common baggage handling system in those days.
In 92, DIA project management team began to see the benefits of an airport-wide automated baggage handling system, as “the friendliness of an airport is measured in time”.
Apr 92, BAE was awarded the contract to build the system (despite BAE originally turned down the opportunity because the project was over-ambitious) and UA’s requirements became part of the project.
- It evolves into a major project involving construction engineering, mechanical engineering, and software engineering (with real-time systems)
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7. What happened (i) May 92, head of DIA project resigned
Aug 92- Jan 93, numerous changes to requirements (from UA and Continental)
Oct 92, Chief Airport Engineer (strong proponent of the baggage system) died
Feb 93, Mayor delayed opening to Dec 93 and then to Mar 94.
Summer 93, cars were running but programming not completed (BAE controlled)
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8. What happened (ii)
Sept 93, BAE negotiated maintenance contract with City of Denver and lost the contract (intended to pay £12 per hr for jobs that the union wanted £20 per hr) – occasioned a 2-day strike of millwrights and electricians
Sept 93, opening delayed until May 94, and then 7 times over the next few months
Jan 94, UA requested alterations to odd-size baggage inputs
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9. What happened (iii)
Mar 94, still dealing with ‘unclean’ electricity supply and needed additional equipment that took months to arrive
Apr 94, City of Denver invited reporters to observe the first test of the baggage system without notifying BAE – reporters saw piles of damaged clothes and personal items lying beneath the Telecar’s tracks
May 94, Mayor hired the German firm ‘Logplan’ to assess the state of the baggage handling system ….beginning of the ‘de-escalation’
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10. The solution at the end DIA opened on 28 Feb 95 with 5 runways
99 gates
Cost of $5.2 billion
3 different baggage handling systems:
UA with an automated system
Continental with a tug-and-cart system
Others with a very conventional, highly labour intensive system
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11. Concept of de-escalation
The MIS Quarterly paper tried to articulate a process to get out of a troubled escalating project (they acknowledged the limitation of drawing conclusion from one case) see table 4 on p.438
Problem recognition
Re-examination of prior course of action
Search for alternative course of action
Implementing an exit strategy
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12. People issues Who were the stakeholders? And their relationships?
Project management teams
Inadequate skills set
Poor communications
Leading figures
The main cause of this project was sometimes said to be caused by frequent changes in requirements….but I think it’s more than this.
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Not enough stakeholder analysis was conducted, including the scanning of the ‘environment’ – e.g. electricity supply
To start with, there was no involvement of the other airlines to find out their requirements… it was City & Denver & UA & BAE who were involved at the initial stages.
(Worth drafting a rich picture now to analyse the problem situation at the beginning of this project.)
This big project was overseen by the DIA project management team with a lot of other ‘project teams’.
Who are in the Project Management Team – head: associate director of aviation, partly staff by City career civil servants, consultants supplied other members of the team to add experience and capability.
Project structure has 5 areas – site development, roadways and parking, airfield paving, building design, utility systems
No major change to project management structure to accommodate the introduction of the Baggage System (P. 10 of Donaldson’t report has more details of how this is handled…area manager with little experience with Baggage system..)
The project manager of the baggage system was the Chairman of BAE.
To make things worse the communication channels between the City, the Project Management Team and the Consultants were never well defined.
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Who are the leading figures? – the Mayor (who has his own political agenda); the Chief Airport Engineer (Slinger), his replacement after his death was Edmond who had a different style and also was the Chief of Construction and Acting Director of Aviation …a bit overstretched!
Weeks 5(1) 2008
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