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 News:  Followup on pay restrictions  Too big to fail.  Review of capture  Rajan & Zingales  More on securitization and credit ratings  How do banks.

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Presentation on theme: " News:  Followup on pay restrictions  Too big to fail.  Review of capture  Rajan & Zingales  More on securitization and credit ratings  How do banks."— Presentation transcript:

1  News:  Followup on pay restrictions  Too big to fail.  Review of capture  Rajan & Zingales  More on securitization and credit ratings  How do banks work?  Chapter 10

2  Executive pay at bailed out firms  Followup at Marginal Revolution : http://www.marginalrevolution.com/ http://www.marginalrevolution.com/  What to do about big financial institutions ▪ ING (Dutch) financial firm forced to “downsize” today ▪ http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/global/27ing.html http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/business/global/27ing.html ▪ Contrast (probable) US approach ▪ Watch closely, failure controlled, don’t restrict size

3  Rajan & Zingales  Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists ▪ Well researched discussion of the importance of finance for creating wealth ▪ Focuses on importance of capture as ever-present danger.  Simon Johnson  Adam Smith  “to widen the market and narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers”

4 Mortgage Originations (Billions) Subprime Originations (Billions) Subprime Share in Total Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities Percent Subprime Securitized 2001$2,215$1908.6%$9550.4% 2002$2,885$2318.0%$12152.7% 2003$3,945$3358.5%$20260.5% 2004$2,920$54018.5%$40174.3% 2005$3,120$62520.0%$50781.2% 2006$2,980$60020.1%$48380.5% Increase in low quality loans in 2004 Increase in securitization – reduces incentive to make quality loans Mortgage Originations (Billions) Subprime Originations (Billions) Subprime Share in Total Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities Percent Subprime Securitized 2001$2,215$1908.6%$9550.4% 2002$2,885$2318.0%$12152.7% 2003$3,945$335 8.5% $20260.5% 2004$2,920$540 18.5% $40174.3% 2005$3,120$62520.0%$50781.2% 2006$2,980$60020.1%$48380.5%

5  Dramatic increase in subprime lending (2004)  SEC allows more leveraged investment banks ▪ New research from the FED  Federal preemption of state “predatory lending” laws.  Housing prices (Academic Research) ▪ Had been trending higher ▪ Disconnect from economic fundamentals at this time 1-5

6  SEC allows more leveraged investment banks  Rapid increase in subprime loans  New evidence: Disproportionate focus on ▪ Low quality loans in high price appreciation areas  Why? ▪ Credit rating agencies give higher ratings (ceteris paribus) where price appreciation has taken place. ▪ Cheapest way to AAA rating is to package low quality high price appreciation  Credit agency default models are critical component  Potential conflict of interest ▪ Those bundling the securities pay the agencies for the ratings. 1-6

7 The Bank Balance Sheet  Liabilities : Sources of funds  Checkable deposits  Nontransaction deposits  Borrowings  Bank capital

8 The Bank Balance Sheet  Assets: Uses of funds  Reserves  Cash items in process of collection  Deposits at other banks  Securities  Loans  Other assets


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