1. Federal Regulation Becomes a Reality 1940 to 1977 ©June 15, 2007 Dr. Bradley C Paul

2. The First Attempts After the Dec. 1907 Disasters Progressives Made a Drive for Federal Regulation –It was diverted to a program of post mortem federal investigations in 1908 Cherry Mine Fire Nov. 13, 1909 plus set of disasters in 1909 fueled a second push Bureau of Mines was created –Inspectors were transferred in –Given a charge to find ways to avoid deaths –First wave of Federal regulation was technical recommendations to State lawmakers

3. Catastrophe as the Mother of Invention After a 1938 to 1939 period the rapid growth of the industrial machine for World War II (and a little bad luck) led to a series of disasters Duvin July 14, 1939 – 28 of 38 miners killed –Shot being fired with people in the mine –Firer ignited his powder while working with primers –Stirred up coal dust in a poorly maintained and cleaned mine Pond Creek Jan. 10, 1940 – 91 killed –Entry filled with methane from badly controlled ventilation –Not inspected and an electric arc touched off the explosion –2 nd blast almost got the rescue party Willow Grove March 16, 1940 – 70 killed –The mine was considered non-gassy so there was no pre-shift inspecting –Black powder shot misfire caught gas pockets and blew up the mine

4. The Clubbing of 1940 Sonman July 15, 1940 – 63 killed –Explosive gas flowed out from open unvented old workings – arc from passing equipment set it off Bates Aug. 27, 1940 – all 10 miners killed –Longwall cut a methane feeder and a smoker on the face lit it up. Nelmes Nov. 29, 1940 – 31 killed –Ventilation flow had been interrupted –Methane accumulated and arc from machinery touched it off #4 Mine Dec. 17, 1940 – 9 more killed –Face area had no ventilation and no inspection for methane –Smoker on the face touched off an explosion.

5. The New Deal and UMWA Gamble New Deal of Great Depression had defined larger role for Federal Government and Programs Joe Lewis had moved UMWA more to a National Political Focus –Had allowed local miners unions with more local focus to spring up –Had opened up some opportunities for corruption in labor organization –Had meant skipping focus on State Laws and Process –Joe Lewis is sometimes criticized but it put him in a position to do an end run around Coal Barrons Locals didn’t pay attention to National because all that came out there were USBM studies and they had short circuited these with Industrial Commission procedures

6. Congress Under Pressure Congress wanted answers Evidence that States were not doing their job was clear. UMWA was well positioned for a national push Industrialists scramble to stop sweeping federal law in Mine Health and Safety Act of 1941

7. More Toothless Enforcement 1941 law allowed US Bureau of Mines to enter and inspect – no more post mortem accident investigations –They could then tell owners what they found –They also got to report to Congress –They couldn’t order or enforce a thing –They could compare mine conditions to their 30 years of Safety testing but could not write their standards into regulation How they enforced –Sent reports to UMWA (the peasant rebels) –Sent to the press –Of course this also created liability for owners if a disaster occurred People never believe it could happen to them –Enforcement by misery factor

8. The 1946 Coal Strike Aggressive John L. Lewis of UMWA called a coal strike paralyzed whole national economic machine –WWII was over so it was no longer unpatriotic to complain about safety President Truman responded by a national seizure of the mines –Tried to pacify interest groups Left owners as operators Signed a UMWA agreement

9. The 1946 Agreement Brought Health and Welfare Benefits into the coal industry –WWII manufactures had used benefits to attract workers when wages were frozen Agreed to a National Safety Code –Slightly watered down version of Bureau of Mines Safety Code became enforceable through a contract Created Mine Safety Committees of Miners –Could take safety concerns to operator –Operators were obligated to act on all practical requests (Still pretty toothless)

10. The 1947 Coal Mine Safety Law Centrelia Mine Disaster occurred on 1946 Government Watch – killed 111 Authorized the Federal Code to be Official and enforceable law of land –Only lasted a year –Did open the Door to an Enforceable Federal Code

11. Other Centralia Effects Next UMWA labor agreement kept Federal Safety code as part of the contract Bureau of Mines revisions in imminent danger –Everyone thought putting enforcement on imminent danger orders was enough –Recognition that piles of coal dust were a disaster waiting to happen – they were an imminent danger Closed 518 mines until problems cared for

12. Kerne Mine Example March 27, 1947 Centralia #5 Blew up –Stemmed a bad shot with coal dust and ignited accumulated coal fines + blew the mine up April 3, 1947 Government Shut Down 518 Mines (in the middle of a demand for production) Kerne mine got permission to put crews under ground to fix things –They set out producing coal when no one was looking –On April 30, 1947 they stemmed a bad shot with coal dust and ignited accumulated coal fines and blew up the mine Insanity Is – –People really are that stupid!

13. Orient #2 Mine Explosion (1951) A problem of toothless enforcement –Since 1942 the Bureau of Mines had identified serious problems in nearly 50% of all U.S. mines Orient #2 was termed “hard for the human mind to conceive a more perfect death trap” –Bureau’s Report circulation strategy only had 11% of managers that even responded at all –Commonly finding 20 violations per visit

14. Key Orient #2 Observations Poor spraying of water on coal cutting bars allowed heavy float dust –Technology to do this had been available since 1930 Vulnerable ventilation system –Still using doors for split entry air system Technology to avoid had been used since 1910s –Had been left open of Dec 21 1951 –Circulating air to worked out areas and then onto active faces

15. More Findings Coal dust had been allowed to pile up on haulageways Nobody was checking for combustible content and need for more rock dusting

16. Black Christmas - 1951 Unventilated worked out areas were emitting high methane amounts –Mine examiners found methane in dangerous quantities but certified the mine as safe anyway A ventilation door was left open dropping pressure and accelerating methane release A couple of timbermen lit-up cigarettes outside of an abandoned area emitting methane Methane explosion stirred explosive dust on the haulageways and blew up half the mine. –120 died –Many only narrowly escaped

17. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1952 Federal Regulations of Bureau of Mines became everlasting law of land The Bureau of Mines had national enforcement powers –Teams of Federal Inspectors –Close for imminent danger –Could order problems fixed –Could issue withdrawl orders if things not fixed in a timely manner Government Cooperation –State Inspectors could put together plans to enforce the Federal Regulations Loopholes –Small mines were Still only under State –Law was still geared for imminent danger enforcement

18. A Question of Philosophy Law was based on the idea that you close imminent dangers down –Reluctance to impose the ultimate penalty unless its very clear Accidents happen because of little things that only kill when the wrong circumstances line-up –It hurts the living of the people your trying to protect Many would go and work in bootleg mines –It shuts off an economic engine for whole economy Rock dust is hard to monitor –Need testing – at Orient #2 people were going by appearance and relative safety of mine from other accidents

19. 1961 Coal Mine Safety Act Ended the Small Mine Exemption Made easy to issue withdrawl orders for repeated failures to comply Created and expanded education and training programs Similar Legislation Passed in 1966 for Metal and Non-Metal Mines –Beginning of dual regulations structure we have today

20. Consol #9 Farmington WV Mine Blew up at 5:30 am on Nov. 20, 1968 99 people in the mine Methane ignition stirred coal Dust propagating explosion Through the mine.

21. #2 Disaster of Recent Time Explosion set fire to mine and flames poured From one main shafts by 9:30 am New Mahan shaft appeared ok. No Communications system in the mine. They Lowered a telephone and found 8 people. They lowered breathing gear. No one had Breathing gear in those days. They rescued The men by lowering buckets.

22. Explosion Destroyed Two Mines Main Fans Illustrates that mine fires and Explosions frequently cripple Your ventilation control Had two crews working in the New 7 south area on way to Mahan shaft. Determined to keep fan running To get air to miners that might Be barricaded. By evening smoke was pouring From Mahan shaft indicating Fire spreading into south wing Of the mine.

23. Fire at Consol #9 On Nov 21 they capped main shaft And intake. Explosions blew the caps right off Nov. 22 they filled the shafts with Limestone. They tried to put boreholes down Into areas where the two mine Crews were working but found Toxic air (remember no one had Breathing gear). They lowered Phones but no one answered.

24. Mine Rescue Teams Sent In Nov 24 mine rescue teams entered Distant Athas shaft (without breathing gear) Conditions looked normal and They advanced toward where The mine crews had been going in 7000 ft before encountering CO Explosions from Mahan shaft and Gas buildup and explosion risk Everywhere caused efforts to be Abandoned Nov. 29. Mine was sealed Nov. 30 th.

25. Farmington WV 78 of the 99 people in the mine were killed –Only those near shaft bottoms were rescued Mine was reopened for recovery operations in Sept of 1969. Investigation continued till 1978 and 55 bodies were found. –19 bodies never recovered. Parts of the mine were inaccessible due to damage. Regulations proposed by Johnson in 68 were strengthened into the coal mine health and safety act of 1969.

26. A Few Points Need for some sort of safety breathing gear was emphasized by rapid spread of toxic gasses and fire Explosions devastate escapeways and ventilation controls "When this thing came in on us, it just sounded like whoosh-whoosh, just like that through the air, and there was flying debris, rock dust, coal dust and everything so dense you couldn't see." Roy Wilson, Mechanic, A Face Section.

27. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 Safety is a $Value$ –Prime Enforcement focus shifted to Little Things Concept that disasters and accidents both happen from little things finally took hold –Administrative Fines for Safety violations If the Bureau showed up and found a violation you were written up and fined Could reduce fine if fixed it in time If had bad record or a pattern got much worse –Could Close All or Part of Mine Included for unwarranted failure to comply Could fine again

28. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 Law spelled out lots of conditions –Administrator of enforcement could add regulations themselves –Made it possible for rules to move with experience and technology – not legislature Added mandatory worker training requirements Guaranteed Miners a voice –Miners complaints taken directly –Retaliation was banned –Representative of the Miners –Miners accompany on inspections and observe all testing Did end State Cooperation and Enforcement Plans

29. Results were Profound 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 1973 Separation of MESA 1977 Creation of MSHA 1952 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 1946 Government Mine Take Over 1941 Start of Bureau of Mines Inspections

30. A Look at Mine Disasters Big Drop in 1950s another in post 1969 era.

31. Explosion Impact Rock Dust Era Ventilation and Lamp Era Mine Safety Health Act Era

32. Coal per Disaster Beginning of Federal Regulation Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969

33. Some of the Not So Good Results Were Profound Too 1952 Mine Health and Safety Act 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 1973 Separation of MESA 1977 Creation of MSHA (If people had been keeping up on safety why did it so Drastically effect them when they had to comply?)

34. 1973 – The Great Separation Political Reaction to Disasters was Swift Bureau of Mines Conflict –Try to manage resources for Department of Interior –Maximizing mining economics and productivity might create conflict of interest on safety –Separated MESA from Bureau of Mines Concerned about Conflict with Both in Interior Department –1977 MSHA created and moved to Department of Labor

35. Myths and Realities of Regulatory Structures Myth – Federal Regulation is Better Than State –Bureau of Mines Brought 30 years of knowledge and 40s brought the money to implement –Changing inspections to Federal doesn’t have a convincing impact

36. Other Graphs Tell the Same Story The Bureau of Mines knowledge base – money and money for investment Made a difference – changing the inspectors did not.

37. Focusing on the Little Things Makes a Difference

38. State vs. Federal Fundamental Principles of Safety and International Mining Conditions and the methods developed to cope with them are local MSHA supplanted the States for inspection leads –They then had to divide into Regional Offices to Cover the local aspects –Had to Make a National Agency Local to Make it Work

39. A Not So Smart Separation Believed that an organization committed Minerals Research could not be a regulator –Certainly making the same people responsible for safety and Productivity to Feed the Economy has a bad history Separated the Enforcers from Innovations –When Bureau of Mines Discontinued in 1996 its safety research went to NIOSH –MSHA basically has to look to others for breakthroughs beyond knee jerk reactions The Sago Seals Dilemma West Virginia says 48 hours – MSHA says 96 –Regulate Smarter – Not Just Harder

40. Top Ten Rationalizations When the safety guarantors have a production interest they rationalize accidents –#1 – If your going to mine coal your going to have accidents –#2- You have to look at the big picture of what is good for society –#3- We have plenty of people – we can replace those we loose –#4- These are the least valuable members of our society serving the needs of the many –#5- Accidents are caused by something somebody else does – it isn’t our fault

41. Rationalizations #6- We can’t control the actions of other people so regulations won’t work #7- We need a program to educate and make better citizens of our miners –Why are you looking at me as the owner to lead out. #8- It will cost too much and put us out of business and wreck the whole economy #9- Get off my back and let me figure out what to do voluntarily (when I get around to it) #10- Lets appoint a commission to study the problem

42. Safety is a $Value$ That value needs to be something that is seen and measured by each in his/her own way –Money seems to work real well –When accidents were cheap the producers didn’t care (bought a few pine boxes) When liability for safety switched to the employer accident rate came down noticeably When enforcement was stronger the accident rate came down When operators were fined directly for potential accident causes the causes went away and accidents fell

43. Safety Technology is about Money People buy equipment because it saves them money –Can save in labor cost –Can save in safety liability Technology’s contribution has been to make it economically possible to address safety issues –Ventilation Fans –Electric Miners Lights –Rock Dust –Roof bolts

44. Effective Laws Focus on Accident Cause Little things cause mine accidents –Enforcement has to focus on little things – looking for eminent danger doesn’t work –Can’t base enforcement on shutting you down We don’t want to “turn off the engines” either –Can’t base it on threat if you have an accident Need for production is there every day People never believe it can happen to them

45. Communicating Accident Cause Big Threats for Big Things Don’t Work Fines – not excuses for little things Mines are about production every day Production is about Money –If fines and safety are about money then safety is part of production

46. Effective Laws Give Miners A Voice Change in responsibility for safety under progressives came because of UMWA New Regulatory initiatives came under pressure from UMWA Political Chronis were still safety oriented because of UMWA 1946 agreements and 1969 law all gave miners a representative voice –Law included exemption from reprisal

47. Put Technology in Its Place Technology of itself doesn’t make mines safe –Technology led miners into the slaughter of the early 20 th century –Technology offered managers something cheaper than accidents –Research told how to use technology 1910 Bureau of Mines was an Enforcement joke –But it proved the impact of rock dust –Roof Bolts for Rock Falls –Broke regulatory debate with new workable rules in the 1940s