1. BOEING/MDC Merger Commission Decision 97/816/EC 30 julij 1997

2. Relevantni trg Produktov – Trg velikih potniških letal – Ne vsebuje letal z vzhodnih trgov (e.g.Illushin) – Trg rabljenih letal je ločen trg Krajša življ. doba Višji stroški vzdrževanja Geografski – Svet

3. Tržni deleži (obstoječe flote letal)

4. Tržni deleži (naročila)

5. Ekskluzivne pogodbe American Airlines – Boeing ekskluzivni dobavitelj letal do leta 2018 – Naročena 104 letala – US $ 6,6 MRD – American – fiksne cene za 513 novih letal do 2018 – Fiksne cene – v zameno za obligacijo kupovanja zgolj Boeingovih letal Delta Airlines – Boeing ekskluzivni dobavitelj letal do leta 2013 – Naročenih 106 letal do leta 2006 Continental Airlines – Naročenih 35 letal – Ekskluzivna nakupna obveznost za vsa velika letala za 20 let.

6. Ocena ekskluzivnih pogodb Dejstvo, da imajo 3 največje letalske družbe sklenjene (in “zaklenjene”) ekskluzivne pogodbe za 20 let, kaže, da Boeing ŽE IMA prevladujoč položaj na trgu velikih potniških letal!

7. Ocena ekskluzivnih pogodb PROS – Potrošniki imajo manj stroškov – enaki rezervni deli, popusti pri servisih… CONS – “Lock-in” učinek – Rigidnost pogodbenega odnosa – Konkurenčni proizvajalci lahko v 20-ih letih znižajo cene – potrošniki ne morejo drugam – Zaprtje trga

8. Ocena gibanj na trgu Boeing – Tržna moč je omejena s povpraševanjem in ponudbo rabljenih letal EU Komisija – Povpraševanje po letalih naj bi se v 20 letih zvišalo za 80% – Rabljena letala lahko zadovoljijo le delček takšnega povpraševanja – Širitev trga  zmanjševanje moči kupcev

9. Potencialna konkurenca / moč kupcev Boeing – Potencialna konkurenca je intenzivno umeščena v Rusiji, Indiji in na Daljnem vzhodu – Priznavanje visokih vstopnih ovir EU Komisija Potencialna konkurenca ne zmore pritiska na trg v doglednem času Visoke vstopne ovire Enormni stroški zagona Strogi varnostni standardi

10. Boeingov prevladujoči položaj Boeing ima PP na trgu velikih potniških letal ZAKAJ? – Tržni deleži – Število letal v obstoječih flotah – Dolgoročne ekskluzivne pogodbe – Ni potencialne konkurence – Visoke vstopne ovire

11. Povečanje Boeingovega prevladujočega položaja 2 glavna faktorja – Dodatek konkurenčnega potenciala MDC-ja – spill over učinki Preliv sredstev MDC-jevih programov (NASA, USAF)

12. Povečanje Boeingovega prevladujočega položaja Neposredni učinki prevzema MDC – Povečanje skupnega tržnega deleža s 64% na 70% – Boeing ima le še enega konkurenta na svetovnem trgu – Povečanje deleža v obstoječih flotah s 60% na 80% – Povečanje kapacitet  usposobljena delovna sila – Še večja moč pri sklepanju pogodb s potrošniki

13. Povečanje Boeingovega prevladujočega položaja Konkurenčni potencial MDC – No longer an active presence in the market BUT its competitive potential can be significant when it merges with B because if B decides to keep it alive it would arguably be able to stand in the market if B decides to close it down, it gains preferential access to its customer base  leverage factor

14. Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant Position Competitive potential of MDC - low?? – Contradictory Arguments: DAC had a firm backlog of US$ 7 billion! DAC lost its core customers American, Northwest Airlines, Delta and Continental, the four largest operators of DAC aircraft over the last nine months. –Because they knew about the merger and signed exclusive deals with Boeing?

15. Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant Position Lexecon Study – comparing 52 aircraft supply competitions from 1994 to 1996: –MDC presence led to a reduction of over 7 % in the realized price as compared with the list price as far as orders placed with Airbus were concerned. –No competitive potential???

16. Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant Position Exclusive Deals easier to obtain after merger – Boeing able to offer MDC planes and spare parts simultaneously – Boeing will offer “Full-family range” of planes  “lock-in” effect – Effects: Blocking 40% of the world-wide market Competition only in smaller jets market

17. Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant Position Effects from the defense & space business – increase of B’s overall financial resources – access to publicly funded R&D and IP portfolio – increase of bargaining power towards suppliers - possibility of leveraging – “bundling deals” – Cross-subsidization

18. Remedies Behavioral, not structural remedies Incoherent with MR structural basis Usual remedies – spin-off + – subsequent sale of consolidated companies

19. Specific Remedies DAC as a separate legal entity – Separate financial accounts and statements Transparency of DAC business Not really effective – Unable to prevent cross-subsidizing – Unable to prevent future predatory behavior by Boeing – Monitoring/ Enforcement??

20. Specific Remedies Boeing will not enforce the exclusive purchase deals Prohibited from signing new exclusive deals for 10 yrs Opening the market for a new competitor However – many airlines are DAC customers They will probably stay with DAC  Boeing

21. Specific Remedies Obligatory Licensing of Patents (R&D) – Government Funded – Reasonable Royalty Transparency of R&D Projects Transfer of publicly funded R&D Enforcement? Arbitration?

22. Specific Remedies Relationship With Suppliers – Boeing not to exert improper influence on suppliers through leveraging (particularly of R&D) Monitoring? Enforcement? Not effective