1. NuMI Lessons Learned DOE Perspective Who am I? Steve Webster – a DOE Federal Project Director at the Fermi Site Office Role during NuMI – was the Deputy Federal Project Director for NuMI during most of the Project and the Federal Project Director at the end of the Project

2. Discussion Areas Safety Baseline Development and Management Resource Availability/Project Priority Contract Management Summary

3. Safety The injury rate for the NuMI tunnels and halls contractor was unacceptably high. One severe injury led to a DOE Type A accident investigation and a work stoppage. (Key findings of the report related to flow down of ES&H requirements to sub-tier contractors, adequacy of the hazard analysis process, root cause analysis of incidents, lessons learned sharing, and oversight) This safety culture led to implementation of corrective actions which included the contractor replacing the superintendent and safety manager, increased oversight by Fermilab and FSO, a heavy safety emphasis in project reviews, initiation of pre-shift safety meetings, and Fermilab implementing safety incentives in the follow on contract for service buildings and outfitting. Safety performance is important in all projects. It’s even more important in projects with underground construction.

4. Baseline Development and Management NuMI was re-baselined when it was about 50% complete. The original baseline was at least partially top down driven. The TPC went from $138M to $171M, a $33M increase, or 24%. Additionally, the CD-4 date was slipped 2 years. Contributing factors included: underestimating underground excavation and beamline components costs and lack of priority relative to other large high priority projects at Fermilab, which made adding resources difficult.

5. Baseline Development and Management (Cont.) Lessons learned from the re-baselining effort include: Re-baselining was not easy in 2001, in today’s environment it would be even more difficult The CD-2 baseline should include contingency related to resource availability and priority, if these are possible issues. Estimates for underground excavation should be thoroughly reviewed (I am not implying this is easy, NuMI had multiple independent estimates) Designs should be thoroughly reviewed for over specification and for conflict between designs and performance specifications (underground water treatment) Adequate engineering resources need to be applied (technical components) The baseline approved at CD-2 needs to have adequate cost and schedule contingency. Projects can’t assume re-baselining will be possible.

6. Resource Availability/Project Priority NuMI Project performance was negatively affected by a lack of priority within Fermilab. Other projects resource needs were filled before considering NuMI’s. (engineering support for beamline components design) The realities of project priority should be considered in baseline development.

7. Contract Management Management of the tunnels and halls contract was handled by Fermilab, the AE, and consultants. Issues related to the contract included: Safety concerns Contractor performance/management issues Claims management SBO contract management went well

8. Contract Management (Cont.) Safety: Safety performance was a concern throughout the life of the tunnels and halls contract. Extensive oversight (Fermilab, FSO, and consultant) was required. The impact on the project included work stoppage and implementation of a requirement for pre-shift meetings, resulting in contractor claims for delay ($ and time). Plan safety into the contract and contract management. Contractor performance/management issues: The tunnels and halls contractor did not meet the schedule requirements, contributing factors included not meeting staffing plans and the performance of the tunnel boring machine. (given the slope of the tunnel and the geology, the tunnel boring machine was not a good fit) Fermilab did not have in-house expertise in tunneling contract management. Relied heavily on the AE and consultants. The contract included a disputes resolution process, which did not work. Implement a contract management process that will proactively manage contract performance issues.

9. Contract Management (Cont.) Claims Management – Disputes Resolution Board did not work. Claims and counter claims were essentially resolved “on the court room steps” Relied heavily on outside consultants (consultants performed well, however was an awkward contractual relationship) Significant outside pressure was received, including political pressure on DOE Political pressure, including from the Italian Consulate DOE-HQ offering “help”, including strongly recommending bringing in a mediator

10. Summary Issues to consider in future projects: Safety performance and oversight of underground construction contractor’s needs to be considered from contract solicitation on (possible inclusion of incentives) At baseline the project should have sufficient contingency given the type work and the level of design completeness of technical components The future projects should consider including contingency related to project priority Underground construction contracts, by their nature, are subject to significant contractor claims. Expect claims and be prepared to deal with them. An appropriate contract management process should be chosen. The use of a construction manager is recommended.

11. Summary (Cont.) Positives from NuMI Lessons learned from the tunnels and halls contract were included in follow-on work. Safety incentives were successfully included in the Service Building and Outfitting contract Pre-shift safety meetings were institutionalized Project performed well after re-baselining Contract claims were settled out of court The bottom line: project was successful, but there are things that could have been done differently