1. “A Zone Free of Nuclear and other WMD’s in the Middle East Addressing Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament and Non- Proliferation” Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein NATO Defense Academy Rome, 25-27 June 2013

2. Introduction I would like to thank you for inviting me today to speak in my personal and academic capacity to reflect some of my views on how to move forward with the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD’s. I believe that the topic of nuclear weapon free zones is of utmost importance, even more so given the transformative changes underway in the political landscape of the Middle East. In my brief comments, I intend to address several issues namely the Arab spring and the changes in the region, the ME conference and the free zone, the way forward to address nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the Middle East and some concluding remarks.

3. I. The “Arab Spring” and the Middle East Free Zone The Arab Spring launched an era of sweeping political changes in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The people's rising demands for a stronger voice in their own governance have brought new opportunities for reform and democratic transition giving rise to new fundamental changes in political rights and civil liberties. The “Arab Spring” has without a doubt changed existing fundamental dynamics and has had significant implications on the political and security settings in the Middle East. While it has undoubtedly affected the capacity of states to engage constructively on the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, in the longer run it could be a positive game- changer. Public opinion is already playing a much more significant and prominent role in Arab societies and in this respect, will have a fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security issues. Arab governments are becoming more accountable to their people and foreign policy is becoming more in line with domestic aspirations and a reflection of popular demands. Parliaments, with their foreign affairs, Arab affairs and National Security committees, are expected to play an increasing role in foreign policy issues in Egypt, in which nuclear issues will receive, without a doubt, considerable attention.

4. The “Arab Spring” and the Middle East Free Zone (cont.) However, the Middle East remains a highly volatile region troubled with protracted conflicts. The acquisition by states of nuclear weapons, and WMD's at large, undoubtedly contributes to greater instability, aggravates tensions, and leads to an accelerated arms race in the region. It is imperative therefore; that the Middle East follows other regional examples and completes the implementation of existing regional nuclear weapon free zones and work actively to establish such a zone given the exceptional challenges this region brings to global stability.

5. II. The Middle East Conference and the Free Zone: 18 years have elapsed, since the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review and Extension Conference adopted a resolution on the Middle East that called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the region. The resolution was an integral part of the fundamental deal around the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and for many states constitutes the fourth pillar of the NPT Regime, which is one reason why many states parties feel aggravated with the lack of progress and the apparent low priority given to the matter prior to 2010. Unfortunately, to this day no practical ground steps have been taken to implement this resolution, beyond the appointment of a facilitator. The fundamental role of the NPT must be reinforced in order to achieve nuclear disarmament and re-enforce non-proliferation in the Middle East. This is why the issue of NPT universality is a pressing issue in the Middle East. Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should also take place within the global efforts made to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament as agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences.

6. The Middle East Conference and the Free Zone (cont.): In this respect, there is a special responsibility on the Depositary States that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution, and the UN Secretary General, to take visible concrete steps on implementation of the Resolution and the 2010 Action Plan on the Middle East. To maintain credibility, the conveners need to fulfill their commitments and hold the conference without further delay before the end of this year. While limited progress has been made, there is still need for intensified work in order to finalize the agenda, modalities, and the rules of procedure. There should be preparation for how the issues of verification and compliance should be addressed. What are the mechanisms? Which institutions will be entrusted with this responsibility? What are the implications for non- compliance? Other issues such as security guarantees, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear safety/security are issues that should be prepared as well.

7. III- The Way Forward to Address Nuclear Disarmament and Non- proliferation in the Middle East: The efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the Middle East are not in vacuum. The Middle East Zone is not beginning from scratch. In fact, there are several building blocks that we can utilize in order to achieve our common goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD’s in the Middle East. A. Building Blocks: 1- Other Successful Examples of Regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zones First, in our attempts to provide a framework for a NWFZ in the Middle East, it would be beneficial then to reflect on the treaties of other regional nuclear weapon free zones such as the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok Treaties. Despite the contextual differences between these zones and the Middle East, these treaties nevertheless can provide us with guidance when it comes to formulating the technical, institutional, and scientific dimensions related to a weapon free zone. Taking the Pelindaba Treaty as the latest example we would notice the following provisions: The Treaty prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes in the African zone by Treaty parties.

8. The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.) The Treaty also prohibits any attack against nuclear installations in the zone by Treaty parties and requires them to maintain the highest standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, which are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. To allow for the verification of its nuclear non-proliferation undertaking, the Treaty requires parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA equivalent to the agreements required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A mechanism to verify compliance, such as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, has been established by the Treaty. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), in addition to being a compliance mechanism, will be responsible for encouraging regional and sub-regional programmes for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. The establishment of AFCONE would also: encourage African states to take responsibility for their natural resources, and in particular nuclear material; and protect against the dumping of toxic waste.

9. 2- UN Guidelines for Nuclear Weapons Free Zones The UN guidelines and principles for the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are also an important reference that must be thoroughly utilized (UN Disarmament Commission report of April 30, 1999), some of which are as follows: A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties. The nuclear-weapon States are to be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty. The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)

10. A nuclear weapon free zone will help to strengthen the security of States that belong to such zones, as well as being an important disarmament tool that contributes to the primary objective of strengthening regional peace and security and, by extension, international peace and security. It can also be considered an important regional confidence- building measure. The establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone reaffirms the commitment of the States that belong to such a zone to honor their legal obligations deriving from other international instruments in force in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament to which they are parties. The obligations of all the States parties to a treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone should be clearly defined and be legally binding, and the States parties should fully abide by such agreements.

11. There are also successful examples of regional verification and cooperation institutions from Europe and Latin America: 3- Euratom (The European Institutional Experience) Furthermore, it could be useful, in our attempt to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, to explore how the Euroatom experience could be applicable in the Middle East, particularly when it comes to the technical dimension. The Euratom was initially created to coordinate the research programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and pool knowledge, infrastructure, and funding of nuclear energy. It ensures the security of atomic energy supply within the framework of a centralized monitoring system and acts in several areas connected with atomic energy, including research, the drawing- up of safety standards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This experience is worth investigating in more detail and see how it could be applied in our region. The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)

12. 4- ABACC (The Argentine/ Brazil Institutional Experience) The ABACC is a regional organization that should be examined to derive lessons for the Middle East. The Middle East needs a similarly bold vision to rid the region of nuclear weapons and solidly put the region on a non- nuclear course: The relationship attained by Brazil and Argentine, in connection with the signature- in July 1991- of the Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy is in this regard a significant example. While recognizing the sovereign right of every nation to have access to nuclear technology for the scientific, technological, economic and social development of their people, both these countries created their Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). The Agreement implied a clear and definite compromise for the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities submitted to their jurisdictions or control exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was within this context that they created the Brazilian Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials- ABACC- in order to manage and apply the SCCC.

13. The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.) There is also the unprecedented example of a South Africa’s dismantlement of its Nuclear Programme: 5- South African Example In all these efforts, the example of South Africa – the first country to voluntarily abandon a fully developed nuclear-weapons programme – should serve as a standard model for relevant disarmament and dismantlement. It took five years to build the country’s first nuclear device and a total of 16 years to construct its six-weapon arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the program and all its facilities, however, took less than 24 months. South Africa proceeded to: Dismantle the six completed gun type devices at Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd (ARMSCOR) under controlled and safe conditions; Melted and recast the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from these six devices as well as the partially completed seventh device and returned it to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) for safe keeping; fully decontaminated ARMSCOR facilities and returned severely contaminated equipment to the AEC (such as a melting furnace); Converted the ARMSCOR facilities to conventional weapon and non-weapon commercial activities; and Destroyed all hardware components of the devices as well as technical design and manufacturing information; The Government then joined the NPT, signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and submitted of a full and complete national initial inventory of nuclear material and facilities, as required by the Safeguards Agreement; and the first IAEA team came in Nov. 1991.

14. The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.) 6-The IAEA Vienna Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East The IAEA Forum on "Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East" held in Vienna by the IAEA November of 2011 is useful in this regard as well. Several constructive proposals, made at the Forum, could be taken into consideration such as: Taking stock of the importance of declaratory policy, in particular, declarations of good intentions, and identifying specific and practical confidence building measures. Issues such as studying the lessons of other regions in terms of the context that prevailed there before a NWFZ was considered; As well as reviewing existing, multilaterally agreed principles for establishing such zones as well as reviewing the theory and practice of establishing the five existing NWFZs and discussing the experience of representatives from the five NWFZs in setting up and implementing such zones and discussing the region of the Middle East in this context.

15. The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.) 7- The NPT Regime and Other International Treaties On the way to negotiating a Treaty based ME Free Zone, it is important to address the centrality of the NPT regime which include: IAEA safeguards, verification and inspection, to be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of the NPT, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. The role of the CTBT in any future zone would also be of importance. The commitment by States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control is one of the building blocks for any future zone. This is in addition to other international Treaties such as the CWC and BWC should be looked at with a greater degree of attention on the way to establishing a ME free zone.

16. The Way Forward (cont.) In addition to the building blocks there are also technical provisions that need to be addressed to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the Middle East: B. Technical Dimensions to the Zone : The technical dimension of a Free Zone needs to be emphasized at this stage as well. The following technical provisions of the free zone in the ME should be addressed: Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities, facilities, and devices under international verification mechanisms. Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from conducting indigenous development and activities related to nuclear weapons. Prohibiting transit or stationing of any nuclear explosive devices in the zone. Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone and the role of the CTBTO in this regard. Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only. Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and mechanisms/entities to uphold such a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD’s and address the issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and other relevant organizations within such a zone as the OPCW and CTBTO and test bans.

17. IV. Conclusions: To conclude let me sum up by emphasizing a few points: A more constructive approach towards engaging with all the countries of the region is required in order to guarantee their full participation in the ME Free Zone Conference. I still believe that the ME Free Zone Conference and the process that follows should be inclusive to allow a more genuine, candid and necessary interaction about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, transparency, accountability, and verification. There has not been an interaction for many years and all opportunities that exist to make this happen should be utilized. The participation in the Middle East Conference should be inclusive. The conference should include Israel, Iran, and the members of the League of Arab States, as well as the nuclear weapon states and other relevant international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW, BTWC, CTBTO, UN-ODA and the NPT Chair.

18. IV. Conclusions (Cont.): Achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East will help achieve the international objective of reaching global nuclear disarmament. It will help in achieving the international initiative of “global zero” dedicated to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Middle East cannot be an exception in the Global Zero campaign. In this regard, universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and subjecting all nuclear facilities in the region to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime is of crucial importance. It is in this context, the establishment of a zone can positively contribute to regional and international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts as well as improving the overall security environment in the Middle East. The convening of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD’s in the Middle East, as soon as possible, is integral to the future stability of the region. This ME zone conference should launch a sustained and serious process involving specific concrete steps and measures to be taken within a specific time frame, and linked to the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty with a view to convening the conference at the end of 2013.

19. IV. Conclusions (Cont.): In this effort, and as indicated previously, there are several examples to be utilized from successful regional zones and institutions such as the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which implied a clear and definite compromise for the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities, submitted to their jurisdictions or control exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was within this context that it was created, in order to manage and apply a Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In addition to South Africa’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state shows that it is possible in principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented integrated IAEA safeguards, joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing its guidelines.

20. Thank you