1. THE LAW OF TORTS
WEEK 1

2. Definition, aims and scope of law of torts Intentional torts
THE LECTURE STRUCTURE
Texts
Definition, aims and scope of law of torts
Intentional torts
The tort of negligence
Duty of care

3. TEXT BOOKS Dominic Villa Annotated Civil Liability Act Lawbook Co.
Luntz & Hambly, Torts - Cases and Commentary, 7th ed. LexisNexis, 2013
Richards, Ludlow and de Zwart, Tort Law Principles, Thomson Reuters, 2012
Blay, Torts in a Nutshell LBC 2010
Sappideen et al Torts Cases Commentary LBC
Balkin and Davies, The Law of Torts

4. DEFINITION: THE NATURE OF TORTS
INTRODUCTION
THE LAW OF TORTS
DEFINITION: THE NATURE OF TORTS

5. WHAT IS A TORT?
A tort is a civil wrong
That (wrong) is based a breach of a duty imposed by law
Which (breach) gives rise to a (personal) civil right of action for for a remedy not exclusive to another area of law

6. How does a tort differ from a Crime?
Discussion/Question
Tort and Crime
How does a tort differ from a Crime?

7. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TORT AND A CRIME
A crime is public /community wrong that gives rise to sanctions usually designated in a specified code. A tort is a civil ‘private’ wrong.
Action in criminal law is usually brought by the state or the Crown. Tort actions are usually brought by the victims of the tort.
The principal objective in criminal law is punishment. In torts, it is compensation

8. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TORT AND A CRIME
Differences in Procedure:
Standard of Proof
Criminal law: beyond reasonable doubt
Torts: on the balance of probabilities

9. Are there any similarities between a tort and a crime?
Question
Are there any similarities between a tort and a crime?

10. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TORTS AND CRIME
They both arise from wrongs imposed by law
Certain crimes are also actionable torts; eg trespass: assault
In some cases the damages in torts may be punitive
In some instances criminal law may award compensation under criminal injuries compensation legislation.

11. TORT and CRIME
The "roots of tort and crime" are "greatly intermingled". And it is not only the roots of tort and crime that are intermingled. The increasing frequency with which civil penalty provisions are enacted, the provisions made for criminal injuries compensation, the provisions now made in some jurisdictions for the judge at a criminal trial to order restitution or compensation to a person suffering loss or damage (including pain and suffering) as a result of an offence all deny the existence of any "sharp cleavage" between the criminal and the civil law. ( Per GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. In Gray v Motor Accident Commission )

12. TORTS DISTINGUISHED FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
A breach of contract arises from promises made by the parties themselves.

13. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TORT AND CONTRACT
Both tort and breach of contract give rise to civil suits
In some instances, a breach of contract may also be a tort: eg an employer’s failure to provide safe working conditions

14. What are the objectives of tort law?
Questions
What are the objectives of tort law?

15. THE OBJECTIVES OF TORT LAW
Loss distribution/adjustment: shifting losses from victims to perpetrators
Compensation: Through the award of (pecuniary) damages
The object of compensation is to place the victim in the position he/she was before the tort was committed.
Punishment: through exemplary or punitive damages. This is a secondary aim.

16. Question
What interests are protected by the Law of Torts, and how are these interests protected?

17. INTERESTS PROTECTED IN TORT LAW
Personal security
Trespass
Negligence
Reputation
Defamation
Property
Conversion
Economic and financial interests

18. SOURCES OF TORT LAW Common Law: Statute:
The development of torts by precedent through the courts
Donoghue v Stevenson
Statute:
Thematic statutes: eg Motor Accidents legislation
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999
General statutes: eg Civil Liability legislation
The Civil Liability Act (NSW) 2002

19. LIABILITY IN TORT LAW Liability = responsibility
Liability may be based on fault or it may be strict
Fault liability: the failure to live up to a standard through an act or omission .
Types of fault liability:
FAULT LIABILITY
NEGLIGENCE
INTENTION

20. Intention in Torts Deliberate or wilful conduct
‘Constructive’ intent: where the consequences of an act are substantially certain: the consequences are intended
Where conduct is reckless
Transferred intent: where D intends to hit ‘B’ but misses and hits ‘P’

21. Negligence in Torts
When D is careless in his/her conduct
When D fails to take reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable injury to another and that party suffers damage.

22. STRICT LIABILITY
No fault is required for strict liability

23. ACTIONS IN TORT LAW Trespass Directly caused injuries
Requires no proof of damage
Action on the Case/Negligence
Indirect injuries
Requires proof of damage

24. THE DOMAIN OF TORTS Trespass Defences Defamation Particular Duty Areas
Financial loss
Negligence
Trespass
Defences
Nuisance
Breach of statutory duty
Defamation
Particular Duty Areas
Conversion
Vicarious liability
Product liability
Liability of public authorities
Concurrent liability

25. INTENTIONAL TORTS Trespass
INTENATIONAL TORTS
Trespass
Conversion
Detinue

26. WHAT IS TRESPASS?
Intentional act of D which directly causes an injury to the P or his /her property without lawful justification
The Elements of Trespass:
fault: intentional act
injury* must be caused directly
injury* may be to the P or to his/her property
No lawful justification

27. *INJURY IN TRESPASS
Injury = a breach of right, not necessarily actual damage
Trespass requires only proof of injury not actual damage

28. THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS: The ‘DNA’
Direct interference
with person or property
Intentional
act +
Absence of lawful
justification + +
A specific
form of trespass
“x” element =

29. SPECIFIC FORMS OF TRESPASS
PERSON
PROPERTY
BATTERY
ASSAULT
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

30. BATTERY
The intentional act of D which directly causes a physical interference with the body of P without lawful justification
The distinguishing element: physical interference with P’s body

31. THE INTENTIONAL ACT IN BATTERY
No liability without intention
The intentional act = basic willful act + the consequences.

32. THE ACT MUST CAUSE PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE
The essence of the tort is the protection of the person of P. D’s act short of physical contact is therefore not a battery
The least touching of another could be battery
Cole v Turner (dicta per Holt CJ)
‘The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person’s body is inviolate’ ( per Goff LJ, Collins v Wilcock)

33. The Nature of the Physical Interference
Rixon v Star City Casino (D places hand on P’s shoulder to attract his attention; no battery)
Collins v Wilcock (Police officer holds D’s arm with a view to restraining her when D declines to answer questions and begins to walk away; battery)

34. SHOULD THE PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE BE HOSTILE?
Hostility may establish a presumption of battery; but
Hostility is not material to proving battery
The issue may revolve on how one defines ‘hostility’

35. THE INJURY MUST BE CAUSED DIRECTLY
Injury should be the immediate The Case Law:
Scott v Shepherd ( Lit squib/fireworks in market place)
Hutchins v Maughan( poisoned bait left for dog)
Southport v Esso Petroleum(Spilt oil on P’s beach)

36. THE ACT MUST BE WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION
Consent is Lawful justification
Consent must be freely given by the P if P is able to understand the nature of the act
Allen v New Mount Sinai Hospital
Lawful justification includes the lawful act of law enforcement officers

37. TRESPASS:ASSAULT
The intentional act or threat of D which directly places P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent physical interference with his or her person or of someone under his or her control

39. WEEK 2 ASSAULT FALSE IMPRISONMENT TRESSPASS TO LAND
THE LAW OF TORTS
WEEK 2
ASSAULT
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
TRESSPASS TO LAND

40. TRESPASS:ASSAULT
The intentional act or threat of D which directly places P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent physical interference with his or her person or of someone under his or her control
It is any act — and not a mere omission to act — by which a person intentionally — or recklessly — causes another to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence:

41. The Gist of the Action
…Assault necessarily involves the apprehension of injury or the instillation of fear or fright. It does not necessarily involve physical contact with the person assaulted: nor is such physical contact, if it occurs, an element of the assault. (Barwick CJ in The Queen v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 472

42. THE ELEMENTS OF ASSAULT
There must be a direct threat:
Hall v Fonceca (Threat by P who shook hand in front of D’s face in an argument)
Barton v Davis
In general, mere words are may not actionable
Barton v Armstrong
But mere silence as in silent telephone calls, may constitute an assault: R v Burstow; R v Ireland [1998] AC 147.
In general, conditional threats are not actionable
Tuberville v Savage
Police v Greaves

43. THE ELEMENTS OF ASSAULT
The apprehension must be reasonable; the test is objective
The interference must be imminent
-Police v Greaves
Barton v Armstrong
Zanker v Vartzokas (P jumps out of a moving van to escape from D’s unwanted lift)

44. Zanker v Vartzokas and the issue of imminence/immediacy
The Facts:
Accused gives a lift to victim and offers money for sex; victim refuses.
Accused responds by accelerating car, Victim tries to open door, but accused increases acceleration
Accused says to victim: I will take you to my mates house. He will really fix you up
Victim jumps from car then travelling 60km/h

45. Zanker v Vartzokas: The Issues
Was the victim’s fear of sexual assault in the future reasonable?
Was the feared harm immediate enough to constitute assault?

46. Zanker v Vartzokas: The Reasoning
Where the victim is held in place and unable to escape the immediacy element may be fulfilled.
The essential factor is imminence not contemporaneity
The exact moment of physical harm injury is known to the aggressor
It remains an assault where victim is powerless to stop the aggressor from carrying out the threat

47. THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS
Intentional act
Direct interference
Absence of lawful
justification + + +
A specific
form of trespass
“x” element =

48. SPECIFIC FORMS OF TRESPASS
PERSON
PROPERTY
BATTERY
ASSAULT
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

49. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The intentional act of D which directly causes the total restraint of P and thereby confines him/her to a delimited area without lawful justification
The essential distinctive element is the total restraint

50. THE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT
It requires all the basic elements of trespass:
Intentional act
Directness
absence of lawful justification/consent , and
total restraint

51. RESTRAINT IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The restraint must be total
Bird v Jones (passage over bridge)
Rudduck v Vadarlis
The Balmain New Ferry Co v Robertson
Total restraint implies the absence of a reasonable means of escape
Burton v Davies (D refuses to allow P out of car)
Restraint may be total where D subjects P to his/her authority with no option to leave
Symes v Mahon (police officer arrests P by mistake)

52. VOLUNTARY CASES
In general, there is no FI where one voluntarily submits to a form of restraint
Herd v Werdale (D refuses to allow P out of mine shaft)
Robison v The Balmain New Ferry Co. (D refuses to allow P to leave unless P pays fare)
Lippl v Haines
Where there is no volition for restraint, the confinement may be FI (Bahner v Marwest Hotels Co.)

53. KNOWLEDGE IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The knowledge of the P at the moment of restraint is not essential.
Merring v Graham White Aviation
Murray v Ministry of Defense

54. Action on the case for Intentional Harm Defences to Intentional Torts
THE LAW OF TORTS WEEK 3
Trespass to property
Action on the case for Intentional Harm
Defences to Intentional Torts

55. OTHER FORMS OF TRESPASS
PERSON
PROPERTY
BATTERY
ASSAULT
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

56. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
LAND
GOODS/CHATTELS

57. TRESPASS TO LAND
The intentional act of D which directly interferes with the plaintiff’s exclusive possession of land

58. Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et inferos
THE NATURE OF THE TORT
Land includes the actual soil/dirt, the structures/plants on it and the airspace above it
Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et inferos
Bernstein of Leigh v Skyways & General Ltd
Kelson v Imperial Tobacco

59. The Nature of D’s Act: A General Note
...[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing.... If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him ( Entick v Carrington (1765) 16 St Tr 1029, 1066)

60. THE NATURE OF D’S ACT
The act must constitute some physical interference which disturbs P’s exclusive possession of the land
Victoria Racing Co. v Taylor
Barthust City Council v Saban
Lincoln Hunt v Willesse

61. THE NATURE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S INTEREST IN THE LAND
P must have exclusive possession of the land at the time of the interference exclusion of all others

62. THE NATURE OF EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION
Exclusive possession is distinct from ownership.
Ownership refers to title in the land. Exclusive possession refers to physical holding of the land
Possession may be immediate or constructive
The nature of possession depends on the material possessed

63. EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION: CO-OWNERS
In general, a co-owner cannot be liable in trespass in respect of the land he/she owns; but this is debatable where the ’trespassing’ co-owner is not in possession. (Greig v Greig)
A co-possessor can maintain an action against a trespasser (Coles Smith v Smith and Ors)¯

64. THE POSITION OF TRESPASSERS AND SQUATTERS
A trespasser/squatter in exclusive possession can maintain an action against any other trespasser
Newington v Windeyer (1985)

65. THE POSITION OF LICENSEES
A licensee is one who has the permission of P to enter or use land (belonging to P)
A licensee is a party not in possession, and can therefore not sue in trespass
A licensee for value however may be entitled to sue(E.R. Investments v Hugh)

66. THE TRESPASSORY ACT Preventing P’s access Waters v Maynard)
The continuation of the initial trespassory act is a trespass continuing trespass
Where D enters land for purposes different from that for which P gave a license, D’s conduct may constitute trespass ab initio (Baker v Crown)

67. THE POSITION OF POLICE OFFICERS
Unless authorized by law, police officers have no special right of entry into any premises without consent of P. But see Halliday v Neville
A police officer charged with the duty of serving a summons must obtain the consent of the party in possession (Plenty v. Dillion )

68. Police Officers; The Common Law Position
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all forces of the Crown. It may be frail- its roof may shake- the wind may blow through it- the rain may enter- but the King of England cannot enter- all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. So be it- unless he has justification by law’. ( Southam v Smout [1964] 1QB 308, 320.

69. REMEDIES Ejectment Self help:
Self redress is a summary remedy, which is justified only in clear and simple cases, or in an emergency…the courts have confined the remedy by way of self redress to simple cases such as an overhanging branch, or an encroaching root, which would not justify the expense of legal proceedings, and urgent cases which require an immediate remedy. (Burton v Winters [1993] 3 All ER 847)

70. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
LAND
GOODS/CHATTELS

71. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY GOODS/CHATTELS TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
Personal property
TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
LAND

72. TRESPASS TO GOODS/CHATTEL
The intentional/negligent act of D which directly interferes with the plaintiff’s possession of a chattel without lawful justification
The P must have actual or constructive possession at the time of interference.

73. DAMAGES
It may not be actionable per se (Everitt v Martin)

74. CONVERSION
The act of D in relation to another’s chattel which constitutes an unjustifiable denial of his/her title

75. CONVERSION: Who Can Sue?
Owners
Those in possession or entitled to immediate possession
Bailees*
Bailors*
Mortgagors* and Mortgagees*(Citicorp Australia v B.S. Stillwell)
Finders (Parker v British Airways; Armory v Delmirie)

76. ACTS OF CONVERSION
Mere asportation is no conversion
Fouldes v Willoughby
The D’s conduct must constitute an unjustifiable denial of P’s rights to the property
Howard E Perry v British Railways Board
Finders of lost property
Parker v British Airways
Destruction of the chattel is conversion
Atkinson v Richardson;)
Taking possession
Withholding possession

77. ACTS OF CONVERSION
Misdelivery ( Ashby v Tolhurst (1937 2KB); Sydney City Council v West)
Unauthorized dispositions in any manner that interferes with P’s title constitutes conversion (Penfolds Wines v Elliott)

78. DETINUE
Detinue: The wrongful refusal to tender goods upon demand by P, who is entitled to possession It requires a demand coupled with subsequent refusal (General and Finance Facilities v Cooks Cars (Romford)

79. DAMAGES IN CONVERSION AND DETINUE
In conversion, damages usually take the form of pecuniary compensation
In detinue, the court may in appropriate circumstances order the return of the chattel
Damages in conversion are calculated as at the time of conversion; in detinue it is as at the time of judgment
The Mediana
Butler v The Egg and Pulp Marketing Board
The Winkfield
General and Finance Facilities v Cooks Cars (Romford)

80. Action on the Case for Indirect Injuries
THE LAW OF TORTS
Action on the Case for Indirect Injuries

81. INDIRECT INTENTIONAL INJURIES
ACTION ON THE CASE FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES OR NERVOUS SHOCK
ACTION ON THE CASE REFERS TO ACTIONS BASED ON INJURIES THAT ARE CAUSED INDIRECTLY OR CONSEQUENTIALLY

82. INDIRECT INTENTIONAL INJURIES: CASE LAW
Bird v Holbrook (trap set in garden)
D is liable in an action on the case for damages for intentional acts which are meant to cause damage to P and which in fact cause damage (to P)

83. THE INTENTIONAL ACT
The intentional may be deliberate and preconceived(Bird v Holbrook )
It may also be inferred or implied; the test for the inference is objective
Wilkinson v Downton
Janvier v Sweeney

84. Action on the Case for Indirect Intentional Harm: Elements
D is liable in an action on the case for damages for intentional acts which are meant to cause damage to P and which in fact cause damage to P
The elements of this tort:
The act must be intentional
It must be one calculated to cause harm/damage
It must in fact cause harm/actual damage
Where D intends no harm from his act but the harm caused is one that is reasonably foreseeable, D’s intention to cause the resulting harm can be imputed/implied

85. THE SCOPE OF THE RULE
The rule does not cover ‘pure’ mental stress or mere fright
The act must be reasonably capable of causing mental distress to a normal* person:
Bunyan v Jordan
Stevenson v Basham
Carrier v Bonham

86. IS THERE ROOM FOR EXTENDING THE SCOPE
The normal person in Wilkinson v Downton
The normal/reasonable person: The gender/race debate

87. The Scope of Intentional Torts to the Person
Trespass:
Battery,
False Imprisonment
Assault
Action on the case (Wilkinson v Downton)

88. ONUS OF PROOF In Common Law, he who asserts proves
Traditionally, in trespass D was required to disprove fault once P proved injury. Depending on whether the injury occurred on or off the highway ( McHale v Watson; Venning v Chin)
The current Australian position is contentious but seems to support the view that in off highway cases D is required to prove all the elements of the tort once P proves injury
Hackshaw v Shaw
Platt v Nutt
See Blay; ‘Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person’ Vol. 61 ALJ (1987) 25
But see McHugh J in See Secretary DHCS v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) CLR 218

89. IMPACT OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY ACT
Section 3B Civil liability excluded from Act
(1) The provisions of this Act do not apply to or in respect of civil liability (and awards of damages in those proceedings) as follows:
(a) civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual assault or other sexual misconduct – the whole Act except Part 7 (Self-defence and recovery by criminals) in respect of civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death

90. Defences to Intentional Torts
THE LAW OF TORTS
Defences to Intentional Torts

91. INTRODUCTION: The Concept of Defence
Broader Concept: The content of the Statement of Defence- The response to the P’s Statement of Claim-The basis for non-liability
Statement of Defence may contain:
Denial
Objection to a point of law
Confession and avoidance:

92. MISTAKE An intentional conduct done under a misapprehension
Mistake is thus not the same as inevitable accident
Mistake is generally not a defence in tort law ( Rendell v Associated Finance Ltd, Symes v Mahon)
‘Mistake’ may go to prove

93. CONSENT
In a strict sense, consent is not a defence as such because in trespass, the absence of consent is an element of the tort
See: Blay; ‘Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person’ Vol. 61 ALJ (1987) 25
But McHugh J in See Secretary DHCS v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) CLR 218

94. VALID CONSENT
To be valid, consent must be informed and procured without fraud or coercion: ( R vWilliams;)
To invalidate consent, fraud must relate directly to the agreement itself, and not to an incidental issue: (Papadimitropoulos v R (1957) 98 CLR 249; R v Linekar (the Times, 1994)

95. CONSENT IN SPORTS
In contact sports, consent is not necessarily a defence to foul play (McNamara v Duncan; Hilton v Wallace)
To succeed in an action for trespass in contact sports however, the P must of course prove the relevant elements of the tort.
Giumelli v Johnston

96. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Since the absence of consent is a definitional element in trespass, it is for the P to prove absence of consent and not for the D to prove consent

97. STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON CONSENT
Minors (Property and Contracts) Act (NSW) ss 14, 49
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW)

98. SELF DEFENCE, DEFENCE OF OTHERS
A P who is attacked or threatened with an attack, is allowed to use reasonable force to defend him/herself
In each case, the force used must be proportional to the threat; it must not be excessive. (Fontin v Katapodis)
D may also use reasonable force to defend a third party where he/she reasonably believes that the party is being attacked or being threatened

99. THE DEFENCE OF PROPERTY
D may use reasonable force to defend his/her property if he/she reasonably believes that the property is under attack or threatened
What is reasonable force will depend on the facts of each case, but it is debatable whether reasonable force includes ‘deadly force’

100. PROVOCATION Provocation is not a defence in tort law.
It can only be used to avoid the award of exemplary damages: Fontin v Katapodis; Downham Ballett and Others

101. A Critique of the Current Position On Provocation
To discourage vengeance and retributive justice
The compensation theory argument
The gender based thesis

102. The Case for Allowing the Defence of Provocation
The relationship between provocation and contributory negligence
The implication of counterclaims
Note possible qualifications Fontin v Katapodis to:
Lane v Holloway
Murphy v Culhane
See Blay: ‘Provocation in Tort Liability: A Time for Reassessment’,QUT Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1988) pp

103. NECESSITY
The defence is allowed where an act which is otherwise a tort is done to save life or property: urgent situations of imminent peril

104. Urgent Situations of Imminent Peril
The situation must pose a threat to life or property to warrant the act: Southwark London B. Council v Williams
The defence is available in very strict circumstances R v Dudley and Stephens
D’s act must be reasonably necessary and not just convenient Murray v McMurchy
In re F
Cope v Sharp

105. INSANITY Insanity is not a defence as such to an intentional tort.
What is essential is whether D by reason of insanity was capable of forming the intent to commit the tort. (White v Pile; Morris v Marsden)

106. INFANTS Minority is not a defence as such in torts.
What is essential is whether the D understood the nature of his/her conduct (Smith v Leurs; Hart v AG of Tasmania)

107. DISCIPLINE
PARENTS
A parent may use reasonable and moderate force to discipline a child. What is reasonable will depend on the age, mentality, and physique of the child and on the means and instrument used. (R v Terry)

108. DISCIPLINE
TEACHERS
CAPTAINS OF VESSELS
SPOUSES

109. ILLEGALITY:Ex turpi causa non oritur actio
Persons who join in committing an illegal act have no legal rights inter se in relation to torts arising directly from that act.
Hegarty v Shine
Smith v Jenkins
Jackson v Harrison
Gala v Preston

110. TRESPASS & CLA 2002
s.3B(1)(a) Civil Liability Act (“CLA”) i.e. CLA does not apply to “intentional torts”, except Part 7 of the Act.
s.52 (2) CLA subjective/objective test i.e. subjective ("…believes…" & "…perceives…")/ objective ("…reasonable response…") test.
s.53(1)(a) & (b) CLA i.e. “and” = two limb test; "exceptional" and "harsh and unjust“ are not defined in the Act so s.34 of the Interpretation Act 1987.
s.54(1) & (2) CLA i.e. "Serious offence" and "offence" are criminal terms so reference should be made to the criminal law to confirm whether P's actions are covered by the provisions.