2. 11 October 2015PAGE 2 Key Events in the history of OCIMF 1970: OCIMF was formed 1998: 50 TH Publication reached and website launched 1967: Grounding of Torrey Canyon 1975: First OCIMF guideline published 1977: London branch office established 1993: SIRE Programme Launched 1978: ISGOTT published 1970: Consultative status at IMO 2004: TMSA Programme Launched 2000: SIRE Inspector Training and Accreditation 2010: MTIS Programme Launched 2009: OVID Programme Launched OCIMF Milestones

3. To be the foremost authority on the safe and environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers, terminals and offshore support vessels, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design and operation. The OCIMF Mission

4. Where are we? In the High Risk Area of the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden statistically an improving picture, but in reality a fragile balance is being maintained by a combination of :- PAG Disruption and Deterrent by Military Forces Effective Self-Protection Measures applied by Merchant Vessels Risk Assessment and employment of PMSC Weaken any one of the elements – the balance can change overnight. Complacency ! We all warn against it but………………..

5. Complacency? There are political calls to move the boundaries of the HRA, that are not supported by risk assessment. Shipping Economics are exceptionally poor, some already going out of business, cost savings become a matter of survival. In order of magnitude:- Fuel – high speed = exponentially high fuel consumption Distance diverted from direct tack- more miles more fuels burned Self Protection – Citadels, triple coil razor wire, speed, armed guards, detections systems, additional crew. All High cost items! There are calls to reduce speed, reinstate rhumb line routes, shrink the boundaries of the high risk areas and reduce use of PMSC today. There is an undercurrent of political questioning, future of current operations under scrutiny and undecided.

6. Protecting the Mariner We must never forget the mariner is at the very centre of this issue. It is our seafarers who are the target of organised crime at sea Protecting Seafarers is paramount. We could talk about the all the measures taken collectively and individually for hours. But what I would like to do is to try an put each of you in the place of the merchant mariner. What does he want?

7. Too Much Information? Irrespective of the size the average merchant ship will have a crew of 25 to 30 persons. One Master and 3 watch standing officers. The officer of the watch, alone navigates the ship, is the focal point for communications. It is this one person who must juggle, navigation, look out, radar, communications, and a dozen other things. We are not serving this officer well There are many agencies pumping out alerts and warnings of piracy to ships. It has grown to the point where a six hourly, transmission now comes of the printer is over 9 feet long!

8. Provision of Maritime Security Information to the Mariner – Is There Too Much Information? Explosion in the provision of Maritime Security information to the Mariner –is it helping the Mariner? –Is it helping the Military? Sophisticated shipping companies struggle to deal with the profusion of Maritime Security information. Mariners at sea (Officers of the Watch) unable to deal with large quantities of Maritime Security information –Vital messages lost in the background noise Discipline and rigour is required in the provision of Maritime Security information to the Mariner

9. Provision of Navigational Warnings to Shipping - World-Wide Navigational Warning System

10. Provision of Maritime Security Information to the Mariner Maritime Security information is of vital concern to all shipping. Essential that common standards are applied to the editing and dissemination of maritime security information. Strongly suggested that an international guidance/standard is developed (analogous to S53 for Navigational Information) for the provision of Maritime Security information to the Mariner. Only by dong so will the Mariner be assured of receiving the information he needs, in a form which he understands, at the earliest possible time.

11. What can be done better? Designing ships to be harder to board at sea Basic ballistic protection against small arms fire designed in Citadel protection included in standard designs Making better use of the knowledge we have to improve this aspect of ship design. IF PIRATES CANNOT BOARD THE SHIP CANNOT BE HIJACKED

13. OCIMF will publish recommendations for Merchant Ship Hardening Measures in 2013 Four basic designs were tested based on recently delivered vessels: 300,000 DWT VLCC LNGC 115,000 Dwt Aframax Tanker 47,000 Dwt MR1 Product Tanker.

14. Gulf of Guinea: Industry Concerns - Maritime Security

15. MTISC-GoG: Voluntary Reporting Area

16. MTISC-GoG 3 day Trial – Feb 2012 US AFRICOM Exercise “OBANGAME EXPRESS” Based at Regional Maritime University, Accra Ghana Participation by Shell, Tullow, NLNG Chevron, OCIMF Secretariat Ghana Navy Watchkeepers INTERPOL liaison Officer Information fusion system “SEAVISION” access provided US AFRICOM Next step:- MTISC-GoG – 12 month pilot project

17. What Can we do better in the future? The focus is NOT Piracy The focus is countering organised crime at sea We must not lose all the collective learning's We must be able to revive an effective turnkey response at the time of need irrespective of location. We must leave a legacy of better protection

18. A Voice for Safety www.OCIMF.com Oil Companies International Marine Forum 29 Queen Anne's Gate, London, SW1H 9BU Tel: +44 (0) 20 7654 1200 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7654 1205