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CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory Phinding Phish: An Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Toolbars Yue Zhang, Serge Egelman, Lorrie.

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Presentation on theme: "CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory Phinding Phish: An Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Toolbars Yue Zhang, Serge Egelman, Lorrie."— Presentation transcript:

1 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Phinding Phish: An Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Toolbars Yue Zhang, Serge Egelman, Lorrie Cranor, and Jason Hong

2 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Anti-Phishing Tools 84 Listed on download.com (Sept. ‘06) Included in many browsers Poor usability Many users don’t see indicators Many choose to ignore them But usability is being addressed Are they accurate?

3 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Tools Tested CallingID Cloudmark EarthLink

4 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Tools Tested eBay Firefox

5 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Tools Tested IE7

6 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Tools Tested Netcraft Netscape

7 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Tools Tested SpoofGuard TrustWatch

8 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Source of Phish High volume of fresh phish Sites taken down after a day on average Fresh phish yield blacklist update information Can’t use toolbar blacklists We experimented with several sources APWG - high volume but many duplicates and legitimate URLs included Phishtank.org - lower volume but easier to extract phish Assorted other phish archives - often low volume or not fresh enough

9 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Phishing Feeds Anti-Phishing Working Group reportphishing@antiphishing.org ISPs, individuals, etc. >2,000 messages/day Filtering out URLs from messages PhishTank http://www.phishtank.org/ Submitted by public ~48 messages/day Manually verify URLs

10 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Testbed for Anti-Phishing Toolbars Automated testing Aggregate performance statistics Key design issue: Different browsers Different toolbars Different indicator types Solution: Image analysis Compare screenshots with known states

11 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Phish!! Warning!! Image-Based Comparisons Two examples: TrustWatch and Google TrustWatch: Google: ScreenShot Verified Not verified

12 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Testbed System Architecture

13 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Testbed System Architecture Retrieve Potential Phishing Sites

14 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Testbed System Architecture Send URL to Workers

15 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Testbed System Architecture Worker Evaluates Potential Phishing Site

16 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Testbed System Architecture Task Manager Aggregates Results

17 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Experiment Methodology Catch Rate: Given a set of phishing URLs, what percentage of them are correctly labeled as phish by the tool - count block and warning only - taken down sites removed False Positives: Given a set of legitimate URLs, what percentage of them are incorrectly labeled as phish by the tool - count block and warning only - taken down sites removed

18 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Experiment 1 PhishTank feed used Equipment: 1 Notebook as Task Manager 2 Notebooks as Workers 10 Tools Examined: CloudMark Earthlink eBay IE7 Google/Firefox McAfee Netcraft Netscape SpoofGuard TrustWatch

19 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Experiment 1 100 phishing URLs PhishTank feed Manually verified Re-examined at 1, 2, 12, 24 hour intervals Examined blacklist update rate (except w/SpoofGuard) Examined take-down rate 514 legitimate URLs 416 from 3Sharp report 35 from bank log-in pages 35 from top pages by Alexa 30 random pages

20 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Experiment 2 APWG phishing feed 9 of the same toolbars tested + CallingID Same testing environment

21 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Results of Experiment 1

22 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Results of Experiment 2

23 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ False Positives ToolbarFalse Positive SpoofGuard218 (42%) CallingID10 (2%) Cloudmark5 (1%) EarthLink5 (1%) Not a big problem for most of the toolbars

24 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Overall findings No toolbar caught 100% Good performers: SpoofGuard (>90%)  Though 42% false positives IE7 (70%-80%) Netcraft (60%-80%) Firefox (50%-80%) Most performed poorly: Netscape (10%-30%) CallingID (20%-40%)

25 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ More findings Performance varied with feed Better with Phishtank:  Cloudmark, Earthlink, Firefox, Netcraft Better with APWG:  eBay, IE7, Netscape Almost the same:  Spoofguard, Trustwatch Different increases over time More increases on APWG Reflects the “freshness” of URLs

26 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ CDN Attack Many tools use blacklists Many examine IP addresses (location, etc.) Proxies distort URLs Used Coral CDN Append.nyud.net:8090 to URLs Uses PlanetLab Works on: Cloudmark Google TrustWatch Netcraft Netscape

27 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Page Load Attack Some wait for page to be fully loaded SpoofGuard eBay Insert a web bug taking infinite load time 5 lines of PHP 1x1 GIF Infinite loop spitting out data very slowly Tool stays in previous state Unable to indicate anything

28 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ Conclusion Tool Performance No toolbars are perfect No single toolbar will outperform others Heuristics have false positives  Whitelists?  Hybrid approach? Testing Methodology Get fresher URLs Test other than default settings User interfaces Usability is important  Traffic light?  Pop up message?  Re-direct page?

29 CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/


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