1. Should the Financial Sector be Regulated by Government? Dr. J. D. Han

2. Should Government Regulate the Financial Sector? Pros “ It should for the reasons …..” Cons “It should NOT for the reasons ……” Empirical/Historical Evidence Alternatives to Government Regulation

3. When a Company needs funds for a project, how would it do? Internal financing: use accumulated funds from Undistributed Corporate Profits External financing: get the funding from outside of the company Most needs for funds are met by external financing

4. Two External Financing Methods: Direct Finance vs. Indirect Finance Savers Households Investors Business Firms Indirect Finance Direct Finance by non-financial firm itself Financial Market banking system Through Banks or/and Securities Companies Most funds are provided by Indirect financing

5. Financial Intermediaries consists of Depository Institutions (banks, trust co., credit unions), Investment Intermediaries (securities co., finance co.), And Contractual Savings Institutions (insurance co, pension funds). Financial Intermediaries channel surplus funds from Savers to Investors

6. Financial Instruments Bank Loans Bonds Stocks(equities) Debt Contract or Instruments Marketable Securities Direct indirect Indirect

7. Pros The financial sector is full of dangers, hazards and risks. And we do not have enough information about them. Thus government should regulate the financial sector and enforce information disclosure.

8. Note that The biggest problem is ‘Information Asymmetry’ between the bona-fide investors and the financial sector players involved in direct and indirect financing (those using the funds, issuers/dealers of marketable securities, and other intermediaries) The government regulations come in many forms and include (Financial) Information Disclosure Requirements on the financial sector players. They take the following example:

9. Those arguing for government regulation use the following logics: (1) Financial sector has a lot of hazards, risks and dangers; (2) The general public as investors do not have enough information about them.

10. Observation of Facts: Sources of External Corporate Financing in U. S. : 1970-1985 Note: these are funds raised through issues of ‘New Securities-Stocks and Bonds’. Of course, stock exchanges trade ‘existing’ stocks as well, which account for the majority of the outstanding market values.

11. Puzzle 1: Stocks or Equities are relatively unimportant compared with Debt Contracts/Instruments (= Bonds + Loans)

12. Puzzle 2: Marketable Securities(=Bonds + Stocks) are not so important as Bank Loans

13. Puzzle 3 Direct Finance is insignificant compared to Indirect Finance. Financial Intermediaries buy most of Marketable Securities

14. The Answer to All these Puzzles: Information Asymmetry : Some financial instruments have more severe problems of Information Asymmetry than others - Equities > Bonds > Bank Loans

15. Other minor answers: Transactions Costs : Financial Institutions or Intermediaries lower Transactions Cost Capital Structure (Comparative Cost of Funding) : - interest payment is tax-deductible - real cost of borrowing is the (actual) real interest rate (=nominal interest rate – inflation rate) Issues of Management Control and a Possible Hostile Take Over

16. Information Asymmetry Ex-ante (Before Deal) May lead to Adverse Selection Problem “Lemon and Jewel problem” -Definition: Bad goods drives good goods out of the market Ex-post (After Deal) May lead to Moral Hazard Problem -Definition: The borrower is subject to the hazard that he has incentives to be engaged in riskier activities than are agreed with the lender

17. Marketable Securities(Direct Finance) versus Bank Loans (Indirect Finance) Information Asymmetry causes a severe Adverse Selection Problem or “Lemon & Jewel” Problem in the case of all marketable securities bank loans are less subject to information asymmetry(cause) or adverse selection(consequence). Why? The key lies in that enough information is generated about the demander of the fund in the case of bank loans while, due to information free rider problem, it is not the case for marketable securities. As bank loans are less risky than marketable securities- Thus, the financial investor prefers bank loans to marketable securities.

18. Closer Look reveals

19. Equities are the most ‘risky’ in the sense that Equities are subject to a more severe Moral Hazard Problem than debts This particular problem in case of equity-financed firms is called the “Principal-Agent Problem” Thus, equities have doubly risky in the eyes of finanical investors, and get less fund(demand).

20. The risk comes from Information Asymmetry Lack of information comes from Lack of Monitoring of the financial situations of the borrower or securities issuers/dealers Lack of Monitoring is the most severe with Equities/Stocks/Shares due to Information Asymmetry

21. Two Dimensions of Information Asymmetry Ex-ante (before the money is invested) Adverse Selection (Problem) Ex-post Moral Hazard (Problem)

22. ex-ante Adverse Selection: “Fatal Attraction” Called “Lemon & Jewel Problem” by G. Ackerloff Security price is set between value of a good firm and value of a bad firm The bad firm’s securities have lower prices and thus carry higher rates of returns, looking more attractive.

23. * Illustration of “Lemons Problem” Second-Hand Car Market Market Price = Average Value of Bad and Good Cars Lemon: Market Price > Its Real Value (Low) Jewell: Market Price < Its Real Value (High) Jewell is not offered in the market

24. ex-post Moral Hazard Problem Once the money is invested, the fund borrower or the securities issuers get engaged in more risky activities than are warranted. Here the hazard is endogenously increased by the user of the fund.

25. * Solutions to Adverse Selection Custom-Made Private Information Financial intermediaries are specialized in collecting and processing information -> explains why bank loans dominates: in case of bank loans, almost complete information is generated. The remaining information asymmetry of the borrow is small. Of course, still there remains information asymmetry between banks and their depositors. Private Provision of Information: Demand and supply of information leads to formation of Information Market, where Information is generate and sold. : It is ultimately incomplete due to “Free Rider Problem” in the Financial Market Public Provision of Information particularly is warranted and required for Securities Market -> explains why financial industry is heavily regulated

26. * Solutions to Moral Hazard Problem Production of Information: “Monitoring” - The most severe problem exists, and “costly state verification’ and free-rider problem will lead to insufficient monitoring in the stock market - The same is true, if to a lesser extent, in the bond market - The least severe problem, but collateral is inevitable in the bank loan market Government Regulation to increase Information: - “Disclosure Requirement” Directly Participating in Management - Venture Capital Firm - Japanese and German Banks

27. (Recap) Why should the financial industry be regulated by government? Because information asymmetry is an intrinsic problem of the industry: adverse selection and moral hazards -> First level of ‘Market Failure’ Unlike other sectors, due to free rider problem, information asymmetry is not to be rectified by Private Provision of Information -> Second level of ‘Market Failure’ = failure of Information Market Ultimately, Public Provision of Information is required,which calls for Government Regulation

28. Cons: Government should not regulate the financial industry: This revisionist view has been gaining an increasing popluarity in relation to finanical liberalization.

29. (Revisionist) The financial sector need not be regulated by government. Information Asymmetry itself does not warrant Government Regulation The key lies in Efficiency of Information If enough information is generated and transmitted in the unregulated or free-market financial sector so as to ensure that the investor with due diligence or prudence may be protected from frauds in a reasonable way to a certain acceptable degree, then government intervention is not necessary.

30. What does the Empirical Evidence tell us? Theoretically, it is possible, and empirically, there is a historical evidence from the 18 th century Scottish Free Banking System experiences(Banks) ; from the 17 th century Stock Market in Amsterdam(Securities Market); from the 20 th century Financial Crises in the U.S.

31. 1) Free Banking: Free Entry and Self Regulated Note Issues Historical Instances of Self-Regulated, or Free-Market Financial Industry Scotland: 1720-1840 U. S. A.: 1836/7-1863 Canada: prior to Bank of Canada 1935 Sweden: 19C Hong Kong: Contemporary

32. Were They Stable? Conventional Wisdom -> Yes, Scotland, Canada, Sweden and HK -> “No”, U. S. A.  We would like to challenge the second part of Conventional Wisdom

33. Scottish Free Banking: Period: 1720-1840 How did it work?: -Banks could print out paper monies, or notes as long as they do not default on redemption request of the notes for species -No government charter needed; Self regulated, competitive (free market driven) supply of money and banking practices

34. * Evaluation of the Scottish Free Banking Compared with the Contemporary British Banking Experience 1. Stability: no major bankruptcy -exception: Ayr Bank 2. Availability: more banking services per capita 3. Competition: small banks along with large ones 4. Efficiency: - spontaneous evolution of a clearing house (payment association) - Rapid propagation of information

35. *American Experiences Free Banks were viciously called “Wildcat Banks”. However, Revisionist Studies by A. Rolnick and W. Weber have proved that they were Not So Bad. Why?

36. Three Point Arguments The bank note holders(lenders) had been well informed of the true value of the assets/notes from Minnesotan Free Banks.” : Free Market is more efficient in propagating information than we might expect (Evidence: Well conversed the New York/Chicago Market Value of Government/Railway Bonds as Major Assets and Reserves of the Banks)

37. Lessons to be Learned from Free Banking Experiences Self-Regulated, Regulation-Free, Banking/Financial Industry may be Viable and even be superior.

38. 2) Securities Market without Regulation From studies on the Amsterdam Bourse of the 17th century, Edward Stringham of UC San Jose, concludes: “…In the 1600s, the first century when equities were traded, there occurred a number of financial innovations, which were out of the bound set by the government. They included short-selling, securitization and others. Contrary to the idea that the government is needed for financial innovation and contractual performance, the case of the Amsterdam Bourse provides evidence that securities markets can function successfully with little assistance from the state…..”

39. 3) Financial Crises in the 20 th Century 1980s Crisis involving Savings & Loans Companies 2000 Crisis involving Subprime Mortgage and Mortgage Backed Securities

40. Who caused the financial crisis? It is the Regulator that set out the ‘wrong’ rules and regulations, and sent out ‘wrong’ signals to the general public and the financial market. Read the article by Jeffrey Friedman, Editor, Critical Review. Full version orFull version Summary version

41. Then, what are the alternatives?

42. We all know that Information Asymmetry is an intrinsic problem to the financial industry. How can we help the Market Economy solve its own problems? What are the market-endogenous, as opposed to exogenous government intervention, solutions to Information Asymmetry?

43. 1) Information Revolution will raise information efficiency to its maximum Information Revolution may resolve Information Free Rider Problem Then there occurs a Perfect Market of Information which will (almost) resolve Information Asymmetry Insider-trading may be legalized –M. Friedman-, which will enhance information efficiency

44. 2) Mergers and Acquisitions will lead to More Information Disclosures M & A targets Firms with severe problems of Principal and Agent (a Moral Hazard), and tries to correct them. M & A process reveals Moral Hazard problems of the target firm. M & A uses Leveraged Buy Out (LBO) with bonds, and replaces equities with bonds which carry more management monitoring through restrictive covenant.

45. 3) New Forms of Financing rises for Close Management Monitoring Private Equity is complex and elusive. -What it does? One major function is Mezzanine Financing (preferred stocks, and subordinated bonds) combines Equities and Bonds with best of both worlds – Lenders can constantly and closely monitor management. -related (confusingly) with Venture Capital (relatively new), Merchant Banking (as old as in 16 th century) Japanese Banking, European Banking, and U.S. Financial Trusts(J.P. Morgan) before Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 by B. De Long - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allows Financial Holding Company to become lenders(no meddling with management) as well as share-holders( who can do management monitoring), and boosts Private Equity(Merchant Banking) - Performances in terms of Returns and Safety(Risk) are superior. - The only problem is “social equity issue” or “protection of small investors” who go alongside with giants – However, it would not be bad at all because U.S. has unique legal system to protect them: “Lender’s Liability and Equitable Surbordination”

46. We should facilitate Information Revolution, and allows for active M & As and new forms of innovative financing formats. In reality, the government often tries to suppress them. Obama-Biden’s basic tone of objection to these pro- market evolutions may be wrong. Obama-Biden’s basic tone of objection to these pro- market evolutions

47. References Read Neil Reynolds’s inspiring article on the Dutch Securities market of the 16 th Century, entitled, “Self-regulation: The Dutch had it right,” The Globe and Mail, Aug.12, 2006. Read Neil Reynolds’s inspiring article on the Dutch Securities market of the 16 th Century, entitled, “Self-regulation: The Dutch had it right,” The Globe and Mail, Aug.12, 2006. Edward Stringham, “The extralegal development of securities trading Edward Stringham, “The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century Amsterdam”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43 (2003) 321–344 J. Bradford De Long, Harvard University, “Did J. P. MORGAN’S MEN Add Value?: An Economist’s Perspective on Financial Capitalism, 1995. J. Bradford De Long, Harvard University, “Did J. P. MORGAN’S MEN Add Value?: An Economist’s Perspective on Financial Capitalism, 1995.

48. A.J.R. Rolnick and W. Weber, "New Evidence on the Free Banking Era," American Economic Review, 1983, Vol. 73, No. 5:1080-1091 A.J.R. Rolnick and W. Weber, "Explaining the Demand for Free Bank Notes," Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988, Vol. 21: 47-71.